Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Morocco
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Unitary |
Constitutional monarchy |
Bicameral |
Civil law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityThe National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption (SNLCC) 2015-2025 was adopted on 28 December 2015 by the Government. The strategy embodies Morocco’s commitment to strengthening democracy through the principles of rule of law, transparency, and accountability, while building a public integrity system capable of effectively preventing corruption. The primary objective is to reduce corruption, enhance integrity, and improve accountability to ensure more efficient public services and human development.
The National Anti-Corruption Commission (CNAC), set up in 2017, serves as the strategic steering body, responsible for supervising the overall implementation of the strategy, proposing measures to strengthen international cooperation with the aim of supporting national efforts to combat corruption, and approving annual evaluation reports. The National Authority for Integrity, Prevention, and the Fight against Corruption (INPPLC), a body established under Article 36 of the Constitution, coordinates and monitors anti-corruption policies and issues analytical reports containing recommendations to strengthen the integrity system. The Ministry of Digital Transition and Administrative Reform, involved primarily during the strategy's formulation phase, oversees its ongoing implementation and progress. In collaboration with the INPPLC, it provides training and practical guidance to public officials to strengthen their role in promoting integrity across the public administration.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for judicial integrity, prosecutorial integrity and disciplinary system are not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Morocco’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Morocco fulfils 73% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 53% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Morocco’s strategic framework for anti-corruption and public integrity, the National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption (SNLCC) 2015-2025, is structured around ten programs and 217 projects at the time of data collection and 205 projects currently. The strategy follows a phased implementation plan comprising three stages: launch (2016-2017), expansion (2018-2020), and maturity (2021-2025). The Strategy includes a situation analysis, identifying public integrity risks and referencing relevant international legal instruments on anti-corruption and integrity. Implementation is supported by an action plan that establishes a central coordination mechanism and designates lead organisations for specific actions. However, while the action plan lists activities, it does not define objectives supported by outcome-level indicators or baseline targets.
The Ministry of Digital Transition and Administrative/ Reform oversees the implementation, monitoring, and reporting of the action plan. Monitoring reports are publicly available for the 2016-2018 and 2019-2022 periods, but not thereafter. The implementation status of each activity is displayed on the SNLCC monitoring platform.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Morocco fulfils 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Morocco does not have a lobbying framework that defines lobbying actors or activities, nor is there a system for disclosing lobbying information. Currently, there is no central government supervisory authority is tasked with overseeing compliance of the lobbying framework.
Morocco fulfils one criterion related to lobbying regulations. The existing legal framework includes beneficial ownership provisions that require companies to disclose information identifying corporate owners, establish a central register, and ensure public access to this information. Law No.12-18 provides for the creation of a beneficial ownership register for legal persons and arrangements, with detailed modalities to be determined by regulation. Although a register of beneficial ownership is operational and publicly accessible, it does not grant free access to the full identity of corporate owners.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Morocco fulfils 78% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 33% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Morocco’s Constitution (Article 147 and 158) and legislation (Organic Laws 27-11, 28-11, Dahir 1.08.72, Organic Law 65-13, Law 54-06 , Organic Law 100-13, Organic Law 106-13, Dahir 1-58-008, Dahir 1.08.73 requires members of government, members of parliament, high ranking judges, top tier civil servants and public officials in high-risk positions to declare their assets. The regulatory framework (in particular Organic Law No.65-13 and, Dahir No.1-58-008) establishes incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities. However, it does not clearly define the circumstances or types of relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials, nor the sanctions applicable to members of government in the event of violations. Moreover, the framework does not specify that sanctions must be proportionate to the severity of the breach.
In practice, all members of government and 99% of members of parliament submitted asset and interest declarations for the 2018-2023 period, although data on compliance by judges and civil servants is not available. There is also no centralised electronic database for asset declarations. Since 2019, Morocco has been developing a digital platform managed by the Court of Accounts to facilitate the submission, monitoring and verification of declarations. Despite these efforts, no data has been disclosed on follow-up actions, the resolution of identified conflicts of interest, or sanctions applied for non-compliance. Almost all non-compliant asset declarations are regularised after official notification.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Morocco fulfils 100% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 100% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Morocco’s regulatory framework governing the financing of political parties is established by Organic Laws 27-11, 28-11, 29-11 and 59-11. These laws prohibit anonymous donations as well as contributions from foreign states, enterprises, and state-owned enterprises. They also set ceilings on personal contributions to electoral campaigns and require political parties to submit both annual and electoral financial reports.
In practice, all political parties have compiled with these requirements by submitting reports within statutory deadlines. The Court of Accounts publishes the reports on a user-friendly platform and holds the authority to impose sanctions on non-compliant parties in line with political finance regulations.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Morocco fulfils 78% of criteria on public information regulations, and 54% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Morocco has enacted a comprehensive access to information law that governs transparency of public information, including the right of access for non-citizens. A dedicated supervisory body, the Commission for the Right of Access to Information (CDAI), promotes transparency by guiding public access to information, issuing recommendations, and publishing annual implementation reports. In addition, the Agency for Digital Development (ADD) fulfils a central government role in advancing digital and open data initiatives.
In practice, Morocco proactively publishes several key integrity-related datasets, including government session agendas, public tender data, and land registries. However, the public does not have access to asset declarations of senior public officials (including ministers and members of parliament), aggregated data on access to public information requests or consolidated versions of laws.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityData not available
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityData not available
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsData not available
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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