Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Czechia
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Unitary |
Parliamentary |
Bicameral |
Civil law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityCzechia has adopted the Government Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2023-2026 which covers four priority areas: 1) an independent executive; 2) transparency and open access to information; 3) economical management of state property; 4) and civil society development. The Strategy is complemented by the Government’s Action Plan to Fight Corruption for 2025-2026 which provides specific measures for each of the priority areas.
The Conflict of Interests and Corruption Prevention Department of the Ministry of Justice is the central body responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Government’s Anti-Corruption Action Plan, whistleblower protection, lobbying regulation and supervising conflict-of-interest situations. Czechia has a supervisory body for open data policy (Digital and Information Agency) and an independent body for political finance (Office for the Supervision of the Finances of Political Parties and Political Movements).
The Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges provides the regulatory framework for judicial integrity in Czechia. Prosecutors are governed by the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and alongside with other high-level officials by the Act No. 159/2006 Coll., on Conflict of Interest. There also is a disciplinary procedure for civil servants established in the Czechia’s regulatory framework under Civil Service Act.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Czechia’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 60% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 73% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32% respectively.
Czechia’s Government Anti-Corruption Strategy 2023-2026 was developed on the basis of an assessment of public integrity risks, as was its predecessor strategy. The Strategy underwent an extended consultation process, which included inputs on the draft strategy by the Government Council for coordinating the fight against corruption, consisting of representatives from government, law enforcement authorities, territorial self-governing units, economic partners, professional chambers, non-profit organisations and the academic sector. However, the Strategy does not include outcome-level indicators with target values for all strategic objectives. The Strategy is complemented by an online available Action Plan which specifies a responsible authority for each of its measures. While monitoring, reporting and evaluation arrangements – as well as reports for the previous Action Plan (2023-2024) – are published online, current monitoring reports do not report progress against pre-defined indicators and targets in the Action Plan. Moreover, the Action Plan does not include financial plans for its implementation.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 60% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 44% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The adoption of the Act on Lobbying No.168/2025 represents a significant improvement in Czechia’s regulatory framework on lobbying. The Act formally defines lobbying activities and identifies lobbyists, thereby addressing the previous absence of a dedicated legal framework. Institutional oversight has been established through the designation of the Ministry of Justice as the central supervisory authority, responsible for administering the lobbying register and monitoring compliance with the Act. The establishment of a publicly accessible lobbying register further enhances transparency, allowing users to search and sort entries by lobbyist name, company or organisation or targeted legislation or regulation. However, there is no code of conduct regulating interactions between public officials and lobbying.
With regards to transparency of beneficial ownership information, the register of beneficial ownership information, the register of beneficial ownership in Czechia is no longer publicly available, following a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2020. This restriction of access has reintroduced the possibility of penalising companies that fail to register their beneficial owners despite being required to do so.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 56% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The Act on Conflict of Interest defines conflict-of-interest situations for various levels of government and include proportional sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions. They require interest declarations at the beginning, annually and at the end of public employment from members of Government, Parliament, and highest bodies of the judiciary as well as for public employees in a high-risk position. The Submission rate of interest declarations is close to 100% for members of Government, parliament, judiciary and newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants of the executive branch.
However, less than 1% of declarations filed during 2023 and 2024, respectively, were verified by the responsible authority. The Conflict of Interests and Corruption Prevention Department of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the implementation of the Act on Conflict of Interest, does not have the power to issue sanctions for non-compliance, as individual local authorities are in charge of issuing administrative penalties.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 100% on political finance regulations, and 57% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Law on Association in Political Parties and Political Movements establish the personal liability for electoral candidates who violate political finance rules, sanctions proportional to the entity of breaches and bans on anonymous donations, contributions from foreign entities as well as from publicly owned enterprises. Stringent limits on campaign expenses, comprehensive reporting requirements, and mandatory public disclosure of party finances are in place.
In practice, however, not all parties have submitted annual reports within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past five years. These are typically smaller political parties not represented in the Parliament and not receiving contributions from the state budget. While the Office for the Supervision of the Finances of Political Parties and Political Movements does not employ certified auditors on its payroll, political parties are required to have their accounts audited annually by an external certified auditor.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 78% of criteria on access to public information regulations, and 65% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Act No. 106/1999 Coll. on Free Access to Information provide that everyone, including non-citizens and legal persons, have the right to access information in all the forms available. The only restrictions to access to public information allowed are listed in the Law on Free Access and in line with the Tromsø Convention. However, information requested is not always provided free of charge. Nevertheless, Czechia’s primary legislation specifies that Government data are “open by default”. The Office for Personal Data Protection lacks competence to conduct compliance reviews under the Freedom of Information Act.
Agendas and minutes of government sessions and results of public tenders are proactively disclosed. Reforms in 2024 introduced a repository of consolidated of primary and secondary legislation that is publicly available. There are aggregated data available regarding the asset declarations of members of Parliament, members of the judiciary and senior civil servants, however the declarations are not proactively disclosed.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityFigure 7. Judicial integrity
Copy link to Figure 7. Judicial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 76% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 56% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges guarantees judges’ tenure until mandatory retirement, expiry of term, or lawful dismissal on objective grounds. The Act establishes merit-based and objective procedures for the selection of judicial candidates, and judicial councils provide recommendations on appointment. Promotions occur through transfers to higher courts based on judicial experience, regulated through internal regulations. The selection procedure and evaluation criteria for the appointment of Supreme Court judges are determined by the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court after consultation with the assembly of all judges. Decisions on judicial appointments and promotions are not subject to formal appeal.
Integrity standards for judges are defined under the Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges, and Act No. 159/2006 Coll., on Conflict of Interest. Additionally, the Supreme Court has adopted a Code of Ethics for Judges aligned with the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. Judges must submit declarations of interest upon appointment, renewal, or change of position. The Supreme Court verifies the completeness of asset declarations. While the submission rate of interest declarations from national judges and highest judicial bodies is nearly 100%, the verification rate since 2020 has remained below 60%.
Mechanisms for reporting misconduct are laid down in Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges, and the Act No. 171/2023 Coll., on the Protection of Whistleblowers. The latter requires all courts to establish internal reporting channels - which are operational in practice – and prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. Court personnel receiving whistleblower reports do not undergo mandatory training on confidentiality.
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityFigure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Figure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 90% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 68% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
In Czechia, while the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office provides merit-based and objective procedures for the selection of prosecutors, it does not set out merit-based procedures for their promotion. The Act No. 159/2006 Coll., on Conflict of Interest defines the circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors. the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office sets out sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions and regulates the dismissal of prosecutors, which is permitted only on objective grounds such as loss of citizenship, reaching retirement age, or a final disciplinary sanction. Recusal measures are set out in the Criminal Proceedings Code and the Act on Conflict of Interest requires members of the highest prosecutorial authorities to submit an interest declaration upon entry into office and upon any renewal or change in their public position. The submission rate of these declarations from highest-level prosecutorial authorities has been at least 80% over the past four years. The Criminal Proceedings Code allows appeals against prosecutorial decisions.
The Act No. 171/2023 Coll., on the Protection of Whistleblowers obliges prosecutors’ offices to establish internal reporting channels and ensure protection against retaliation. The website of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office provides information on whistleblowers’ rights, reporting procedures, and relevant contact details. It has also established a dedicated channel for reporting corruption. However, staff handling such reports are not required to undergo mandatory confidentiality training.
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsFigure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Figure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Czechia fulfils 33% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Civil Service Act defines a disciplinary offence as any breach of official duties and establishes a statute of limitations for such offences. However, the Act does not differentiate disciplinary offences according to their severity or the specific circumstances of the misconduct. The Act guarantees the right of civil servants to appeal disciplinary decisions before a judicial body once all administrative remedies have been exhausted. It also requires officials responsible for investigating and adjudicating disciplinary cases to notify judicial or law enforcement authorities if the matter involves suspected criminal conduct.
Despite these provisions, shortcomings remain in the practical implementation of the disciplinary framework. Staff members responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations do not receive dedicated training on investigative procedures. Furthermore, there is no electronic case management system for disciplinary proceedings, and data are not systematically collected on the number or types of disciplinary sanctions imposed on civil servants.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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