Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Kazakhstan
Table of contents
In 2022, the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted the Concept of Anti-Corruption Policy for 2022–2026 by presidential decree, which provides a strategic framework to prevent and combat corruption. The Concept includes an action plan and identifies lead organisations for at least each objective. Kazakhstan has dismantled the Anti-Corruption Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan (effective 30 June 2025, per the President’s decree), transferring its functions for implementing, monitoring, reporting on, and evaluating anti-corruption measures to the National Security Committee and the Agency for Civil Service Affairs.
The Election Code prohibits donations from state bodies, anonymous donors, and legal entities with foreign participation, and sets a cap on personal contributions to candidates. Access to public information is guaranteed for all, including non-citizens and legal persons, with statutory deadlines for requests. Despite this, some restrictions go beyond international standards, and requested information is not consistently provided free of charge or in an open-by-default format. The Regulation on the Commission on Access to Information contains and regulates main tasks of the Commission which is established as a supervisory body responsible for public information issues. However, to date, no central government bodies are responsible for conflict of interest or open data policy. The Central Election Commission oversees political finance. Kazakhstan has no central government body responsible for lobbying.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for judicial integrity, prosecutorial integrity and the disciplinary system are not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Data on where Kazakhstan’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Kazakhstan fulfils 47% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 43% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32% respectively.
The Concept of Anti-Corruption Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2022–2026 establishes strategic objectives to mitigate public integrity risks in key areas, including human resource management, public procurement, the private sector, public corporations, state-owned enterprises, and public-private partnerships, as well as to reduce fraud and other forms of corruption across the public sector. The Concept includes a situation analysis identifying existing public integrity risks, along with an action plan; however, it lacks outcome-level indicators and target values for the public integrity objectives.
The strategy underwent mandatory inter-institutional and public consultations, as well as an extended consultation process. The Anti-Corruption Agency previously served as the central coordinating body responsible for implementing, monitoring, reporting on and evaluating the action plan, with the role now transferred to the Agency of Civil Service Affairs. Kazakhstan reported a 100% implementation rate in 2024, completing 33 out of 34 planned activities. While this demonstrates strong follow-through on planned actions, a 100% implementation rate alone does not necessarily indicate the effectiveness or ambition of the strategy. High completion rates may reflect careful planning or limited risk-taking, and without clear, measurable, and ambitious outcomes, implementation statistics provide only a partial picture of impact.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Kazakhstan fulfils 0% of criteria on lobbying regulations and 0% on criteria regarding practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
In Kazakhstan, the legislative framework does not provide definitions of lobbying activities or lobbyists. Furthermore, existing legislation does not set out sanctions for breaches of transparency and integrity standards that are proportionate to the severity of the offence. The Rules of Rendering State Services in the Sphere of State Registration of Legal Entities and Record Registration of Branches and Representative Offices do not require beneficial ownership information to be publicly accessible. Accordingly, the register of beneficial ownership of corporate entities is not available online.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Kazakhstan fulfils 44% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
In Kazakhstan, the Law on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan defines conflict-of-interest situations and establishes responsibility for civil servants to manage them. The Law on Combating Corruption establishes an obligation for persons covered by its provisions to submit two types of declarations: a declaration of assets and liabilities, and a declaration of assets and income. The form and structure of these declarations are determined in accordance with the Tax Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Current regulations do not, however, require members of the Government, Parliament, or the highest judicial bodies, as well as public officials in high-risk positions and senior civil servants within the executive branch, to submit a declaration of interests upon renewal or change of public office. The Law on Combating Corruption further provides for the administrative liability of public officials in cases where discrepancies are identified between declared income and expenditures, in accordance with the provisions of the Code on Administrative Offences.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Kazakhstan fulfils 60% of criteria on political finance on regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
In Kazakhstan, the Election Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan prohibits anonymous donations from individuals and legal entities, as well as from foreign states or enterprises and publicly owned enterprises. The Election Code also establishes a ceiling for personal contributions to candidates’ own election campaigns. However, the regulatory framework does not require political parties to disclose information on all contributions, including those exceeding a fixed threshold.
The Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan is responsible for overseeing the financing of political parties and election campaigns; however, its members are appointed and may be removed by the President, and financial accountability is channelled through the state budget rather than directly to Parliament. In addition, the Commission does not have the authority to conduct independent audits of political party finances and has no certified auditors on its payroll. Its oversight role is also primarily focused on electoral periods, without a clear mandate for continuous monitoring during non-electoral periods. While political parties must disclose financial statements by publishing them in national print media, they are not required by law to submit annual accounts or financial reports to the Central Election Commission. Parties’ financial statements are therefore not available on a single online platform in a user-friendly format, thereby limiting the accessibility and usability of this information for the public.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Kazakhstan fulfils 56% of criteria on access to public information regulations and 31% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
In Kazakhstan, the Constitution and the Law on Access to Information establish that all public institutions, as well as private entities performing public functions, are considered holders of public information, and that everyone, including non-citizens and legal persons, has the right to access information in all available forms. These instruments require information holders to provide information in the format requested, without requiring applicants to justify their requests, and set statutory deadlines for processing requests for information. However, the legislation does not provide an exhaustive list of possible restrictions, and some of the existing limitations go beyond the standards set by the Tromsø Convention.
In addition, requested information is not consistently provided free of charge, and primary legislation does not specify that government data are “open by default”. At the same time, Kazakhstan makes consolidated versions of all primary laws, as well as information on public tenders announced and awarded by the central government, available on a single website. However, government agendas are not made publicly available online prior to sessions, ministers’ agendas are not publicly available, and state budget data for the current and most recent full calendar years are also unavailable. Moreover, aggregated data on information requests, the company registry, and salaries of individual senior civil servants are not accessible on ministries’ websites or government portals.
Data not available
Data not available
Data not available
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
© OECD 2026
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. By using this work, you accept to be bound by the terms of this licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Attribution – you must cite the work.
Translations – you must cite the original work, identify changes to the original and add the following text: In the event of any discrepancy between the original work and the translation, only the text of the original work should be considered valid.
Adaptations – you must cite the original work and add the following text: This is an adaptation of an original work by the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this adaptation should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its Member countries.
Third-party material – the licence does not apply to third-party material in the work. If using such material, you are responsible for obtaining permission from the third party and for any claims of infringement.
You must not use the OECD logo, visual identity or cover image without express permission or suggest the OECD endorses your use of the work.
Any dispute arising under this licence shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Arbitration Rules 2012. The seat of arbitration shall be Paris (France). The number of arbitrators shall be one.