Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Netherlands
Table of contents
In the Netherlands the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations is responsible for promoting public integrity and the prevention of corruption, while the Ministry of Justice and Security is responsible for combatting corruption. Current strategic objectives for public integrity are set by the Parliamentary Letter of 20 June 2025.
The Netherlands has no single entity for monitoring conflict-of-interest situations across the public sector, as this is the responsibility of each individual government employer (Civil Servants Act 2017). Senior civil servants’ interests are supervised by the Compliance Officer of the Top Management Group. The Netherlands has no single entity supervising lobbying. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations oversees the financing of political parties and has the mandate to impose fines for breaches of political finance regulations. Furthermore, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is advised by the Commission for supervision of finances of political parties. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is the government institution responsible for open data and freedom of information policies. The Advisory Board on Openness and Information Management monitors the implementation of public information disclosure.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Netherland’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
The Netherlands fulfils 60% of OECD criteria on the strength of its strategic framework and 33% for implementation in practice, compared to the OECD average of 40% and 33% respectively.
The Netherlands’ strategic framework on integrity is outlined in two parliamentary letters (25 April 2023 and 20 June 2025), in which the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations presented the strategic directions for integrity measures at both the national and decentralised levels to the House of Representatives. The 2023 letter prioritises as strategic objectives clearer standards and frameworks on integrity, the standardisation of rules, and better support on integrity for political office holders. Amongst other issues, the 2025 letter empowers ministries to design sector-specific anti-corruption measures. However, while the 2025 letter prioritises a national risk assessment as a strategic priority, neither letters were based on a formal risk assessment, nor do they contain outcome level indicators for strategic objectives. Finally, neither of the letters were subject to public consultation.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
As measured against OECD standards on lobbying, the Netherlands fulfils 40% of criteria on regulations and 33% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 44% and 39%, respectively.
In the Netherlands there is no designated entity responsible for supervising lobbying activities. Safeguards against high-risk situations in interactions with external parties rely on codes of conduct applicable to ministers, members of Parliament, central government civil servants and lobbyists. Previously, registration tools for lobbyists were not publicly accessible, and the lobbying register was published only for the lower chamber of Parliament, the Tweede Kamer. Now, registration tools for lobbyists are publicly accessible, and the lobbying register is available online to everyone. Moreover, in October 2025, the Act on Rules for Integrity and Follow-up Positions of Government Officials introduced mandatory two-year cooling-off periods for former ministers, requiring them to seek prior approval from an advisory board before accepting post-public employment. The Act further prohibits former ministers from engaging in employment or business relations with their former ministry or civil servants with whom they had close professional contact.
Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
The Netherlands fulfils 78% of criteria on conflicts of interest regulations, compared to the OECD average of 80%. At the same time, it fulfils 22% of criteria on practice, while the OECD average is 42%.
In the Netherlands, members of the Government, members of Parliament, judges, and central government civil servants must submit interest declarations. While procedures for the submission and verification of interest declarations for different categories of officials are established in various regulations, there is no centralised requirement for a risk-based approach in verifying the content of these declarations. Declaration submission rates were 100% for both members of the Government and Parliament over the past six years and were above 90% for both judges and high-level civil servants over the past four years. However, there is no data available on the rate of verification of declarations, whether any recommendations for resolution were issued, or whether sanctions for breaches were applied.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
As measured against OECD standards on political finance, the Netherlands fulfils 70% of criteria for regulations, and 57% of criteria for practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
In the Netherlands there is no ban on political contributions from state owned enterprises and no ceiling for campaign expenses. However, legislative changes in 2023 introduced a ban on contributions from foreign states and enterprises and a maximum threshold on personal contributions to election campaigns of €100 000. While there is a dedicated entity overseeing political finance, the Commission for supervision of finance of political parties, it is an advisory body and does not employ certified auditors or issue sanctions for non-compliance. The Commission does not have independence in budgetary and recruitment decisions and is dependent on the Ministry of the Interior in these matters. The Political Parties Act has been submitted to the Dutch parliament and will establish an independent Authority for Political Parties, to replace the Commission, with responsibility for supervising political finance. Financial reports of all political parties represented in parliament are available online. However, while most were submitted by statutory deadlines over the past five years, full compliance has not been consistently achieved.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
As measured against OECD standards on public information, which include access to information and open data, the Netherlands fulfils 78% of criteria for regulations and 73% of criteria for practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 63%, respectively.
The Netherlands has a strong access to information law - the Open Government Act - which establishes a right to access information in all forms available and that information must be provided completely free of charge. The Netherlands is one of the top performers among OECD countries in terms of the availability of key integrity-related datasets. Consolidated versions of primary laws, government sessions and agendas, the national budget, comments provided during public consultations, and conflict of interest declarations of elected officials, judges and top civil servants are all publicly available. Moreover, the Advisory Board on Openness and Information Management, monitors the implementation of public information disclosure, although it cannot issue sanctions for non-compliance.
Since 2023, the government has also included information on how it handles public information requests under the former Public Access to Government Information Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur, in force until 1 May 2022) and the current Open Government Act (Wet open overheid, in force from 1 May 2022) in the Annual Report on Central Government Operations (Jaarrapportage Bedrijfsvoering Rijk), published by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
In addition, in January 2025 the Ministry launched the “OGA in numbers” (Woo in cijfers) dashboard. which publishes updated quarterly data on how ministries process Woo requests. This dashboard provides quarterly updates on how ministries process Woo requests, including the number of objections, legal proceedings, and penalty payments, as well as the amounts involved.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
The Netherlands fulfils 68% of criteria for regulations on judicial integrity and 40% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The Law on the Legal Status of Judicial Officials guarantees judges tenure until mandatory retirement, the expiry of their term, or lawful dismissal, which is permitted only on objective grounds such as resignation, illness, loss of Dutch nationality, or conviction for a criminal offence. The Law on the Legal Status of Judicial Officials, together with the Judicial Organisation Act, regulates the selection, appointment, and promotion of judges. Under this framework, judges are appointed by the King upon a technical recommendation by the Minister of Justice and the substantive decision rests with the independent Judicial Selection Committee and the Council for the Judiciary. Although there is no legal requirement ensuring that the Minister of Justice abides by their recommendations, in practice no departures have occurred when submitting nominations to the King. Supreme Court judges are appointed by Parliament. Although candidates may appeal the initial assessment decisions of court boards under the General Administrative Law (Awb), this right does not extend to later stages involving the Council for the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, or the formal appointment by Royal Decree. These bodies are not legally bound by court boards’ recommendations, and their decisions are not subject to judicial review. There are, however, safeguards in place to ensure judicial independence and fairness in the later stages of the process.
Standards of conduct are set out in the Law on the Legal Status of Judicial Officials, the Judiciary Code of Conduct, and the Judicial Impartiality Guidelines. Judges are required to declare only their secondary activities, but not a full interest declaration. While legislation introducing mandatory asset declarations has been adopted by the House of Representatives, it has not yet entered into force. The Internal Reporting Scheme for Suspected Malpractice in the Judiciary establishes a dedicated internal channel for reporting misconduct and prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. There is no legal requirement for court personnel handling such reports to complete confidentiality training.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
The Netherlands fulfils 55% of criteria for regulations on prosecutorial integrity and 63% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The Code of Conduct for the Public Prosecution Service and the Code of Conduct for Civil Servants define circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest for prosecutors and sets out objective grounds for their dismissal. Although a range of sanctions exists for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions, the regulations do not require that sanctions vary according to the severity of the offence. The Code of Conduct for the Public Prosecution Service also requires prosecutors to recuse themselves in cases of conflict of interest, allocates institutional responsibilities for resolving conflicts, and permits appeals against prosecutorial decisions.
No specific merit-based procedures (e.g. exams or interviews) for the selection and promotion of prosecutors are established in law. The legal framework also does not provide candidates with the right to appeal decisions concerning selection, appointment, or promotion, and not all prosecutorial vacancies are publicly advertised.
The Public Prosecutor’s Reporting Regulation, adopted under the Whistleblower Protection Act, requires prosecutors’ offices to establish internal reporting channels and ensures protection against retaliation. However, while whistleblower cases are handled by the same staff member throughout the process, there is no mandatory confidentiality training for those managing such reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
The Netherlands fulfils 42% of criteria for regulations on disciplinary systems for civil servants and 0% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Civil Service Act and the Central Government Collective Labour Agreement establish the disciplinary framework for civil servants, defining a disciplinary offence as any breach of official duties. The regulations guarantee the right to appeal disciplinary decisions before a judicial body once administrative remedies have been exhausted. The Act further requires officials responsible for investigating and adjudicating disciplinary cases to report suspected criminal conduct to the judiciary or law enforcement authorities.
Although the regulations specify the circumstances under which disciplinary proceedings or suspensions may be initiated and require that sanctions be proportionate to misconduct, they do not provide for a differentiated range of sanctions for various types of disciplinary offences. In addition, staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations do not receive specialised training on investigative procedures.
While the government publishes annual reports on its operations, these do not include data or statistics on disciplinary proceedings.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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