Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Spain
Table of contents
The State Plan to Combat Corruption is Spain’s first anti-corruption strategy adopted at the level of government (in August 2025). A Public Integrity Organic Draft Law introducing the legal changes necessary to implement this Strategy was approved by the Council of Ministers on 17 February 2026, and will be submitted to the Parliament to continue its legislative process. The strategy is structured around five pillars and includes strategic objectives to mitigate integrity risks on human resource management, public financial management, public procurement, internal control and the private sector. Royal Decree No.711/2025 created an Inter-Ministerial Commission to direct, promote, and coordinate the activities of the State Plan.
While there is no central body responsible for mitigating public integrity risks in lobbying, the Office of the Conflicts of Interest is responsible for the keeping and management of the Registers of Activities and Assets and Patrimonial Rights of senior officials of the General State Administration, and examining the compliance with the regulatory framework in terms of conflicts of interest, as well as the incompatibilities regime for all personnel at the service of Public Administrations. Furthermore, the Data Office of the State Secretariat for Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence of the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Civil Service is responsible for the open data policy and the monitoring function, while the Council for Transparency and Good Governance is the autonomous and independent supervisory body responsible for public information. The Department of Political Parties, under the Court of Auditors, which is the Supreme Audit Institution, has the specific mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns.
The aforementioned Public Integrity Organic Draft Law would consolidate various of these functions under a newly created and independent Agency for Public Integrity which, amongst others, would integrate the competencies of the Office for Conflicts of Interest; the Independent Authority for Informants’ Protection, and the National Anti-fraud Service.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Data on where Spain’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Spain fulfils 53% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The State Plan to Combat Corruption has extensive coverage through its strategic objectives. It includes a situation analysis which identifies the current public integrity risks the country is facing. However, the State Plan does not have an action plan in force, although one is currently under development. As the strategy was adopted very recently, no monitoring reports on its implementation are available.
While the State Plan itself was not submitted for public consultation, all of its elements were included in the Public Integrity Organic Draft Law, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 17 February 2026, which was submitted to a two-stage public consultation process, as required by Spanish legislation and for which information is available in a dedicated website. The Draft Law included the creation of an Independent Agency for Public Integrity, as well as reforms to the judiciary, the Criminal Code and political financing rules. An ex-post public consultation on the Draft Law, as approved by the Council of Ministers, was launched on 18 February 2026 for a 15-day period.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Spain fulfils 40% of criteria on lobbying regulations and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
While Law 3/2015 establishes cooling-off periods for public officials leaving office, there are no regulations on lobbying, and no register on lobbying. Beneficial ownership rules are established in Order JUS/319/2018 and make mandatory the disclosure of company data to identify owners of corporations. Spain is in the process of developing legislation aiming to regulate interest groups (lobbyists) and increase transparency of lobbying activities through the creation of a lobbying register.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Spain fulfils 89% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations and is a top performer on practice, fulfilling 89% of criteria, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Law 3/2015 lists incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities, defines the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials, and establishes the institutional responsibilities and procedures governing the submission, compliance, and content verification of interest declarations. Any member of the government, parliament, the highest bodies of the judiciary, and newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servant of the executive branch must submit an interest declaration as a minimum upon entry and any renewal or change in public office. However, not all public officials in high-risk positions, such as chiefs of staff of members of the Cabinet, are subject to this obligation.
In practice, all members of the government and members of the parliament have submitted interest declarations for the past six years, and all newly appointed top-tier civil servants submitted interest declarations in the past four years. Furthermore, all the declarations filed during the last two calendar years were verified by the Office of Conflicts of Interest, and the Office issues recommendations each time a conflict-of-interest case is detected.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Spain fulfils 70% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 43% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The Organic Law 8/2007, as significantly amended by Organic Law 3/2015 establishes sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations in proportion to the severity of the offence, ban contributions to political parties from publicly owned enterprises, foreign enterprises, and foreign states. Furthermore, all political parties must report their finances during electoral campaigns, and make financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling. However, the regulatory framework does not provide for broader bans on the use of public funds and resources in favour or against a political party.
In terms of practice, the Court of Auditors has the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns, has certified auditors on its payroll, and has published reports and rulings with information on number of cases related to breaches of political finance regulations, number of investigations conducted, and a breakdown of the different types of sanctions issued. However, not all political parties submitted their annual accounts within the timelines defined by national legislation in 2023, and others did not submit them in 2024. Further, the accounts related to elections and the financial reports from all political parties are not publicly available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Spain fulfils 89% of criteria on access to public information regulations, and 81% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Law 19/2013 establishes that everyone, including legal persons and non-citizens, has the right to access information in all forms, and the only restrictions to access to public information allowed are listed by law and in line with the Tromsø convention. Furthermore, there are statutory deadlines for processing requests for information, and information holders are required to provide information in the requested format. In practice, consolidated versions of all laws, the state budget, the results of the last national elections, government legislative proposals, government session agendas, ministers’ agendas, the land registry, the salaries of individual senior civil servants, and public tenders announced by central government and their results are all accessible on the respective government websites. Most asset and interest declarations are disclosed publicly, except those of the Supreme Court Judges.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Spain fulfils 88% of criteria for judicial integrity regulations and 64% for practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Article 117 of Spain’s Constitution establishes that members of the judiciary are “independent, irremovable, accountable and subject only to the rule of law”. Guaranteed tenure for judges and objective grounds for their dismissal are set in Spain's General Law on the Judiciary (LOPJ). The General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) is the body charged with deciding on the appointment and promotion of judges. The Council is an independent body according to OECD standards. The LOPJ establishes that the selection and promotion of judges must be based on merit-based, objective procedures, including examinations.
A list of ethical principles for members of the judiciary was adopted by the CGPJ, which, in addition to LOPJ, outlines a list of incompatibilities to be observed by judges and the situations that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations. While Decree No.249/1996 regulates incompatibilities and private activities for court employees, it does not specifically define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for them. The LOPJ establishes that only the members of the highest bodies of the judiciary are obliged to submit interest declarations. While the declarations of all members of the CGPJ are available online, the interest declarations of Supreme Court judges are not public. Moreover, there is no data on the number of declarations verified by the responsible authority, the Office of Conflicts of Interest, during the latest full calendar year.
An internal whistle-blower reporting channel that allows individuals to report misconduct is in place for members of the judiciary and legal protections against retaliation for whistleblowers are established in Law 2/2023. The website of the reporting channel contains information on whistleblowers’ rights, the procedures for reporting misconduct, and the contact details for reporting. Although courses on confidentiality are offered to staff handling reports in courts, these trainings are not mandatory.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Spain fulfils 76% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 74% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The Law No.50/1981 on the Public Prosecutor's Office or EOMF, alongside the LOPJ, establish the integrity safeguards for the prosecutorial system. These regulations set objective grounds for the dismissal of prosecutors, establish merit-based, objective procedures for their selection and promotion, and grant the right of candidates to appeal appointment decisions. They also define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors, and the circumstances that could lead to the recusal of prosecutors.
A code of ethics developed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office is applicable to all prosecutors, which includes various principles and standards of conduct in areas such as conflicts of interest, relations with the media, and intervention in criminal procedures. However, prosecutors are not obliged to submit interest declarations.
Prosecutors have access to an internal reporting channel for whistleblowers, which includes information on the procedures for reporting misconduct and whistleblowers’ rights. Although courses on confidentiality are offered to staff handling reports in public prosecutors’ offices, these trainings are not mandatory.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Spain fulfils 92% of criteria on disciplinary system for civil servants’ regulations, but only 17% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 22%, respectively.
In Spain, the Basic Statue of the Public Employee (EBEP), complemented by other regulations, establishes the disciplinary framework for civil servants. This regulatory framework defines what constitutes as a disciplinary offence, establishes a disciplinary procedure for public servants, and sets a range of disciplinary sanctions for each type of offence. Disciplinary decisions can be appealed in front of an administrative court after exhausting the administrative remedies.
No central government body has provided guidelines on the standardisation of disciplinary procedures, but a training course on how to conduct disciplinary investigations is offered to officials by the National Institute of Public Administration. An electronic case management system to manage disciplinary cases and proceedings is not in place.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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