Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Serbia
Table of contents
The National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption (NSFAC) 2024-2028, adopted in July 2024 by the Government of Serbia, aims to enhance existing mechanisms and develop new systemic tools to prevent corruption at all levels, increase public awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption, and create conditions for more effective detection, prosecution, and sanctioning of corrupt activities. The Working Body of the Government, a political mechanisms, has been established to oversee, coordinate and monitor the National Strategy and its Action Plan’s implementation. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption provides technical and administrative coordination, monitoring the completion of activities from the Action Plan, collecting data on their implementation from all state authorities, and assessing overall progress. Within the Agency, a dedicated unit from the Sector for International Cooperation, National Strategic Documents, Plans, and Projects is tasked with monitoring and evaluating national anti-corruption strategies.
The Agency further ensures compliance with conflict-of-interest regulations in accordance with Law No.35/19 on Prevention of Corruption and coordinates the implementation of Law No.87/18 on Lobbying. The Agency’s mandate also includes overseeing the financing of political parties and election campaigns by publishing annual and electoral financial reports and imposing sanctions in case of violations of the Law No.14/22 on Financing of Political Activities. Two institutions share the mandate to mitigate public integrity risks within the field of transparency of public information. The Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection is the competent institution for monitoring and processing requests for public access to information, whereas the Administrative Inspectorate of the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government safeguards the right to access by conducting inspections and imposing sanctions when public entities fail to comply with the relevant regulations.
The High Judicial Council (HCJ) appoints judges following a merit-based selection procedure. Similarly, prosecutors are permanently appointed by the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC), while the Supreme Public Prosecutor is elected by the National Assembly upon the HPC’s proposal. The Law on Civil Servants outlines the disciplinary procedure for civil servants, but the use of digital technologies to manage disciplinary cases and facilitate the proactive disclosure of statistics about the disciplinary system is limited.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Serbia’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 73% on the strength of strategic framework, and 77% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The 2024-2028 National Strategy for the Fight Against Corruption (NSFAC) is structured around five key objectives: 1) Enhancing the regulatory framework; 2) Strengthening institutional capacity; 3) Improving transparency; 4) Reinforcing integrity in the public sector; 5) Raising public awareness of corruption. Each objective is supported by specific measures. The Strategy includes a situation analysis of current public integrity risks and references relevant international legal instruments on anti-corruption.
The implementation of the strategy is supported by the 2024-2025 Action Plan. The Action Plan includes objectives with dedicated outcome level indicators, baseline targets and a list of activities, and references administrative data sources from existing public registries. However, it does not outline the monitoring, reporting, and evaluation arrangements.
The Implementation of the action plan will be monitored and evaluated by the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. Under the previous strategy (2020-2023), the Agency published four annual implementation reports. The most recent report, covering 2023, assessed progress against pre-defined indicators and targets in the action plan.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 80% of the criteria on lobbying regulations, and 56% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Currently, Law No. 87/18 on Lobbying includes definitions of lobbying activities and lobbyists, and establishes a mandatory cooling-off period for several categories of public officials, including elected and appointed officials and other public employees. However, it does not prescribe a cooling-off period for lobbyists. The law further defines a range of sanctions depending on the severity of the offence. While a Code of Conduct for Lobbying Participants exists, it lacks practical examples of at-risk behaviours or situations. The publicly available lobbying register provides information on the names of lobbyists and their organisations, but does not disclose details on the domain of intervention, targeted legislation, or lobbying expenditures. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption coordinates the implementation of the law and is responsible for overseeing lobbying activities, conducting investigations into non-compliance, and ensuring adherence to lobbying regulations.
A publicly accessible register of beneficial ownership provides information on the ownership structures of companies, entrepreneurs, associations, and joint stock companies.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 89% of criteria on conflict of interest regulations, and 56% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Serbia’s Law No.35/19 on Prevention of Corruption mandates the submission of asset and interest declarations for all elected and appointed officials, judges and civil servants. The regulatory framework also establishes incompatibilities between public functions and private activities (Law No.79/05 on civil servants) and prescribes a range of sanctions depending on the severity of violations (Law No.35/19 and 88/19). The submission rate of interest declarations from ministers for the past six years (2019-2023) is 77%, and the submission rate of interest declarations from members of the National Assembly through the declaration portal is only 66% for the past six years (2017-2023).
As of 2023, the submission rate for high-ranking judges stood at 82% in line with OECD standards. There is no explicit requirement for a risk-based approach in selecting declarations for verification; however, the Agency for Prevention of Corruption has developed a methodology for preparing the annual verification plan based on risk assessment principles.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 43% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Law No.14/22 on Financing of Political Activities prohibits anonymous donations and contributions from foreign states, enterprises, and state-owned enterprises. Legal entities may contribute to a political entity up to 30 average monthly salaries, while political entities are required to publish, on their website, any contribution (donation) exceeding one average monthly salary. The law mandates the publication of annual financial statements, and political parties must make financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling. However, there is no ceiling on electoral campaign expenditures for political parties, candidates, and third parties.
In practice, the submission rate of annual and electoral financial reports of political parties ranges between 50-74% for the past five years. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption publishes annual and electoral financial reports on a user-friendly digital platform and has the authority to sanction parties that fail to comply with political finance regulations.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 56% of criteria on access to public information regulations, and 69% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Serbia has a comprehensive legal framework governing public information transparency, including the right of access to information for non-citizens. Law No.120/04 on Free Access to Information of Public Importance designates the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection as the authority responsible for overseeing public access to information. While the Commissioner processes access to information requests, the Office for Information Technologies and Electronic Administration is responsible for open data policy. Additionally, the Administrative Inspectorate of the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government has the mandate to conduct inspections and impose sanctions on public entities that fail to comply with access to information regulations.
In practice, Serbia proactively publishes key integrity-related datasets, including consolidated versions of all primary laws, government session agendas, data on public tenders, business and land registries, and asset declarations. However, aggregated data on access to information requests and detailed individual ministerial agendas are not published. When it comes to public availability of data on lobbying, the lobbying register includes information on lobbyists and lobbying activities, but data on the identity and field of action of interest representatives met by members of Government and members of Parliament are not aggregated.
Note: 2025 data. Data for Serbia on judicial integrity regulations were assessed in December 2025, thus not reflecting the amendments of the Law on Amendments to the Law on Judges adopted on 30 January 2026 ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 9/2026).
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Serbia fulfils 97% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 64% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively. Against the backdrop of low public confidence and international guidance for reforms, for the past decade, Serbia has worked on improving its regulatory and institutional framework for the judiciary, including on integrity.
The Constitution of Serbia and the Law on Judges establish merit-based procedures for the selection and promotion of judges, including standardised exams and interviews, led by the High Judicial Council (HCJ), and set out objective grounds for dismissal. Selection decisions must be reasoned and are subject to appeal at the Constitutional Court. Judges are permanently appointed by the HCJ, which is composed of eleven members, including six judges and the President of the Supreme Court. The Law on the High Judicial Council provides members’ selection criteria and reasons for their removal.
The Code of Ethics for Judges provides ethical principles governing judicial conduct. The Law on Judges and the Law on the Prevention of Corruption set rules for managing conflicts of interest and require judges to submit asset and interest declarations upon entry and any renewal or change in public office. Declarations are verified by the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption based on an annual risk-based verification plan and are publicly available on the Agency’s website. Violations of these obligations are subject to disciplinary and financial sanctions.
Persons reporting judicial misconduct are protected under the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, which provides whistleblower protections, but internal reporting channels are not yet operational in courts.
Note: 2025 data. Data for Serbia on prosecutorial integrity regulations were assessed in December 2025, thus not reflecting the amendments of the Law on Amendments to the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s office adopted on 30 January 2026 ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 9/2026).
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 93% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 63% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively. Against the backdrop of low public confidence and international guidance for reforms, for the past decade, Serbia has worked on improving its regulatory and institutional framework for prosecutors, including on integrity.
The Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office establishes merit-based procedures for the selection of ordinary public prosecutors and the Supreme Public Prosecutor, including public competitions. Generally, prosecutors are permanently appointed by the High Prosecutorial Council (HPC), while the Supreme Public Prosecutor is elected by the National Assembly upon the HPC’s proposal. Appointment decisions must be reasoned and are subject to appeal at the Constitutional Court. The law specifies reasons for dismissing prosecutors, with decisions made by the HPC, which initiates and conducts disciplinary proceedings.
The Code of Ethics for Public Prosecutors defines standards for prosecutorial conduct. The Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Law on the Prevention of Corruption regulate conflicts of interest and require the submission of interest and asset declarations upon entry and any change in public office. Declarations are verified by the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption based on an annual risk-based verification plan and are publicly available online. Violations of these obligations are subject to disciplinary and financial sanctions.
The Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers establishes protections for persons reporting prosecutorial misconduct and internal reporting channels, but these are not yet operational in public prosecutors’ offices.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Serbia fulfils 75% of criteria for regulations on disciplinary systems for civil servants, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average is 63% and 22%, respectively.
The Law on Civil Servants outlines the disciplinary procedure for civil servants, defining minor and serious offences and a range of sanctions depending on the severity of the offence. Disciplinary decisions are subject to judicial review. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, if a disciplinary investigation reveals signs of a criminal offence, officials responsible for disciplinary cases must notify the relevant law enforcement agency.
In practice, there is no electronic management system for disciplinary cases and procedures and public availability of data on these procedures and sanctions is limited.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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