Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Denmark
Table of contents
While Denmark does not have a dedicated strategy with defined objectives specifically targeting corruption prevention and the enhancement of public integrity, key elements of the integrity framework are embedded across several legislative instruments. In particular, the Public Administration Act addresses conflicts of interest for public officials and is reinforced by the general legal principle of impartiality. The Act on Openness in Administration regulates access to information, while the Public Sector Information Law, which implements the European Open Data Directive, establishes the legal framework for the re-use of public sector information. Its implementation, including the management of the National Data Portal, falls under the Danish Agency for Digital Government.
Institutional responsibilities for integrity and anti-corruption are likewise distributed across government. The Employee and Competence Agency under the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office promote integrity standards for civil servants and ministers, while the Ministry of Justice coordinates cooperation among national authorities in developing anti-corruption measures. In certain areas, such as political finance and lobbying, oversight arrangements remain decentralised, and no additional strategic documents have been adopted since 2020. The Employee and Competence Agency is responsible for developing and publishing key regulatory documents, including the Civil Servants Act and the Code of Conduct in the public sector. Through these documents, the Agency establishes ethical standards, administrative procedures, and the handling of disciplinary matters for public employees.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for prosecutorial integrity is not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Denmark’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 0% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Denmark does not have a dedicated strategy to prevent corruption or strengthen public integrity. Executive Order No.116 of 2018 included a primary objective to address integrity risks through internal control and risk management; however, it does not constitute a comprehensive strategy. The Order does not provide a situation analysis identifying existing public integrity risks, includes no outcome-level indicators to assess progress, and contains no action plan to support implementation. Having a strategic framework based on evidence and outlining objectives and priorities is essential to mitigate corruption risks in the public sector.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 0% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
In Denmark lobbying actors and activities are not regulated by law. There is no mandatory cooling-off period for public officials or lobbyists, and no central supervisory body responsible for ensuring transparency in lobbying. Moreover, a publicly accessible lobbying register disclosing information on lobbyists, their activities, and policy areas is not in place, which constrains transparency in the policy-making process.
The slight decline in lobbying transparency is linked to recent amendments to the Act on the Central Business Register, which limits access to the beneficial ownership register to persons with a legitimate interest. While beneficial ownership data continue to be collected and maintained, the restriction on public accessibility reduces the level of openness previously ensured through full public access.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 33% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 33% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The regulatory framework outlines the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of interest situations for public officials. All members of parliament are required to submit an interest declaration; however, this obligation does not extend to members of the highest judicial bodies, public employees in high-risk positions, or top-tier civil servants in the executive branch.
Declarations are submitted electronically, but they are not reviewed according to a risk-based approach, and there is no central data on the number of declarations that have been verified by the responsible authority. Broadening the scope of disclosure requirements to cover additional high-risk categories and verification procedures could further strengthen the overall effectiveness of the conflict-of-interest framework.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 30% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 14% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Denmark’s Political Parties Funding Act establishes sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations, including the possibility for electoral candidates to be held personally liable. Political parties are also required to make their financial reports publicly available. However, there are no restrictions on anonymous donations below DKK 22 200 (€3 000), nor on contributions from foreign states or enterprises, or publicly owned enterprises. Moreover, political parties are not required to report their finances during electoral campaigns. Improving the coverage and level of detail in financial disclosures could further support transparency and accountability in political finance.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 67% on public information regulations, and 38% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% of criteria and 62%, respectively.
Denmark’s regulatory framework for access to information and open data, primarily the Act on Openness in Administration, guarantees access to information for all individuals. It defines the grounds for restrictions in line with the Tromso Convention, sets statutory deadlines for processing requests, does not require justification from the requesters, and provides for appeal to an impartial external body or court.
Progress in this area reflects developments in the open data framework. While the Act on Openness in Administration does not establish a list of datasets for proactive disclosure, the Public Sector Information Law provides for the identification and mandatory publication of high-value datasets in line with EU open data rules.
A broad range of key datasets relevant to public integrity is publicly accessible, including the state budget, election results, public tenders and outcomes, land registries, and the salaries of top-level civil servants. However, some important datasets remain unavailable, such as consolidated laws, ministerial and cabinet agendas, asset and interest declarations, and aggregated data on access-to-information requests.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 41% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 32% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Section 62 of Denmark’s Constitutional Act guarantees the principle of judicial independence. The Procedural Code (the Administration of Justice Act) establishes that judges are appointed by the King upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice, following advice from the Judicial Appointments Council. The procedure includes a public recruitment process and a suitability assessment, but it does not legally require, as a minimum, standardised written exams or panel interviews, nor does it provide for the possibility of appeal. The Judicial Appointments Council is composed of six members serving non-renewable four-year terms. Half of its members are judges, and all are appointed by the Ministry of Justice based on nominations from different institutions. However, the legal framework does not contemplate criteria for the removal of Council members.
The Procedural Code includes rules on recusal, incompatibilities and secondary employment. However, there is no definition or enumeration of circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest for judges outside the procedure of a specific case, nor are there standards of conduct and ethical behaviour applicable to all judges. Judges are also not required to submit interest declarations.
Judges have constitutionally guaranteed tenure. Under Section 64 of the Constitutional Act, judges cannot be dismissed except by judgement and cannot be transferred against their will, except in such cases where a rearrangement of the courts of justice is made. Judges over 65 may be retired without loss of income up until their normal retirement date. According to the Civil Servants Act judges have a mandatory retirement age of 70. Dismissal is regulated in the Procedural Code in cases of serious disciplinary offences following a disciplinary procedure involving the Special Court of Indictment and Revision. Internal reporting channels for judicial misconduct are available under the Whistleblowing Protection Act, which provides safeguards against retaliation. In practice, an internal reporting channel has been established by the Danish Court Administration, which includes information on whistleblowers’ rights and contact details of the reporting channel.
Data to be provided
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Denmark fulfils 67% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Regulations define disciplinary offences and provide a graduated range of sanctions proportionate to the severity of the offence. However, they do not establish statutes of limitations. Civil servants have the right to appeal disciplinary decisions to a judicial body after exhausting administrative remedies, but there is no regulatory provision requiring investigators to refer cases involving criminal behaviour to law enforcement or judicial authorities.
Training is not systematically provided to staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations. The Danish Employee and Competence Agency provides guidance and advisory support in this area. An electronic case management system for disciplinary proceedings is not established at the central government level. Instead, individual employers use their own internal case management system. Data on cases initiated, concluded, or appealed by offence type, as well as on the number and types of sanctions applied, are not regularly published. While certain related information may be available through broader public sector reports or statistics, comprehensive and consolidated data covering disciplinary proceedings across central government bodies are not maintained in a single public database.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, Series Title, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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