Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Hungary
Table of contents
Hungary adopted the Medium-Term National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2024–2025), and its corresponding action plans by Government Resolution No. 1025/2024. The Ministry of Interior, in cooperation with the National Protection Service, coordinates implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation.
The regulatory framework provides for public participation in law-making, including consultation processes and strategic partnership agreements. It also establishes conflict-of-interest rules for public functions, notably under the Act on Government Administration (2018), and regulates political finance primarily through the Act on the Transparency of Campaign Costs (2013). Hungary also maintains a framework for access to public information, with central government websites providing a range of publicly accessible data.
The Fundamental Law of Hungary and Act CLXII of 2011 provide the framework for judicial integrity. The National Judicial Council plays a central role in judicial appointments and career progression. Prosecutors are also governed by Act CLXIV of 2011, which establishes tenure safeguards, conflict-of-interest restrictions, asset declaration obligations and disciplinary procedures.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for disciplinary system are not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Hungary’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 60% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 47% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Hungary’s public integrity framework, as reflected in the Medium-Term National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2024–2025), sets out strategic objectives addressing core risk areas across the public sector. These include human resource management, public financial management, internal control, and public procurement, alongside measures to prevent fraud and corruption more broadly. The scope also extends to state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships. In addition, against Fraud and Corruption Involving Funds from the European Union for 2021-2027 was adopted to protect EU and domestic public funds from intentional misuse, fraud and corruption, and to strengthen trust in the development institutional system.
Each strategy includes a situation analysis outlining public integrity, but outcome-level indicators or targets values for the stated integrity objectives are not defined in either strategy. The strategies were developed in close collaboration with state administration bodies vested with special responsibilities and consulted through regular intergovernmental consultation procedures; however, neither underwent mandatory public consultation.
Each strategy is accompanied by an action plan with designated lead organisations and central coordination, and no funding shortfalls have been reported. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are also in place, including end-of-term evaluations. However, the action plans do not set out objectives supported by outcome-level indicators, baseline targets, or a list of activities.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Government Decree No. 50/2013 defines a “lobbyist” as a non-state actor who interacts with public administration employees outside formal administrative procedures. However, the regulatory framework does not provide a definition of lobbying activities, nor does it clearly specify the categories of actors subject to transparency obligations.
Legislation governing public participation in the preparation of laws and related government decrees regulates consultation processes and strategic partnership agreements between ministries and certain organisations. These instruments aim to structure stakeholder engagement in legislative drafting.
Legislation adopted in 2021 provides for the establishment of a beneficial ownership register with defined disclosure requirements. The register has not yet become operational, and no public access is currently available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 78% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 33% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Hungary’s regulations on conflicts of interest establish rules on incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities. Key legislation includes the Act on Government Administration (2018) and the Act on Public Trust Performing Public Functions (2021), which define circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest and set out the obligation for public officials to manage them.
In line with these rules, officials are required to submit interest declarations upon entry into public office. This applies to members of the government, parliament, top-tier civil servants of the executive branch, and public employees in high-risk positions, although the requirement does not extend to the highest bodies of the judiciary.
Implementation of these requirements includes the monitoring of compliance with declaration obligations. Declarations are published and publicly accessible, allowing verification by the public. Submission rates are reported to be consistently high across the main categories of officials concerned. While the verification process benefits from this public scrutiny, information on the outcomes, including detected conflicts of interest, recommendations for resolution, or the application of sanctions, is limited in public information.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 43% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Political finance is regulated primarily through the Act on the Transparency of Campaign Costs (2013) and related legislation. Under this framework, electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches, which are subject to proportional sanctions, including repayment obligations. Anonymous donations, as well as contributions from foreign states, enterprises, or publicly owned entities, are prohibited. Political parties and candidates are required to report contributions and campaign expenditures, and parties must make financial reports publicly accessible.
In practice, the State Audit Office oversees the financial management of political parties and the use of contributions allocated to parliamentary groups. All political parties have submitted annual accounts within the statutory deadlines over the past five years. However, reports are published in the Official Gazette in their original format, limiting accessibility and searchability. Similarly, information on the outcomes of audits, including detected breaches, investigations conducted, or sanctions applied, is not systematically made available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 100% of criteria on public information regulations, and 69% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Hungary maintains a well-established framework for public information, with the government and relevant authorities ensuring access to key datasets, including consolidated versions of all primary laws, state budget, public tenders, and other official records. The websites of central authorities provide users with a range of publicly accessible information, supporting transparency in public administration and decision-making processes.
Sanctions for non-compliance with public information obligations have not been imposed by the supervisory bodies. Agendas and minutes of government sessions, as well as schedules and meetings of ministers, are not consistently published.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 88% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 32% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The principle of judicial independence in Hungary is enshrined in Article 26 of the Fundamental Law, which provides that judges are independent, and may not be instructed in relation to their judicial activities. Under Act CLXII of 2011, initial appointments are generally for a three-year period, followed by appointment for an indefinite term. Candidates with the required experience by law are appointed indefinitely without probation. Judges may be removed solely on grounds and through procedures defined by law. Reasons for the termination of service include resignation, retirement, criminal conviction, disciplinary dismissal or other legally defined circumstances, thereby establishing objective safeguards for tenure.
Merit-based procedures govern the selection and career progression of judges. Vacancies are publicly announced, candidates are interviewed and ranked against predefined criteria, and performance evaluations inform advancement. The National Judicial Council (NJC), composed predominantly of judges elected by their peers, plays a central role in the application process.
Standards of conduct are set out in the Code of Ethics for Judges and complemented by detailed statutory conflict-of-interest rules. Judges are subject to comprehensive asset declaration requirements upon entry into office and periodically thereafter, with reported full submission rates. While verification mechanisms are in place, evidence of systematic review and follow-up is limited.
Internal whistleblowing channels have been established, accompanied by statutory protection against retaliation and publicly accessible reporting guidance. However, there is no mandatory training requirement on confidentiality for staff responsible for handling reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Hungary fulfils 62% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 32% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%.
The independence and accountability of prosecutors in Hungary are established under Act CLXIV of 2011 and related legislation. Prosecutorial service may be terminated only on clear grounds, including resignation, retirement, disciplinary dismissal, incompatibility, organisational restructuring, or failure to comply with asset declaration obligations. Similarly, the mandate of the Prosecutor General is limited to specific legal grounds, such as expiry of term, resignation, or conflict of interest, thereby providing formal tenure safeguards.
Entry into the profession requires a suitability examination. However, promotions and appointments to senior positions, including the Prosecutor General and Deputy Prosecutor General, are not based on standardised merit-based procedures, and legislation does not provide a general right of appeal for these decisions.
Detailed conflict-of-interest rules prohibit political activity or holding elected office, and impose restrictions on secondary employment, business interests, and certain family-related relationships. In addition, the Criminal Procedure Code sets out grounds and procedures for recusal, while disciplinary provisions define sanctions ranging from reprimand to dismissal, proportionate to the severity of the breach.
Asset declaration obligations applicable to all prosecutors, though centralised data on submission and verification are not available. Mechanisms for reporting misconduct operate under Act XXV of 2023, with internal channels, whistleblowers protection, and public guidance. Staff responsible for handling reports are subject to mandatory confidentiality and data protection training.
Data not provided.
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Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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