Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Slovenia
Table of contents
The Resolution of the Prevention of Corruption in the Republic of Slovenia was adopted by the Government in January 2025 and by the National Assembly in March 2025. It establishes the national strategic framework for preventing corruption and strengthening public integrity in Slovenia.
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC) is an independent state body responsible for strengthening and safeguarding the rule of law with regards to corruption, as established in the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act. The CPC supervises, inter alia, activity related to conflict-of-interest and lobbying. The Court of Audit is the independent body overseeing, among others, the financing of political parties and election campaigns, and the Information Commissioner is the independent supervisory body responsible for public information that conducts inspections on compliance with regulations on access to information, among others.
The regulatory framework for public integrity in Slovenia is based on the Constitution, the Judicial Service Act, the State Prosecution Service Act, the Civil Servants Act, and the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act. Prosecutorial integrity is regulated by the State Prosecution Service Act. Disciplinary procedures for civil servants are established under the Civil Servants Act.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Slovenia’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 73% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework and 53% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The Resolution of the Prevention of Corruption in the Republic of Slovenia contains strategic objectives to mitigate public integrity risks in the areas of human resource management, internal control and risk management, fraud, public financial management, public procurement, and the private sector, public corporations, state-owned enterprises or public-private partnerships.
The strategy underwent both inter-ministerial coordination and public consultation prior to adoption and was published on the national eDemokracija portal. An extended consultation process was conducted including representatives from ministries, civil society and the private sector.
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption is the central coordination body responsible for implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the strategy. An action plan is in force and published on the Commission's website but does not provide outcome-level indicators. The action plan also does not include estimates of capital or operational expenditures, nor does it identify additional costs or provide cost estimates for specific activities.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 60% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 67% on practice compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act defines both lobbyists and lobbying activities. The Act also introduces a two-year cooling-off period for former public officials before they may engage in lobbying activities but there are no cooling-off periods for lobbyists entering public office. The Act establishes a range of fines for breaches of lobbying transparency and integrity standards which are graduated according to the severity of the offence.
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption is the supervisory authority responsible for overseeing transparency of lobbying activities under the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act. The Commission maintains the lobbying register and publishes records of contacts between lobbyists and public officials through the ERAR platform. The register is publicly accessible online and allows sorting of data by lobbyist, organisation, authority contacted, purpose of lobbying and targeted legislation. A beneficial ownership register exists but is not publicly accessible without demonstrating legitimate interest.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 89% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations and 33% on practice compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act establishes incompatibilities between public office and other public or private activities. The Act also defines conflict-of-interest situations and imposes obligations on public officials to disclose and manage such situations. Members of government, parliament, high-risk public employees and senior executive officials are required to submit asset declarations upon entry and exit from office. They must also report any changes in asset value exceeding 10,000 EUR and submit an additional declaration one year after leaving office. However, members of the Judicial Council are not covered as certain members (some of whom are not judges) are not required to declare. Sanctions for breaches are defined in the Act and include proportionate fines for individuals and legal persons. Individuals that commit a breach may be fined between €400 and €1,200 and responsible persons within public sector bodies may face fines ranging from €400 to €4,000.
The Commission for the Prevention of Corruption is responsible for supervising compliance, including oversight of asset and interest declarations, verification procedures, and enforcement. Declarations selected for verification follow a risk-based approach. Under the Commission's Rules of Procedure, the Senate annually selects categories of officials for thematic oversight, sometimes applying random sampling within large groups. Full data on submission rates for different branches was not made available to the OECD. Where conflicts of interest were identified, the Commission issued recommendations for resolution within 12 months in 54% of cases over the 2023-2025 period. A range of sanctions has been issued over the past three years, including fines and reprimands. All declarations are submitted electronically.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 100% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 57% on practice compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign rules are defined in the Political Parties Act and the Election and Referendum Campaign Act. Penalties can range between €350 to €30,000 depending on the type of breach. Electoral candidates can be held personally liable because the Election and Referendum Campaign Act treats a candidate as a potential campaign organiser and makes the organiser responsible for lawful conduct of the campaign. Campaign spending is capped (for example, for National Assembly elections, costs may not exceed €0.40 per eligible voter in the relevant district or unit). Parties must publish financial reports, and campaign finance reports must be filed within 15 days of closing the dedicated campaign bank account. Disclosure obligations include publishing individual contributions above a fixed ceiling exceeding the average gross monthly salary.
Oversight of political party and campaign finance is mandated to the independent Court of Audit. Under the Election and Referendum Campaign Act, the Court of Audit must audit election campaign organisers entitled to public reimbursement within six months of the campaign bank account closure and may also audit other organisers at national and local level. Certified auditors are on the Court's payroll. Audit reports on campaign and party financing are publicly available online. However, no single aggregated report systematically compiles the number of cases, investigations, and sanctions issued. Political parties’ annual financial reports are published through a centralised online platform. Authorities indicated that all parliamentary parties submitted accounts within statutory deadlines, but data was not made available to the OECD.
Transparency of public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 78% of criteria on transparency of public information regulations and 88% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The Access to Public Information Act provides that all public institutions and private persons carrying out public duties are holders of public information. The only restrictions to access to public information allowed are listed by law and are in line with the Tromsø Convention. Statutory deadlines for processing requests for information require authorities to decide within 20 working days, extendable by up to 30 working days. Information holders are required to provide information in the requested format. The right to appeal to an independent body or the court against refusal or inactivity of an administrative body is ensured through the Information Commissioner, whose decisions can only be challenged before the Administrative Court. Information requested is not always provided free of charge.
The Information Commissioner, created by the Information Commissioner Act, oversees compliance and carries out administrative enforcement under the Access to Public Information Act. The head is appointed for a fixed term of five years and can be dismissed during this term only in strictly defined cases including incapacity. Statistical data on requests and decisions have been aggregated and published for the past three years in annual reports, which also confirm that fourteen inspections of compliance were conducted and sanctions for non-compliance were imposed within the latest full calendar year. Slovenia also proactively publishes several datasets including consolidated primary laws, state budgets, national election results, legislative proposals, government session agendas, lobbying data, public tenders and awards, company and land registries, and asset declarations of senior officials.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 91% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 48% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Under the Constitution, judges are independent in the performance of their judicial function and enjoy tenure for judges until mandatory retirement age, expiry of term or lawful dismissal. The Judicial Service Act sets eligibility criteria for entry and objective grounds for dismissal of judges. While the Judicial Council generally conducts interviews with shortlisted candidates, including for Supreme Court judges, merit-based, objective procedures, such as exams or interviews, are not set in law. The Act requires appointment and promotion of judges to be based on the recommendations of the Judicial Council, which consists of 11 members, six of whom are judges; furthermore, candidates can appeal judicial appointment and promotion decisions.
The Code of Judicial Ethics sets standards of conduct, and defines circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for judges. The Judicial Service Act sets incompatibilities and the Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure Acts require judges to avoid and disclose conflicts of interest, and submit interest declarations. Data on the submission of interest declarations is not available, and less than 60% of the declarations were verified in 2024. In the past three years, no conflicts of interest were formally detected, nor were recommendations for resolution issued.
The Whistleblower Protection Act sets out internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in the judiciary, which are established, and the law provides measures for protection against retaliation. Information on whistleblower rights, reporting procedures and contact details is available on an internal portal, but this is not publicly available. There is no mandatory confidentiality training for staff handling reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 86% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 58% on practice compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The State Prosecution Service Act regulates the selection and promotion of prosecutors, and provides that merit-based, objective measures such as exams and interviews may be used for selection processes conducted by the State Prosecutorial Council, but are not mandatory by law. The Prosecutor General is appointed by the National Assembly upon a proposal from the State Prosecutorial Council after obtaining the Government's approval. Objective grounds for dismissal are established in the Act. The Act further provides that candidates can appeal decisions on the selection, appointment and promotion of prosecutors.
Incompatibilities are established in the Constitution and the Judicial Service Act, and Criminal Procedure Act defines the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors. Recusal measures are outlined in the Criminal Procedures Act. Disciplinary sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions are defined and range from a written reprimand or salary reduction to dismissal. All prosecutors are required to submit asset declarations under the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act. Submission and compliance are overseen by the Commission, but no data were provided on submission or verification rates.
The Whistleblower Protection Act requires public prosecutors’ offices to set up internal reporting channels and protects against retaliation. Such channels exist and information on whistleblower’s rights is available online, but there is no dedicated reporting contact point, and staff handling reports are not required to receive confidentiality training.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Slovenia fulfils 50% of criteria on disciplinary system for civil servants' regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Civil Servants Act regulates the disciplinary framework for civil servants and sets out the disciplinary process. It categorises violations into minor or serious offences and defines sanctions for both. Penalties can include fines of up to 15% of salary for minor offences and up to 20 to 30% for more serious offences. The Criminal Procedure Act establishes that staff are obligated to inform the prosecutor or police of criminal behaviour, extending to criminal behaviour detected in a disciplinary case. The Act also guarantees the right of civil servants to appeal disciplinary decisions before an Appeals Commission as well as the right to appeal the decisions of the Commission before the competent court.
The handling of disciplinary procedures is decentralised across central government bodies, as proceedings are initiated by the head of each authority. Training on disciplinary investigations is in place; however, digital tools are not systematically used and there is no unified electronic case management system for disciplinary cases across ministries. Publicly available data on disciplinary enforcement are limited. Aggregated data on the number of disciplinary proceedings initiated, concluded or appealed, as well as on the number and type of sanctions imposed, are not published. Only data on appeals handled by the Government’s Appellate Employment Commission are publicly available.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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