Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Jordan
Table of contents
The National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy (NIACS 2020-2025) constitutes the main piece of Jordan’s strategic framework on public integrity and anti-corruption. Itis overseen by the Jordanian Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC). The 2020-2025 NIACS sets five strategic objectives, emphasising organisational values and a comprehensive approach to foster a culture of integrity, enhance corruption prevention mechanisms, strengthen the rule of law, and reinforce institutional capacities. The NIACS 2020-2025, assessed in this note, is due to be replaced by a new strategy (NIACS 2026-2030), launched in December 2025.
The (JIACC), established in 2006 and merged with the Ombudsman Bureau in 2016, is the main body responsible for public integrity and anti-corruption policy, including the development, implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the NIACS.
Jordan’s institutional framework on public integrity involves multiple bodies. The Information Council oversees access to public information and transparency, handling requests and complaints related to the right of access to information, approving reports, and drafting legislation. The Financial Disclosure Department audits conflict-of-interest and asset declarations, and the Independent Election Commission of Jordan supervises political finance. Jordan has not yet adopted regulations on lobbying, and no institution is currently responsible for oversight of these activities.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for judicial integrity, prosecutorial integrity and disciplinary system are not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Jordan’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Jordan | OECD Public Integrity Indicators
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Jordan fulfils 13% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 20% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32% respectively.
Jordan’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission (JIACC) oversees the strategic framework, under Law 13/2006. The NIACS 2020-2025 strategy sets five overarching objectives, including on strengthening the national integrity system, enhancing preventive measures against corruption, developing complaint-handling mechanisms, managing strategic partnerships, and building organisational and human capacities. It promotes career and training tracks, enhances the role of the innovation and training centre, and implements the organisational excellence programme to mitigate integrity risks in human resources.
Although the strategy does not address integrity risks in areas such as public financial management, internal control, public procurement, or fraud, related activities are included under the prevention objective (including Project No. 5 “Risk Identification and Assessment”). In terms of use of evidence, no inter-institutional assessment identified specific integrity risks, actors, likelihood, and impact. Outcome indicators are established but lack target values, and the strategy’s Action Plan does not specify baselines, monitoring, or evaluation arrangements. Monitoring Reports, available through JIACC annual reports, do not provide implementation rates or progress against targets. Results have not been communicated to civil society or the public.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Jordans fulfils 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Jordan does not have a dedicated regulatory framework on lobbying. It does not have a central-government supervisory body to oversee lobbying transparency, nor accessible lobbying registration tools. No system for disclosing lobbying information or investigating non-compliance is in place. However, the Conduct and Ethics of Public Service Law establishes a one-year cooling-off period for officials who leave their posts, prohibiting them from accepting a job in an institution with which they have had significant dealings.
Regarding access to beneficial ownership information, while Jordan provides access to basic company information, beneficial ownership information is not publicly available online. The CDD website enables users to search by criteria such as company name, partner name, and company number, yet, access to beneficial ownership information is granted to competent authorities only.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Jordan fulfils 67% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Jordan’s Law on Illicit Enrichment establishes mandatory interest and asset declarations for members of government, parliament, senior judiciary officials and top-tier civil servants. Declarations must be submitted upon assuming and leaving office and every two years during the term. While the law allows for both paper and electronic submissions, an electronic system for submission has not been implemented yet.
The Financial Disclosure Department (FDD), within the Ministry of Justice, is responsible for examining and auditing declarations and ensuring compliance with content and timely submission. In addition, upon receipt of a complaint, JIACC is authorised to request copies of asset declaration data for review and verification purposes. The Commission also has the mandate to pursue cases of abnormal or unjustified wealth increase, including with respect to public officials who are not subject to the Illicit Enrichment Law and are not required to submit asset declarations.
Sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions are established under the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Law No. 13/2016 and are proportional to the severity of the offence. However, publicly available data on detected cases and related recommendations is lacking, and there is no risk-based approach in place for selecting declarations of interest to be verified. Moreover, while the Code of Conduct and Ethics of Public Service sets general principles, it does not clearly define incompatibilities or specific situations that may give rise to conflicts of interest.
In practice, data on the submission and verification of asset and interest declarations by members of government, Parliament, high-ranking judges and senior civil servants is not available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Jordan fulfils 70% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 14% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Law No.7 of 2022 regulates political finance, prohibiting anonymous donations and contributions from publicly owned enterprises. The law also explicitly bans the use of public funds or state resources to support or oppose political parties or electoral campaigns. Political parties are required to rely exclusively on domestic financial resources and are prohibited from receiving any cash or in-kind funding, grants or donations from foreign states, agencies or entities. The law introduces expenditure limits for campaigns at the local and general electoral district levels, but these limits do not extend to third parties. The Elections Law establishes sanctions for breaches of campaign finance and election campaign regulations that are proportional to the severity of the offence, ranging from fines to imprisonment.
Oversight of political finance is entrusted to the Independent Election Commission, in accordance with Article 67 of the Constitution. The Commission is also responsible for administering elections, registering political parties and monitoring their activities. Party lists must submit final financial accounts within 30 days of publication of election results, and the Commission is required to publish them within 14 days. Nonetheless, transparency of political finance remains limited, as information on violations, investigations and sanctions is not proactively disclosed. Data on parties’ compliance with reporting obligations is also unavailable, and no centralised online platform consolidating political finance reports exists.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Jordan fulfils 33% of criteria on public information regulations, and 42% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The primary legislation governing access to public information is the Access to Public Information Law. Its implementation is overseen by the Information Council, which is responsible for ensuring access to information, promoting transparency, handling requests and complaints, approving reports, and proposing legislative reforms. The law provides for several procedural safeguards, including statutory deadlines for responding to requests, the right to appeal refusals or administrative silence before the Administrative Court, and limitations on the disclosure of sensitive information.
However, gaps remain in the regulatory framework. Not all public institutions and private entities performing public functions are clearly designated as holders of public information, and requesters are required to demonstrate a legitimate interest in accessing information to request it. In addition, no authority is mandated to conduct compliance inspections, and no statistical data on access to information requests or decisions has been published over the past three years.
Regarding proactive disclosure, consolidated versions of primary legislation, the state budget, results of the most recent national elections, and information on public tenders announced and awarded are publicly available on a single website. By contrast, data on access to information requests, asset and interest declarations of senior officials, ministers’ agendas, government session schedules, and legislative proposals submitted to Parliament are not publicly accessible.
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This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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