Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Poland
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Unitary |
Semi-presidential |
Bicameral |
Civil Law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityPoland had an anti-corruption strategy adopted at the central government level – the Government Programme for Counteracting Corruption – that expired in 2020. Poland does not currently have an anti-corruption strategy in place.
In terms of institutions, Poland has central government bodies on anti-corruption (Central Anti-Corruption Bureau), political finance (National Election Commission), and lobbying (Ministry of Interior and Administration). However, Poland does not have central body responsible for overseeing conflict of interest.
The Chancellery of the Prime Minister oversees the functioning of the civil service system and Disciplinary Commissions adjudicate cases. The Civil Service Act No. 227/2008 regulates disciplinary liability and Regulation of the Prime Minister No. 60/2009 sets out the disciplinary process. Ordinance No.70/2011 of the Prime Minister sets out guidelines for compliance with the principles of the civil service and the principles of the code of ethics of the civil service.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 data or latest year available. Data for judicial integrity and prosecutorial integrity are not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Data on where Poland’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
On average, OECD countries fulfil 38% of criteria regarding the strength of the strategic framework, and 32% on practice.
The Government Programme for Counteracting Corruption was in place from 2018-2022, but has since expired and no new strategy has been adopted since.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Poland fulfils 60% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 33% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The Act on Lobbying Activities defines lobbying activities but does not state which actors are considered lobbyists. Sanctions for breaches of lobbying rules are further set out in the Act. The Ministry of Interior and Administration is responsible for overseeing lobbying and a lobbying register is available online. The Register includes information on the name of the lobbyist, but information on the domain of intervention, type of lobbying activity, and piece of legislation targeted is not available.
The Act on Limiting the Conduct of Economic Activity by Persons Performing Public Functions establishes cooling off periods for public officials leaving public office, but there is no legal regulation establishing cooling off periods for lobbyists entering the public service.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Poland fulfils 89% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 11% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The Act on the Restriction of Business Activities by Persons Performing Public Functions establishes incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities. Circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials are defined, as is the obligation to manage them. The Act further sets out institutional responsibilities as well as submission, compliance, and content verification procedures for asset declarations. Amongst other positions, Members of the Government, Parliament, highest bodies of the judiciary and newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants legally must submit asset declarations upon appointment, annually and when leaving post, although this coverage is not extended to public employees in a high-risk position.
In practice declarations are verified according to a risk-based approach but not all are submitted electronically. Additionally, fewer than 25% of cases of conflict of interest received a recommendation for how to resolve the conflict within 12 months from the responsible authority. However, in 2025 data was not available on interest declaration submission rate for members of Government, members of Parliament, the highest bodies of the judiciary, and newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants of the executive branch. Similarly, no data was available on the share of declarations verified during the latest two full calendar years or on the range of sanctions issued in cases of non-compliance with disclosure obligations or conflict-of-interest situations.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Poland fulfils 70% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 43% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The Act on Political Parties defines sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations that are proportional to the severity of the offence. The Act also bans contributions from foreign states or enterprises and publicly owned enterprises but does not fully ban anonymous donations as these can still be made in cash. Additionally, there are no regulations that state that electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches and be sanctioned, nor are electoral campaign expenses for parties, candidates and third parties limited to a ceiling.
In practice the independent National Election Commission oversees the financing of political parties and election campaigns. Financial reports from all political parties are publicly available from one single online platform in a user-friendly format. Data was not available as to whether all political parties submitted accounts related to elections within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past two election cycles or for if all parties submitted annual accounts within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past five years.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Poland fulfils 67% of criteria on public information regulations, and 46% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The Act on Access to Public Information provides that all public institutions and private persons carrying out public duties are holders of public information, and that everyone, including non-citizens and legal persons, has the right to access information in all the forms available with the only restrictions to access to public information allowed listed by law and in line with the Tromsø Convention. Additionally, the Act on Access to Public Information establishes statutory deadlines for processing requests for information and the right to appeal to an independent body or the court against refusal or inactivity of an administrative body is ensured. However, information is not always provided free of charge.
In practice, Poland does not have a supervisory body responsible for public information issues, but it does have dedicated unit, the Ministry of Computerisation, which is responsible for access to information matters in central government. All agendas of formal government sessions have been made publicly available online prior to the session within the latest full calendar year and records of all decisions agreed upon at the government sessions are kept. Poland also proactively discloses several datasets including consolidated versions of all primary laws, government session agendas, public tenders announced by central government, aggregated on one website in addition to the results of these tenders. However, data was not provided for proactive disclosure indicators of ministers’ agendas or aggregated data on lobbying on public decision making.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityData not available
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityData not available
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsFigure 7. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Figure 7. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Poland fulfils 83% of criteria for regulations on the disciplinary system for civil servants and 17% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Civil Service Act No. 227/2008 regulates disciplinary liability and Regulation of the Prime Minister No. 60/2009 sets out the disciplinary process. Ordinance No.70/2011 of the Prime Minister sets out guidelines for compliance with the principles of the civil service and the principles of the code of ethics of the civil service. Act No. 227/2008 establishes that disciplinary actions are breaches of duties, and penalties are established ranging from a warning to expulsion from the civil service. Act No.227/2008 also guarantees the right of parties to appeal decisions of disciplinary committees to a Higher Disciplinary Committee, as well as the right to appeal the decisions of the Higher Disciplinary Committee to the court of appeal. The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that staff are obligated to inform the prosecutor or the police of criminal behaviour; this includes criminal behaviour detected in a disciplinary case.
The handling of disciplinary procedures is decentralised across ministries, and while training on handling disciplinary programmes may be in place, there is no centralised training programme offered to all staff. The case management system for disciplinary cases and proceedings is decentralised, although there is one case-management system for disciplinary cases, but it only covers disciplinary decisions reviewed at the appeal stage. The Open Data portal includes information on initiated and discontinued disciplinary investigations, but data on appealed disciplinary procedures is not available. Annual reports include the number of finalised disciplinary procedures, but this data is not available on the portal.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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