Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Italy
Table of contents
The National Anticorruption Plan (PNA) 2026-2028 constitutes Italy’s central policy framework for preventing corruption and guiding public administrations in the implementation of transparency and integrity measures. It was developed by the National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) and incorporates the input of the Unified State–Regions-Local Autonomies Conference, followed by the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and Illegality in Public Administration, both of which expressed their approval of the strategy. ANAC is also the main body responsible for transparency and access to public information obligations.
Conflict-of-interest rules are enforced internally by each administration through an Anti-Corruption Manager, while ANAC supervises externally. The Antitrust Authority (AGCM) and the Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM) oversee compliance for the members of the national government, and the Court of Auditors assesses administrative and financial liability for violations. Magistrates must submit their asset declarations to the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSM), while Members of Parliament are required to deposit their declarations with the Office of the Presidency of their respective Chamber.
The Committee for the Transparency and Control of Financial Reports of Political Parties and Political Movements supervises the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns. Currently, there is no central supervisory authority within government for lobbying transparency.
The Superior Council of the Judiciary is responsible for overseeing the recruitment, appointments, assignments, transfers, career progression, and disciplinary proceedings of both judges and public prosecutors.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Italy’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 40% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 57% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The National Anticorruption Plan (PNA) 2026-2028 serves as the central framework for coordinating anti-corruption policies and guiding administrations in the implementation of prevention and transparency measures. The Strategy underwent a legally mandated intergovernmental consultation and was opened to public consultation through an ad hoc online portal, where both the draft strategy and, at the end of the process, a summary of responses to all comments were published. However, no non-state actors participated in the working group responsible for developing the current public integrity strategy.
The PNA is the first plan to adopt a structure organised around six strategic lines, each with specific objectives, defined timeframes, expected results, and relevant actors, functioning simultaneously as the national strategy and the action plan. The plan lacks outcome-level indicators to measure the effects of its implementation. The PNA provides for monitoring, reporting, and evaluation mechanisms. Implementation is subject to continuous annual monitoring, with an overall strategic evaluation at the end of the triennium. As the strategy is newly introduced, not enough time has elapsed to produce monitoring reports. ANAC is however mandated to submit an annual report to Parliament detailing the results of its anti-corruption activities and the effectiveness of current legislative provisions.
Although the PNA draws on analyses of individual administrations’ integrity plans (PIAOs and PTPCTs) and oversight activities, the expected likelihood and impact of integrity risks are not assessed at the national strategic level. The plan also lacks financial estimates and cost projections for specific activities.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 60% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 44% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The Chamber of Deputies regulates interactions between its members of parliament and lobbyists through internal rules adopted by the Bureau on 26 April 2016, which define lobbying activities and identify actors considered lobbyists and establish a public register overseen by the College of Quaestors. Registration tools are available on the Chamber of Deputies’ website, where a list of registered legal entities and natural persons is published. Profiles include information on authorised representatives and ongoing representation activities. However, the data cannot be sorted by policy area or targeted legislation, and no information is disclosed on lobbying budgets or expenditures. Annual activity reports are published for each registered lobbyist.
Beyond these parliamentary rules, there is no general legislative framework governing lobbying activities involving other public officials or authorities. However, it should be noted that a broader bill on lobbying regulation (C. 2336) was approved on January 29, 2026 by the Chamber of Deputies and is under examination by the Senate.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 22% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Legislative Decree No. 39/2013 regulates conflict of interest for civil servants by defining incompatibilities between public office and other public or private activities, requiring the management of such situations, and establishing procedures for the submission, verification of content, and compliance with interest declarations. The Legislative Decree also regulates the prohibition on assigning top administrative and management positions to individuals convicted of crimes against the public administration, coming from regulated/financed private entities, or holders of political offices, in order to prevent conflicts of interest and guarantee impartiality. Law No. 215/2004 defines the situations and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest, imposing declaration and management obligations. It applies to the Prime Minister, ministers, deputy ministers, undersecretaries of state, and government commissioners.
Members of the government, parliament, the highest bodies of the judiciary, and public officials in high-risk positions, as well as newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants, are required to submit interest declarations upon taking office and whenever their position changes. Sanctions for non-compliance are defined and proportionate to the severity of the breach. The regulatory framework and supervisory responsibilities are fragmented across multiple government institutions- including ANAC, AGCM, AGCOM, the Court of Auditors, and parliamentary bodies- adding complexity to oversight.
In practice, submission rates for interest declarations by members of the government have reached 100% over the past four years, as per the biannual report published by the National Antitrust Authority (AGCM). However, data on submission rates for members of parliament and the highest judicial bodies are not publicly available, nor is information on inspections conducted by the relevant supervisory bodies during the latest full calendar year or on the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance.
A legislative reform process is currently underway. Draft Law No. 304 was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in May 2024 and authorises the Government to reform conflict-of-interest rules through a legislative decree within 24 months. The bill is now awaiting consideration by the Senate.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Oversight of political parties and electoral campaigns is entrusted to the Committee for the Transparency and Control of Financial Reports of Political Parties and Political Movements, a body reporting to parliament established under Law 96/2012 and further regulated by Decree Law No.149/2013.
A comprehensive legal framework provides that electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches, with sanctions proportionate to the severity of the offence. Regulations prohibit anonymous donations, contributions from foreign or publicly owned enterprises, and set ceilings on electoral campaign expenses for parties, candidates, and third parties; however, contribution limits apply to parties but not to candidates’ personal campaigns.
Under Law No. 149/2013, parties must make financial reports public, including all contributions above a defined threshold, and submit campaign expense accounts to the Court of Auditors within 45 days of the establishment of each chamber.
In practice, data on the submission rate of annual accounts by political parties represented in Parliament are available only up to 2023. These show that all parties submitted their annual accounts on time in 2023 and 2022, while compliance was lower in 2020 and 2021. Not all campaign-related accounts have been submitted on time, full financial reports are not publicly available for all parties, and no public data exists on investigations, sanctions, or dispute outcomes due to ongoing proceedings.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 78% on public information regulations, and 54% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Legislative Decree 33/2013 governs access to public information by setting statutory deadlines for processing requests to access public information, defining grounds for withholding information, and mandating the proactive disclosure of information, documents, data and specific databases by all public entities. The Decree assigns ANAC as the supervisory body responsible for public information, overseeing compliance with proactive transparency obligations and verifying whether public administrations fulfil their publication duties. ANAC can exercise inspection powers with reference to these publication duties but does not adjudicate disputes or issue binding decisions on FOIA access to information.
The Agency for Digital Italy (AGID) holds monitoring and strategic responsibilities for open data policy at the central government level.
In practice in the Italian transparency system is disclosed a wide range of information online, including consolidated versions of primary legislation, public tenders and awarded contracts, salaries of senior civil servants, and assets and interest declarations of top-tier public employees in the executive branch and national elected officials. However, the same information is not available for members of the judiciary, government and ministers’ agendas are not fully published, and aggregated data on access-to-information requests is also unavailable.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 74% on judicial integrity regulations, and 28% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The Constitution guarantees judges security of tenure and irrevocability. The Constitution also establishes the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSM) as an independent, self-governing body responsible for judges’ employment, assignments, transfers, promotions, and discipline. Judges are recruited through competitive examinations under Legislative Decree No. 160/2006. The recruitment is administered by a Commission and final appointment decisions are made by the CSM.
Magistrates may be dismissed only following a CSM decision, based on the objective grounds established in Legislative Decree No. 109/2006.. Decisions on recruitment and promotion may be appealed under Law No. 195/1958.
While Legislative Decree No. 109/2006 outlines certain duties and disciplinary offences, the judiciary has not issued formal standards of conduct and ethical guidelines applicable to all judges. Regulations define circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest. Under Circular P-19146, in line with Law No. 441/1982, magistrates must submit an asset declaration within three months of taking office, after any significant change in their financial situation, and within three months of leaving office. However, information on the submission of these declarations -both by national judges and members of the highest judicial bodies- as well as on their verification or follow-up, is not available.
Legislative Decree No. 24/2023 provides detailed rules on whistleblowing but is not applicable to the judiciary, and there are no internal reporting channels for judicial misconduct, nor is there a publicly available portal on whistleblowers rights. While staff have training on handling complaints, training is not specific to whistleblower reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 66% on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 42% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Prosecutors are recruited through competitive examinations governed by Legislative Decree No. 160/2006, which sets out the rules of the competition. The procedure is administered by a Commission appointed by the Minister of Justice following a resolution of the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSM). The final appointment decisions rest within the CSM. Decisions on appointment and promotion may be appealed under Law No. 195/1958, and CSM decisions are subject to an administrative appeal. Objective grounds for dismissal, applicable to all magistrates, are established by Legislative Decree No. 109/2006. Prosecutors may be removed only on those grounds and following a CSM decision.
Conflict-of-interest situations are defined by regulation, and sanctions for breaches are provided by law. Disciplinary sanctions range from a formal warning to removal from office. The Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure further specify recusal measures, outlining the procedure for resolving potential conflict of interest situations.
Circular P-19146 requires all magistrates, including members of the highest prosecutorial authorities, to submit an asset declaration within three months of assuming office, following any significant change in their financial situation, and within three months after leaving office. However, information on the submission of these declarations and on recommendations issued in conflict-of-interest cases are not available.
Legislative Decree No. 24/2023 provides detailed rules on whistleblowing but is not applicable to the prosecution service, and there are no internal reporting channels for prosecutorial misconduct, nor is there a publicly available porting on whistleblowers rights. While staff have training on handling complaints, training is not specific to whistleblower reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Italy fulfils 50% on disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The disciplinary procedure for civil servants is primarily established by Legislative Decree No. 165/2001, which defines disciplinary offences and establishes sanctions proportionate to the severity and circumstances of the violation. These procedures are further detailed in the National Collective Labour Agreement for Central Functions.
Decree 165/2001 also sets procedural deadlines for disciplinary proceedings, but it does not establish a fixed statute of limitations. The law also guarantees the right to challenge disciplinary sanctions before ordinary courts once administrative remedies have been exhausted. Read together with the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Decree requires authorities handling disciplinary cases to report conduct amounting to a criminal offence to relevant authorities.
Staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations receive dedicated training and in 2025 courses were offered by the National School of Administration on ethics, sanctions, disciplinary proceedings, and investigative activities, aimed at both managerial and non-managerial personnel.
However, no centralised digital tools or case management systems exist to support disciplinary procedures in all central government bodies. Additionally, data on the number of disciplinary procedures initiated, concluded, or appealed, as well as the types and frequency of sanctions applied, are not available or published.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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