Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Türkiye
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual Factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual Factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|
Unitary
|
Presidential System |
Unicameral |
Civil law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityTürkiye’s 11th Development Plan (2019-2023) was the first development plan adopted at the central government level after the change to a presidential system. However, the Plan is no longer in force, and at the time of data collection for this note, no other relevant strategic objectives were in place.
The Ministry of Treasury and Finance is the central government body responsible for the internal control system, while the Internal Audit Coordination Board is responsible for the internal audit system. The Constitutional Court of Türkiye oversees the financing of political parties and election campaigns in addition to its broader mandate, but does not have budgetary autonomy. Additionally, the Court of Accounts – the supreme audit institution – assists the Constitutional Court by auditing acquisitions, revenue and expenditure of political parties, and the Supreme Election Council is an independent authority that supervises elections. In terms of conflict of interest, Türkiye has a decentralised approach, and there is no centralised body responsible for the collection and verification of interest or asset declarations. Regarding access to information, the Board of Review of the Access to Information issues decisions on requests for access to public information. Additionally, the Digital Transformation Office is responsible for open data policy and mediates the delivery of e-government services. There is neither legislation regulating lobbying nor an institution responsible for overseeing lobbying activities.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Türkiye’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 0% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32% respectively.
Türkiye’s 11th Development Plan (2019-2023) was the first development plan adopted at the central government level after the change to a presidential system. However, the Plan is no longer in force, and at the time of data collection for this note, no other relevant strategic objectives were in place.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
In Türkiye, there is no dedicated regulatory framework for lobbying activities. There is also no institution in place with a mandate to oversee transparency of lobbying activities, nor a lobbying registry. Nonetheless, Law No.2531/1981 establishes a two-year cooling-off period for public officials that bans them from being involved with matters on which they worked while in office.
While a register of beneficial ownership has been established as per the Tax Procedure Law General Communique No. 529/2021, information is maintained as confidential tax data by the Turkish Revenue Administration and not made accessible to the public or third parties.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 56% of the criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 0% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
According to the Regulation on the Declaration of Goods, members of the Government, parliament, High Court and top-tier civil servants must submit an interest declaration, as a minimum, upon entry and any renewal or change in public office. However, the regulatory framework does not list incompatibilities between public functions and other public and private activities, nor does it define circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations.
Türkiye has not shared information with the OECD on the submission rates of interest declarations from members of the Government, parliament, and the highest bodies of the judiciary.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 50% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 14% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
In Türkiye, the Law No. 2820 bans anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states or enterprises, and from publicly owned enterprises. Sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations are in place and proportional to the severity of the offence. However, parties and/or candidates do not have an obligation to report their finances during electoral campaigns, nor do they have an obligation to make these reports public. Additionally, there is no ceiling for electoral campaign expenses nor a threshold for personal contributions to candidates’ personal campaigns.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Türkiye has the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties, though it is not independent as it is not directly financially accountable to Parliament. Key information, including the number of cases related to breaches of political finance regulation and the number of investigations conducted have been made available to the public by the Constitutional Court. However, Türkiye has not provided information or supporting documentation to the OECD regarding the submission rates of annual accounts and financial reports by political parties.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 44% of criteria on public information regulations and 42% of criteria in practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Türkiye’s main regulation concerning access to public information is the Law on the Right to Information, which grants all citizens the right to information but sets restrictions on foreigners’ ability to access the same amount of information as nationals. Individuals have a right to appeal to the Board of Review of Access to Information in cases of refusal or inactivity of an administrative body. The Law on the Right to Information states that the cost of the information requested will be charged to applicants.
In practice, Türkiye publishes information on public tenders and land registry. It does not publish ministers’ agendas, nor does it publish the agenda of formal government sessions, interest and asset declarations of high-level public officials, or the register of businesses.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityFigure 7. Judicial integrity
Copy link to Figure 7. Judicial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 56% of criteria for judicial integrity regulations and 28% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Articles 138 to 142 of Türkiye’s Constitution establish the principle of independence of judges and guarantee their tenure until mandatory retirement age, expiry of their term or dismissal from office. Judges are recruited through a competitive process requiring a law degree and success in written and oral exams, followed by a three-year training period with final assessments. Promotion is seniority-based, with annual step increases and rank advancement every two years decided by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP), subject to conditions such as good conduct, performance, and absence of disciplinary sanctions. Article 3 of Law No.6087/2010 establishes the CJP as an independent institution in performing its duties. The CJP is headed by the Minister of Justice, includes ex-officio members, and membership is determined by either the President or Congress.
The Declaration of Ethics for Turkish Judiciary established binding standards of conduct and ethical behavior applicable to all judges with the exception of members of the Turkish Supreme Court, for which the Ethics, Transparency and Trust Project of the Court of Cassation is applicable. Law of 16 April 1979 defines the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for judges but there is no obligation for national judges and members of the highest bodies of the judiciary to submit interest declarations.
No regulation establishes internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in the judiciary and there is no publicly available portal providing information on whistleblowers’ rights, procedures for reporting misconduct of judges and contact details. Staff are not offered confidentiality training offered on handling reports.
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityFigure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Figure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 55% of criteria for regulations on prosecutorial integrity and 37% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The Declaration of Ethics for Turkish Judiciary, a binding text adopted in 2019, outlines the need for integrity and impartiality for judges and prosecutors in the country. Law No. 3628/1990 establishes an obligation for selected public officials to submit general interest and/or asset declarations. According to Article 48 of Law No. 2802/1983 these provisions apply to the highest prosecutorial authorities, and Law No. 3628/1990 defines responsibilities related to the submission, compliance and verification procedures of these interest declarations. Within the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the Commission for the Review and Comparison of Asset Declarations is responsible for declarations’ review.
While Law No.6100 establishes reasons for recusal of judges in civil and criminal procedures, these are not applicable to prosecutors. While procedural rules on the investigation and examination of reports and complaints about judges and prosecutors do exist, there is no dedicated internal channel for whistleblowers. Reports can only be made through denunciation and complaint channels, designed for disciplinary control rather than whistleblowing. Additionally, there is no publicly available portal giving information on whistleblowers’ rights.
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsFigure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Figure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Türkiye fulfils 67% of criteria for regulations on disciplinary systems for civil servants and 0% for practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Turkish Civil Servant Law establishes a disciplinary framework for civil servants, which provides a list of disciplinary sanctions, ranging from warnings to dismissal from office, which correspond to specified offences. The framework guarantees that administrative courts may be resorted to against disciplinary sanctions.
However, Türkiye’s regulatory framework does not include an obligation to inform the judiciary or law enforcement in situations where disciplinary cases may involve criminal behaviour. While some training on how to conduct disciplinary investigations is available through the Department of Training of the Ministry of Justice and the Justice Academy of Türkiye, these options are not mandatory for all staff conducting disciplinary investigations.
Türkiye’s central government bodies do not use an electronic case management system for disciplinary cases, nor is data on disciplinary sanctions published in an accessible or open data format.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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