Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Sweden
Table of contents
The Government of Sweden approved the "Action plan against corruption and undue influence 2024-2027" (APCUI) in 2024. The APCUI serves as both a strategy and an action plan, since it contains both strategic objectives and specific activities under each of them. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the coordination of the development of the strategy, while the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Justice are responsible for monitoring and evaluation of all activities in the action plan.
There are different institutions which have the mandate to mitigate public integrity risks in their corresponding fields. The Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet) has the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns. There are no central bodies responsible for mitigating public integrity risks in lobbying or overseeing the submission of conflict-of-interest declarations. While the Freedom of the Press Act regulates access to information and the Parliamentary Ombudsmen can process complaints related to access to information requests, there is no specific supervisory body for public information. The Judges Board submits proposals to the Government on the appointment of judges, although the board is not an independent body according to OECD standards. The Swedish Prosecution Authority decides on the employment of public prosecutors, with the exception of the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Data on where Sweden’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Sweden fulfils 53% of criteria on the strength of the strategic framework and 50% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The APCUI contains a situation analysis in the introduction, as well as a more detailed situation analysis on particular risks in each section but does not include outcome-level indicators for its strategic objectives. The strategy underwent extended inter-institutional and public consultations, which included the involvement of representatives from business, civil society, and academia. The actions in each section of the strategy specify which institution is tasked with their implementation, but since there is no centralised monitoring of the activities, the implementation rate of the strategy cannot be calculated. Finally, the APCUI does not contain any budgetary information, therefore its financial sustainability cannot be assessed.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Sweden fulfills 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations but none of the criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
There are no regulations setting legal definitions on lobbying in Sweden. A register of beneficial ownership of corporate entities exists but following a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2022, it is no longer publicly available. While regulations establish cooling-off periods for public officials, there are no cooling-off periods for lobbyists taking up public functions. Moreover, there is no supervisory function in government overseeing lobbying activities issues, and no lobbying register.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Sweden fulfils 56% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations and 22% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Regulations define circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials, establish the obligation to manage them, and define sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions in proportion to the severity of the offence. While members of the Government and parliament (Riksdag) are required to declare their interests upon taking up office and when the information changes, there is no equivalent overarching requirement for public employees in high-risk positions or top-tier civil servants, since establishing reporting obligations is left to individual public authorities. Members of the highest bodies of the judiciary only submit ad hoc interest declarations to report secondary employment, and these do not cover financial interests. Moreover, there is no central authority responsible for collection and verification of interest declarations, but the submission rate for members of government and parliament was 100% for the past six years. Data on the verification of the information contained in interest declarations is not available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Sweden fulfils 40% of criteria on political finance regulations and 29% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Regulations establish that political parties have the obligation to report their finances regularly and to make their financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling. However, regulations do not completely ban anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states and enterprises, or contributions from publicly owned enterprises.
In practice, financial reports from all political parties are publicly available on a single online platform in a user-friendly format. While the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (Kammarkollegiet) has the mandate to oversee political parties’ financing, it does not have certified auditors on its payroll, and it does not meet the OECD criteria for independence since it does not have financial accountability directly to the Swedish parliament (Riksdag). Moreover, aggregated data on the number of cases related to breaches of political finance regulations, number of investigations conducted, and a breakdown of the different types of sanctions are not publicly available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Sweden fulfils 56% of criteria on transparency of public information regulations and 42% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The only restrictions to access to public information allowed are listed by law and are in line with the Tromsø Convention, and the regulations establish the right to appeal in the case of refusal of an administrative agency. In Sweden information requested is in many cases provided free of charge, but a fee can be charged for copies of public documents. Furthermore, requesters are not required to provide justification for their requests.
In practice, there is proactive disclosure of the following integrity-related datasets: consolidated versions of all primary laws, the state budget for the current calendar year, the results of the last national elections, legislative proposals of the government, Government meeting agendas, ministers’ agendas, the company registry, and the land registry. However, aggregated data on access to information requests, public tenders and their results, salaries of individual senior civil servants, and asset and interest declarations of high-level officials are not proactively published and aggregated on one website.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Sweden fulfils 59% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations and 48% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The principle of independence of judges is enshrined in one of Sweden’s four fundamental laws –the Instrument of Government. The Instrument of Government also establishes that judges can only be dismissed if they have committed a criminal act or shown gross negligence in their duties. However, no regulation exists requiring the transfer of judges to only be permitted with their consent or upon their request. The Act on the Appointment of Permanent Judges regulates the procedure for the selection of judges, which is based on a proposal from the Judges Board to the Government, who then appoints the judges. The proposal is based on interviews and considers objective factors, such as merit and competence. Regulations explicitly do not allow candidates to appeal decisions on the appointment of judges.
The Swedish judiciary has a set of guidelines on good judicial practice, which contain sections on both ethical behaviour and professional competence. Furthermore, regulations define the circumstances that can lead to conflict of interest in both judges and court employees. However, judges are only required to submit ad hoc interest declarations, and they do not include financial interests.
An internal whistle-blower reporting channel that allows individuals to confidentially or anonymously report misconduct is available for all public sector employees, which includes judges and court employees. The website of the Swedish Courts provides information on who can receive whistleblower protection, how to report misconduct, and the contact details of the relevant contact persons for all courts. The Act on the Protection of Persons Reporting Irregularities establishes a series of protective measures against retaliation for whistleblowers. However, the Judicial Training Academy has not offered mandatory trainings on confidentiality to staff handling reports in courts.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Sweden fulfils 66% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations and implements 68% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The Employment Protection Act (1982:80) regulations establish objective grounds for the dismissal of all public servants, which includes prosecutors. The Code of Judicial Procedure and the Public Employment Act (1994:260) define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors, and establish sanctions. They also define the specific circumstances that could lead to the recusal of prosecutors. The selection and promotion of public prosecutors is regulated by Ordinance containing Instructions for the Swedish Prosecution Authority (2015:743). The Swedish Prosecution Authority appoints prosecutors that fulfil certain requirements based on the advice of an employment board. However, the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General are appointed by the government, and the Attorney General appoints chief prosecutors and deputy chief prosecutors directly. As prosecutors are public employees, the Instrument of Government requires that their appointments are based on objective factors such as merit t. Regulations also establish the right of appeal to appointment decisions. However, high-ranking prosecutors are only required to submit ad hoc declarations, and they do not include financial interests.
The prosecutorial service is subject to a set of ethical guidelines for the prosecution service, and prosecutors also have access to an internal reporting channel for whistleblowers. The websites of the Swedish Prosecution Authority and the Swedish Economic Crime Authority provide information on who can receive whistleblower protection, and the process to report and follow-up on misconduct. The Act on the Protection of Persons Reporting Irregularities establishes a series of protective measures against retaliation for whistleblowers. All new employees at the Prosecutor’s Office undergo training on confidentiality, including confidentiality regarding whistleblowing reports, but there is no such mandatory training for staff handling confidential reports in the Swedish Economic Crime Authority.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Sweden fulfils 58% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, but only 33% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Public Employment Act (1994:260) in Sweden defines what constitutes a disciplinary offence and, complemented by other regulations, establishes a disciplinary procedure for public servants. A range of disciplinary sanctions is established in regulations. However, there is no provision establishing that these should vary according to the severity and circumstances of the offence. Disciplinary decisions can be appealed through a labour court system after exhausting administrative remedies.
The Swedish Agency for Government Employers (SAGE) has issued relevant guidelines for public authorities on conducting disciplinary proceedings, and offers trainings on how to conduct disciplinary investigations to officials. However, not all central government bodies are required to use an electronic case management system to manage disciplinary cases and proceedings. Although data on the number and type of disciplinary sanctions applied against civil servants is published, it is not available in an open or user-friendly format which allows searching, filtering and downloading the data.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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