Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Korea
Table of contents
Korea’s Five‑Year Comprehensive Anti‑Corruption Plan (2018–2022) set out 15 objectives across four priority areas: strengthening integrity standards, preventing conflicts of interest, curbing abuse of power, and addressing corruption in recruitment. Informed by international standards, the Plan included clear implementation and monitoring mechanisms. While it guided anti‑corruption policy through 2022, a new national strategy is currently under development.
Institutionally, the Anti‑Corruption and Civil Rights Commission coordinates integrity policy and oversees conflict‑of‑interest prevention, playing a central role in promoting transparency, integrity awareness, and policy coherence across the public sector; the National Election Commission supervises political finance; and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety manages public information and open data policy. Korea’s regulatory framework is comprehensive in conflict‑of‑interest prevention and political finance, and well‑developed in access to information.
The Constitution and the Court Organisation Act provide the overarching framework for judicial integrity. The Judges Personnel Committee plays a central role in judicial appointments, and standards of conduct and ethics apply to all judges. Prosecutors are governed by the Prosecutors’ Office Act, which establishes tenure safeguards, conflict-of-interest restrictions, asset declaration obligations, and disciplinary procedures under the Act on Discipline of Prosecutors. A disciplinary procedure for civil servants is also established under the State Public Officials Act.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Korea’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 0% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Korea’s Five-Year Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Plan (2018-2022) identified four strategic areas: i) strengthening integrity standards; ii) preventing conflicts of interest among public officials; iii) addressing abuse of power in the public sector; and iv) eradicating corruption in the recruitment processes of public institutions. Across these areas, the Plan set out 15 objectives to mitigate corruption risks in the public sector.
The strategic framework also included measures for human resource management and public financial management to address integrity risks across both the public and private sectors. It was informed by the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention against Corruption and employed data on public integrity from international organisations and household surveys. The framework incorporated an action plan that identified lead organisations for each objective and established monitoring and evaluation arrangements.
While the 2018-2022 Plan provided a coherent and results-oriented basis for integrity policy, a new national anti-corruption strategy is yet to be adopted.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 40% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The regulatory framework establishes cooling-off periods for public officials and provides sanctions proportionate to breaches of transparency and integrity standards related to lobbying. However, it does not define lobbying activities or specify which actors are considered as lobbyists, nor does it include cooling-off periods for lobbyists or mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership through a public register.
Lobbying is referenced indirectly in the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act, which prohibits improper solicitation but does not provide a formal definition of lobbying. Developing a comprehensive legal definition covering influence and advocacy activities beyond the current scope of the Act, accompanied by mechanisms for registration, disclosure, and oversight, could further strengthen transparency and accountability in public decision-making.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 100% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The regulatory framework defines incompatibilities between public functions and other activities, identifies situations that may give rise to conflicts of interest, and sets out corresponding management obligations. Asset declarations are required from members of the Government, Parliament, and the highest judicial bodies upon entry into office, renewal, or change in position. In practice, compliance rates remain high — 100% among Government members, at least 90% in Parliament, and 80% in the judiciary. Declarations are submitted electronically and verified using a risk-based approach, with over 60% reviewed in the past two years.
The Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission oversees conflict of interest guidance, and data management, while competent institutions investigate violations and apply timely recommendations or sanctions. The slight improvement in practice reflects recent data confirming that recommendations are issued within 12 months for conflict-of-interest cases.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 70% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 43% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The regulatory framework establishes limits on campaign expenditure, prohibits contributions from foreign and publicly owned enterprises, and bans the use of public resources in favour of or against political parties. Candidates can be held personally liable for violations, with sanctions defined and proportionate to the severity of offences. Political parties and candidates are required to report their campaign finances, and compliance with reporting timelines has remained consistent over the past five years. Compared to the OECD average, public funding to political parties constitutes a relatively smaller share of political party financing in Korea.
Oversight is carried out by the National Election Commission, an independent body mandated to supervise party and campaign financing. However, the regulations do not prohibit anonymous donations or require public disclosure of detailed financial reports, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling, which represents a gap relative to international practice. Implementation remains limited in terms of the transparency of audits, investigations, and sanctions.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 56% of criteria on public information regulations, and 77% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The legal framework ensures broad access to public information through clear procedures and statutory deadlines for processing requests. Applicants may obtain information in their preferred format without providing justification and appeals to an independent body or the courts are guaranteed. Decisions of the specialised oversight body cannot be overturned by the executive.
In practice, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety oversees public information and open data policy under institutional safeguards. Aggregated statistics on access requests are published regularly, and comprehensive information (e.g., legislation, budgets, election results, public tenders, and asset declarations) is made available online. Remaining gaps concern the absence of “open by default” provisions, limited coverage of non‑citizens and legal persons, and the non-publication of government session records.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 59% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 36% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The principle of judicial independence is enshrined in the Constitution, and the legal framework guarantees judges tenure until retirement, expiry of term, or dismissal on objective grounds. Appointment procedures are based on recommendations from the Judges Personnel Committee as an independent body, and standards of conduct and ethics apply to all judges, including provisions addressing situations that may give rise to conflicts of interest.
Regulations provide for merit‑based and objective procedures including written examinations and interviews in the initial selection and appointment of judges. In Korea’s single‑rank judicial system, judges serving in different courts hold the same official status and there is no formal promotion system.
The Code of Judicial Ethics applies to all judges and serves both as a standard of ethical conduct and a code of behavioural compliance. The Public Service Ethics Act and the Act on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest Related to Duties of Public Servants establish interest disclosure requirements for all national judges, including those in the highest judicial bodies. However, data on interest declarations of judges, detected cases of judicial conflicts of interest, and corresponding recommendations are not collected. .
The Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission operates a whistleblower protection system under the Public Interest Whistleblower Protection Act. Judicial misconduct is not explicitly covered by the Act or related regulations, and procedures for reporting misconduct within the judiciary are not included within these protections.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 45% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 37% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Entry into the prosecution service follows a competitive selection procedure under the Prosecutors’ Office Act, which includes written and oral examinations and through the Judicial Research and Training Institute, although these are not required by law. Under the Prosecutors’ Office Act, only two ranks are defined – the Prosecutor General and prosecutors – and no distinct career progression framework or appeal mechanisms are provided. Involved parties or senior prosecutors may appeal prosecutorial decisions.
The legal framework establishes objective grounds for dismissal, defines conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors, and sets out recusal procedures with corresponding resolution mechanisms. Sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest are also outlined.
Standards of conduct address conflict-of-interest risks and require interest declarations from prosecutors upon entry into office or changes in position, but implementation remains limited. No data confirm verification rates above 60% in recent years or timely resolution of identified conflicts. There are no internal channels exist for whistleblowers in public prosecutors’ offices. Reports are handled externally through e-People and Clean Portal, managed by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Korea fulfils 92% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 67% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Regulations define disciplinary offences, provide a graduated range of sanctions proportionate to the severity of offences, and establish statutes of limitations. Civil servants have the right to appeal disciplinary decisions to a judicial body after exhausting administrative remedies, and investigators must refer cases involving criminal behaviour to law enforcement or the judiciary.
Training is systematically provided to staff responsible for disciplinary investigations, supporting consistent and professional implementation of procedures. An electronic case management system for disciplinary proceedings is in place, including a register of disciplinary actions and support for documentation. While data on cases concluded and appealed by offence type are published, data on cases initiated are not regularly published.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
© OECD 2026
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. By using this work, you accept to be bound by the terms of this licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Attribution – you must cite the work.
Translations – you must cite the original work, identify changes to the original and add the following text: In the event of any discrepancy between the original work and the translation, only the text of the original work should be considered valid.
Adaptations – you must cite the original work and add the following text: This is an adaptation of an original work by the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this adaptation should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its Member countries.
Third-party material – the licence does not apply to third-party material in the work. If using such material, you are responsible for obtaining permission from the third party and for any claims of infringement.
You must not use the OECD logo, visual identity or cover image without express permission or suggest the OECD endorses your use of the work.
Any dispute arising under this licence shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Arbitration Rules 2012. The seat of arbitration shall be Paris (France). The number of arbitrators shall be one.