Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Austria
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Federal |
Parliamentary |
Bicameral |
Civil law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityThe Austrian Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) first adopted by the Council of Ministers on 31 January 2018 and last on 11 October 2023, provides a strategic framework for measures taken to prevent and combat corruption. It incorporates insights from the latest evaluation report and is supplemented by two formal Action Plans for three years. The original Strategy was drawn up by the Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAK), the Ministry of Justice, and the Federal Chancellery, in co-operation with all other relevant ministries and institutions and authorities at state level, the public sector and civil society.
Austria has a central government body responsible for anti-corruption, the Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption, Ministry of Interior (BMI). The Co-ordination Body on Combating Corruption (KgK) fulfils a coordinating function in matters of preventing and combating corruption, including inter-ministerial compliance coordination. With regard to the NACS, the BAK is responsible for the Prevention part, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for criminal prosecution. Austria has a central government body responsible for lobbying (Ministry of Justice). The Austrian Court of Auditors as well as the Independent Political Parties Transparency Panel oversee political finance. Given Austria’s constitutional allocation of competences, there are no dedicated central government bodies responsible for conflict of interest, open data policy and public information.
Judicial and prosecutorial integrity safeguards are established in the Judiciary and Public Prosecution Service Act. Complementary integrity standards are detailed in the Ministry of Justice’s Compliance Guidelines. Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, all courts and prosecutors’ offices are required to set up internal reporting channels. The Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption serves as both an internal and external reporting authority. There also is a disciplinary procedure for civil servants established in the Austria’s regulatory framework under Civil Servants Employment Act.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Austria’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 73% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 47% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) was slightly adapted following an evaluation of the NACS and the 2019-2020 action plans. The associated three-year action plans include priorities (e.g. objectives) to mitigate public integrity risks related to human resource management, internal control and risk management, public procurement fraud and other types of corruption, private sector corruption, and education. While it contains a situation analysis, including identification of existing public integrity risks and outcome-level indicators for public integrity objectives, the strategy was not based on a formal comprehensive risk assessment.
The Action Plan 2023-2025 contained 120 secondary objectives to support the primary objectives outlined in the strategy and these are supported by 228 specific actions, each of which has lead organisations and both output and outcome level indicators. The second action plan for organisations voluntarily involved in implementing the Anti-Corruption Strategy introduces additional measures for private sector organisations and contains 111 operational objectives with 228 specific actions and 216 success indicators. The evaluation report for the 2023-2025 action plans was adopted and made publicly available by the Co-ordination body on combating corruption (KgK) on 28 January 2026. The anti-corruption strategy continues to exist as a long-term strategy, and the new action plans for 2026–2028 are currently under development.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 60% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 67% on practice, exceeding the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Regulations define lobbying activities, and which actors are considered lobbyists and establish sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying. Moreover, Austria has taken several steps to encourage transparency of lobbying activities and prevent undue influence in practice. These include, for example, a Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Corruption in the Civil Service, which provides practical examples of how civil servants can deal with situations that may indicate corruption, online registration tools for lobbyists, and a publicly available lobbying register operated by the Ministry of Justice. However, regulations do not require the disclosure of the legislation and/or regulations targeted by lobbyists, and this information is not publicly available online, which limits the amount of transparency that the lobbying register provides.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 67% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 22% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Austria’s regulations define incompatibilities between public functions and other private or public activities and circumstances that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations. They outline submission procedures for interest declarations for both members of Government and parliament and define sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions.
The submission rate of interest declarations from both members of parliament and Government is 100% in the last six years. However, there is no data for members of the highest bodies of the judiciary and newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants of the executive branch as neither are required to submit interest declarations (with the exception of a reporting requirement for gainful secondary employment). The incompatibility committees of the National Council, Federal Council and the Court of Auditors are generally the competent bodies responsible for examining the verification of declaration and issuing recommendations for resolution conflict-of-interest cases. However, declarations are not verified according to a risk-based approach, and less than 60% of declarations filed during the latest two full calendar years were verified.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 70% of criteria on political finance regulations and 100% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Austria’s regulatory framework includes personal liability for electoral candidates that violate the rules, proportionate sanctions, and bans on donations from publicly owned enterprises. Limits on campaign expenses, comprehensive reporting requirements, and mandatory public disclosure of party finances are in place.
However, Austria does not impose a total ban on anonymous or foreign donations. Anonymous donations are prohibited above EUR 150 per individual case (EUR 180 from 2026 onwards) and donations from foreign natural or legal persons, including entities with foreign beneficial owners, are prohibited where they exceed EUR 500 per case (EUR 580 from 2026), with EU citizens residing in Austria exempt from this restriction.
Donations exceeding the statutory thresholds, as well as financial reports of political parties at federal and provincial levels, are publicly available through the Austrian Court of Audit.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 78% of criteria on public information regulations and 35% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
From 1 September 2025, Austria's new federal constitutional amendment and Freedom of Information Act grant everyone the right to access information held by federal, state, and municipal administrations, including private entities performing public administrative tasks. This right also extends to private entities not performing public tasks, but under the control of the Court of Audit, including companies, foundations, institutions and funds in which the federal government, a state, or a municipality holds at least a 50% stake, or controls these by other mechanisms, e.g. controlling influence. Requests must typically be fulfilled within four weeks, with information supplied in the format specified by the applicant. Submitting requests, receiving information, and related decisions incur no administrative fees.
The constitutional changes further mandate that the National Council and the Federal Council all relevant administrative bodies, ordinary courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Constitutional Court proactively publish information of general public interest in an accessible manner, unless secrecy is legally justified. No dedicated institution oversees these obligations exclusively; instead, standard legal remedies provide recourse for any disputes. In Austria, the general framework for legal protection in matters of access to public information includes administrative appeals, judicial review, and oversight by bodies such as the Ombudsman Board and the Data Protection Authority. These mechanisms enable citizens to challenge refusals of access and ensure compliance by public authorities with transparency requirements.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityFigure 7. Judicial integrity
Copy link to Figure 7. Judicial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 74% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 52% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The Judiciary and Public Prosecution Service Act ensures judges’ secure tenure until mandatory retirement, resignation, or lawful dismissal permitted only on objective grounds such as, loss of Austrian citizenship, or a final disciplinary sanction. The Judiciary and Public Prosecution Service Act also regulates the procedures for the selection, appointment, and promotion of judges. Judicial panels propose candidates to the Ministry of Justice, which in turn recommends appointments to the Federal President. The proposals shall consist of at least three candidates. Similarly, for positions of the Supreme Court’s President and Vice President, a judicial panel chaired by the senior President of a Higher Regional Court and composed of elected judicial members conducts interviews and submits appointment proposals to the Ministry of Justice. If the Minister of Justice intends not to follow any of the proposals, this shall be communicated to the judicial panels in writing, stating the relevant considerations. However, candidates do not have the right to appeal decisions concerning selection, appointment, and promotion.
Integrity standards are provided under the Judiciary and Public Prosecution Service Act and the Ministry of Justice’s Compliance Guidelines, which outline potential conflicts of interest. However, judges and members of the highest prosecutorial authorities are not required to file declarations of interest upon appointment, renewal, or change of position. In addition to these integrity provisions, mechanisms for reporting misconduct are addressed under the Whistleblower Protection Act, which requires the establishment of internal reporting channels within all courts and prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. The Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption serves as both an internal and external reporting authority. Nonetheless, there is no obligation for court personnel handling such reports to undergo confidentiality training. Regarding allocation of cases, judges have detailed regulations establishing procedures for both the initial allocation and re-allocation of cases based on objective criteria such as workload distribution and specialisation.
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityFigure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Figure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 72% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 47% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
In Austria, judges and prosecutors are governed by the same legal framework under the Judiciary and Public Prosecution Service Act, which defines circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest for prosecutors, establishes sanctions for related violations, and specifies objective grounds for their dismissal. The Code of Criminal Procedure further requires prosecutors to recuse themselves when conflicts arise and allocates institutional responsibilities for resolution. It also allows appeals of prosecutorial decisions.
Transparent and merit-based procedures govern the selection and promotion of prosecutors. All positions are publicly advertised, and selection criteria mirror those applied to judicial appointments. However, the Act does not grant candidates the right to appeal decisions related to selection, appointment, or promotion.
The Whistleblower Protection Act obliges prosecutors’ offices to establish internal reporting channels and provides safeguards against retaliation. Individuals responsible for retaliatory actions must restore legality, compensate financial loss, and redress personal harm. The internal whistleblowing platform of the Federal Ministry of Justice serves as a confidential channel for staff of both courts and prosecution offices, providing guidance on rights, procedures, and reporting of prosecutorial misconduct. However, staff responsible for processing such reports are not subject to mandatory confidentiality training.
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsFigure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Figure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Austria fulfils 75% of criteria on the disciplinary system regulations, and 67% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Civil Servants Employment Act sets out the disciplinary procedures for civil servants and defines a disciplinary offence as any violation of his or her official duties. It establishes a range of sanctions for disciplinary offences and introduces a statute of limitations for disciplinary actions. Together with the Federal Constitution, it guarantees the right to appeal disciplinary decisions before a judicial body once administrative remedies are exhausted. The Act also requires officials responsible for investigating and adjudicating disciplinary cases to notify the judiciary or law enforcement authorities if a case involves suspected criminal conduct.
All staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations receive dedicated training on investigative procedures. The Federal Academy of Public Administration, the central institution for civil service training and professional development, provides relevant courses, including specialised instruction in disciplinary law. Central government bodies manage disciplinary cases through their own electronic systems rather than a unified case-management platform, while the Federal Disciplinary Authority uses the electronic file (ELAK), the standard digital workflow system of the Austrian federal administration with interfaces to departmental units. While data on disciplinary sanctions and procedures exist in official reports, they are not published in an accessible or open data format.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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