Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Indonesia
Table of contents
Indonesia’s anti-corruption and public integrity framework centres around the National Strategy for Corruption Prevention (Stranas PK) 2014-2025, updated and adopted in 2018 through Presidential Regulation N. 54 of July 2018. The Stranas PK builds upon the National Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2025, a strategic document establishing national priorities in all areas of policymaking. It focuses on three areas: licensing and commercial systems, public financial management, and law enforcement and bureaucratic reform. All areas contain primary objectives relating to anti-corruption and public integrity. Under Presidential Regulation No. 54 of 2018, the National Secretariat for Corruption Prevention (Setnas PK), hosted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, by its Bahasa acronym), oversees the strategy’s implementation.
The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is a key piece of the strategic and institutional framework. The KPK monitors both the implementation of the Stranas PK, as well as public officials’ compliance with asset declarations submission. For its part, the Ministry for State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform (PANRB) oversees compliance with conflict-of-interest declarations. The Information Commission regulates and oversees access to public information.
The regulatory framework on judicial integrity comprises several pieces of legislation. These include Law No. 2 of 1986, as amended by Law No. 49 of 2009, Law No. 48 of 2009 on the Judicial Power, Law No. 18 of 2011 on the Judicial Commission, and Law No. 24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional Court.The Judicial Commission proposes candidates for appointment and promotion as Supreme Court judges. The prosecutorial career is governed by Law No. 16 of 2004. Government Regulation No. 94 of 2021 on Civil Servant Discipline sets forth the disciplinary procedure for civil servants.
Note: 2025 data and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Indonesia’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 60% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 57% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The National Strategy for Corruption Prevention contains a short situation analysis broadly describing existing public integrity risks. It also sets outcome-level indicators for the strategic objectives and references to international legal instruments related to anti-corruption. The implementation of the Stranas PK is supported by action plans that identify a central co-ordination function and lead organisations for each action, both at the national and subnational level, such as KPK, the Ministry of National Development Planning, the Head of the National Development Agency, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of State Apparatus, Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform and the Presidential Chief of Staff adopting the Corruption Prevention Action Plan.
However, preparation of the Stranas PK was not informed by a comprehensive assessment of public integrity risks (identifying types of breaches, actors involved, likelihood and impact), nor diverse data sources. While the strategy was consulted with key integrity bodies who provided input through a public consultation framework, there is no evidence of non-state actors’ involvement in this process as part of a working group tasked with setting up the strategy. The strategy was also not uploaded to a public portal for consultation and commentary by interested parties or subject to extended public consultation mechanisms.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 40% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 11% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Indonesia has no regulations on lobbying, and therefore lobbying activities and lobbyists are not defined. There is also no supervisory body within the central government responsible for overseeing lobbying transparency, accessible lobbying registration tools, and a system for disclosing lobbying information or investigating non-compliance.
However, the Regulation of the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform on Management of Conflicts of Interest No.17/2024 establishes a two- year cooling-off period for public officials following resignation or retirement. During this time, they are prohibited from engaging in work or business closely related to their former authority, while the authority itself must refrain from taking any action that could benefit them.
Indonesia’s Presidential Regulation 13/2018 mandates the disclosure of beneficial ownership to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. The regulation sets up a central register, accessible through the Beneficial Ownership Portal.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 56% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
All elected officials, judges and civil servants must submit asset declarations according to KPK Regulation Number 7 of 2016. The Regulation of the Ministry of Bureaucratic Reform Number 17 of 2024 establishes a similar obligation for high-risk civil servants. Indonesia has set out legal incompatibilities between public and private roles (Law No. 20/2023) and sanctions proportional to the severity of the offence (Law No.30/2014). Since the adoption of KPK’s Regulation Number 2 of 2020, verification of asset declarations involves a proactive examination through an AI-driven system that detects red flags for fraudulent activities within 60 days from submission. Through this system, over 95% of all interest declarations are verified each year. However, no data has been provided on recommendations for resolution of conflict-of-interest situations and imposed sanctions for non-compliance.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 29% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58% respectively.
Public funding of political parties is regulated by Law 7/2017, which also bans anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states or enterprises, contributions from state-owned enterprises, and the use of public funds and resources in favour of or against political parties. While the threshold for personal contributions to candidates’ personal campaigns is set at IDR 2.5 billion for individuals and IDR 25 billion for entities, the regulatory framework does not establish ceilings to campaign spending by political parties and third parties. The Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK) is responsible for auditing public funding to political parties, as per Law No.15/2006.
In terms of political finance disclosure and reporting, KPU Regulation No. 18/2023 requires parties and/or candidates to report their finances during electoral campaigns, which are made available on the General Elections Commission (KPU) Portal. Law 7/2017 requires private donations, whether from individuals, groups, companies and NGOs, to be reported to the KPU, the independent electoral board, responsible for managing, coordinating, supervising and monitoring every stage of the electoral process. Nonetheless, political parties are not mandated to make their annual financial reports publicly available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 56% on public information regulations, and 58% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% of criteria and 62%, respectively.
The Access to Information Law states that information on all branches of Government can be accessed via freedom of information requests, but the regulation does not extend access to foreign citizens. The Information Commission conducts inspections for non-compliance within the public administration and processes access to information requests. The central government institution overseeing open data policy is the Satu Data Indonesia Secretariat, a unit within the Ministry of National Development Planning.
In practice, Indonesia proactively discloses a wide range of integrity-related datasets, including on the national budget, interest declarations by public officials and legislative proposals discussed in Parliament. However, a consolidated repository of primary laws, government sessions and ministerial agendas are not made available to the public online.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 41% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 64% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia guarantees the independence of the judiciary. The legal framework does not establish guaranteed tenure for judges until mandatory retirement, the expiry of their term of office, or lawful dismissal. Objective grounds for the dismissal of judges are set out in law.
Law No. 49 of 2009 (which amends Law No. 2 of 1986) primarily regulates procedures for the selection, appointment, and promotion of judges. It defines general court judges as district and high court judges, sets qualification and selection requirements for each level. Written tests or panel interviews are not required for either the selection or promotion process. Judges are appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Judicial Commission is responsible for proposing judges for appointment to and promotion within the Supreme Court. Judicial appointment recommendations require the approval of the People’s Representative Council. Decisions on the selection and appointment of judges may be challenged through administrative dispute mechanisms.
Standards of conduct for judges are established in the Code of Ethics and the Guidelines for Judges’ Conduct. Conflict-of-interest situations are regulated by decree and judges are subject to interest and asset declaration requirements, including annual submission and upon taking and leaving office.
Judicial whistleblowing channels within the judiciary are established. Regulations guarantee confidentiality of the complaint, yet no legal provisions state that those responsible for handling whistleblower reports receive specialised training, and protection against retaliation for reporting judicial misconduct is not established in law.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 34% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 21% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The Attorney General’s Office and the prosecutorial career are governed by Law No. 16 of 2004, as amended by Law No. 11 of 2021. The regulatory framework provides that recruitment, career development, promotions, transfers, discipline, and supervision of prosecutors must be conducted in an open, professional, and accountable manner based on qualifications, competencies, and performance. Both the Constitution and Law No. 16 of 2004 grant the President authority to appoint the Attorney General, without a formal requirement for approval by the People’s Representative Council or the Judicial Commission. Objective grounds are established for dismissal of prosecutors. Under the existing legal framework, prosecutorial decisions can neither be appealed by affected parties nor reviewed by a senior prosecutor.
The Criminal Procedure Code and Regulation of the Attorney General No. 2 of 2020 define the circumstances and relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest for prosecutors and establish both management and recusal obligations. Prosecutors are required to submit asset declarations in accordance with KPK Regulation No. 7 of 2016 and Law No. 28 of 1999.
Whistleblowing arrangements are regulated under Regulation of the Attorney General No. 3 of 2020 on the Handling of Reports and Protection of Reporters of Legal Violations, which establishes an internal reporting channel accessible to current employees of the Attorney General’s Office. Additional complaint mechanisms are available through the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission. As there is no whistleblower protection framework in place, personnel responsible for handling such reports are not required to undergo mandatory confidentiality training.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Indonesia fulfils 58% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Government Regulation No. 94 of 2021 on Civil Servant Discipline defines the obligations and prohibitions applicable to civil servants and establishes what constitutes a disciplinary sanction. Law No. 20 of 2023 on the State Civil Apparatus and implementing regulations issued by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform and the National Civil Service Agency sets out a range of disciplinary sanctions corresponding to different types of offences. However, the legislation does not establish a statute of limitations for disciplinary action.
Under Regulation No. 79/2021, civil servants may challenge the decisions issued by the Personnel Supervisory Office (PPK) through administrative appeal before a judicial body, once all administrative remedies have been exhausted. However, the regulatory framework lacks an obligation to notify judicial or law enforcement authorities when a disciplinary case involves potential criminal conduct.
Disciplinary investigations are conducted in accordance with Government Regulation No. 94 of 2021 and BKN Regulation No. 6 of 2022, which detail investigative procedures and the composition of investigation teams. Nonetheless, there is no requirement for officials responsible for disciplinary investigations to receive specialised training in disciplinary law or investigative techniques.
In terms of information management and public availability, there is no unified or centralised electronic case management system for disciplinary proceedings across central government bodies. Information on the number of disciplinary cases and the types of sanctions imposed is confidential – hence not published online either.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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