Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Costa Rica
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Unitary |
Presidential |
Unicameral |
Civil law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityCosta Rica adopted the National Strategy of Integrity and Prevention of Corruption 2021-2030 (ENIPC) which was declared of public interest by the Executive Decree 43248-MJP. The strategy was co-created by different ministries and government bodies as well as other key stakeholders. It includes an action plan, as well as a series of strategic objectives to mitigate public integrity risks in human resources, in public-private interactions, conflicts of interest, bribery and traffic of influence, and in the management of lobbying activities. The Ministry of Justice is the guarantor of the implementation and fulfilment of the objectives of the ENIPC, and a dedicated Task Force is responsible for overseeing implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the action plan.
The National Commission for an Open State is responsible for open data policy at the level of the central government. Costa Rica regulates conflicts of interest through a series of laws which set out guidance, prohibitions and incompatibilities between private interests and public roles. Conflicts of interest are managed primarily in the management chain with support from HR offices, and complaints on conflicts of interest are overseen by the Attorney for Public Ethics and the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is the independent body with the mandate to oversee political finance. No dedicated lobbying regulations have yet been enacted in Costa Rica. The selection and appointment of judges is based on the recommendations of, the Council of the Judiciary, except for permanent Supreme Court judges. The Ministry of Planification and Economic Policy has the authority to issue guidelines on the standardisation of disciplinary proceedings for civil servants.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Costa Rica’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 53% of criteria on the strength of the strategic framework, and 47% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Costa Rica’s National Strategy of Integrity and Prevention of Corruption 2021-2030 (ENIPC) includes outcome-level indicators for public integrity objectives, including set targets for these indicators. The Strategy underwent mandatory inter-governmental and public consultation processes. The Ministry of Justice is the guarantor of the fulfilment of the objectives of the Strategy, and a dedicated Task Force is responsible for its implementation. However, associated action plans do not link objectives with identified lead organisations, nor do they relate to specific financial plans. Monitoring reports on the action plans have not yet been published, and the implementation rate of activities is not public.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Costa Rica has no dedicated lobbying law but manages interactions between public office holders and outside interests through a series of other regulations. For example, cooling-off periods for public officials are established in the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Administration (Law 8422), which prohibits public officials from accepting paid employment or acquiring equity in a company that was awarded a public contract if the official had participated in any phase of that contract during the previous year.
However, the current regulatory framework in Costa Rica does not define lobbying or lobbyists, set out sanctions for breaches of lobbying and influence rules, establish a central government supervisory function to oversee transparency of lobbying activities, nor mandate the disclosure of company data to identify owners of corporations or make information accessible to the public including through a central register. No cooling-off periods are in place for lobbyists entering public roles. Costa Rica also has no lobbying register to improve transparency around influence activities through disclosure of information such as domains of intervention, types of lobbying activities and related budgets and expenses.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 89% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The country’s Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function (No. 8422) presents a comprehensive regulatory framework on conflicts of interest. It lists incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private functions and defines institutional responsibilities. Any member of government, parliament, or the highest body of the judiciary, as well as public employees in high-risk positions and top-tier civil servants must submit interest declarations. The submission rate of declarations for these functions is over 90%, and the vast majority of them have been verified according to a risk-based approach by the Direction of Ethics of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The same body has issued a range of sanctions during the past three years for cases of non-compliance with disclosure obligations.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 86% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The Electoral Code defines sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations and bans anonymous donations as well as contributions from foreign states or enterprises and publicly owned enterprises. Parties and/or candidates must report their finances during electoral campaigns and make financial reports public. However, no ceilings are set to electoral campaign expenses for parties and to personal contributions to candidates’ personal campaigns.
In practice, financial reports from all political parties are publicly available on a single platform and in a user-friendly format. Furthermore, according to the monitoring of the independent oversight body on political finance, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, parties have submitted their annual accounts within the timelines defined by the national legislation.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 56% of criteria on public information regulations, and 46% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
In Costa Rica, everyone including non-citizens and legal persons, has the right to access information in all forms available following the adoption of Law No.10544 in 2024, although no primary legislation establishes that government data is “open by default”. Responsibility for open data policy and its monitoring lies in central government with the National Commission for an Open State, but there is no supervisory body responsible for managing potential issues related to transparency of public information. As a result, no statistical data exists on information requests, and no sanctions for non-compliance are issued. While consolidated versions of all primary laws, legislative proposals submitted to parliament, and asset declarations of top-tier public employees, judges, and national elected officials are published online, datasets such as government sessions agendas, ministers’ agendas and aggregated data on lobbying on public decision making are not.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityFigure 7. Judicial integrity
Copy link to Figure 7. Judicial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 74% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 60% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The principle of independence of judges is enshrined in articles 9 and 154 of Costa Rica’s Constitution. The Organic Law of the Judiciary (LOPJ) establishes guaranteed tenure and objective grounds for the dismissal of judges. The Judicial Career Act regulates the procedure for the selection of judges, which is based on open and competitive examinations for entry and promotion within the judicial career. However, these procedures do not apply to Supreme Court Judges, which are appointed by Congress for a period of eight years. Regulations do not establish the right of candidates to appeal decisions on the appointment and promotion of judges.
The Costa Rican judiciary has a code of ethics, which applies to all judicial personnel and is available online. Furthermore, Circular 72/2019 by the Supreme Court and Law No. 8422/2004 define the circumstances that can lead to conflict of interest in judges and court employees. All national judges are required to submit an asset declaration to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The submission rate of these declarations was 98% for the past four years.
There is a general complaints procedure to report judicial misconduct and an internal whistle-blower reporting channel that allows individuals to confidentially or anonymously report misconduct. The internal reporting channel includes information on whistleblowers rights and the procedures to report misconduct. Law No. 10437 establishes a series of protection measures against retaliation for whistleblowers. However, although staff handling reports in courts are required to read and abide by a manual, no training on confidentiality is made mandatory to this staff.
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityFigure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Figure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 66% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 68% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The LOPJ also establishes objective grounds for the dismissal of prosecutors. Costa Rica’s regulations define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors and establish sanctions. They also define the specific circumstances that could lead to the recusal of prosecutors.
The selection and promotion of public prosecutors is also regulated by Law No.7728/1997 on the Public Prosecutor's Service Law, but it does not establish merit-based, objective procedures. Prosecutors must fulfil certain requirements but are appointed by the Prosecutor General, and the Prosecutor General is appointed by majority of the Supreme Court. The law does not establish the right of appeal to appointment decisions.
The code of ethics of Costa Rica’s judiciary also applies to prosecutors, and prosecutors also have access to an internal reporting channel for whistleblowers. Although staff handling reports in public prosecutors’ offices are required to maintain confidentiality, they do not undergo mandatory trainings on the matter.
Moreover, prosecutors are obliged to submit an interest declaration annually. The overall submission rate of interest declarations among the highest members of prosecutorial authorities was 93% over the past four years, and more than 90% of these declarations were verified by the General Comptroller’s Office in 2024 and 2023.
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsFigure 9. Disciplinary system
Copy link to Figure 9. Disciplinary system
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Costa Rica fulfils 83% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Several regulations in Costa Rica establish a disciplinary procedure for public servants, but the law does not define what constitutes a disciplinary offence. Law No.1581 on Civil Service and Law No.10159 on Public Employment establishes a range of disciplinary sanctions for offences. Disciplinary decisions can be appealed in front of a judicial body after exhausting the administrative remedies according the Law on the Public Administration.
No training programme on how to conduct disciplinary investigations is offered to officials in Costa Rica. Furthermore, not all central government bodies are required to use an electronic case management system to manage disciplinary cases and proceedings. Although administrative records exist, there is no aggregate information on the disciplinary procedures initiated the and sanctions issued available to the public.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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