Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Peru
Table of contents
The National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Policy was adopted in 2017 by Decreto Supremo Nº 092-2017-PCM. The Policy was drafted through a participatory process led by the General Coordination of the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (CAN), and was submitted to the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers for evaluation and approval. The strategy is currently undergoing an update to extend its validity until 2040.
The definition of lobbyists and lobbying activities in Peru is found in Law 28 024. However, there is no centralised body charged with supervising the transparency of lobbying activities, and no public register of lobbyists. The Secretariat of Public Integrity of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Comptroller General of the Republic are the institutions responsible for establishing regulations, guidelines, and directives for the proper management of situations involving conflicts of interest, while the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) is the independent body that monitors political finance. The Transparency and Access to Public Information Tribunal is the supervisory body responsible for public information issues, and the Secretariat of Government and Digital Transformation of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers is the unit responsible for monitoring open data policy. Judicial governance is entrusted to the National Board of Justice (JNJ), a constitutionally autonomous body responsible for the selection, appointment, evaluation and dismissal of judges and prosecutors. Disciplinary proceedings for civil servants are handled by a technical secretariat within each public entity, with appeals decided by the Civil Service Court.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Peru’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Peru fulfils 60% of criteria on strength of the strategic framework, and 27% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Peru’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Policy was adopted at the highest level of government in 2017 by Decree Nº 092-2017-PCM. The High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (CAN) is the main body charged with the monitoring and evaluation of the strategy. The strategy is currently undergoing an update with the intention to extend its validity until 2040. No action plan is set with activities and targets related to the strategy’s objectives, as Decree Nº 029-2018-PCM establishes that national policies do not require the elaboration of additional action plans.
The CAN, with support from the Public Integrity Secretariat of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for the follow-up, monitoring and evaluation of the Policy. According to Peru’s regulations, national policies do not require the elaboration of additional action plans.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Peru fulfils 40% of criteria for lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Peru’s regulatory framework provides a definition of lobbyists and lobbying activities in Law No. 28024. The law establishes a 12-month cooling-off period for former public officials. During that period, they may not engage in lobbying activities in matters for which they had direct responsibility while in office. While Law No. 31564 establishes certain restrictions on private individuals which extend up to three years after the termination of their employment, it does not apply to lobbyists as defined by Law No. 28024. Law 28 024 and the Civil Service Act establish sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying for public officials, but there are no sanctions applicable to lobbyists.
There is no authority responsible for overseeing lobbying activities. Until 2017, lobbyists were required to register in a public registry. This requirement was removed following amendments to Law No. 28024. As a result, Peru no longer maintains a public lobbying registry. There is therefore no official registry identifying who is lobbying, on whose behalf, or on which issues.
Peru regulates the obligation of persons and legal entities to report on the identification of final beneficiaries under Legislative Decree 1372. However, the registry is not publicly available online.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Peru fulfils 89% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 33% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 80% and 45% respectively.
In Peru, Law No. 31564 and other regulations govern incompatibilities between public and private functions, including restrictions related to the hiring of personnel. In addition, although some sectoral and post-employment regulations provide for the management of conflict-of-interest risks in specific contexts, the general legal framework does not establish either a general duty or procedures for public officials to manage conflict-of-interest situations.
Members of government, of the parliament, of the highest bodies of the judiciary, as well as public employees in high-risk positions and top-tier civil servants, are obliged to present a sworn statement of interests as per Law 31 227. This same law assigns institutional responsibilities to the Comptroller General to oversee implementation and gives it the power to issue sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions.
However, since the Annual Reports by the Office of the Comptroller General only include aggregated numbers, it is not possible to determine the submission rate of interest declarations from any of the functions. Furthermore, less than 60% of declarations were verified by the Comptroller General during the last two years. No information on the sanctions issued during the past three years in cases of breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions is available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Database (data extracted on 24 February 2026)
As measured against OECD standards on political finance, Peru fulfils 80% of criteria on regulations, and 57% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Peru’s regulations on political finance are mainly stipulated by Law 28 094. The law establishes sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations and establishes that electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches of these regulations. Moreover, Law 28 094 bans anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states or enterprises, and contributions from publicly owned enterprises to political parties. Although there are limits established for contributions to electoral campaigns (including personal contributions), no ceiling is fixed to limit electoral campaign expenses for parties. In addition, during electoral campaigns parties must report their finances to the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE), which is the independent body charged with overseeing political finance. However, there is no obligation for political parties to make their financial reports public.
The website of ONPE has dedicated sections on private and public financing, which can be filtered to find the financial reports of political parties in a user-friendly manner. However, not all parties represented in Congress have submitted accounts related to elections within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past two election cycles.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
As measured against OECD standards on public information, which include access to information and open data, Peru fulfils 89% of criteria related to regulations, and 92% related to practice, while the OECD average is 72% and 62%, respectively.
Access to public information in Peru is established in Law 27 806, which stipulates that every person has the right to request and receive information from any entity of the public administration, and that the public administration has an obligation to provide the requested information. Statutory deadlines are specified for processing requests for information, and the right to appeal against refusal or inactivity of an administrative body is ensured. However, some reproduction costs and costs for providing information in a certain format can be charged for information requests. Additionally, Legislative Decree No. 1412 establishes Government data as “open by default”, and the Secretariat of Government and Digital Transformation of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers is the unit responsible for monitoring open data policy.
The Transparency and Access to Public Information Tribunal, part of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, is the supervisory body responsible for public information issues. The body conducts inspections of compliance and has issued sanctions for breaches of access to information provision during the last year.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Peru fulfils 71% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 68% in practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 45%, respectively. For a full assessment of Peru’s justice system, see OECD 2024.1
Judicial independence is enshrined Constitution and judges formally enjoy tenure. However, they are subject to a mandatory “ratification” procedure every seven years, conducted by the National Board of Justice (JNJ), requiring a two-thirds vote to remain in office. The grounds and evaluation criteria are set out in Resolution No.260/2020 by the JNJ. The JNJ is responsible for the appointment and promotion of judges and conducts period performance evaluations with the Magistrates’ Academy. 42% of judges hold temporary or provisional positions, which further limits tenure guarantees, above the 13% average for OECD.
The judicial Code of Ethics and is publicly available. Interest declaration submission rates for members of the highest bodies of the judiciary and for national judges were 98% and 86% for the past four years, respectively; less than 60% of declarations were verified by the responsible authority, according to annual reports by the Comptroller General.
Complaints of judicial misconduct may be sent to the National Authority for the Control of the Judiciary (ANC-PJ) or to the JNJ; both operate internal whistleblowing channels. The “Digital Board” includes complaints by the JNJ and information on judicial misconduct is publicly available, but whistleblowers do not enjoy legal protections from retaliation.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Peru fulfils 69% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 74% in practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The selection and promotion of public prosecutors is done according to a public competition process, conducted mainly by the JNJ, and regulated by Law No.30916/2019, Law No.30482/2016, and other relevant legislation. According to these regulations, all prosecutorial vacancies are public and include a written exam, a personal interview, and induction courses. However, as is the case for judges, appointment and promotion decisions cannot be appealed and are only reviewed by the JNJ.
In Peru, prosecutors are subject to a seven-year “ratification” procedure under which they may cease their functions based on criteria established in secondary regulations, namely Resolution No.260/2020. As a result, the grounds for dismissal are not exhaustively regulated at the legislative level. Peru’s regulations define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors, establish sanctions, and specify the circumstances that could lead to the recusal of prosecutors.
Besides the general code of ethics that all public officials must follow, prosecutors are also subject to a specific code of conduct and are obliged to present interest and asset declarations. Although the submission rate of interest declarations is above 80%, no data is available on the verification.
Peru’s regulations establish internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in public prosecutors’ offices managed either by the National Authority on Control of the Public Prosecutor (ANCMP) or the JNJ. Complaints managed by the JNJ can be presented over at a “Digital Board”. However, protection against retaliation for whistleblowers is not established by law.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Peru fulfils 75% of criteria on regulations related to the disciplinary system for civil servants, and 50% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Law 30 057 defines what constitutes a disciplinary offence and establishes a disciplinary procedure for civil servants. It also establishes a range of disciplinary sanctions and a statute of limitations for each type of disciplinary offence. Disciplinary decisions can be appealed in front of a judicial body when there are different interpretations on evidence or law, or when there is new instrumental evidence, after exhausting administrative remedies. The rights of accused civil servants are also ensured by the same law and include the presumption of innocence, the right to access and contest evidence, the right to a hearing, and the right to legal counsel.
The National School on Public Administration of the National Authority of Civil Service has conducted seminars, courses, and conferences on how to conduct disciplinary investigations, reaching 16,414 officials between 2015 and 2024.
There is no electronic case management system for disciplinary cases and proceedings, and no information on the number of disciplinary procedures initiated or concluded against civil servants. However, there is information on the disciplinary procedures appealed and resolved through Civil Service data, and on disciplinary sanctions issued through a national registry on sanctions against public officials
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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← 1. OECD (2024) OECD Justice Review of Peru: Towards Effective and Transparent Justice Institutions for Inclusive Growth, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/07/oecd-justice-review-of-peru_de9fb54d.html