Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Chile
Table of contents
The Chilean National Public Integrity Strategy 2023-2033 (ENIP) is the country’s main strategic and operational framework for preventing and combating corruption. The Strategy adopts a comprehensive and integrated approach to the promotion of a culture of integrity, structured around five thematic pillars: Public Service, Public Resources, Transparency, Politics, and the Private Sector.
Responsibility for coordinating the implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the ENIP action plan rests with the Presidential Advisory Commission for Public Integrity and Transparency. The Commission advises the President of the Republic on public integrity, administrative probity, and transparency in the exercise of public functions.
The Council for Transparency is responsible for overseeing access to public information and, together with the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, supervises the transparency of lobbying activities for most authorities. The Comptroller General also enforces conflict-of-interest regulations by managing the electronic asset and interest declaration system, investigating breaches, and imposing sanctions. Oversight of political parties and electoral campaigns is carried out by the Electoral Service of Chile.
The Constitution and the Organic Code of Tribunals (COT) provide the regulatory framework for judicial integrity in Chile. The Prosecutor’s Office, a constitutionally autonomous body, is governed by the Constitution and the Organic Constitutional Law of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Disciplinary procedures for civil servants are established under Law No. 18.883 (Administrative Statute) and complementary legislation which defines disciplinary offences, sanctions, and applicable procedures across the public administration,Law No. 18,883 regulates the Administrative Statute applicable to municipal officials.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Chile’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 87% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 77% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The National Public Integrity Strategy 2023-2033 (ENIP) is a strong and comprehensive strategic framework for anti-corruption and public integrity. It represents the first strategy of its kind adopted at the central government level in Chile. The ENIP is accompanied by an annexed action plan that translates its main strategic objectives into concrete actions. The action plan mirrors the Strategy’s thematic structure and includes 210 measures aimed at preventing corruption and strengthening public integrity. For each measure, the Strategy identifies a lead institution and includes a dedicated “Challenges” section outlining the mechanisms for implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation. However, the action plan does not include outcome-level indicators or baseline targets to assess impact over time, nor does it provide an end-of-term evaluation. Additionally, the plan lacks financial estimates, additional costs, or cost projections for specific activities.
Monitoring of the ENIP is both internal and external. The Public Integrity Commission handles internal monitoring while the Chilean Anti-Corruption Alliance and the Open Government Partnership provide external oversight. In 2025, both bodies assumed this role, and the Alliance (a multi-stakeholder working group) amended its statutes to formally include this function.
The ENIP was developed through an extensive and inclusive consultation process. It underwent inter-institutional and public consultations, complemented by broader participatory initiatives such as town hall meetings. Key integrity institutions were consulted and contributed through established intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, while civil society and academic stakeholders participated through a dedicated working group.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 40% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 78% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Law No. 20.730 establishes the legal framework governing lobbying activities in Chile by defining what constitutes lobbying and identifying who qualifies as a lobbyist. The law sets out transparency and integrity standards applicable to lobbying activities and provides for sanctions that are proportionate to the severity of any breaches. Oversight of lobbying transparency is shared between various authorities, but mainly the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Council for Transparency.
Interactions between public officials and lobbyists are further regulated by a code of conduct issued by the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency. Chile has an operational lobbyist register that enables the classification and consultation of information disclosed by lobbyists, including their name, affiliated organisation, area of intervention, and type of lobbying activity. However, the information made public does not extend to lobbyists’ budgets or lobbying-related expenditures.
The current regulatory framework does not provide for cooling-off periods applicable to lobbyists and there is no beneficial ownership register.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 100% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Chile’s regulations define incompatibilities between public office and other public or private activities, specify situations and relationships that may lead to conflicts of interest, and establish an obligation for officials to manage them. Law No. 20.880 sets out responsibilities and procedures for submitting, verifying, and ensuring compliance with interest declarations. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Chile is responsible for verifying the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of all declarations. Members of the government, parliament, senior judicial authorities, and public officials in high-risk positions must submit declarations upon entering office and whenever their position changes or is renewed. Sanctions for breaches are clearly defined and proportionate to the severity of the offence.
In practice, submission rates for members of the government, parliament, and the highest judicial bodies have been 100% over the past four years. Between 2021 and 2023, the Comptroller General issued 221 observations and recommendations on detected conflicts of interest and applied a range of sanctions. All declarations are submitted electronically through an online portal or digital system.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 100% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 57% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Oversight of political parties and electoral campaigns is entrusted to the Electoral Service of Chile (SERVEL). Law No. 19.884 establishes a comprehensive framework for political finance and election campaign regulation. It defines sanctions for breaches that are proportionate to the severity of the offence and provides that electoral candidates may be held personally liable and sanctioned for violations. The law prohibits anonymous donations, requires all contributions to political parties and candidates to be registered and reported, and bans contributions from foreign states or enterprises, publicly owned companies, and entities or individuals not legally entitled to vote in Chile. It also sets ceilings on electoral campaign expenditures for parties, candidates, and third parties, as well as limits on personal contributions to candidates’ campaigns. Political parties are required to make their financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed threshold.
In practice, compliance varies across reporting obligations. 73% of political parties represented in Chile’s Congress submitted their annual accounts on time during the period 2021-2025. For election-related accounts, 93% were submitted on time during the 2025 election cycle. Submitted reports are publicly available on the Electoral Service website.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 67% of criteria on public information regulations, and 69% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The Council for Transparency is the independent supervisory body responsible for overseeing access to public information. Law No. 20.285 regulates access to public information by setting statutory deadlines for processing requests, requiring information to be provided in the requested format, and defining the grounds for withholding information. The law also guarantees the right to appeal refusals or cases of administrative inaction before the Council for Transparency. However, the regulatory framework does not extend access-to-information obligations to private entities performing public functions and does not require that information always be provided free of charge.
In practice, Chile proactively discloses a wide range of information online, including consolidated versions of primary legislation, the state budget, public tenders and awarded contracts, and asset and interest declarations of senior public employees, members of the judiciary, parliament, and national elected officials. By contrast, certain categories of information- such as government and ministers’ agendas, aggregated data on access-to-information requests, the company register, and the land registry- are not publicly available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 62% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 56% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The Constitution guarantees judicial independence and tenure. Chile uses a merit-based entry system under the Organic Code of Tribunals, requiring completion of the Judicial Academy’s programme with standardised exams. The President appoints first instance and appellate judges from judiciary prepared shortlists through public procedures, and promotions rely on seniority, evaluations, and secret ballots. The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal issue recommendations for appointments and promotions. Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President from a list proposed by the Court and approved by the Senate. Appeals of appointment or promotion decisions are allowed only for procedural errors. The Constitution also allows the Supreme Court to order dismissals after consulting the relevant Court of Appeals, though detailed procedures and safeguards exist only in secondary regulations.
Standards of conduct are set by Supreme Court Internal Regulation No. 262/2007, complemented by the Ibero American Code of Judicial Ethics and the Judicial Academy’s Good Practices Guide. Law 20.880/2015 defines conflicts of interest, and Regulation No. 118/2016 requires submission of interest declarations for judges and senior judicial on entry, annually, and upon leaving office. Submission rates have been high over the past four years, with verification rates above 90%.
In 2025, the Supreme Court created an internal reporting channel managed by the Internal Comptroller’s Office (Session No. 942). Case management is handled by the Superior Council according to its institutional powers, and public access to complaints follows the Transparency Law (Law No.20.285). However, the channel does not cover the judicial branch, and no public portal provides information on whistleblower rights, reporting procedures for judicial misconduct, or related contacts.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 59% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 68% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office is governed by the Constitution and the Organic Constitutional Law (LOCMP). The National Prosecutor serves an eight-year term and is appointed by the President from a Supreme Court shortlist, with Senate approval. Regional Prosecutors are appointed by the National Prosecutor from Courts of Appeal shortlists formed through a public, qualification-based process that excludes standardised exams or panel interviews.
Career prosecutors are generally selected through public competitions, though alternative systems may be authorised by the National Prosecutor’s Office. The law provides no detailed criteria or procedures for selection or promotion, no explicit appeal right, and Article 20 of the Constitution does not cover appointments or promotions, leaving the process largely discretionary
The LOCMP sets objective grounds for dismissal and defines recusal grounds and sanctions from warnings to dismissal. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, prosecutorial decisions can be challenged by parties or reviewed by a higher-ranking prosecutor. Laws No. 19.640/1999 and No. 20.880/2015 define conflicts of interest and require asset and interest declarations on entry, annually, and upon leaving office.
Internal reporting channels, including the Integrity System Platform and Resolution No. 922/2020 (Code of Ethics) allow confidential reporting of misconduct but only for current staff and protections against retaliation are not legally enforceable. channels. Staff handling reports receive mandatory confidentiality training, but there is no public portal offering whistleblower guidance for prosecutorial misconduct.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Chile fulfils 75% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 33% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The disciplinary regime for civil servants is set out in Law 18.834 (Administrative Statute, EA), which governs administrative responsibility and establishes procedures for summary investigations and disciplinary processes. Complementary laws - Law 10.336 for bodies under the Comptroller General and Law 18.883 for municipal employees – apply in specific sectors. Disciplinary offences cover breaches of public officials’ duties, obligations, and incompatibilities. Other laws, such as Law No. 18.575, 20.880, 19.886, and 21.634, further define integrity duties, administrative obligations, procurement rules, and sector-specific requirements.
Sanctions range from censure and fines to suspension or dismissal, with mitigating factors like cooperation considered. A four year statute of limitations applies. Civil servants generally cannot appeal disciplinary decisions to a judicial body; the EA offers only reconsideration before the sanctioning authority or appeal to a hierarchical superior. Judicial remedies exist but do not confer a general right to challenge disciplinary decisions. Complaints may be filed with the Comptroller General for legal breaches affecting officials’ rights. Staff handling disciplinary cases must report any criminal conduct to the competent authorities.
All investigative staff receive training through the Centre for Studies on State Administration. Central government bodies lack a unified electronic case management system: files are stored digitally, and the Comptroller General uses its own system, but no standardised platform exists, and disciplinary data are not systematically available.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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