Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Canada
Table of contents
Canada does not have a unified central anti-corruption strategy, instead relying on multiple specialised bodies and legislation to address the overall risks of corruption. The main pieces of legislation include the Financial Administration Act, the Lobbying Act, the Conflict of Interest Act, the Canada Elections Act, the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, the Criminal Code, and the Access to Information Act.
In terms of institutions, rather than having a central body overseeing anti-corruption activities, there are multiple bodies in Canada with responsibility for different parts of the integrity system. The Commissioner of Lobbying is an independent body responsible for ensuring the transparency and ethics of federal lobbying activities. The Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is responsible for helping appointed and elected officials prevent and avoid conflicts. The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner handles disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal at the federal level, the Information Commissioner is responsible for overseeing compliance with the federal access to information legislation, and the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada oversees political financing. The Internal Audit Sector of the Office of the Comptroller General of Canada, within the Treasury Board Secretariat, is responsible for the policy on internal audit. The Canadian Judicial Council is responsible for the independent judiciary. In addition, TBS administers the Risk and Compliance Process to help deputy heads meet their numerous and varied accountabilities and responsibilities articulated in legislation and Treasury Board policy.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Canada’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada does not have a stand-alone anti-corruption strategy. Instead, public integrity objectives are set out across a range of legislative and policy instruments adopted at the federal level. These include the Criminal Code, the Financial Administration Act, the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, and several Treasury Board–approved policies, notably the Policy on People Management, the Directive on Conflict of Interest, and the Policy on Financial Management.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 80% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 89% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The Lobbying Act defines lobbying activities and sanctions for breaches of transparency standards in lobbying and establishes cooling-off periods for public officials leaving the public service. Cooling off periods are not established for lobbyists joining the public service. Sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying are defined and proportional to the severity of the offence and beneficial ownership rules make mandatory the disclosure of company data to identify owners of corporations, establish a central register, and make information accessible to the public.
In practice, the Officer of the Commissioner of Lobbying supervises lobbying activities in central government, oversees transparency of lobbying activities issues and at least three investigations were carried out for non-compliance with the regulation of lobbying activities or incomplete or erroneous disclosure of information during 2024. Additionally, the code of conduct that regulates interactions between public officials and lobbyists is supported by practical examples of at-risk or undesirable behaviors and situations and was updated in 2023. Information disclosed by lobbyists in the register includes their name, organisation, domain of intervention, and type of lobbying activities, but does not include budget/expenses for lobbying activities, and pieces of legislation and regulation targeted. Registrants are also required to register lobbying about legislative proposals, bills, resolutions, regulations, policies, programmes, grants, contributions, financial benefits or contracts.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 89% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 78% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Canada's Conflict of Interest Act defines conflict-of-interest situations for various levels of government and establishes procedures for managing them. The Act also lists incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities for 3 categories of public officials: Public Office Holders, Reporting Public Office Holders and Public Servants. While members of the highest bodies of the judiciary do not declare interest declarations, the Ethical Principles for Judges sets out mechanisms for managing judicial conflicts of interest .
The Act defines institutional responsibilities as well as submission, compliance and content verification procedures for interest declarations. In practice, the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner verified 100% of interest declarations within the last two full calendar years, with most cases being resolved when they were detected. Furthermore, the Office issued recommendations for resolution within 12 months for all cases of conflict of interest detected as well as sanctions including monetary penalties, compliance orders and investigation reports.
Additionally, 100% of both members of parliament and members of the government submitted interest declarations for the past six years as did 100% of newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants over the past four years.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 90% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 86% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The Canada Elections Act defines sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations that are proportional to the severity of the offence. The Act also states that electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches and be sanctioned. Electoral campaign expenses for parties, candidates and third parties are limited to a ceiling, and must be reported following the electoral period. The Act bans contributions from foreign states or enterprises and publicly owned enterprises but does not ban anonymous donations that are under $20.
In practice, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada oversees the political financing of political parties in election campaigns. It has certified auditors on its payroll and publishes financial reports from all political parties on a single online platform in a user-friendly format. The Commissioner of Canada Elections is responsible for ensuring compliance and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act and publishes information on its website related to its investigative work when formal compliance or enforcements measures are taken. This includes, but is not limited to, information relation to enforcement action arising out of breaches of political finance regulations.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 78% of criteria on public information regulations, and 73% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The Access to Information Act provides Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and individuals and corporations present in Canada a right to access records of over 250 government institutions subject to the Act. The Act provides that government information should be available to the public with limited and specific exceptions, and that decisions on the disclosure of such information be reviewed by an independent party. The Act also sets out proactive publication requirements for parliamentarians, ministers, government institutions, and administrative bodies that support Parliament and the courts.
The Information Commissioner oversees compliance with the Act (excluding proactively published information) and is appointed for a fixed term by the Governor in Council, with approval of both houses of the Canadian Parliament. The Commissioner may only be removed for cause by the Governor in Council on address of both houses. After the Commissioner completes an investigation into a complaint and issues a final report, the parties named in the report may seek a review of any matter related to the complaint before the Federal Court.
Amongst other publicly available information, Canada’s Parliament publishes calendars of meetings and records of decisions; Cabinet meeting agendas are not public. Additional information, such as consolidated versions of primary federal statutes, legislative proposals introduced in Parliament, public tenders announced by the federal government, and details of government expenditures, is public. The Office of the Prime Minister of Canada publishes a daily media advisory outlining key engagements by the Prime Minister; Minister’s schedules are not otherwise published.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 47% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 32% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Judicial independence is enshrined in the Constitution, and developed through Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. Judges enjoy guaranteed tenure until they resign by choice, reach mandatory retirement age, or are lawfully removed, and objective grounds for removal are defined in statute. Appointment eligibility for superior court judges is defined in federal statute. The Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs oversees assessment, selection, appointment and elevation (promotion). Merit-based and objective procedures are in place, and independent bodies conduct assessments and interviews. The Governor General appoints chief justices, associate chief justices, and Supreme Court judges on the advice of the Prime Minister. Other superior court judges are appointed by the Governor General on the Minister of Justice’s advice, based on Judicial Advisory Committee recommendations. The Independent Advisory Board assesses candidates and recommends nominees to the Prime Minister for Supreme Court appointments. Regulations do not require that appointment and elevations decisions follow advisory committees’ recommendations, but in practice only recommended candidates are appointed. Legal provisions do not give candidates the right to appeal appointment or elevation decisions.
The Ethical Principles for Judges set conduct standards for all federal judges, including conflict-of-interest rules and recusal procedures, which are further enforced through relevant case law. Judges are not required to file interest declarations, but strong systems to detect and manage judicial conflicts of interest exist. The Canadian Judicial Council manages the federal judicial misconduct complaints process. However, the judiciary has no internal whistleblower channels, no legal protections against retaliation, and no public portal on whistleblower rights.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 93% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 74% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Canada has core safeguards for prosecutorial integrity established in the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. The law provides objective grounds for the dismissal of prosecutors and prosecutorial decisions are subject to appeal. Procedures governing the selection, appointment and promotion of prosecutors are set out in law. The Public Service Employment Act establish merit-based and objective procedures for the selection and promotion of prosecutors, whereas the Director of Public Prosecutions Act and the Governor in Council Appointments policy set out merit based procedures for Director of Public Prosecutions. Regulations also establish the right of candidates to appeal decisions on selection, appointment and promotion, including for senior prosecutorial positions.
The Conflict of Interest Act defines conflict-of-interest situations and recusal procedures, and interest declaration requirements apply to the Deputy Directors of Public Prosecutions. In practice, submission rates for interest declarations are high and 100% of interest declarations were verified by the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Mechanisms to report prosecutorial misconduct, including corruption, are established in regulation through, the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, which requires internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in public prosecutors’ offices. Protection against retaliation is legally guaranteed and internal reporting channels exist for public prosecutor’s offices.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Canada fulfils 67% of criteria on the disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Canada’s disciplinary regime for civil servants is established under the Financial Administration Act, collective agreements, and as well as under Treasury Board’s Guidelines for Discipline and Policy on People Management. A right to appeal disciplinary decisions before a judicial body is established, while statutory time limits are not defined in regulation. However, there is a policy expectation that the disciplinary process will be initiated and concluded in a timely manner.
The Guidelines for Discipline set out the standardisation of disciplinary procedures. Although there is no training programme on how to conduct investigations, several guidance documents exist covering this topic including the Guidelines for Discipline and the Handbook on Administrative Investigations into Misconduct.
The use of digital tools to support disciplinary procedures is limited. There is no systematic use of electronic case management systems to manage disciplinary cases, and such systems do not allow for comprehensive documentation or tracking of proceedings.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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