Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Switzerland
Table of contents
Switzerland’s Federal Council adopted Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2024 in 2020. Following its expiry in 2024, no anti-corruption and integrity strategy was in place at the time of data collection. Subsequently, on 28 January 2026, the Federal Council approved a new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2029, building on the previous framework. The Strategy is implemented by the Federal Administration and will be monitored by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Combating Corruption (IDWG), which oversees progress and promotes coordination among federal offices.
In Switzerland, responsibilities in the justice sector are shared between the Confederation and the cantons. While each canton organises and administers its own courts, the federal level oversees the Federal Supreme Court and specialised federal courts, as well as the Office of the Attorney General. Judicial and senior prosecutorial appointments at the federal level are made by the Federal Assembly.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for lobbying, conflict of interest, political finance and public information are not available for 2025.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Data on where Switzerland’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
On average, OECD countries fulfil 38% of criteria regarding the quality of strategic framework, and 32% for implementation. As the previous strategy expired in 2024, Switzerland did not have a national anti-corruption and integrity strategy at the time of data collection.
On 28 January 2026, the Federal Council approved Switzerland’s Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026-2029, building on the Federal Council’s previous 2021-2024 Strategy. The measures set out in the Strategy are addressed to the Federal Administration, which is responsible for their implementation. Monitoring of the Strategy is carried out by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Combating Corruption (IDWG), which oversees progress, facilitates information exchange, and promotes coordination among the relevant federal offices.
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Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Switzerland fulfils 35% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 16% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed under Article 191c of Switzerland’s Constitution. Switzerland has a decentralised judicial system: each canton organises its own courts and determines the status of its judges. At the federal level, the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) serves as the highest judicial authority, while the Federal Administrative Court (FAC), the Federal Criminal Court (FCC) and the Federal Patent Court (FPC) exercise jurisdiction in their respective areas. Each federal court is governed by its own act, which provide for tenure guarantees and objective grounds for dismissal.
Federal judges are elected by the Federal Assembly for six-year terms, pursuant to the Federal Assembly Act, the 2023 Guiding Principles by the Judicial Committee and the respective court acts. Vacancies are publicly advertised, and candidates are assessed and interviewed by the Judicial Committee, which submits proposals to the Federal Assembly based on professional and personal criteria. The Judicial Committee is composed of members of the Federal Assembly. Appointment decisions are not subject to appeal.
Standards of conduct are adopted and published by each federal court. Nevertheless, the legal framework does not comprehensively regulate conflict-of-interest situations beyond incompatibilities, and judges are not required to submit general interest declarations. At the federal level, there is no formal whistleblower channel nor are whistleblowers protected against retaliation against the law. Therefore, there is also no publicly available portal for reporting misconduct nor training in handling whistleblower reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Switzerland fulfils 31% of criteria related to prosecutorial integrity regulations and 37% on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Under Article 20 of the Federal Act on the Organisation of the Federal Criminal Authorities (FCAOA), the Federal Assembly elects the Attorney General and Deputy Attorneys General upon proposal of its Judicial Committee, which publicly advertises vacancies, interviews candidates and submits recommendations based on professional and personal criteria. Other federal prosecutors, as well as promotions, are appointed by the Attorney General under the Federal Personnel Act. Although vacancies are publicly advertised, the legal framework does not require standardised written examinations or panel interviews as a minimum safeguard, and appointment decisions are not subject to appeal.
Under Article 21 FCAOA, the Federal Assembly may dismiss the Attorney General or Deputies for serious misconduct or incapacity, while ordinary prosecutors may be dismissed under the Federal Personnel Act and the Federal Personnel Ordinance. While prosecutors are prohibited from holding certain foreign positions, must declare outside activities and are subject to recusal rules under the Code of Criminal Procedure, conflict-of-interest situations are not clearly defined in law, and prosecutors are not required to submit general interest or asset declarations. The framework does not establish specific sanctions for breaches of prosecutorial conflict-of-interest provisions, nor does it provide internal whistleblowing channels within prosecutors’ offices. A general external reporting channel for corruption allegations is managed by the Swiss Federal Audit Office.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Switzerland fulfils 50% of criteria related to the regulatory framework for the disciplinary system for civil servants and 0% in practice, compared to the OECD averages of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The disciplinary framework for federal civil servants is primarily governed by the Federal Personnel Act (FPA) and the Federal Personnel Ordinance. Article 10 FPA sets out the grounds for termination, including serious breaches of duty or deficient performance. In addition, Article 25 FPA authorises employers to impose disciplinary measures -ranging from warnings to suspension- to ensure the proper execution of tasks. However, the legislation does not clearly define what constitutes a disciplinary offence nor does it establish a statute of limitations for the procedure under Article 25 FPA.
The FPA provides procedural guarantees, including the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, the right to access and contest evidence, and the right to legal counsel. Disciplinary decisions may be appealed to the Federal Administrative Court. Officials responsible for handling disciplinary cases must also notify the competent judicial or law enforcement authorities where suspected criminal conduct arises.
In practice, no central government body has issued guidelines to standardise disciplinary procedures. Not all staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations receive dedicated training, central government bodies are not required to use electronic case management systems for disciplinary cases, and aggregated data on disciplinary proceedings against civil servants are not publicly available.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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