Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: France
Table of contents
In November 2025, France adopted the Multi-year National Anti-Corruption Plan 2025-2029, which sets out 36 measures to support public administrations, local authorities and businesses in mitigating public integrity risks, and to strengthen anti-corruption efforts at the international level. In May 2023, France adopted a roadmap to counter fraud in public finances.
In terms of institutions, policies for preventing and detecting breaches of integrity rely on a range of public authorities. The French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA) is the national body responsible for coordinating the implementation of preventive and detection measures related to anti-corruption. Additional bodies lead in the fields of lobbying and foreign influence activities (High Authority for Transparency in Public Life), public information issues (Commission for Access to Administrative Documents), open data policy (Etalab) and political finance (National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing). The Inter-ministerial Committee for Internal Control and Internal Audit is the central harmonisation unit responsible for coordinating risk management across the public administration. The Interministerial Anti-Fraud Coordination Mission coordinates the fight against fraud in public financial management.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where France’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 80% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 33% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Based on data from the national anti-corruption strategy that was adopted in 2025 - the Multi-year National Anti-Corruption Plan 2025-2029 – and the Roadmap for the fight against fraud in public finance that was adopted in 2023, France’s strategic framework contains strategic objectives aimed at mitigating public integrity risks in human resource management, public procurement, public financial management, fraud, the private sector and customs.
The national anti-corruption strategy was developed using a wide range of diagnostic tools, including a situation analysis provided by the Anti-Corruption Agency, inter-institutional and public consultation, and by applying a risk-based approach. The strategy clearly identifies activities to be implemented across a comprehensive action plan, but it does not contain outcome-level indicators to measure achievements on intended results. As the national strategy was adopted within the last 12 months, annual monitoring reports are not yet available, reflecting the early stages of implementation in the results for practice.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 80% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 89% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
The regulatory framework, including the Law on Public Transparency, as amended by the Law of 9 December 2016 (loi Sapin 2), defines lobbying activities, referred to as “interest representation activities”, contains practical examples of at-risk or undesirable behaviours and situations, and establishes proportional sanctions for breaches of provisions. Law No. 83-634 on the rights and obligations of civil servants, as amended by the 2019 Public Service Transformation Act, estblishes cooling-off periods and the monitoring of public-to-private mobility for all public officials by their hierarchical authority, as well as the possibility of an optional referral to the High Authority in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. For certain officials, referral to the High Authority is mandatory for specific strategic positions.
In practice, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life is the independent institution overseeing transparency of interest representation activities, and has carried out over 100 inspections in 2024 for for failure to comply with registration or annual declaration obligations in the register. The Register of Interest Representatives is publicly available, and contains all key information, such as the lobbyist's name, organisation, type of lobbying activities, domain of intervention, pieces of legislation targeted and the resources allocated to these activities.
The two criteria not fulfilled by France (one for regulation and one for practice) relate to the register of beneficial ownership, which is no longer publicly available, following a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2022.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 78% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The comprehensive regulatory framework, including the Law on Transparency in Public Life, defines how to manage conflict-of-interest situations at various levels of government and includes proportional sanctions for breaches of provisions on conflicts of interest. Additionally, approximately 18 000 elected and non-elected public officials are required to declare their interests, including ministers, members of parliament, top tier civil servants and public employees in a high-risk position. High-ranking judges are required to declare their assets.
In practice, submission rates for interest declarations are high for ministers, members of parliament and top-tier civil servants (close to 100% on average), although data for high-ranking judges is not available. The responsible authority, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP), verifies declarations according to a risk-based approach (less than 60% are verified), and issues recommendations for resolution for all cases of conflict of interest detected.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 100% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 57% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The regulatory framework, including the Law on Political Financial Transparency, includes all standard regulatory safeguards. For example, political parties cannot receive anonymous donations or financial contributions from state-owned enterprises, foreign states and foreign enterprises, and they must report their annual and campaign finances. Additionally, electoral candidates can be held personally liable for breaches and be sanctioned, electoral campaigns are limited to a ceiling, and sanctions for breaches of regulations are proportional to the severity of the offence.
In practice, the National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing has the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns. Although it does not have certified auditors on its payroll, certified auditors are part of the auditing process. The Commission publishes all financial reports on a platform. Not all political parties represented in the national assembly have submitted their annual financial reports within the timelines defined by national legislation.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 89% on public information regulations, and 73% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The strong regulatory framework establishes that government data are “open by default”, defines deadlines to process requests, defines a mandatory list of datasets to be disclosed and ensures the right to appeal in case of refusal.
In practice, a supervisory body responsible for public information is established (Commission for Access to Administrative Documents - CADA). Although it publishes aggregated data on requests for information, it has not conduct inspections for compliance. A central government body is responsible for open data policy (Etalab). Most standard datasets are publicly available, such as consolidated versions of all primary laws, but some are not, such as ministers’ agendas and the results of all public tenders awarded by central government.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfills 59% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 36% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The organic law on the status of magistrates ensures judges’ secure tenure until resignation, retirement, dismissal or appointment to one of the central administrations of the State. Dismissal is only permitted on objective grounds, such as serious and deliberate breaches of procedures or breaches of essential values listed within the law on the status of magistrates.
The Act also regulates the procedures for the selection, appointment, and promotion of judges. The selection is primarily carried out through the National School for the Judiciary; admission is dependent on success in a competitive examination and is only open to graduates and professionals. Candidates are appointed as justice auditors, and the successful completion of the curriculum guarantees formal appointment in the judiciary. However, while the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM) is responsible for appointment and promotion of judges, only 7 of the 15 members are judges.
Integrity standards are provided by the CSM and outline potential conflicts of interest. All members of the highest bodies of the judiciary must submit interest declarations upon entry and renewal or change of public office. However, no regulation establishes an internal reporting channel for whistleblowers in the judiciary. Additionally, there is no available portal that provides information on whistleblowers’ rights and procedures for reporting the misconduct of judges.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 38% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 37% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
In France, judges and prosecutors are governed by the same legal framework under the organic law on the statute of magistrates. This legislation provides objective grounds for the dismissal of prosecutors, defines the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest and defines sanctions for breaches of prosecutorial conflict-of-interest provisions. However, there are no regulations defining the circumstances in which prosecutors can be recused or should recuse themselves.
Transparent and merit-based procedures, including through written tests and interviews, govern the selection and promotion of prosecutors. However, the organic law does not establish the right for candidates to appeal decisions on the appointment and promotion of prosecutors. With regards to promotions, ordinary appeal mechanisms are available against decisions of the promotion committee based on general administrative law.
Standards of conduct establish that all magistrates must submit an interest declaration and must update it in cases of significant changes. The declaration must include professional activities, participation in governing bodies of the public and private companies, direct financial holdings and voluntary and elected functions. In practice, data is not available concerning the number of interest declarations submitted and verified by the responsible authority, which varies depending on the category of magistrates. Law No. 2016-1961 establishes that whistleblowers in the judiciary have the possibility to use external reporting channels, listed under Law No. 2022-401, but no internal reporting channels exist within the prosecution service. Additionally, while legislation protects reporting of prosecutorial misconduct that may constitute criminal behaviour, reports concerning broader integrity violations are not covered under the law.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
France fulfils 67% of criteria on the disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The General Code of Civil Service and the General Code of Relations between the Public and Administration are the main regulations applicable to disciplinary procedures. The General Code of Public Service in its articles L121-1 and L124-7, defines disciplinary misconduct and establishes that misconduct exposes civil servants to disciplinary sanctions. Under the latter, a wide range of sanctions are defined, divided into four categories depending on the severity and circumstances of the offence. The General Code of Relations between the Public and Administration establishes the right to appeal to disciplinary decisions.
However, there is no training program offered to all staff conducting disciplinary investigations in the central government, as each ministry is individually responsible for the organisation of training programs of officials under its authority. Additionally, there is no electronic case management system, as each ministry manages its own files according to its own internal tools.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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