Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Mexico
Table of contents
Mexico adopted the Sectoral Programme on Anti-Corruption and Good Governance 2025–2030 through a Presidential Decree. The Secretariat for Anti-Corruption and Good Governance (SABG) is responsible for coordinating the implementation, monitoring, and accountability of the Sectoral Programme. The Sectoral Programme identifies four main objectives that mitigate integrity risks in human resource management, public financial management, internal control and risk management, public procurement, and the private sector, while also strengthening transparency and the right of access to information as key tools for social oversight.
The Digital Transformation and Telecommunications Agency has the mandate to oversee open data policies, while Transparency for the People is the Federal Oversight Authority for public information issues. The National Electoral Institute oversees the financing of political parties and election campaigns. The Secretariat is responsible for issuing the rules of integrity for the exercise of public management. Furthermore, the Secretariat and their internal control bodies are responsible for managing the submission and compliance of interest and asset declarations. However, there is no entity monitoring lobbying activities. The Attorney General’s Office decides on the employment of public prosecutors, with the exception of the appointment of the Attorney General. Disciplinary proceedings in Mexico are investigated by Internal Control Bodies (OICs) within each institution.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available. Data for judicial integrity is not available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Mexico’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Mexico fulfils 80% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, but only 20% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD averages of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Mexico adopted its first anti-corruption and integrity strategy at the level of government in 2019, elaborated by the Secretariat of Public Administration, now the Secretariat for Anti-Corruption and Good Governance (SABG). This strategy expired in 2024 and was replaced by the current Sectoral Programme on Anti-Corruption and Good Governance 2025–2030, led and monitored by the Secretariat for Anti-Corruption and Good Governance (SABG).
No standalone public consultation process was established for the Sectoral Programme, although the consultation exercises carried out within the National Development Program (PND) were considered in the strategy’s development. The Sectoral Programme’s situation analysis identifies key integrity risks relating to inefficiency, discretion, mismanagement of resources, and administrative duplication.
The Sectoral Programme is publicly available online and includes outcome-level indicators, baseline targets, and a list of activities to be implemented. The SABG is designated as the lead organisation responsible for coordinating the implementation, monitoring, and reporting. As the strategy was adopted only recently, no monitoring reports have yet been published. In addition, the Sectoral Programme does not indicate whether evidence from the previous strategy was used to inform its design, and it does not include an end‑of‑term evaluation among its activities.
Lastly, although implementation is expected to rely on resources allocated through the Federal Expenditure Budget Decree, no dedicated financial plan has been developed for the Sectoral Programme.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Mexico fulfils 40% of criteria for lobbying regulations, and fulfils 22% of the criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38% respectively.
In Mexico, lobbying is regulated through internal rules of the legislative branch. Rules of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate define lobbying activities, determine who is considered lobbyists within Congress, and establish that lobbyists can be suspended for breaches of transparency and integrity standards. Lobbyists must submit an application to access the premises of both chambers, which also publish lists of registered lobbyists. However, these provisions only apply to interactions within the legislature and do not constitute a broader regulatory regime covering lobbying activities across other public institutions.
There is no institution responsible for supervising lobbying activities. Although public lobbying registries exist for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and are updated each legislature, they do not include information on the type of lobbying activity conducted, the piece of legislation or regulation targeted, and the budget or expenses for lobbying activities. Lastly, no codes of conduct regulates the interaction between Deputies or members of the Senate and lobbyists, and no sanctions have been issued for non-compliance with the disclosure of lobbying information over the past year.
No regulation in Mexico establishes cooling off periods for public officials before undertaking lobbying activities after having left office, as well as for lobbyists wishing to take up public posts. However, the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities restricts the use of privileged non-public information obtained during public service for up to one year after public officials have ended their functions. There are no beneficial ownership rules that make the disclosure of company data mandatory to identify owners of corporations.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Mexico fulfils 89% of criteria for conflict of interest regulations, and 56% of criteria on practice. The OECD average is 80% and 45%, respectively.
The General Law of Administrative Responsibilities defines circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials and establish the obligation to manage them. It assigns responsibility for submission and compliance with interest and asset declarations to the Secretariats and their internal control bodies. However, it does not list incompatibilities between public functions and other activities.
The Constitution obliges all public servants -including elected officials, judges, and senior civil servants- to submit interest and asset declarations. Sanctions proportional to the severity of the breach in cases of non-compliance with conflict-of-interest provision are also established in the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities, ranging from financial penalties to the disqualification from working in the public sector.
In practice, submission data is aggregated and published through a publicly available portal managed by SABG. All members of the government and top tier civil servants have declared their interests in the past six and four years, respectively. Moreover, in the past four years, 99% of members of the highest bodies of the judiciary declared their interests. However, data is not available on the submission rates for the members of parliament. SABG is responsible for the verification of interest declarations of the executive branch. In accordance with the provisions of the law, the verification is conducted on a sample randomly selected from the total submitted declarations. There is no risk-based approach to interest declaration verification, and less than 60% of public servants are targeted by the random verification approach.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Mexico fulfils all of the criteria for political finance regulations, but only 71% of those for practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58% respectively.
In Mexico, the General Law of Electoral Institutions and Procedures and the General Law of Political Parties make up the regulatory framework on political finance. These regulations establish a threshold for personal contributions to candidates’ campaigns, as well as a ban on anonymous donation, foreign contributions to political parties and from state-owned enterprises. Campaign expenses also have a ceiling, and candidates are personally liable for breaches of political finance regulations.
The National Electoral Institute (INE) is the independent body with the mandate to implement political finance safeguards. The body does not have certified auditors on its payroll, and while it publishes an annual report of its activities, it does not include information on the number of investigations conducted, the number of cases reported, and the types of sanctions issued. However, the INE collects and publishes in a user-friendly format parties’ financial reports for the last five years and information on parties’ potential breaches of political finance regulations. It has also published the annual accounts of all political parties for the past five years.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Mexico fulfils 78% of criteria on access to public information regulations and 62% of criteria on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The Constitution and the General Law on Access to Public Information guarantee the right of access to information for all persons, including legal entities and non-citizens. Restrictions are limited to those established by law and in line with the Tromsø convention. Information holders are required to provide information in the requested format, but some reproduction costs can be charged to requesters.
In 2025, the new General Law on Access to Public Information was adopted and reassigned institutional responsibilities from the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection (INAI) to the newly created Oversight Authorities. The head of the Federal Oversight Authority is appointed by the head of the Federal Executive, but the new law does not specify the terms of office or grounds for removal. Since the Oversight Authorities were established only recently, inspections of compliance during the last full calendar year were carried out by the now-supressed INAI. The INAI also issued sanctions for non-compliance with access-to-information obligations, published reports on the state of transparency in the public sector, and collected and disseminated information on the requests for access to data.
Mexico proactively publishes a range of datasets including the consolidated versions of primary legislation, draft laws, and asset declarations for elected officials, members of the Supreme Court, senior civil servants, and their salaries. Nevertheless, conflict-of-interest declarations for members of the judiciary remain unavailable to the public, and agendas of ministerial and government meetings are not published.
Data not available
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Mexico fulfils 55% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulation and 47% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
The General Law on the Prosecutor Office (LFGR) sets objective grounds for the dismissal of public prosecutors. The LFGR establishes that selection and promotion of prosecutors should be conducted via an objective procedure based on merit, but the procedure itself and the criteria for promotion are not established by law. The Attorney General is appointed by the Senate from a shortlist of three candidates provided by the President, following an eligibility check of legal requirements. Regulations do not establish the right to appeal decisions on the appointment and promotion of prosecutors.
The Attorney General’s Office (FGR) developed a code of ethics that is applicable to all public servants holding a position, role, or commission within the FGR. The Constitution and the General Law on Administrative Responsibilities (LGRA) define the circumstances that can lead to conflict of interest situations for prosecutors, as well as the incompatibilities with other functions. The National Code on Criminal Procedures define circumstances for recusal. The LGRA also establishes that all members of the highest prosecutorial authorities must submit interest declarations. However, no information was provided on the submission rate of these declarations.
The LFGR and LGRA establish a complaints procedure available online and internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in public prosecutors’ offices managed by an Internal Control Body. However, there are no dedicated measures protecting whistleblowers against retaliation, and there is no dedicated mandatory training in confidentiality for those handling reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026)
Mexico fulfils 75% of criteria on disciplinary system for civil servants’ regulations, and 50% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
In Mexico, the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities, complemented by other regulations, establishes the disciplinary framework for civil servants. This regulatory framework defines what constitutes as a disciplinary offence, establishes a disciplinary procedure for public servants, and sets a range of disciplinary sanctions for each type of offence. Disciplinary decisions can be appealed in front of a judicial body after exhausting the administrative remedies.
Mexico’s disciplinary system is decentralised. Internal control bodies within each institution act as investigation authorities responsible for identifying and gathering evidence on alleged misconduct of civil servants. For this reason, each level of government (federal, state and municipal) coordinates its own internal control bodies and provides guidelines on the standardisation of disciplinary procedures as well as the reporting of information for oversight, within the framework of the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities. As a result, aggregated information on disciplinary sanctions and guidelines on standardisation of disciplinary procedures is managed at the institutional or subnational level, and not centrally consolidated. The SABG implements the Integrated System of Administrative Responsibilities (SIRA), through which information on disciplinary procedures and sanctions is recorded for public officials and private individuals, and has mandatory specialised courses in investigations and disciplinary procedures for the Internal Control Bodies staff. Additionally, an operational manual for a standardised electronic system of disciplinary cases exists and is applicable to all central government bodies.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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