Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Honduras
Table of contents
The 2022-2026 National Strategy for Transparency and Anti-Corruption (ENTAH) is the primary policy instrument of Honduras’ anti-corruption and public integrity framework. It was issued by the Secretariat (Ministry) for Transparency and Anti-Corruption in 2022. The strategy is guided by key principles, including creating a comprehensive anti-corruption system, fostering a collaborative institutional culture to address corruption and cultivating a strong commitment to the citizenry and its rights. The ENTAH has not been approved at Ministerial Council level.
The Secretariat (Ministry) for Transparency and Anti-Corruption coordinates the implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the Action Plan included in the ENTAH. It also oversees the National System for Transparency and Anti-Corruption (DTPC), which promotes and implements policies on transparency, integrity and corruption prevention. The Court of Accounts leads the Ethics Committees in the public administration and exercises key institutional oversight responsibilities, including the verification of conflict-of-interest declarations. The Institute for Access to Public Information oversees compliance with access-to-information requirements. The National Electoral Council supervises political finance through its Unit for Financing, Transparency, and Oversight. Currently, there is no body responsible for overseeing lobbying.
Note: 2025 or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Honduras’ integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras’ anti-corruption strategic framework has not been adopted by the highest level of Government, which means it is not aligned with the Public Integrity Indicators’ methodology. Strategies not adopted by the highest levels of government can lead to limited cross-government buy-in and the required institutional support for effective implementation. In contrast, OECD countries meet an average 40% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework and 33% on practice.
The current National Transparency and Anti-Corruption Strategy (ENTAH) provides a comprehensive analysis of the national regulatory framework, focusing on key areas such as open government, access to public information, municipal and fiscal transparency, electoral integrity, legislative openness, and the promotion of integrity within the public sector. It also evaluates the effectiveness of corruption prevention, investigation, and sanctions, identifying existing measures and processes. The general framework of the ENTAH includes its vision, guiding principles, strategic lines and action plan. Additionally, it defines crucial factors for its successful implementation as well as the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating its effectiveness.
The Secretariat (Ministry) for Transparency and Anti-Corruption is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the National Transparency and Anti-Corruption Strategy of Honduras (ENTAH).
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras does not fulfil any criteria on lobbying regulations and practice, as it does not have a regulatory framework governing lobbying activities and lacks key mechanisms to ensure transparency and oversight. In contrast, the OECD average is 44% and 39%, respectively.
As a result, there is no regulatory definition of lobbying or lobbyists, and no designated supervisory authority within central government responsible for monitoring lobbying practices. Tools for registering lobbying activities are not available, and there is no system in place for disclosing lobbying-related information or investigating cases of non-compliance.
Article 21 of the Code of Ethical Conduct for Public Officials establishes a one-year cooling-off period for officials who held decision-making roles in significant public sector processes (e.g. privatisations, public service concessions) while in office. However, this provision only applies to a limited category of public officials, does not cover all positions susceptible to undue influence, and does not extend to lobbyists.
Honduras does not have a beneficial ownership regulation requiring companies to provide information on the identity of their real owners or to set up a publicly accessible central register.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 11% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The Regulatory framework on conflict of interest comprises two key pieces of legislation, Decree 36 of 2007 (Code of Ethics for Public Servants) and the Organic Law of the Court of Accounts. The Code establishes incompatibilities, prohibiting officials from holding additional paid positions that could interfere with their public duties. It outlines circumstances that may lead to conflicts of interest, requiring officials to abstain from decisions involving personal or familiar interests and to disclose any potential conflicts. It also mandates public servants to submit declarations of interest upon entering office and any changes in their roles, but also to update these declarations annually. For these requirements, ‘’public servants’’ include all members of Government, Congress, the highest bodies of the judiciary, employees in high-risk positions, and newly appointed or reappointed top-tier civil servants.
The Court of Accounts is the body responsible for overseeing and verifying compliance with declaration requirements, ensuring transparency within the public sector. The regulatory framework also specifies sanctions for violations, which are designed to be proportional to the severity of the offence.
Despite meeting 100% of the criteria for regulatory safeguards, implementation remains a challenge in Honduras, with only 11% of the measures effectively applied. Honduras has not provided data on the submission and verification of asset and interest declarations by members of government, Parliament, high-ranking judges and senior civil servants.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 29% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The Law on Financing, Transparency, and Oversight of Political Parties and Candidates (Decree No. 137-2016) establishes clear sanctions for breaches of electoral financing and campaign regulations, ensuring that violations are met with penalties proportional to the severity of the offence. Electoral candidates can be held personally liable for financial breaches. Contributions from foreign entities and public enterprises are prohibited. However, anonymous donations at public fundraising events are permitted.
The National Electoral Council, through its Financing, Transparency and Auditing Unit, is responsible for monitoring and overseeing election campaigns, and publishes reports containing information on the number of cases of breaches of political finance consultation, the number of investigations conducted, and the different types of sanctions issued. Under Decree No. 137- 2017, parties must make financial reports public, including all contributions above a defined threshold, and submit campaign expenditure accounts. However, in practice, compliance has been inconsistent. Not all parties have submitted their annual accounts within the prescribed deadlines over the past five years, and not all have submitted election-related accounts within the timeframes established by national legislation for the past two electoral cycles. Furthermore, no central online platform for compiling the information is established.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras fulfils 56% of criteria on public information regulations, and 38% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
The Transparency Law (Legislative Decree 170 of 2006) sets that all public institutions, as well as private individuals or entities performing public functions, are holders of public information. It further provides that everyone -including non-citizens and legal persons- has the right to access information in all available forms. The Law also sets out the grounds for withholding information and stipulates that requests for information do not need to be justified.
The Institute for Access to Public Information (IAIP) is the independent body for supervising and promoting access to public information. Citizens can appeal to the body if their requests are denied or not addressed within the legally established timeframe. The head of the IAIP is appointed for a fixed term of five years and can only be dismissed under strictly defined circumstances.
Statistical data on access requests has been aggregated and published for the past three years through the SIELHO portal. While sanctions have been imposed for violations to the Transparency Law (Legislative Decree 170 of 2006), an open data policy is still under approval.
In terms of proactive data disclosure, consolidated versions of primary laws are accessible online through the Virtual Library on the Court of Accounts’ website, as are the results of the most recent national elections which are aggregated on the National Electoral Council’s website. Legislative proposals and government session agendas are not publicly accessible. Aggregated data on information requests, asset declarations and interest disclosures are not published.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras fulfils 53% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 4% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
In Honduras, judicial independence is constitutionally guaranteed, ensuring judges’ security of tenure until mandatory retirement, expiry of term, or lawful dismissal. The Judicial Career Law and its Regulation establish objective grounds for dismissal and regulate disciplinary procedures, safeguarding due process and the right to be heard. Disciplinary decisions may be appealed to the Judicial Career Council, the body created to oversee judicial career matters and review sanctions.
The same framework provides for merit-based procedures for the selection and promotion of ordinary judges. Selection is based on competitive examinations and aptitude assessments administered by a Selection Committee within the Directorate of Personnel Administration, the judiciary’s human resources body. This Committee conducts standardised exams and submits a shortlist of three candidates to the Supreme Court of Justice for appointment. Promotions rely on seniority, competitions, and performance criteria. However, the Committee operates within the judiciary’s administrative structure.
Supreme Court magistrates are elected by Congress from a shortlist prepared by a Nominating Board composed of representatives of various institutions. Pursuant to Resolution No. 01-2022-JN, candidates must undergo a standardised examination before the Nominating Board as part of the selection process. Following the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the Law of the Council of the Judiciary and the Judicial Career Council, powers over selection, appointment, and dismissal reverted to the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, who centralises authority based on provisional legislation.
Ethical standards are set out in the 1993 Code of Ethics and the Law of the Superior Court of Auditors makes it mandatory for all judges and members of the highest judicial bodies to submit an interest declaration upon entry and any renewal or change in public. However, no data on compliance or verification is available. There are no internal or public reporting channels for judicial misconduct, nor is any training provided on whistleblower confidentiality.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras fulfils 24% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 16% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 16%, respectively.
The selection and promotion of prosecutors are formally regulated through secondary legislation, namely the Special Regulations for the Organization and Operation of the General Directorate of Prosecutors and the Public Prosecutor Career Statute, under the authority of the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office. These regulations also establish grounds for dismissal, list disciplinary offences leading to sanctions (including removal from office), and specify penalties for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions.
The Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General are elected by Congress from a shortlist prepared by a Nominating Committee. However, this process does not include formal exams or panel interviews, which would ensure a merit-based selection.
Although the Code of Ethics for Public Officials of the Public Prosecutor’s Office establishes standards of conduct and ethical behaviour, it does not clearly define circumstances or relationships that may create conflicts of interest outside procedural matters. The Public Prosecutor’s Office Act requires prosecutors to excuse themselves from cases where conflicts arise, while the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies grounds for recusal. The Special Regulations provide guidance on appointing substitutes and managing recusals internally. However, prosecutorial decisions, including whether to initiate or dismiss a case, cannot be appealed by the parties, nor are hierarchical appeals by senior prosecutors available.
All prosecutors, including senior officials, must submit asset and interest declarations upon entry, renewal, or changes in office, in line with the Law of the Superior Court of Auditors. However, no data exists on verification procedures or recommendations to resolve conflicts of interest.
Training on integrity and anti-corruption is offered at least every two years, covering crimes against public administration, electoral offences, financial analysis, and technological investigation tools. Internal reporting channels for whistleblowers are not in place, leaving prosecutors without legal protection against retaliation, no public guidance on reporting procedures, and no mandatory confidentiality training for staff handling reports.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Honduras fulfils 42% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The disciplinary procedures for civil servants are established in the Civil Service Law and further developed in secondary regulations. The framework defines different categories of disciplinary offences (minor, serious and very serious) and provides a corresponding range of sanctions, including reprimand, suspension without pay, demotion and, in certain cases, dismissal. It also regulates the main procedural stages, including notification, the right to be heard, the presentation of evidence and the possibility to appeal before the Civil Service Council. Statutes of limitation for initiating disciplinary action are provided.
However, while administrative review is available, only dismissal decisions may be further appealed before a judicial body. Other disciplinary sanctions cannot be challenged before a court.
Although a general regulatory framework is in place - including the Civil Service Law, the Code of Ethical Conduct for Public Servants, and internal regulations within each institution, the country did not provide evidence that the staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations receive specific training for this role. Moreover, no centralised electronic case management system exists for handling disciplinary proceedings across central government bodies. While institutions are required to document offences, investigations, and sanctions in accordance with their internal procedures, there is no unified or mandatory electronic system to manage these cases. In addition, aggregated data on the number of disciplinary proceedings (initiated, concluded, and appealed), as well as on the number and types of sanctions imposed, are not publicly available.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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