Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Guatemala
Table of contents
The Strategy for Integrity and Corruption Prevention 2025-2032 is the central instrument of the Guatemalan Executive Branch's framework to combat corruption and foster public ethics. Articulated by the National Anti-corruption Commission (CNC), this strategy serves as the operational tool to materialise the country's long-term development goals.
Along with the Government, the public integrity ecosystem covers other institutions that oversee different activities. The public body responsible for ensuring access to public information is the Human Rights Prosecutor. Responsibility for public officers' control and compliance with asset declarations lies with the Office of the Comptroller General of Accounts. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is responsible for overseeing the financing of political parties and election campaigns through the Specialised Unit for the Control and Oversight of Political Parties' Finances. Currently, there is no legislation on lobbying activities, and therefore no institution has an oversight mandate in this area.
The Constitution and Decree 32-2016 establish the regulatory framework for judicial integrity, under the supervision of the Judicial Career Council. Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Courts of Appeal are elected by Congress from lists proposed by Nominating Commissions. Prosecutors are governed by Decree No. 40-94, which establishes a merit-based career system within the Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as by Decree No. 2-89 and Decree No. 89-2002, which regulate recusal obligations and asset declarations. Disciplinary procedures for civil servants are established under Decree No. Decree No. 1748-68 and Agreement 18-98, defining disciplinary offences and sanctions.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Guatemala’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 60% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 27% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The Strategy for Integrity and Corruption Prevention 2025-2032 is organised around five strategic axes with defined objectives and outcome-level indicators, including target values. The primary objective of the strategy is to strengthen the culture of integrity and prevent corruption by implementing effective mechanisms for prevention, detection, and reporting, while promoting transparency, accountability, and multi-sectoral collaboration to improve public services.
The five strategic axes include strengthening the civil service through meritocracy; enhancing institutional capacity by simplifying procedures and reinforcing internal controls; promoting transparency and citizen participation; establishing a sustainable National Integrity System with effective inter-institutional coordination; and supporting knowledge production to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies.
A central coordination function is attributed to the Ministry of the Interior, together with the National Anti-corruption Commission, which are responsible for articulating and implementing the Strategy.
The Strategy was developed through an inclusive process, overseen by a board of directors that included representatives from civil society, indigenous peoples, and the private sector, and was complemented by an inter-institutional consultation process. However, the legal framework does not establish minimum timelines for inter-institutional or public consultations, and the public consultation portal does not systematically disclose consolidated feedback or responses to submitted comments.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 0% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
These results reflect the absence of a regulatory framework governing lobbying activities. Currently, there is no legal definition of lobbying or lobbyists, no designated authority responsible for oversight, and no tools for registering or disclosing lobbying activities. In addition, there are no mechanisms to monitor compliance or investigate potential breaches. The absence of cooling-off periods for public officials and lobbyists further increases the risk of undue influence in public decision-making. Similarly, Guatemala lacks a comprehensive beneficial ownership framework.
Nonetheless, recent developments indicate progress. In 2024, the Government adopted Governmental Agreement No. 208-2024 (Transparent Suppliers Agreement), strengthening transparency requirements within the General Registry of Government Procurement by enabling the identification of beneficial owners of legal entities seeking to operate as government suppliers. In the same year, Congress adopted Decree No. 31-2024, requiring the disclosure of shareholder information, including ownership percentages, in the Unified Tax Registry.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 78% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 22% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
The primary regulation governing interest declarations is Decree No.89/2002 on the Law on probity and responsibilities of public officials and employees, including a list of incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities. The legal framework also includes the Organic Law on the Comptroller General of Accounts and the Political Constitution of Guatemala, stipulating that selected public officials must submit an asset declaration to the Comptroller General of Accounts through a dedicated portal upon appointment, renewal or change of public office, and when there is a change in the information declared.
The Comptroller General of Accounts is the dedicated institution responsible for verifying the accuracy and compliance of asset declarations submitted by public officials. Despite public officials’ obligation to submit asset declarations through the portal of the Comptroller General of Accounts, in practice, these declarations have not been verified by the competent authority, nor have recommendations been issued based on them.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 90% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 57% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The primary legislation on political finance is the Electoral Law on Political Parties (No.85/2007), which establishes both administrative and criminal sanctions for violations of regulations governing party and campaign financing and holds electoral candidates personally liable for any breach. It prohibits anonymous donations, as well as contributions from foreign states, foreign enterprises, and publicly owned companies.
The independent body overseeing the financing of political parties and election campaigns is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal through its Specialised Unit for the Control and Audit of Political Party Finances.
According to the Regulation on Control and Auditing of Political Organisations, political parties must submit an “Electoral Campaign Financial Report “INFOCAM” within three months of the conclusion of electoral processes.
The Regulation on Control and Auditing of Political Organisations also requires political parties to publish their annual financial statements, which are subsequently made publicly available on the Clear Accounts portal. Over the past five years, all political parties have submitted their annual financial statements within the deadlines established by national legislation.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 78% on public information regulations, and 50% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% of criteria and 62%, respectively.
The Public Access to Information Law (Decree No. 57/2008) guarantees the right to access public information in all available formats for all persons, including non-citizens and legal entities. The law clearly defines permissible restrictions, establishes statutory deadlines for processing requests, and requires information to be provided in the requested format. Constitutional protection is ensured through the amparo procedure, which guarantees the right to appeal in cases of refusal or administrative inaction.
Oversight of access to information is entrusted to the Human Rights Prosecutor, an independent institution whose decisions on information requests are binding, despite the absence of direct administrative sanctioning powers. The legal framework (Decree No. 57/2008) further provides for criminal liability for public officials who unlawfully retain, alter, destroy, or conceal public information, reinforcing compliance.
Guatemala also proactively discloses several integrity-related datasets, including public procurement information, senior civil servants’ salaries, budget data, legislative proposals, and land registry records. Nonetheless, transparency gaps remain, notably the non-disclosure of government and ministerial agendas, cabinet meeting minutes, and asset and income declarations of public officials.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 59% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 8% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively
Decree 32-2016 and its General Regulation govern the judicial career, including access, evaluation, and promotion. First-instance and Peace Judges enter the judiciary through public competitive examinations organised by the Judicial Career Council and administered by the School of Judicial Studies, which assesses candidates against objective and transparent criteria. Promotions follow a similar process under the Council’s supervision. The Council supports the Supreme Court of Justice and manages the judicial career. Decisions on appointments and promotions cannot be appealed on substantive grounds, but only on procedural aspects of evaluations conducted by the School.
Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges are selected by the Congress of the Republic from lists proposed by Nominating Commissions, promotions to higher courts are decided by Congress on the basis of these lists. Evaluations consider ethical standards, academic and professional merit, and personal qualities. Less than half the membership of Nominating Commissions are judges and written exams or interviews are discretionary.
The Standards of Ethical Behaviour of the Judiciary are mandatory for all judicial personnel. While the legal framework regulates incompatibilities and grounds for recusal, it does not address broader interests that may generate conflicts outside judicial proceedings. Under the Probity Law (Decree 89-2002), judges and members of the highest judicial bodies must submit declarations of interests upon taking and leaving office, with annual updates for any changes. There are no internal reporting channels established for the judiciary, and there is no law establishing protection against retaliation of whistleblowers reporting judicial misconduct.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 38% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 11% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Decree No. 40-94 establishes a merit-based professional career system for prosecutors, providing for competitive examinations as the basis for entry and promotion within the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The regulatory framework does not grant candidates the right to appeal decisions concerning selection, appointment, or promotion. Prosecutorial decisions may not be appealed by the parties involved or reviewed by a senior prosecutor.
Selection and appointment procedures do not apply to the appointment of the Prosecutor General. The Prosecutor General is appointed by the President of the Republic from a shortlist submitted by a Nominating Commission. Under Decree No. 19-2009, the Commission’s interviews are optional. Decree No. 40-94 establishes objective grounds for dismissal and provides that the President may remove the Prosecutor General for a duly established justifiable cause.
Decree No. 40-94 and Decree No. 2-89 require prosecutors to recuse themselves on the same grounds applicable to judges. Violations of conflict-of-interest provisions are classified as very serious offences and may result in suspension without pay for a period of 21 to 90 days or in dismissal. The legal framework does not define broader circumstances or relationships that may give rise to conflicts outside judicial proceedings. Under Decree No. 89-2002, senior prosecutorial authorities must submit an asset declaration upon taking office, leaving office, or when relevant changes occur. There are no dedicated internal reporting channel for whistleblowers within the Prosecutor’s Office, and legislation does not ensure protection against against retaliation of whistleblowers reporting prosecutorial misconduct.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Guatemala fulfils 50% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The disciplinary procedures for civil servants are governed by Decree No. 1748-68 in conjunction with Agreement 18-98, which define what constitutes a disciplinary offence and establish the corresponding sanctions, ranging from a verbal warning to suspension without remuneration. It also sets out the grounds for dismissal, as specified in and regulates the procedures applicable to both dismissal and suspension.
Both suspension and dismissal may be challenged by submitting a written appeal to the Director of the National Civil Service Office within three days. The National Civil Service Board must issue a decision within 30 days. If no decision is rendered in cases of dismissal, the appeal is deemed denied, thereby allowing the appellant to bring the matter before the Labour and Social Security Courts.
Decree No. 1748-68 further establishes a statute of limitations for disciplinary offences, providing that all actions or rights arising from the law or its implementing regulations are subject to a maximum limitation period of three months, except where special regulations provide otherwise.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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