Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Ecuador
Table of contents
Contextual factors
Copy link to Contextual factorsTable 1. Contextual factors
Copy link to Table 1. Contextual factors|
State structure |
Executive power |
Legislative system |
Legal system |
|
Unitary |
Presidential |
Unicameral |
Civil law |
Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrity
Copy link to Regulatory and institutional framework on anti-corruption and public integrityThe results for Ecuador's strategic framework reflect the country's National Anti-Corruption Strategy, adopted by the Presidency of the Republic of Ecuador through the Secretariat for Anti-Corruption Public Policy in 2022. Building on the findings of the previous strategy, the strategy sets eight objectives and outlines over twelve corresponding recommendations, accompanied by an action plan for the 2022–2025 period. Ecuador’s current integrity policy framework is now guided by the National Public Integrity Strategy 2024-2030.
The Secretariat for Public Integrity, established in 2024 under Executive Decree No. 249, within the President of the Republic’s Office, oversees coordinating, implementing, and evaluating public integrity policies within the executive branch. Additionally, several other institutions are tasked with mitigating public integrity risks within their remits. Ecuador’s regulatory framework assigns the Ombudsman the responsibility to uphold the constitutional right of access to public information, while the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Society is the lead agency on open data policy. The Comptroller’s General Office oversees verification of public officials’ asset and interest declarations, and in 2025, the SGIP issued a technical standard on conflict-of-interest management in the executive branch. The National Electoral Council is the independent constitutional body that monitors political finance. However, Ecuador has not enacted lobbying regulations, hence no institution has a formal oversight mandate in this area. The Council of the Judiciary is the body charged with deciding on the appointment and promotion of judges and prosecutors.
Overview
Copy link to OverviewFigure 1. Overview
Copy link to Figure 1. Overview
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Ecuador’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Strategic framework
Copy link to Strategic frameworkFigure 2. Strategic framework
Copy link to Figure 2. Strategic framework
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 53% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 50% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
The National Anti-Corruption Strategy adopts a preventive and systemic approach to public integrity, supported by a situation analysis that identifies priority risks across the integrity system and references relevant international anti-corruption and integrity instruments. The drafting process involved inter-institutional and public consultations with a wide range of stakeholders, including key integrity bodies such as the anti-corruption and public procurement authorities, as well as non-state actors, notably the United Nations Development Programme and Grupo FARO.
The General Secretariat for Public Integrity (SGIP) was established by Executive Decree No. 249 of 30 April 2024 as a high-level entity within the Presidency of the Republic of Ecuador. Executive Decree No. 249 of 2024 assigns to the Secretariat for Public Integrity responsibility for designing methodologies and coordinating the monitoring, evaluation, and implementation of the strategy and its action plan. The 2022–2025 action plan includes outcome-level indicators, baseline targets, and identified lead institutions for each activity. A monitoring report covering May 2022–November 2023 provides conclusions and management recommendations. However, neither the action plan nor the monitoring report is made publicly available, and they remain accessible only through an internal digital platform. Lastly, the report does not include a financial plan, and it does not indicate which of the activities planned for 2023 were carried out, therefore the implementation rate of the strategy is not available.
Lobbying
Copy link to LobbyingFigure 3. Lobbying
Copy link to Figure 3. Lobbying
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
Although the regulatory framework provides for cooling-off periods for certain public officials taking up private functions, as specified in Articles 153 and 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, these provisions do not apply to members of the judicial or legislative branches. Beneficial ownership rules are established by law and make mandatory the disclosure of company data to identify owners of corporations.
The National Assembly of Ecuador has discussed bills aimed at regulating lobbying activities, such as Cod. AN-2019-1696/378426 and Cod. AN-2020-1805/397243. However, none of these have been approved to date.
Conflict of interest
Copy link to Conflict of interestFigure 4. Conflict of interest
Copy link to Figure 4. Conflict of interest
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 78% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 11% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Ecuador’s regulatory framework provides a broad legal basis for managing conflicts of interest. The Public Service Organic Law defines incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities, as well as relationships that may give rise to conflicts of interest. In addition, the Law on the presentation and control of sworn declarations of assets and liabilities establishes a constitutional obligation for all public officials, including members of Congress and the judiciary, to submit comprehensive declarations of assets and liabilities, which are to be verified by the Comptroller General’s Office. The framework includes strong formal safeguards, notably the constitutional requirement that asset declarations be submitted prior to assuming public office.
There are no sanctions for non-compliance, and no publicly available information on submission rates, verification outcomes, or recommendations issued to address detected conflicts of interest. Moreover, despite the universal disclosure requirement, the absence of specific provisions targeting high-risk positions, such as political advisers or regulatory officials, limits the regulatory framework’s effectiveness.
Political finance
Copy link to Political financeFigure 5. Political finance
Copy link to Figure 5. Political finance
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 90% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 29% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Ecuador’s Electoral and Political Organisations Law establishes a comprehensive framework for political finance, prohibiting anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states and enterprises, and donations from state-owned entities. The law sets spending ceilings for political parties, candidates, third parties, and personal contributions to electoral campaigns. Sanctions for breaches are enforced by the National Electoral Council, with decisions subject to appeal before the Electoral Contentious Tribunal.
In practice, the Electoral Contentious Tribunal’s 2023 Annual Report provides detailed information on political finance enforcement, including ongoing investigations and sanctions issued, enhancing transparency and accountability. Sanctions are determined based on the severity of offences and their impact on electoral processes. However, only 13% of political organisations submitted annual accounts within legally defined timelines over the past five years, and not all parties represented in Congress complied with campaign finance reporting deadlines. In addition, while financial reports are published online, they were not up to date and lacked user-friendly features, limiting effective public scrutiny.
Access to public information
Copy link to Access to public informationFigure 6. Access to public information
Copy link to Figure 6. Access to public information
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 89% on public information regulations, and 50% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Ecuador’s Law on transparency and access to public information regulates the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to public information for all persons, including non-citizens and legal entities, and establishes broad transparency obligations across public institutions. The framework provides appeal mechanisms through the courts or the Ombudsman and requires that disclosed information be made available in open data formats. The scope of transparency duties is wide, covering political parties, public entities managing public funds, and institutions delivering health and education services. The Ombudsman conducted 63 random compliance inspections during the latest full calendar year.
However, implementation gaps persist. Formal government session agendas and ministers’ agendas are not systematically published, and there is no aggregate data on access-to-information requests. Enforcement is further constrained by the Ombudsman’s lack of sanctioning powers, as it may only request prosecution or corrective action, limiting the effectiveness of compliance.
Judicial integrity
Copy link to Judicial integrityFigure 7. Judicial integrity
Copy link to Figure 7. Judicial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 71% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 24% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Ecuador’s Constitution establishes that the judiciary “shall enjoy internal and external independence” and tenure and objective grounds for dismissal are set in the Organic Code of the Judiciary. The Council of the Judiciary decides on judicial appointment and promotion, however its delegates can be proposed by the Executive and the Legislative, and there is no requirement that half of them shall be judges. Objective, merit-based appointment and promotion measures are in place for judges, including theoretical, practical and psychological tests. While members of the National Court of Justice are exempt from these tests, the Organic Code of the Judiciary establishes a selection process that is based on expert committee evaluation of the applicants and a public hearing where the candidate defends their application.
The Code of Ethics of the Judiciary, applicable to all judicial branch employees, sets standards of conduct and ethical behaviour. The Organic Code of the Judiciary lists the incompatibilities for judges and court employees, while the Organic Criminal Code and General Organic Code of Procedures establish grounds for recusal. The Law on submission of sworn asset declarations obliges all public servants to submit interest declarations, which includes judges. However, no data is available on the submission rate or the number of declarations verified.
The Protocol for Reporting Alleged Acts of Corruption provides an internal reporting channel for corruption or bribery, but not other judicial misconduct. The law does not protect people who report corruption or judicial integrity violations from retaliation. Training on confidentiality are not made mandatory to staff handling reports in courts.
Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Prosecutorial integrityFigure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Copy link to Figure 8. Prosecutorial integrity
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 69% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 32% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Under the Constitution, the Prosecutor General’s Office is an autonomous body within the judicial branch, with administrative, economic, and financial autonomy. The Organic Code of the Judiciary sets integrity safeguards, including objective grounds for dismissal, merit-based, objective procedures for selection and promotion, and the right to appeal appointment decisions before an administrative court. The Prosecutor General is selected and appointed for a single six-year term by the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Oversight, as per Ecuador’s Constitution, where citizen selection committees are responsible for organising a competitive exam with written and oral tests. These committees include one delegate from each government branch and an equal number of representatives from social groups and citizens.
The Code of Ethics of the Judiciary, applicable to prosecutors, sets standards of conduct. The Organic Code of the Judiciary sets out incompatibilities while the Criminal Code sets grounds for recusal and the procedure for processing them. Prosecutors submit interest declarations under the Law on submission of sworn asset declarations; data is not available on submission or verification rates.
The Protocol for Reporting Alleged Acts of Corruption provides an internal reporting channel for corruption or bribery, but not other prosecutorial misconduct. The law does not protect people who report prosecutorial misconduct, but protective measures for at-risk parties involved in legal proceedings are in place. Training on confidentiality is not made mandatory to staff handling reports in the prosecution service.
Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Disciplinary system for civil servantsFigure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Copy link to Figure 9. Disciplinary system for civil servants
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Ecuador fulfils 100% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 17% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Organic Law on Public Service establishes the disciplinary framework for civil servants, which defines what constitutes a disciplinary offence, establishes a disciplinary procedure for public servants, and sets a range of disciplinary sanctions for each type of offence (minor and serious). It also includes provisions on the presumption of innocence, the right to access and contest evidence, the right to a hearing, and the right to legal counsel. Internal Disciplinary decisions can be appealed in front of a judicial body after exhausting the administrative remedies.
The management of disciplinary procedures is decentralised; therefore, each public institution has its internal regulations that set out and describe the disciplinary regime. However, in cases of serious offences, an administrative summary proceeding is carried out by the Ministry of Labour, who has issued guidelines for its standardisation through Ministerial Agreement MDT-2026-026. Ecuador does not have a standardised, mandatory training programme at the central level for staff responsible for conducting disciplinary investigations and processes, nor does it have an electronic case management system to handle disciplinary cases and proceedings in all central government bodies.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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