Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Belgium
Table of contents
Belgium’s anti-corruption regulatory framework is mainly composed of royal decrees, which are regulatory acts implementing Acts of Parliament. The most relevant to the integrity framework of Belgium is the Royal Decree of 18 April 2024, which requires federal public organisations in Belgium to identify integrity objectives and develop an integrity management action plan. The Integrity Bureau of the Federal Public Service Policy and Support (FPS BOSA) is responsible for the promotion of integrity policy within the federal administrative civil service.
The Federal Internal Audit (FIA) evaluates the efficiency of internal control and risk assessment mechanisms within public services. The Court of Audits analyses the annual accounts of recognised political parties, in accordance with election spending ceilings, and it can report irregularities to the House of Representatives. The Minister of Finance is in charge of the Coordination of the Fight against Fraud, while the Central Office for the repression of Corruption is part of the Federal Police and specialises in prosecuting corruption. Finally, the Superior Council of Justice is responsible for the selection, promotion and nomination of judges and prosecutors.
Note: data is for 2025 or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Belgium’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: data is for 2025 or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfils 0% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Regulations can only be considered as a strategic framework if they set a strategic direction in the short or medium term with clear, specific and time-bound primary level objectives specifically aimed at mitigating public integrity risks. The Royal Decree of April 18 2024 requires federal public organisations in Belgium to identify integrity objectives and corresponding indicators in the organisation’s strategic plan. All federal public organisations must develop annual integrity management implementation plans and report on the implementation of the action plan to the responsible minister and FPS BOSA.
Note: data is for 2025 or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfills 20% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 11% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38%, respectively.
In Belgium, there is no dedicated regulatory framework for lobbying activities. There is also no institution in place with a mandate to oversee the transparency of lobbying activities in the executive. The Rules of Procedure of the National Parliament, which cover lobbying activities aimed at Members of Parliament, define lobbying activities as “activities with the aim of directly or indirectly influencing the development or implementation of policies or the decision-making of the Chamber”.
A lobbying register is available as a downloadable PDF. It includes the name of lobbyists and their organisation but does not provide information on their domain of intervention, type of lobbying activities, or pieces of legislation targeted. A registrar of beneficial ownership, called the Ultimate Beneficial Owner, does exist but is not available to the public.
Note: data is for 2025 or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfills 78% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 44% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
In Belgium, the Royal decree on state public officials, ministerial code of conduct and code of conduct of parliament define circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict of interest in their respective administrations. The ordinary and special laws of 2 May 1995 and 26 June 2004 include a list of obligations for high-level civil servants of the executive regarding the publication of interest declarations, employment and mandates. Submission rates have consistently been above 80% in the last four years.
Sanctions are in place in cases of non-compliance with disclosure obligations, which can take the form of fines and restrictions on the capacity to serve in a public office. However, there is no mechanism in place to verify interest declarations, as the Supreme Audit Institution only unseals interest declarations in cases of judicial proceedings.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfils 80% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 71% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
The Law relative to the control of political finance bans contributions from foreign states and enterprises, and contributions from publicly owned enterprises. It sets a ceiling for campaign expenses for parties and establishes that parties and/or candidates must report their finances.
The Act of 4 July 1989 allows the Supreme Audit Institution, the Cour des Comptes, to verify the origin of funds in the annual accounts of recognised political parties and to verify compliance with election spending ceilings. All Belgian political parties have submitted annual accounts within the timeline defined by national legislation for the past five years. However, the annual accounts are published as a PDF online, reducing their accessibility to the public. There is no centralised record of all violations of political finance regulations.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfils 78% of criteria on public information regulations, and 54% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Belgium is a signatory of the Tromso Convention since 2009, and the only restrictions on access to public information in the country’s Law on Freedom of Information are the exceptions listed in the convention. The Law on Freedom of Information also establishes a deadline of 30 days to process requests for information. The Law of 4 May 2016 establishes a list of mandatory information to be disclosed and establishes that administrative documents are made available to the public by default.
The Royal Decree of 29 April 2008 established the Federal Commission for Access to Administrative Documents, an institution responsible for public information issues, which publishes statistical data on requests for access to information and gives advisory opinions related to open information. However, the reception of an administrative document can be subject to a fee, and there are no obligations to provide information in a specific format.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfils 47% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 12% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
The Belgian Constitution establishes that judges are appointed for life, and they retire at an age determined by the law; no judge can be deprived of his post or suspended except by a court decision. Article 151 of the Constitution establishes that the Superior Council of Justice (CSJ) can nominate candidates for judicial positions from a list of applicants having passed the professional aptitude examination. The procedure for the promotion of judges is defined and requires an interview.
The Belgian legislative framework does not define the circumstances that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for judges, nor are they required to submit interest declarations. Additionally, there is no regulation establishing internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in the judiciary, nor are whistleblowers protected against retaliation by law. There is no portal providing information on whistleblowers’ rights.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfils 41% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 21% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
In Belgium, judges and prosecutors are governed by the same legal framework under the Belgian Constitution and Judiciary Code, which establishes a merit-based, objective procedure for the selection and promotion of prosecutors. However, there is no right of candidates to appeal decisions taken by CSJ regarding appointment and promotion.
The Judiciary Code establishes objective grounds for the dismissal of prosecutors but does not define the circumstances that lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors. There is also no regulation establishing the requirement for prosecutors to recuse themselves when conflicts arise.
The Judiciary Code regulates the disciplinary regime for magistrates and establishes the possibility of presenting complaints for judicial misconduct allegations. There is no regulatory basis establishing internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in public prosecutors’ offices, nor are there legal protections against retaliation for whistleblowers.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Belgium fulfils 58% of criteria on the disciplinary system regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
The Royal Decree of 2 October 1937 on the status of civil servants establishes a list of disciplinary sanctions in its article 77. The legislation also sets out a right to appeal, described as a “right to challenge assessors at the appeal board”, but there is no obligation to inform the judiciary or law enforcement if a disciplinary case involves criminal behaviour.
There is no training offered to staff conducting disciplinary investigations. Additionally, there is no case management system for disciplinary cases and proceedings, and no public data available concerning the number of procedures against civil servants, and the type of disciplinary sanctions applied.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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