Anti‑Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Argentina
Table of contents
In 2023 Argentina adopted its National Integrity Strategy (ENI) through Decree 591/2023. Building on the previous National Anti-Corruption Plan 2019-2023, the strategy includes five general guidelines, each accompanied by a set of prioritised activities. The coordination and monitoring of the ENI’s implementation is led by the Anti-Corruption Office (OA) and the Secretariat for Management and Public Employment.
The Agency for Access to Public Information is the institutional body charged with upholding the right to access to public information established in Law 27 275. The Anti-Corruption Office is responsible for receiving and verifying the conflict-of-interest declarations for public officials, although the Council of Magistrates verifies the declarations of the highest bodies of the judiciary. Regulations on lobbying are established by Decree 1172/2003 and applicable to entities under the National Executive Power. There is no supervisory function for lobbying activities and no public register of lobbyists. The National Electoral Justice is the independent body with the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns. The Magistrate’s Council is responsible for producing recommendations on the appointment and promotion of judges. The Attorney General’s office is charged with submitting a short-list of candidates for public prosecutor positions.
Note: 2025 and 2020 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Data on where Argentina’s integrity system is strongest and could be most improved can be found at the link below:
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 60% of criteria on the strength of strategic framework, and 63% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 38% and 32%, respectively.
Argentina’s National Integrity Strategy (ENI) was developed using evidence from the predecessor strategy and extracting lessons from it. Although the drafting process included a consultation with key integrity institutions, the strategy did not undergo a public consultation process, unlike its predecessor. The “National Board on Integrity and Transparency” was created through Decree No.592/2021 with the purpose of formulating recommendations and setting priorities on public integrity, informing the development of the Strategy. The Board includes the Anti-Corruption Office, the Agency for Access to Public Information, and the Attorney General of the Nation. The initiatives of the ENI are compiled into an online database that serves as the action plan. The database identifies the lead organisations responsible for the implementation of each objective. The Anti-Corruption Office is mandated to publish a monitoring report of the strategy every year. The 2023 report is available online and includes the implementation rate of activities. No end-of-term evaluation is listed as an activity in the action plan.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 40% of criteria on lobbying regulations, and 0% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 43% and 38% respectively.
Argentina’s Decree 1172/2003 provides a legal definition of lobbying activities and which actors are considered lobbyists that is applicable to entities operating under the jurisdiction of the National Executive Power. Resolution No.7/2022 by the Anti-Corruption Office establishes cooling-off periods for public officials and includes an obligation to declare private activities for up to three years prior to assuming office and a year after ceasing in the position. However, no such cooling-off periods exist for lobbyists entering public roles. Law No.27739/2024 established a register of beneficial ownership of corporate entities in 2024. However, the register is only accessible to certain public authorities, and therefore cannot be consulted by the public.
The regulatory framework does not establish sanctions for specific breaches for standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying, and no supervisory function in central government oversees transparency of lobbying activities. Argentina also has no lobbying register to improve transparency around influence activities through disclosure of information such as domains of intervention, types of lobbying activities and related budgets and expenses.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 100% of criteria on conflict-of-interest regulations, and 78% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 80% and 45%, respectively.
Regulations including the National Civil and Commercial Procedure Code, Law 25 188, and Law 19 549 list incompatibilities between public and private activities - - define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials, and establish an obligation to manage them.
Law 25 188 additionally establishes the institutional responsibilities related to interest declarations submissions, and obliges members of Government, members of high judicial bodies, parliamentary representatives, top-tier civil servants, and employees in high-risk positions to submit an interest declaration within thirty business days from the assumption of their positions. In practice, these office holders are generally observing their obligations to submit declarations, though only 73% of members of parliament submitted interest declarations for the past six years. Interest declarations are submitted electronically and freely accessible in the OA’s website, with certain restrictions regarding confidential information. The OA verified 73% of the interest declarations filed during the latest two full calendar years and has advised the competent authorities to issue sanctions in all cases of non-compliance with disclosure obligations for the past three years.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 90% of criteria on political finance regulations, and 71% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 76% and 58%, respectively.
Argentina’s regulations on political finance are stipulated by Law 26 215, which bans anonymous donations, contributions from foreign states or enterprises, and contributions from publicly owned enterprises. Although sanctions for breaches of political finance and election campaign regulations are established, electoral candidates cannot be held personally liable for breaches of these regulations.. This law also sets ceilings to electoral campaign expenses for parties and to personal contributions to candidates’ personal campaigns.
The National Electoral Justice is the independent body with the mandate to oversee the financing of political parties and election campaigns. Financial reports from political parties are publicly available online in a user-friendly format. However, only 76% of parties submitted annual accounts within the timelines defined by national legislation over the period 2020-2024.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 100% of criteria on public information regulations, and 69% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 72% and 62%, respectively.
Law 27 275 stipulates that all information held by the State is presumed to be public, with certain exceptions, and that everyone has a right to access it. The same law specifies statutory deadlines for processing requests for information, and establishes that Government data is open by default, except for specific cases defined in the regulatory framework.
The Agency of Access to Information (AAIP) is the supervisory body responsible for public information and open data, and its decisions cannot be quashed by any executive power. The AAIP develops a Transparency Index to measure compliance with public information regulations across the public administration and other publicly owned bodies. However, no sanctions for non-compliance are issued, since the law does not provide the AAIIP with sanctioning powers. Argentina proactively publishes consolidated versions of all primary laws, government legislative proposals, the state budgets, ministers’ agendas, and aggregate data on information requests. However, government session agendas and the salaries of individual senior civil servants are not publicly available.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 56% of criteria on judicial integrity regulations, and 48% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 45%, respectively.
Argentina’s Constitution establishes the principle of irrevocability of judges, stating that all judges shall remain in office as long as their good conduct lasts and setting objective grounds for their dismissal. Under Law No.24.937/1997 and Decree No.7/14, the Magistrate’s Council is charged with producing recommendations on the appointment and promotion of judges, which includes merit-based, objective procedures for the selection and promotion of all judges, including Supreme Court members (under Decree No.222/2003). However, less than half the members of the Council are required to be judges.
There are no dedicated standards of conduct and ethical behaviour applicable for judges in Argentina, though provisions related to judges’ conflicts of interest are laid out in Law 25 188 and Decree 31/99. All judges are required to submit interest declarations. Although there is a general complaints procedure to report judicial misconduct to the Magistrates’ Council available in Resolution No.98/2007, in Argentina there is no internal whistleblower reporting channel that allows individuals to confidentially or anonymously report misconduct. There are also no legal protections in place against retaliation for whistleblowers.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 52% of criteria on prosecutorial integrity regulations, and 37% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 52%, respectively.
Law 27 148 establishes objective grounds for the dismissal of prosecutors, including poor performance, the commission of a common crime or a crime in the exercise of their functions. Argentina’s regulations define the circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for prosecutors and establish sanctions, but do not define the specific circumstances that could lead to the recusal of prosecutors.
The selection and promotion of public prosecutors is also regulated by Law 27 148, which establishes a public competitive selection process. Following this process, the Attorney General’s office submits a short-list of candidates, from which the Executive Branch selects one. The appointment requires the approval of a simple majority of the Senate. The General Prosecutor is appointed by the Executive Power, with the agreement of two thirds of members of the Senate following a procedure regulated in Decree No.222/2003. The law indicates the possibility of appeal to the judiciary decisions on appointment on cases of arbitrariness or serious breaches to the procedure. There are no dedicated standards of conduct and ethical behaviour for prosecutors, although prosecutors are obliged to submit an asset declaration annually, within 30 days of taking office, and 30 days after ceasing in the position. The overall submission rate of asset declarations for prosecutors was 97% for the period 2021-2024. However, no information is available on the number of declarations verified by the responsible authority. There are no internal reporting channels for whistleblowers in public prosecutors’ offices, and no law includes rules on whistleblower protection.
Note: 2025 data or latest year available.
Source: OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database (data extracted on 7 March 2026).
Argentina fulfils 83% of criteria on disciplinary system regulations, and 67% on practice, compared to the OECD average of 66% and 22%, respectively.
Law 25 164 of Argentina defines what constitutes a disciplinary offence and establishes a disciplinary procedure for public servants. It also establishes a range of disciplinary sanctions and a statute of limitations for each type of disciplinary offence. Disciplinary decisions can be appealed in front of a judicial body after exhausting the administrative remedies.
The National Treasury Procurator's Office offers training to lawyers working in public administration through the School of the Corps of State Lawyers (ECAE), who are in charge of conducting disciplinary investigations in each institution. Disciplinary cases and proceedings are managed through a digital management system, albeit not an exclusive one for disciplinary cases. However, there is no publicly available information on disciplinary procedures because of data protection legislation.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
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The full book is available in English: OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
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