This report assesses Korea’s economic and social transformation of recent decades through the lens of the OECD Well-being Framework, providing a broader picture of societal progress that considers people’s living conditions, experiences, and collective resources. It highlights achievements in terms of longer and safer lives, widespread educational attainment, and gains in material well-being, but also identifies potential opportunities for further improvements in inclusive and sustainable well-being. Youth well-being, promoting good mental health and social connectedness, and gender equality are highlighted as key areas in which there are opportunities to implement more multidimensional and integrated, more equity- and people‑focussed, and more preventative policy approaches to build on existing government efforts.
Inclusive and Sustainable Well‑being in Korea
Abstract
Korea has experienced an extraordinary socio‑economic transformation in a relatively short amount of time. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, it changed from a primarily subsistence‑based economy to become a world leader in manufacturing, and this rapid pace of evolution has continued over the last three decades, with continued investment in technological development, industrial innovation, and human capital. During this period, Korea achieved one of the highest rates of GDP growth among OECD countries: with aggregate GDP almost tripling between 1996 and 2024, and GDP per capita more than doubling, to match the OECD average rate (OECD, n.d.[1]; 2024[2]).
The publication of this report marks the 30th anniversary of Korean membership of the OECD, and its aim is to assess how Korea’s remarkable economic growth has translated into more inclusive and sustainable well-being for Korean people, drawing from OECD work on well-being measurement and policy practice. It takes a multidimensional and granular approach, analysing Korea’s performance across the full range of dimensions in the OECD Well-being Framework (see Figure 1.1), benchmarking results over time – going back to 1996 when Korea joined the OECD wherever possible – and in comparison with other OECD countries. It also complements and draws from Korean national efforts to measure multidimensional well-being through the “Quality of Life in Korea” indicators, which have been produced since 2014 (see Box 1.1).
This introductory chapter (Chapter 1) provides more context for the evidence and principles underpinning a well-being approach to measurement and policy practice, as well as a summary of the key insights from subsequent chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a statistical descriptive analysis of Korea’s well-being performance, with the former focussing on aggregate trends and outcomes and the latter on differences in well-being outcomes by gender, age, and education level. Chapter 4 focusses on three opportunity areas for further improving inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea, including more detailed policy context and drawing from relevant OECD work and international experiences to provide insights for supporting Korean policy efforts in these areas.
Well-being measurement
The purpose of measuring people’s well-being is to obtain a more comprehensive picture of people’s living conditions, experiences, and collective resources, and to monitor societal progress in a more precise and nuanced way than is possible with macroeconomic indicators alone. Well-being measurement frameworks and accompanying indicator sets are generally multidimensional, reflecting that many different aspects matter for people’s lives,1 and tend to include measures that provide information about inclusion and inequality alongside aggregate outcomes, as well as data on the drivers of future well-being (OECD, 2023[3]). In this way, decision makers and citizens themselves have access to a rich set of information to better understand whether people’s lives are getting better overall, signal areas of underperformance where greater policy attention may be needed and identify potentially vulnerable population groups or geographic areas for more targeted policy design and implementation.
“Well-being” is referenced in the original founding Convention of the OECD (OECD, 1960[4]), and the Organisation has a long history of developing social and environmental indicators to complement the measurement of economic performance (Scrivens and Iasiello, 2010[5]). OECD efforts to directly define and measure multidimensional well-being date back two decades, first with the establishment of the OECD World Forums on Statistics, Knowledge and Policy in 2004 (later renamed the OECD World Forums on Well-being) (OECD, 2025[6]) – which were created to foster exchange and discussion across countries and disciplines on how to measure and support societal progress and well-being – and through subsequent contributions to the final report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (known also as the Sen-Stiglitz-Fitoussi report), which set out a roadmap for statistical development for broader, more people‑focussed measures of progress (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009[7]).
In 2011, the OECD established its multidimensional Well-being Framework (see Figure 1.1) to guide data collection, statistical analysis, and methodological development. Informed by the recommendations of the Sen-Stiglitz-Fitoussi report among other sources, and developed under the guidance of the OECD Committee on Statistics and Statistical Policy (representing the national statisticians of all OECD countries), the Framework is intended to cover broadly relevant and policy-amenable aspects of inclusive, sustainable well-being encompassing:
Current well-being: Spanning 11 dimensions related to material conditions that shape people’s economic options as well as quality-of-life factors that encompass how well people are (and how well they feel they are), what they know and can do, and how healthy and safe their places of living are. In addition, dimensions addressing community relations encompass how connected and engaged people are, and how and with whom they spend their time.
Equality and inclusion: As national averages often mask large inequalities in how different parts of the population are doing, three types of inequalities are systematically considered in analysis based on the Framework: Gaps between population groups (e.g. between men and women, old and young people, etc.); gaps between those at the top and those at the bottom of the achievement scale in each dimension (e.g. the income of the richest 20% of individuals compared to that of the poorest 20%); and deprivations (the share of the population falling below a given threshold of achievement, e.g. a minimum level of skills or health).
Long-term sustainability: Resources for future well-being are expressed in terms of country’s investment in (or depletion of) different types of capital resources that last over time but that are also affected by decisions taken (or not taken) today. They include natural capital (stocks of natural resources, land cover, species biodiversity, as well as ecosystems and their services), economic capital (man-made or produced capital and financial assets), human capital (skills and the future health of the population) and social capital (social norms, shared values and institutional arrangements that foster co‑operation).
Source: OECD (2024[8]), How’s Life 2024: Well-being and Resilience in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1787/90ba854a-en.
As a multilateral organisation, the OECD’s aim in developing its Well-being Framework is enable international comparison and address common methodological challenges across member countries. Many OECD countries have also developed their own national well-being framework to guide measurement, and increasingly, to inform strategic co‑ordination and policy decision making (see next section) (OECD, 2023[3]). While analysis of country-level frameworks show a high degree of conceptual overlap with the OECD approach (OECD, 2023[3]), they are also generally developed to reflect specific national contexts, and national-level data usually allows for a more detailed and granular picture of outcomes within a country than is possible at the international level. The Korean Ministry of Data and Statistics has been publishing its own well-being indicators since 2014, “Quality of Life Indicators in Korea” or KQoL, and they have been an important complementary resource for the drafting of this report (see Box 1.1).
The Ministry of Data and Statistics (formerly Statistics Korea) has published its Quality of Life in Korea (KQoL) indicators online since 2014, and additionally in a regular statistical report since 2017 (OECD, 2023[9]). The set includes 71 indicators across 11 dimensions of current well-being (that map closely to the OECD’s own Framework dimensions): Family and Community; Health; Education; Employment and Wages; Income, Consumption and Wealth; Leisure; Housing, Environment; Safety, Civic Engagement and Subjective Well-being. The indicators measure both objective and subjective outcomes. The KQoL framework conceptualises well-being through a set of concentric circles (Figure 1.2). At the centre, subjective well-being sits within a broader, multi-level framework encompassing individual, societal, and environmental factors. The individual level covers income and wealth, health, education, and housing – the foundations of a “capable individual”. The societal level focusses on social relationships, where indicators of civic engagement and leisure underpin a “mutually supportive and active community”. The outermost circle captures environmental conditions, with measures of the environment and safety contributing to a “safe and sustainable environment (Data and Statistics Research Institute, 2025[10]).
Source: Data and Statistics Research Institute (2025[10]), Quality of Life Indicators in Korea 2024, https://mods.go.kr/board.es?mid=b10105000000&bid=0060&act=view&list_no=437505.
Over time, the indicator set has been frequently reviewed and refined to ensure continued relevance, data quality, and political neutrality by the Committee for KQoL, encompassing one expert reviewer and 5 advisors for each dimension. Public consultations were also conducted at the national level in 2018 and 2020 (via online surveys involving almost 25 000 participants) to ensure that the selection of indicators reflected widely held priorities (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2023[11]).
The Ministry of Data and Statistics has also developed targeted measurement frameworks to monitor the well-being of population groups and regions requiring greater policy attention, including children and youth (aged 0-18), young adults (aged 19-34) and older people (Data and Statistics Research Institute, 2025[12]), advanced work on “The Framework of Measuring Quality of Life by Life Cycle” (Data and Statistics Research Institute, 2025[10]; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2023[13]) and identified indicators to capture how people’s lives are changing in the digital age (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2025[14]). Through close co‑ordination with local governments, the Ministry of Interior and Safety and the Presidential Committee for Balanced National Development, the ministry has also undertaken a comprehensive assessment of regional well-being across all 17 regional governments and 229 municipalities in Korea (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2025[14]; Lee and Tosetto, 2024[15]). The most recent well-being results, including deep dives into selected topics, are presented and discussed every year at the National Quality of Life Measurement Forum, organised by the Ministry of Data and Statistics since 2015 (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2025[14]).
The National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences and Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs have also developed and published the Korean Quality of Life Index in 2021, drawing on the KQoL conceptual framework. Encompassing 10 domains (Subjective Well-being, Health, Education and Skills, Work, Economic Living Standards, Sociocultural Capital, Safety, Governance, Social Safety Net and Environment) and measured by 20 indicators, the index showed room for improvement in areas such as life satisfaction, suicide rate, GDP per hour worked, and relative income poverty (Lee and Tosetto, 2024[15]).
Well-being policy practice
The existence of a well-being measurement framework or dashboard is not enough on its own to ensure the integration of well-being evidence and principles in day-to-day government decision making processes. To address this, OECD countries (and sub-national governments) have taken steps to more strongly integrate well-being evidence into policy decision making processes (OECD, 2023[3]), including through:
Performance management frameworks and the use of well-being Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to more closely link government performance with well-being outcomes, including in Scotland, Iceland and Japan.
Methods to quantify the value of well-being impacts and incorporate these into cost-benefit analysis. For example, in the United Kingdom a valuation method (called the WELLBY approach) has been widely employed to monetise well-being impacts for policy appraisal. The New Zealand Treasury’s CBAx tool, a spreadsheet model containing a database of values has been developed to help agencies monetise impacts and do cost-benefit analysis across a broader range of social outcomes, in part informed by the Treasury’s multidimensional Living Standards Framework.
Modelling and forecasting techniques to better estimate the effect of government action on well-being outcomes, such as employed in Italy in the context of budgetary impact assessment (see also Box 1.2).
Impact assessment and screening tools to provide a broader well-being perspective for government analysis and decision making, such as Canada’s inclusion of quality of life and inequalities analysis in Budget Impact Reports (see Box 1.2), and impact screening guidance and toolkits for government analysts employed in the Australian Capital Territory, the Netherlands and Scotland.
Strengthening the assessment of well-being outcomes in policy and programme evaluations. For example, in the United Kingdom, four measures of subjective‑well-being from the Office of National Statistics – life satisfaction, happiness, anxiety and feeling that life is worthwhile – (known as the ONS4) have been widely used across government departments to evaluate effectiveness across a variety of intervention types, including community-centred approaches, skills training, volunteering, physical activity, social care, advice and support, and arts and culture.
These new and adapted tools and approaches are being used across a wide range of government decision making areas (OECD, 2023[3]). One important emerging focus area for many OECD countries is strengthening the use of well-being evidence in budgeting and resource allocation processes, as described in Box 1.2.
Several OECD countries (and sub-national governments) have developed, or are in the early stages of developing, ways to better integrate well-being evidence and principles into budgeting and resource allocation processes and some common themes can be observed across the existing examples, including:
Reporting on well-being indicators as scene‑setting context for budgetary discussions
The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance reports twice a year on the evolution of 12 well-being indicators (selected from a larger set produced by the national statistical office) and the actual or projected impact on them of different budget scenarios (OECD, 2022[16]). The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has published Well-being Factsheets for each government ministry since 2023 (after a more limited pilot exercise in 2022). These Factsheets present information on outcomes and trends from the CBS Monitor of Well-being and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator frameworks, tailored to the budgetary themes of each department (Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023[17]; OECD, 2023[18]). Since 2021, Ireland has held an annuasummer Economic Dialogue with social partners and other stakeholders, which is in part informed by insights from Ireland’s well-being framework indicators (OECD, 2023[3]).
Identifying priority areas for resource allocation
Multidimensional well-being indicator sets can inform the identification of a narrower set of priority areas for resource allocation. For example, in New Zealand’s Well-being Budget in 2019, the New Zealand Treasury’s Living Standards Framework was used to inform expert and cross-government deliberations to select five priority areas to receive increased policy attention and financial resources. In Iceland, six well-being priority areas for the 2019-2023 and 2024-2028 five‑year fiscal strategies were identified with reference to 40 national well-being performance indicators through a similar process of cross-government consultation (OECD, 2023[3]).
Better linking government expenditure with well-being outcomes
In Ireland, the Department of Public Expenditure, Infrastructure, Public Service Reform and Digitalisation, works with all other government Departments and Offices to implement a budget tagging approach, identifying policy goals for each sub-head of the Budget, and matching them with the most appropriate dimension(s) from the Irish Well-being Framework. The potential benefits of tagging public expenditure in such a way include: increased transparency, supporting the identification of opportunities for cross-government and cross-sector co‑ordination on cross-cutting challenges, enhancing analysis, and informing broader discussions around budgetary decision making (Department of the Taoiseach, 2025[19]).
Well-being budgetary impact assessment
In Italy, in addition to its regular reporting on trends in the 12 headline well-being indicators, the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (with the support of the OECD) has developed modelling techniques for a smaller sub-set (healthy life expectancy, overweight and obesity, and early school leaving) to help make projections for future trends, and better predict the potential impact of different budgetary and policy scenarios (Murtin et al., 2022[20]). In Canada, the Budget Impacts Report, included as an annex to the federal budget, provides a publicly reported assessment of the expected impacts of new spending on the quality of life of Canadians based on the indicators in Canada’s Quality of Life Framework combined with its Gender-Based Analysis Plus methodology for distributional impact analysis (Department of Finance Canada, 2025[21]; OECD, 2025[22]).
In addition to strengthening the use of evidence from well-being frameworks and associated indicators, governments are also taking steps to consider how implementing a well-being approach in practice may require different ways of thinking and working, rather than being a simple add-on to existing economic policy practice. This is a relatively new area of policy practice, and the diversity of approaches at the national, sub-national and community level attest that there is no single, established approach. However, some common principles underpin efforts to strengthen well-being-informed decision making and policy implementation in OECD countries (Figure 1.3).
These principles have been derived from initiative mapping and discussions with government experts in the context of the OECD Knowledge Exchange Platform on Well-being Metrics and Policy Practice (see Box 1.3). They include:
Joined-up multidimensionality: As well-being is inherently multidimensional, centring it in policy practice means moving beyond traditional policy silos to address the interlinkages across different well-being domains and associated policy goals. This requires the application of multidimensional evidence and analytical frameworks, including systems-thinking approaches, to better gain a holistic vision of the trade‑offs and synergies across different well-being areas (enabled by integrated and linked datasets where possible). It also necessitates more integrated strategies and joined-up ways of working, including cross-government co‑ordination across policy areas and agencies, and cross-sector collaboration including with non-governmental actors.
Equity and inclusion: Ensuring inclusive and sustainable well-being for all people means paying particular attention to the distribution of well-being outcomes, and identifying population groups and geographic areas experiencing, or at risk of experiencing, absolute or relative deprivations in one or more aspects of well-being. It also means systematically improving insight into the multidimensional impacts of government decisions and programmes on inequalities and vulnerable groups.
People focus: Designing and implementing people‑focussed policy requires a broader evidence base to better understand the reality of people’s experiences, attitudes, aspirations and behaviour. Subjective well-being measures that are often included in well-being indicator sets provide important information in this regard, but gaining a fuller picture may require additional forms of evidence (including from qualitative research) such as lived experience perspectives, behavioural science insights, and ethnographic studies. Participatory processes and co-design or co‑implementation can also help ensure that policies accurately reflect and address the needs of the people and communities they are intended to support, thus strengthening programme effectiveness. Finally, people‑focussed policy practice includes person-centred interventions and service delivery that prioritise individual dignity and agency.
Long-term vision: Well-being approaches consider both short-term and long-term outcomes, ensuring that improvements to well-being today are not at the expense of future well-being, including for future generations. Additionally, a longer-term vision of outcomes and drivers fosters a greater focus on early intervention, preventative action, and life course models of policy design – directing attention to opportunities to prevent or minimise negative outcomes before they develop and become more costly (as well as opportunities to promote the likelihood of positive outcomes). From a fiscal perspective, a longer-term and more integrated vision of outcomes, second-order effects, and avoided costs can support targeted investment that may reduce crisis spending and overall expenditure in the long-run, as well as promoting economic goals such as productivity. Finally, a focus on evidence‑informed impact and understanding of what works supports iterative policy and programme design for supporting long-term institutional and system change.
The OECD Knowledge Exchange Platform on Well-being Metrics and Policy Practice (KEP for short) was formally launched in November 2023 to facilitate peer learning across OECD governments. It brings together experts from different levels of government (national, regional, municipal) and different departments (such as Treasuries; Ministries of Finance, Social Affairs, Health or Environment; centralised strategic units and Cabinet Offices; and National Statistics Offices) to share knowledge and experience in the implementation of well-being frameworks and principles of well-being informed policy practice. It also collates relevant case studies and resources for public knowledge‑sharing. Key activities include:
A publicly-accessible KEP online resource portal, with relevant OECD resources (reports, working papers, policy papers, and methodological guidance) and case studies of experiences from across OECD Member and non-Member countries: https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/kep.html.
A series of virtual and in-person government expert workshops on priority topics for the KEP network, such as impactful communication of well-being indicator dashboards, or new analytical policy tools for well-being informed decision making.
Centering well-being in policy practice is not about a single tool or “silver bullet”, rather it requires iterative and broad-based efforts to integrate well-being evidence and principles across a range of contexts, with different methods for different needs. Policy practice methods that embody these principles can take a range of different forms and may not be explicitly labelled as part a “well-being approach” or be associated with a formal well-being framework or strategy. In this report, consideration of these principles has shaped the analysis of potential opportunity areas to further strengthen inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea.
The application of well-being evidence and policy principles underpinning the analysis in this report
This report combines insights from OECD work on well-being measurement and policy practice to provide an overview of inclusive and sustainable well-being outcomes in Korea and identify opportunity areas to further improve well-being for all Koreans.
Chapter 2 analyses Korea’s performance on indicators from the full range of the OECD well-being framework, benchmarking results over time and in comparison with other OECD countries. Where possible, time series present progress since 1996 to track changes since Korea first joined the OECD, and otherwise trends are shown going back to the earliest year for which data are available. To more easily identify opportunity areas for further improving inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea, each indicator has been colour-coded as set out in Figure 1.4. Bright green signifies areas to safeguard (i.e. maintain positive performance), where Korea performs relatively well internationally, and changes over time have been either positive or stable (top left quadrant). Light green signifies areas to watch closely, where Korea still ranks relatively well in comparison with the OECD average but has experienced deteriorating trends (top right quadrant). Yellow signifies areas to strengthen, where Korea ranks below the OECD average, but has experienced improving trends over time (bottom left quadrant). Finally, red signifies areas to counteract low performance as a priority, where Korea performs below the OECD average and has experienced worsened or stagnating trends over time (bottom right quadrant).
Chapter 3 then takes a deeper dive into well-being inequalities for different population groups within Korea, with a particular focus on disparities by gender and age, with some attention also given to differences by educational attainment where data allow. It also identifies areas to safeguard, strengthen, watch closely or counteract, combining comparative well-being performance with data on changes since 1996 (or the earliest available year).
Finally, drawing from the statistical insights in Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 focusses on three opportunity areas for further improving inclusive, sustainable well-being outcomes in Korea: supporting young Koreans’ ability to thrive in their transition from education to adult independence; promoting good mental health and social connectedness across the Korean population; and addressing the social and structural factors hindering gender equality. The chapter explores the policy context in more depth for these areas and provides some insights from OECD recommendations and international good practice to help further strengthen the effectiveness of policy interventions. It also includes policy examples that emphasise principles of well-being informed policy practice that can support more multidimensional and integrated, more equity- and people‑focussed, and more long-term preventative approaches.
Koreans live longer and are safer and more educated than the OECD average on key indicators, although some risks exist regarding lifestyle determinants of health, student well-being, and adult skills retention
Life expectancy in Korea has risen dramatically over the past three decades. A newborn in 2022 could expect to live nearly 83 years, 8.5 years longer than in 1996 and almost two years above the OECD average (Figure 1.5). Korea’s proactive epidemic control during COVID‑19 also helped maintain resilience in life expectancy compared to many OECD peers. While lives have grown longer, indicating better health outcomes overall, the picture is a little more mixed when looking at selected lifestyle health determinants (see Chapter 2). Smoking rates have halved since 1998, falling from close to 31% to about 15% in 2022, though still slightly above the OECD average (13.6%). Obesity prevalence remains among the lowest in the OECD at 7.2% in 2023, roughly one‑third of the OECD average, but has gradually increased since 1998 and spiked during the pandemic. Just over one‑half of Koreans (52%) rated their health as good or very good in 2022, which marks a 9 percentage points (p.p.) improvement since 2003 (43%) but remains below the OECD average (67%).
In terms of safety, with fewer than 1 homicide per 100 000 population in 2021, the homicide rate in Korea is the lowest amongst OECD countries and has remained so since 1996 (Figure 1.5). Perceived safety when walking alone at night has considerably improved: in 2022-2023, close to 80% of Koreans reported feeling feel safe when walking alone at night in the area where they lived, 5 p.p. more than the OECD average (which Korea overtook in 2017) and 16 p.p. above 2006-2007 levels (see Chapter 2). Road safety, once a major challenge in Korea, has seen substantial progress. In 1996, the Korean road death rate was the highest in the OECD and was more than twice the OECD average. Since then, Korea has reduced road deaths by over 80% (Figure 1.5) thanks to comprehensive measures such as stricter speed limits under the “Safe Speed 5030” initiative, infrastructure upgrades, and public education. Korea is now close to the OECD average road death rate, although efforts could address specific risks for vulnerable road users such as pedestrians, cyclists, and the elderly (OECD/ITF, 2023[23]).
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Life expectancy: 1996 and 2022 (Korea) and 2023 (OECD). Homicides: 1996 and 2021 (Korea and OECD). Feeling safe: 2006-2007 and 2022-2023 (Korea and OECD) – due to small sample size, data have been pooled over 2 or 3 years. Road deaths: 1996 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Tertiary educational attainment among young adults: 1997 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Student skills (math) and low student skills (deprivation): 2000 and 2022 (Korea and OECD). While only student skills in maths is shown in the chart, student skills in reading and science follow a similar pattern. The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 1.4.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[24]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation: https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Educational attainment levels of the Korean population are exceptionally high. Almost all Korean young adults aged 25‑34 years (98.5%) had at least an upper secondary education, and 70% had attained tertiary education in 2023. These are the highest rates among OECD countries, and well above OECD average rates of 86% and 48% respectively (see Figure 1.5 for tertiary and Chapter 2 for upper secondary educational attainment rates). Korean students’ cognitive skills in mathematics, reading, and science (as measured by the performance of 15‑year‑olds in the Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA) have also been consistently amongst the highest across OECD countries since 2000 (see Figure 1.5). Only 7.2% of Korean students received low scores2 in all three PISA subjects in the latest PISA assessment in 2023, less than half of the OECD average share (see Chapter 2). This strong performance reflects a combination of factors including a strong alignment between Korea’s national curriculum and PISA domains, as well as a high societal and cultural value placed on education, which shapes high parental expectations and investment in after-school private academies (hagwon) to supplement learning. However, against the backdrop of academic excellence, concerns related to student well-being (including high levels of stress and low life satisfaction) have emerged, as discussed later in this chapter. Some challenges also exist for the cognitive skills of adults, as results from the 2022-2023 wave of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) revealed considerable age‑related skill losses after the age of 35 years in Korea, which is more pronounced than patterns seen in other OECD countries (OECD, 2026[25]; 2024[26]).
Economic growth has been accompanied by increases in material well-being at the individual and household level, including significant reductions in material inequality and deprivation, although some challenges remain
National economic growth has translated into steady increases in material well-being at the household level over recent decades in Korea. Between 2004 and 2022, the annual growth rate of Korean average household income was more than double that of the OECD average (2.6% in Korea compared with 1.2% in the OECD on average), reaching USD 32 600 in 2022 (Figure 1.6) and halving the gap between Korean income levels and the OECD average over this period. The median household net wealth also grew at a more accelerated pace than that of OECD average rates since 2013.3 By 2023, Korean household net wealth exceeded USD 247 000, remaining significantly above that owned by the average OECD household. Further, only 17% of Koreans were financially insecure in 2023 (as measured by the share of people without sufficient liquid financial wealth to protect them from poverty in the case of income loss for more than three months), down from close to 23% in 2015. This is one of the lowest rates across OECD countries, where the average is 42% (Figure 1.6).
Household debt (as a share of household income), however, has risen significantly since 2010 and is above the OECD average, in large part due to high housing purchase and rental deposit costs (see Chapter 2). While debt accrued for household rental and ownership is not generally considered a risk to individual financial security or systemic economic stability in Korea, it may impact economically vulnerable households in the case of an economic shock (Bank of Korea, 2024[27]; OECD, 2026[25]). As noted later in this chapter, younger people may be more vulnerable to rising household debt levels as they shoulder a disproportionate debt burden, have lower relative income, and have much lower accumulated assets and savings than older generations.
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Household net wealth: 2013 and 2023 (Korea), and 2014 and 2021 (OECD). Household income: 2004 and 2022 (Korea) and 2023 (OECD). Household debt: 1996 (OECD), 2008 (Korea) and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Financial insecurity: 2015 and 2023 (Korea) and 2014 and 2021 (OECD). S80/S20 income share ratio and relative income poverty: 2011 and 2022 (Korea) and 2004 and 2022 (OECD). The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 1.4.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[24]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation: https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Relative income poverty (measured as the percentage of people with household disposable income below 50% of the national median income) and income inequality (measured by the income share ratio between the richest 20% and the poorest 20%, known as the S80/S20 ratio) have both decreased since 2011, narrowing the gap between Korean performance and the OECD average in these areas. In 2023, close to 15% of people were income poor (down from 18.6% in 2011) and the income ratio between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% narrowed to 5.8 (down from 8.3 in 2011). Korea has made important progress in reducing child poverty (Figure 1.7, Panel A), moving from a poverty rate well above the OECD average in 2011 to one of the lowest rates in OECD countries by 2022 (see Chapter 3).
However, poverty among older people remains well above the OECD average, despite reductions in recent years (contrasting with a modest upward trend on average across OECD countries). In Korea, 40% of those aged 66 and over lived in relative income poverty in 2022, more than twice the OECD average of 16% (Figure 1.7, Panel B). Among those aged 76 years and over, the figure rose to 54%, compared with an OECD average of 19% (see Chapter 3). The statutory retirement age is set at 60 in Korea, and many workers exit their main job even earlier through so-called “honorary retirement” schemes in their early 50s. However, eligibility for the state pension begins only at 63, obliging many older workers to re‑enter the workforce after retiring from their main job to bridge this gap. Indeed, Korea has one of the highest shares of older adults working beyond the legal retirement age among OECD countries. In 2023, the employment rate among 65‑69 year‑olds stood at 51%, nearly double the OECD average of 29%, while for those aged 70‑74 years, the rate was 40%, more than twice the OECD average of 17% (OECD, n.d.[28]). Most older Koreans who re‑enter the workforce after retiring from their main career do so in insecure, low-paid roles with limited access to social protection and minimal pension contributions (OECD, 2025[29]; OECD, 2018[30]).
Percentage of those with household disposable income below 50% of the national median income
Note: The OECD average is the simple average of countries with complete time series since 2013, namely Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Income Distribution Database (n.d.[31]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3yg.
While Korea has experienced substantial improvements in human and economic capital outcomes, some warning signs for natural and social capital outcomes are evident
Within the OECD Well-being Framework, the sustainability of well-being into the future is underpinned by human, economic, natural, and social capital. Korea performs relatively well on several indicators related to human capital (education, skills, and health status) as set out above. Korea also has relatively strong performance in economic capital indicators such as produced tangible assets and financial assets). Financial net wealth of the Korean Government is well above the OECD average, for example (see Chapter 2). However, regarding natural and social capital some warning signs are evident.
Ensuring sustainable management of natural capital remains a key well-being challenge for Korea (Figure 1.8). Korea’s per capita greenhouse gas emissions and carbon footprint are among the highest across OECD countries. While Korea has made progress on renewable energy, increasing its share in the total primary energy supply from 0.4% in 1996 to 3% in 2023, it remains a small part of the energy mix and below the OECD average renewable energy share, which is close to 15%. The share of natural land cover and biodiversity (as measured by the Red List index) have also declined over time, consistently below OECD average levels. On a positive note, Korea has one of the highest recycling rates among OECD countries, with close to 57% of total municipal waste recycled or composted in 2021, compared with an OECD average rate of 42%. Recycling rates have more than doubled in Korea since 1996, a trend also seen across other OECD countries.
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Recycling rate: 1996 and 2021 (Korea) and 2022 (OECD). Greenhouse gas emissions: 1996 and 2021 (Korea) and 2022 (OECD). Carbon footprint: 1996 and 2020 (Korea and OECD). Natural and semi-natural land cover: 2000 and 2022 (Korea and OECD). The Red List Index: 1996 and 2020 (Korea and OECD). Renewable energy: 1996 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 1.4.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[24]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation: https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
While the picture related to social capital (social norms, shared values, and institutional arrangements that foster co‑operation among different population groups) is more mixed, some indicators signal potential areas to monitor closely (Figure 1.9). Trust in government (institutional trust) and trust in other people (interpersonal trust) are both weaker in Korea than the OECD average and have shown declining trends in recent years (Figure 1.9, Panel A).
Percentage of the population
Note: In Panel A, “High or moderately high” trust corresponds to the aggregation of response options 6‑10 to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?”; neutral to option 5 and “low or no” to response options 0‑4. In Panel B, data refer to the percentage of the population who responded “yes” to a question about confidence in the national government. Data are pooled over 2022 and 2023, due to small sample size. In Panel C, data refer to the percentage of the population who reported a score of 6 or higher (on a scale from 0, “not at all”, to 10, “a great deal”) when asked “How much would you say the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?”. In Panel D, data refer to the percentage of the population who gave a score of 4 or below on a 0‑10 scale to the question “How much would you say the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?”. The OECD average is reported as available from the source in Panels A, C and D.
Source: Panel A: OECD (2024[32]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions: 2024 Results – Country notes: Korea, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results-country-notes_a8004759-en/korea_ab1a95c7-en.html; Panel B: OECD calculations based on Gallup World Poll microdata (n.d.[33]), https://www.gallup.com/analytics/318875/global-research.aspx; Panels C and D: OECD (2024[34]), OECD Trust Survey, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-trust-survey-data.html.
Data from the Gallup World Poll also signal that Korean men are more likely to express trust in government than Korean women, with a 5 p.p. gender gap, which contrasts with the OECD average where no gender gap is observed (Figure 1.9, Panel B). Close to 39% of Koreans felt they had a say in what the government does, which while still above the OECD average of 30% in 2023, representing a decline from the 2021 value of 55% when it was the highest share among participating countries in the OECD Trust Survey (OECD, 2024[32]). The decline was particularly pronounced for people aged 30‑49 years (Figure 1.9, Panel C). Korean women are slightly more likely than Korean men to experience low political efficacy (i.e. the share of people who feel they do not have a say in government decisions, Figure 1.9, Panel D), but the 3 p.p. gender gap is smaller than the OECD average of 5 p.p. Finally, volunteering rates (a potential contributor to social capital) are slightly lower in Korea than the OECD average: in 2022-2023, 19% of Koreans volunteered for an organisation in the previous month, just below the OECD average of 23% (see Chapter 2).
Young Koreans face challenges transitioning to economic independence, and supporting their ability to thrive is a key opportunity area for strengthening inclusive and sustainable well-being
Young people in Korea, as in many OECD countries, enjoy relatively better health, higher levels of subjective well-being, and stronger social connectedness compared to older cohorts. However, young Koreans also experience significant pressure to attain prestigious academic qualifications and then face fierce competition in a highly polarised labour market where a limited share of good-quality, secure, and well-paid jobs are concentrated amongst a handful of large companies, outside of which work opportunities tend to be more precarious and low-paid (see Chapter 2). With the most desirable jobs in the public and private sectors tending to go to graduates with academic diplomas from select elite universities, those who are unable to follow this pathway have fewer opportunities to employability in high-quality, secure, and well-paid jobs. There is also a high degree of mismatch between the skills young people acquire through the education system and those demanded employers, which in turn leads to ongoing youth disengagement from the labour market. In 2023, 13% of tertiary-educated men and 21% of women aged 25‑34 were economically inactive (i.e. not working and either not seeking nor available to work (ILO, n.d.[35])) in Korea – both among the highest rates across OECD countries (Figure 1.10, Panel A). These challenges are currently compounded by increasing cost-of living and housing affordability pressures, particularly in the Seoul metropolitan area. Since the pandemic, the debt levels of young people in their 20s and 30s have grown much faster than their income and assets (Figure 1.10, Panels B and C).
Note: In Panel A the latest available year is 2022 for Chile and 2021 for Luxembourg. In Panel B, the income by age group as a share of the average total income is calculated over four‑quarter moving averages. Panel C shows debt for individuals under age 40 and for the total population. The OECD average is reported as available from the source.
Source: Panel A: OECD (n.d.[36]), OECD Inactivity rates of adults, by educational attainment, age group and gender (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/297; Panels B and C: Korea’s Ministry of Data and Statistics; Bank of Korea; Financial Supervisory Service, Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions as available from the OECD (2024[2]), OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/c243e16a-en.
For many young Koreans, the seemingly insurmountable difficulty of meeting their career or material aspirations has led to a phenomenon of opting out from traditional life goals, social activities and milestones in young adulthood, with associated negative well-being impacts. In 2024, 5.2% of young people aged 19‑34 years were identified as being in extreme social withdrawal (defined as remaining home at all times for reasons not related to pregnancy, childbirth or disability), representing a more than doubling from the 2022 version of the same survey and almost a third of those impacted (32.8%) cited difficulty finding work as a reason for their isolation (Lee, 2025[37]) Granular studies of the incidence of social isolation by age in Korea show peaks around the age of 20, when transitioning from high school to university or economic activities, and around the age of 25‑27, when moving from university to the workplace, suggesting that unsuccessful transitions to higher education or the workforce increase young adults’ risk of social withdrawal and seclusion (Korea Youth Foundation, 2023[38]). Secluded young adults are more than twice as likely to be depressed as their non-secluded peers, and over three times as likely to have suicidal thoughts (Korea Youth Foundation, 2023[38]). One study has estimated the total social and economic cost of youth social isolation in Korea as at least KRW 7 trillion per year (roughly equivalent to over USD 12 billion annually), in terms of healthcare costs, social security costs related to poverty and unemployment, and economic costs due to economic inactivity, weakening job performance, and low fertility rate (Korea Youth Foundation, 2023[38]).
In addition to sectoral education and labour market reform (to address structural issues such as skills mismatch and unequal access to well-paid and secure work), opportunity areas for Korea to support young adults to thrive include:
Continuing and deepening efforts to provide integrated support for young people’s transition to adulthood. The challenges faced by young people impact multiple areas of their lives and have complex drivers. While structural reform efforts are needed to address systemic barriers (such as addressing labour market polarisation to enable greater access to secure, high-quality work), improving outcomes and equality of opportunity for young people also requires multi-faceted action to address young people’s needs across the different areas of their lives. The Korean Government is implementing a wide range of policies and programmes to improve young people’s material well-being, social connectedness, and mental health across different Ministries. Some aspects of these programmes are taking an integrated approach, such as recent youth employment policy packages that address broader economic needs alongside skills and employability development (Min-kyung, 2025[39]), and the expansion of Employment Welfare Plus Centres (which provide a more comprehensive range of social services and individualised assistance than standard Employment Centres, including access to mental health and stress management resources) (OECD, 2024[40]). Further deepening cross-government co‑ordination and service integration on initiatives to support young people’s economic participation (largely managed by the Ministry of Employment and Labour), reducing youth isolation (various Ministries), and promoting good mental health (Ministry of Health and Welfare) will support effective joined-up action and positive spillover effects for youth well-being overall, promoting win-win opportunities to boost economic participation and social and psychological well-being simultaneously.
Continuing and strengthening efforts to strengthen young people’s voice in government and political decision making. Increasing the level of young people’s participation in political decision making is crucial to develop more inclusive policies, bridge intergenerational divides, and strengthen trust in government (OECD, 2024[34]). Youth representation in government is a particular challenge area for Korea, which has the lowest share of parliamentarians aged under 40 across OECD countries (5.7%, compared with an OECD average of 22% in 2024) (OECD, 2025[41]). Korea has taken steps to strengthen young people’s voice in government such as the lowering of the minimum voting age from 19 to 18 in 2020, and through increasing participation of young people in the Youth Policy Co‑ordination Committee (Min-kyung, 2025[39]; Jones and Beom, 2022[42]). Countries that have developed co‑ordinated national youth engagement strategies based on a whole‑of-government framework to improve youth participation and representation in decision making, such as Ireland and Slovenia, could provide further examples to strengthen young people’s voice in government.
Promoting good mental health and social connectedness across the life course and for all Koreans is another key priority area for achieving inclusive and sustainable well-being
Improving mental health and social connectedness outcomes is not only a priority issue for young adults, but for Koreans of all ages. For example, with regards to mental health, Korea has the highest rate of suicide amongst OECD countries, despite reductions in the overall suicide rate in recent years (Figure 1.11, Panel A) due to wide‑ranging suicide prevention efforts. Gender and age play an important role, with the suicide rate for men more than double that for women (a pattern seen in other OECD countries) and Korean men’s suicide risk increasing as they get older (contrasted with the relatively stable suicide rate for women through the life course, Figure 1.11, Panel B). While children and adolescents are less likely to die by suicide, there is a rising trend in child and adolescent suicide in Korea, which contrasts with global patterns. Between 2000 and 2024, a time when global youth suicide rates decreased, Korea’s suicide rate for 10‑14 year‑olds multiplied almost four‑fold from 0.8 per 100 000 population to 3.5, and the rate for 15‑19 year‑olds doubled, from 6.3 to 12.6 (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2025[43]). The recent rise in suicide rates of adolescent girls aged 10‑14 years is particularly worrying in Korea, more than tripling from 1.2 in 2017 to 4 in 2024 (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2025[43]).
Per 100 000 population
Note: In Panel A, the trendline for the OECD average includes only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years.
Source: Panel A: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[24]), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation: https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf; Panel B: Ministry of Data and Statistics (2025[43]), Causes of Death Statistics, https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B34E07&conn_path=I2.
Other indicators for mental health also vary by gender and age. Younger Koreans are experiencing increasing rates of worry, according to Gallup data, with rates particularly high for young women: pooled data for 2015-2023 show that almost half of Korean women aged 18‑29 (47%) reported worrying a lot the previous day, compared with 39% for their OECD peer average, and for Korean males in the same age range (Figure 1.12, Panels A and B). Around one‑half (49%) of older Korean women aged 70+ report feeling a lot of physical pain, 6 p.p. above the OECD peer group average, and 17 p.p. above the Korean male average for the same age range (more than double the OECD average gender gap for this age group).
Social isolation and loneliness are also becoming an increasing concern in Korea, in part driven by a rising share of single‑person households in Korea (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2024[44]). Social isolation and loneliness are different yet connected phenomena, and both have negative impacts on well-being outcomes such as mental and physical health (OECD, 2025[45]). As in most OECD countries, elderly Koreans are more likely to live alone and Gallup data show that perceived social support declines much more significantly by age than the OECD average, particularly for men (Figure 1.12, Panels C and D). Only 61% of Korean men and 65% of Korean women aged 70+ say they have someone to count on in a time of need, compared with OECD averages of 89% (men) and 87% (women) for the same age group. A rising incidence of “lonely deaths”, referring to deaths of people who live alone and remain undiscovered for a long period of time, has also become a policy priority in Korea, leading to the establishment of the 1st Master Plan for the Prevention of Lonely Deaths in 2023 (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2023[46]). Men in their 50s and 60s accounted for more than half of lonely death cases in 2023 (The Korea Herald, 2024[47]). However, social isolation and loneliness also impact younger people. The phenomenon of social isolation and withdrawal among young adults has been referenced above already, and national data show that the share of people aged 18‑29 reporting feeling lonely rose from 13% to 16% between 2022 and 2023 – the only age group which showed an increasing trend for this indicator (corresponding with patterns seen in many other OECD countries, see Chapter 3).
The drivers of mental health and social connectedness risks differ across the life course. Korean children and adolescents face high levels of academic pressure, with little free time due to long hours spent in school and private tutoring classes, less opportunity for children to play, and lower reported student life satisfaction than their OECD peers (see Chapter 3). Stress is widespread and increasing for this age group: more than 42% of middle and high schoolers (students aged 13‑18) said they felt stress in daily life over the previous year in 2024, up five p.p. compared with 2022. Girls report significantly higher rates of stress and anxiety than boys at this age, with 18% percent of girls showing symptoms of generalised anxiety disorder compared with 10.3% of boys (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2025[48]). In addition, emerging digital risks, peer pressure and negative self-image can also be mental health risk factors for children and adolescents (see Chapters 3 and 4). For young adults, the previous section outlined the pressures they experience finding good-quality work and once in a job, employment pressures such as long working hours and job insecurity are also associated with mental ill-health outcomes for all workers, but particularly for younger workers (see Chapter 4). For older people, job loss, low income and income insecurity, chronic ill-health, change in marital status, excessive drinking, and living alone are some of the key drivers for negative mental health and social connectedness outcomes (see Chapter 4).
Percentage of the population
Note: Data refer to the percentage of the population aged 15 or more who replied “yes” to the following questions. Panels A and B: Did you experiencing worry a lot the previous day. Panels C and D: “If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?”). Panels E and F: Did you experience physical pain a lot yesterday. Data are pooled over multiple years, due to small sample size.
Source: OECD calculations based on Gallup World Poll microdata (n.d.[33]), https://www.gallup.com/analytics/318875/global-research.aspx.
Some important opportunity areas for promoting good mental health and social connectedness for all Koreans include:
Improving access to preventative mental healthcare support and reducing social stigma around mental health and loneliness. Mental healthcare in Korea has traditionally focussed heavily on in-patient crisis care, which differs from a trend in the majority of OECD countries to prioritise outpatient or community care. Increasing access and affordability of preventative mental healthcare support for less severe conditions would be in line with OECD recommendations for high-performing mental health systems (OECD, 2021[49]). In addition to addressing the structural barriers to accessing mental healthcare support, stigma surrounding mental health is relatively high in Korea, which can dissuade people from seeking help when needed. Existing efforts to combat mental health-related stigma in Korea (such as media guidelines to encourage responsible reporting on mental illness and to emphasise the importance of proper treatment and care) could be supplemented with efforts targeted to specific population groups, including peer-to-peer support services and training programmes for teachers and parents, as well as efforts to combat shame and stigma linked to loneliness and social isolation.
Strengthening cross-government co‑ordination to combat loneliness and boost social connections. In 2025, the Korean Government announced a plan for “Responding to Social Isolation across the Life Course”, aiming to support more effective co‑ordination across existing programmes targeting social isolation for adolescents, youth, and the elderly, and preventing lonely deaths (National Policy Planning Committee, 2025[50]). Additionally, the Seoul municipal government is implementing a city-wide anti-loneliness programme incorporating social prescribing (a practice in which health professionals connect patients to non-health-related support provided by community organisations); various community programmes, including recreational and art activities and volunteering; and investment in social infrastructure such as public, civic and green spaces. Evidence on the impact of the programme could provide relevant insights for successful interventions to be potentially scaled up to national level. Integrating explicit targets in cross-government and local-level strategies and creating long-term initiatives and institutional structures with dedicated funding and convening power, such as Ministerial roles or central government taskforces could also boost the effectiveness of government action (OECD, 2023[51]). For example, Japan’s integrated policy approach to tackle loneliness and social isolation includes the creation of a dedicated Ministerial post.
Strengthening and expanding prevention and promotion interventions for mental health and social connectedness in childhood and adolescence. Korean children and adolescents are at an increasing risk of negative mental health and social connectedness outcomes (broadly in line with trends in other OECD countries since the COVID‑19 pandemic, but more pronounced in some aspects), and targeted efforts are needed to address the underlying drivers. Academic pressure is an important factor in stress and anxiety for this age group, and while this is likely to remain the case without structural shifts to address the competitive nature of the education system and job market, school-based social and emotional learning interventions could support children and adolescents’ psychological resilience and relationship-building skills. Korean children and adolescents are also vulnerable to digital risks such as excessive phone use, cyberbullying, and exposure to online sexual content and harassment (as across OECD countries). Tackling these risks requires a comprehensive strategy, including the promotion of digital literacy for children and their families, as well as regulatory and technological development frameworks to ensure online safety. Finally, ensuring that children and adolescents can easily access early intervention mental healthcare and social isolation support, including for mild-to-moderate issues, is key for improving outcomes today and through the life course for this age group.
Integrating measures to promote mental health and social connectedness for job seekers and workers. Mental ill-health and loneliness are closely linked with negative work and employment outcomes (see Chapter 4). The value of integrating mental health and social connectedness into job-seeking support has been described above in the context of young people but can also be relevant for older people experiencing job loss. Additionally, efforts to encourage employers to strengthen mental health and social connectedness in the workplace can also help support employee well-being, alongside structural reform to reduce job-related stress and long working hours (such as the Korean Government’s recent steps towards introducing a 4.5 day work week (Lim, 2025[52])).
Strengthening integrated efforts to boost mental health and social connectedness of older people. The comparative rapidity of population ageing in Korea, combined with high levels of old-age poverty, and a steeper drop-off in old age for many indicators of mental and social well-being in comparison with OECD peers underline the importance of integrated and forward-looking strategies to ensure thriving in old age for all Koreans. Taking steps to encourage participation of older people in group and community activities and increasing access to lifelong learning opportunities for older people (as well as through the life course) could help to promote and protect mental health and social connectedness for older people.
Addressing the structural and social barriers to achieving gender equality is central for achieving inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea
Korea has made significant strides in narrowing – and in some cases, such as educational attainment, even reversing – many gender inequalities over the last three decades. However, gender gaps persist in key areas of work, family life, and leadership in the public and private sectors. Despite improvements in the last three decades, women’s employment remains below the OECD average (Figure 1.13, Panel A) and the gender employment gap is still among the largest across OECD countries (OECD, 2025[53]), while the gender wage gap is the largest across OECD countries (Figure 1.13, Panel C). In recent years, the fertility crisis has brought additional urgency to policy action for improving gender equality in work and family life, as the difficulty Korean parents of both genders (but especially mothers) face in combining career and parenthood is recognised as a major contributing factor to declining birth rates (see Chapter 3). Korean women’s employment follows an “M-shaped” pattern (Figure 1.13, Panel B): employment rates are highest in women’s twenties, sometimes exceeding those of men, but drop steeply in their thirties as many women leave the labour market to marry and raise children (OECD, 2025[53]; Choi and Lee, 2022[54]).
Women are also under-represented in leadership and decision making: for example, only 20% of Korean Parliamentarians were women in 2025, representing a substantial increase from 6% in 2002, but still well below the OECD average of 34%. Korean women spend more time on unpaid household and care responsibilities, while men spend considerably more time in paid employment. While this is a pattern seen across OECD countries, the gender gaps in time spent on paid and unpaid work are more pronounced in Korea than the OECD average (Figure 1.13, Panel E). These divisions are in part upheld by prevalent beliefs and stereotypes about acceptable societal roles for women and men. Fifty nine per cent of Korean men and 47% of Korean women agree or strongly agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce, far above the OECD averages of 18% for men and 13% for women (Figure 1.13, Panel F). Endorsement rates of traditional gender roles in political and business leadership are similarly high (see Chapter 3). Finally, while gender-based violence (GBV) impacts safety outcomes for both men and women, the majority of GBV victims and survivors are women and girls across OECD countries. Nearly 9% of Korean women aged 15 years and over, and 8% of those aged 15‑49, reported experiencing intimate partner violence in the previous year in 2018, well above the OECD averages of 4% and 5%, respectively. Digital and online platforms are facilitating new GBV and harassment risks for women, men, and children in Korea and across OECD countries (see Chapter 4).
Note: OECD time series are reported as available from the source, when available. In Panels C and D, the grey band represents the range between the maximum and minimum values observed across OECD countries for each year. In Panel E, the OECD average excludes Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Iceland, Israel, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, as data are not available. In Panel F, OECD Total excludes Belgium, Costa Rica, Ireland, Israel and Luxembourg, as data are not available and data for the United Kingdom refer to Great Britain. In Panel G, the OECD average excludes Czechia and Germany, as data are not available.
Source: Panels A and B: OECD (n.d.[28]), OECD Employment and unemployment by five‑year age group and sex – indicators (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1yy; Panel D: OECD (n.d.[55]) OECD Gender wage gap (database), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3ye; Panel E: OECD (n.d.[56]), OECD Time Use (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/203; Panel F: World Value Survey (n.d.[57]) World Value Survey 2017-2022 (wave 7), https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp; Panel G: UNDESA (n.d.[58]), SDG Indicator 5.2.1, SDG Global Database, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal.
Opportunity areas for addressing structural and social barriers to gender equality are wide‑ranging, including:
Further strengthening gender mainstreaming efforts. Korea has implemented a number of gender mainstreaming efforts, including a dedicated Ministry, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), which is responsible for co‑ordinating policies promoting women’s rights and interests, alongside family, child, and youth policies (Government of Korea, 2023[59]). The government also utilises a Gender Impact Assessment (GIA) system and a Gender-Responsive Budgeting method to further ensure that gender equity is considered in policy design and resource allocation since the 2000s. The Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality Policies (2023-2027) recognised the importance of strengthened institutional functioning and co‑ordination on gender equality policies and included a pillar dedicated to improvements in this area (Government of Korea, 2024[60]). International experiences, such as the Canadian Government’s efforts to strengthen the implementation of its gender impact assessment method, Gender-Based Analysis Plus, can provide useful reference points related to institutional investment in co‑ordination, capacity-building, and performance evaluation.
Employing school-based interventions to combat gender stereotypes. Attitudes regarding gender roles and expectations begin to develop at a young age, and formal education and the school environment are important channels for combatting gender stereotypes. Key focus areas include career aspirations (for example, to foster female participation in science, technology, engineering, mathematics and communications technology, or STEM, fields of study and career paths) and combatting sexual harassment and gender-based violence (tackling unconscious bias about male and female roles and expectations in society and modifying harmful behaviours and attitudes at an early age). In addition, eradicating gender bias in educational content such as textbooks, curricula, and teaching methods will help further combat students’ exposure to gender stereotypes.
Implementing proactive measures to overcome gender inequality in work and leadership. The Korean Government has introduced a widespread package of household-level policies to boost female labour force participation, particularly as part of efforts to combat declining fertility, including investment in the capacity and quality of early childhood education and care (ECEC) and out-of-school hours services, and the expansion of parental leave and flexible working hours for working mothers and fathers to promote a more equal distribution of household responsibilities (Kim, 2025[61]). It has also implemented employer-level policies, such as mandatory quotas to encourage female participation and leadership in public sector management, and private sector board representation. Further proactive measures to overcome gender inequality in work and leadership could include: Raising quotas for female participation in public and private sector leadership even further; continuing efforts to strengthen anti-discrimination measures; introducing mandatory pay transparency reporting requirements; and, encouraging workplace efforts to weaken the influence of trenchant norms and exclusionary networks such as through training, mentorship and networking programmes that facilitate the access and promotion of female talent in the workplace.
Continuing and expanding efforts to combat gender-based violence and harassment including intimate partner violence. The Korean Government has implemented a wide range of measures to combat gender-based violence and harassment, and its efforts in the provision of integrated protection and support for victims and survivors (through its Sunflower Centers for sexual assault treatment and response and Advocacy Centers for Online Sexual Abuse Victims) are particularly well-developed. Opportunities to further expand anti-GBV measures include: Continuing to review, expand, and strengthen legal protection for victims and survivors of all forms of GBV, including the improvement of legislation to combat and prevent technology-facilitated violence; and raising public awareness and championing zero tolerance of GBV, including intimate partner and domestic violence.
Engaging men and boys to be part of the solution. Gender inequalities and gender stereotypes not only hurt women and girls, but also trap boys and men in socially-defined roles and forms of behaviour that harm themselves, as well as being detrimental to society overall. Restrictive norms of masculinity, such as the need to “act tough” or stigma around talking about emotions, have been linked to increased prevalence of traffic accidents, sexual violence, bullying and physical violence, increased levels of suicide, depression, binge drinking, and loneliness in men. The need to engage men and boys directly in efforts to change restrictive or harmful attitudes on gender is increasingly being recognised. International experiences of school-based and community interventions such as Equimundo, a global network of initiatives promoting positive masculinities (for example, through increasing father’s involvement in childcare and household work, and promoting gender-equitable decisions between partners or parents) can provide example approaches.
Integrating well-being evidence into policy processes, and applying more joined-up, people‑focussed, equity-focussed, and preventative long-term strategies can support efforts to improve inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea
Insights from the three areas addressed in-depth in the report – helping young adults to thrive in their transition from education to work; promoting good mental health and social connectedness; and addressing the structural and social barriers to achieving gender equality – show how applying principles of well-being informed policy practice can support sector-specific reform efforts to improve inclusive and sustainable well-being outcomes in Korea (see Table 1.1 for a summary of selected examples). These principles could also help inform government action in other priority areas which have fallen outside the scope of detailed analysis in this report. For example, protecting natural capital is another key opportunity area for improving inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea; taking a more equity-focussed and people‑focussed approach to green transition policies (such as addressing distributional impacts and understanding behavioural incentives to promote public acceptability of energy pricing reform) could complement industrial sector strategies such as investment in low-carbon technology production (OECD, 2025[62]; IEA, 2024[63]; IEA/KEEI, 2023[64]).
Finally, in addition to applying a well-being informed approach to specific policy challenges, Korea could take inspiration from other OECD countries who are taking steps to integrate well-being evidence in whole‑of-government decision making and resource allocation processes, as described earlier in the chapter. For example, Canada’s efforts in combining inequality impact assessments (through its Gender-Based Analysis Plus methodology) with multidimensional well-being evidence from its Quality of Life Framework to inform budgetary impact analysis (see Box 1.2) could provide one model for Korea, building on its own well-established gender impact assessment, gender budgeting and well-being measurement frameworks.
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← 1. Some well-being measurement approaches focus primarily on a single dimension – subjective well-being – reasoning that the way people experience and feel about their lives has the potential to act as a proxy measure of how people are doing across all dimensions. For example, the annual World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al., 2025[65]) focusses on subjective well-being as the primary outcome of interest, though analysis within the report considers several other well-being domains as drivers of this final outcome. The approach taken by the OECD and most national initiatives is to retain direct measurement of all relevant dimensions in well-being frameworks, while recognising that some subjective well-being measures (such as life satisfaction evaluations) can provide useful data to summarise overall well-being in analytical policy contexts (OECD, 2025[66]).
← 2. Those with cognitive skills below Level 2 in all three subjects.
← 3. Annual time series available from Korea’s Ministry of Data and Statistics also show that household average net wealth grew since 2013, peaked in 2022 and slightly dropped below 2021 values in 2023 and 2024 (Data and Statistics Research Institute, 2025[10]).