To assess whether and how Korea’s economic growth has translated into better lives overall in the last three decades, this chapter analyses Korea’s performance on indicators from the full range of the OECD well-being framework, benchmarking results over time and in comparison with other OECD countries. Koreans are wealthier, safer, live longer, and are more educated than in 1996, with Korean performance ranking at the top of OECD countries in relevant indicators in these areas. Many other positive well-being improvements have also been achieved, but with more nuanced results across indicators. Mental and emotional well-being, social connectedness, and environmental performance are among the areas where inclusive and sustainable well-being outcomes could be further strengthened.
Inclusive and Sustainable Well‑being in Korea
Abstract
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, Korea experienced a remarkable transformation from a subsistence‑based agrarian economy to an export-based manufacturing model. In 1996, Korea joined the OECD and in the subsequent three decades, Korea continued to invest in industrial innovation and human capital, becoming a global leader in the production of cutting-edge technology, with the highest-educated population among OECD countries. Between 1996 and 2024, Korea’s GDP almost tripled (OECD, n.d.[1]) – one of the highest rates of increase in the OECD – and its per capita values more than doubled over the same period, matching the average OECD rate (OECD, 2024[2]).
To assess how Korea’s economic growth has translated into better lives and well-being over the last three decades, this chapter analyses Korea’s performance on indicators from the full range of the OECD well-being framework, benchmarking results over time and in comparison with other OECD countries. Where possible time series present progress since 1996, to track changes since Korea first joined the OECD, and otherwise trends are shown going back to the earliest year for which data are available.
To more easily identify opportunity areas for further improving inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea, each indicator has been colour-coded as set out in Figure 2.1. Bright green signifies areas to safeguard (i.e. maintain positive performance), where Korea performs relatively well internationally, and changes over time have been either positive or stable (top left quadrant, Figure 2.1). Light green signifies areas to watch closely, where Korea still ranks relatively well in comparison with the OECD average but has experienced deteriorating trends (top right quadrant). Yellow signifies areas to strengthen, where Korea ranks below the OECD average, but has experienced improving trends over time (bottom left quadrant). Finally, red signifies areas to counteract low performance as a priority, where Korea performs below the OECD average and has experienced worsened or stagnating trends over time (bottom right quadrant).
Figure 2.2 highlights a summary selection of indicators to safeguard, watch closely, strengthen, and counteract in Korea, based on the more detailed analysis presented in this chapter.
Overall, Koreans are wealthier, safer, live longer, and are more educated than the OECD average on several relevant measures, and these achievements should be safeguarded through efforts to maintain or further improve positive trends. However, some areas of relatively strong performance in comparison with other OECD countries, such as low obesity prevalence and positive feelings of political empowerment (represented by the share of people feeling they have a say in government decision making) should be watched closely to prevent the continuation of recent declines in performance. Korea remains below the OECD average in some areas of inclusive material well-being (average household income, relative poverty, income inequality), work and job quality (employment rates, long working hours), health (perceived health status, smoking prevalence), life satisfaction, and trust in government but has narrowed the performance gap over time, and efforts in these areas should be further strengthened. Finally, there is a need to prioritise efforts to counteract low performance in areas where Korea performs below the OECD average, and has experienced declining or stagnant trends over time, such as mental and emotional well-being (as represented through suicide rates, experience of negative emotions), social connectedness (perceived social support, time spent with others), and greening the economy (such as per capita greenhouse gas emissions and carbon footprint).
Note: “High/Low” and “Improving/Worsening” performance are based on indicator-specific thresholds as defined in the Reader’s Guide and consistent with OECD (2024[3]), How’s Life? 2024: Well-being and Resilience in Times of Crisis, https://doi.org/10.1787/90ba854a-en.
This chapter discusses these findings in more detail. Chapter 3 will examine disparities in well-being by gender and age (and to lesser extent by educational attainment) and Chapter 4 will present policy insights and opportunities to further improve inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea.
National economic growth has translated into steady increases in income and wealth at the household level over recent decades. Between 2004 and 2022, the annual growth rate of Korean average household income was more than double that of the OECD average (2.6% in Korea compared with an OECD average of 1.2%), reaching USD 32 600 in 2022 (Figure 2.3) and halving the gap between Korean income levels and the OECD average over this period. Median household net wealth also grew at a more accelerated pace than that of OECD average rates since 2013.1 By 2023, Korean household net wealth exceeded USD 247 000, remaining significantly above that owned by the average OECD household.2 Unlike most OECD countries, financial insecurity and wealth inequality are relatively low in Korea: and only 17% of Koreans were financial insecure in 2023 (i.e. those who are not income poor, but do not have enough liquid financial wealth to protect them from a sudden drop of their income and keep them above the poverty line for more than three months), down from close to 23% in 2015 – one of the lowest rates across OECD countries, where the average is 42% (Figure 2.3). This financial resilience reflects a relatively broad distribution of financial assets, with Korean households in the bottom and middle wealth quintiles holding comparatively high shares of deposits, life insurance, voluntary private pensions and other non-pension financial assets when compared with the OECD average (Balestra and Tonkin, 2018[4]).
While many indicators of household material well-being are broadly positive, average household debt has risen since the 2008 financial crisis, and although some reduction in the level of household debt has been seen since 2021, it remains one of the highest among OECD countries (Figure 2.3). High household debt is driven largely by property loans in Korea (Bank of Korea, 2025[5]), with high housing purchase costs and Korea’s unique jeonse rental system – requiring large interest-free deposits of 50‑70% of the market value of the property, repaid at the end of the rental contract – exacerbating borrowing pressures. Debt accrued for household rental and ownership is not generally considered a risk to individual financial security or systemic economic stability in Korea, but may impact economically vulnerable households in the case of an economic shock (Bank of Korea, 2024[6]; OECD, 2026[7]). For example, a sharp rise in interest rates from 2022 significantly increased debt-service burdens for new borrowers (OECD, 2026[7]). While borrowing thresholds (such as loan-to-value and debt servicing-to‑income limits) are employed to reduce the financial stability risk associated with household debt, such limits can be looser for first-time buyers.3 House price changes also can increase the risk associated with jeonse loans (which are not always guaranteed), and jeonse deposit default rates (where the landlord is unable to return the deposit in full to the renter) increased considerably in 2023 (OECD, 2024[2]) at the same time as falling house prices, affecting primarily young renters in their 20s and 30s (Lee, 2023[8]),
Income inequality and income poverty remain slightly above the OECD average, though the gap has narrowed in recent years (Figure 2.3). Relative income poverty (measured as the percentage of people with household disposable income below 50% of the national median income) and income inequality (measured by the income share ratio between the richest 20% and the poorest 20%, known as the S80/S20 ratio) have both decreased since 2011: in 2022, close to 15% of people were income poor (down from 18.6% in 2011) and the income ratio between the richest 20% and the poorest 20% narrowed to 5.8 (down from 8.3 in 2011).
Selected income, wealth and economic resources indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Household net wealth: 2013 and 2023 (Korea), and 2014 and 2021 (OECD). Financial insecurity: 2015 and 2023 (Korea) and 2014 and 2021 (OECD). Household debt and financial net wealth of general government: 1996 (OECD), 2008 (Korea) and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Household income: 2004 and 2022 (Korea) and 2023 (OECD). S80/S20 income share ratio and relative income poverty: 2011 and 2022 (Korea) and 2004 and 2022 (OECD). The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Finally, when looking beyond indicators of household economic well-being to more systemic aspects of economic capital, financial net wealth of the Korean Government is well above the OECD average (Figure 2.3). In 2023, government financial net wealth in Korea stood at nearly 41% of GDP, whereas the OECD average is negative, with liabilities exceeding assets by 19 percentage points (p.p.) of GDP. However, demographic pressures such as Korea’s population ageing, low fertility rates and labour force shrinking are expected to increase ageing-related expenditures on health, welfare, and social security, increasing financing needs and potentially impacting debt levels (IMF, 2025[11]).
Korea’s employment rate has steadily increased over the past two decades, despite temporary setbacks from the late 1990s Asian financial crisis, the early 2000s credit card crisis,4 the 2008 global financial crisis, and the 2020-2021 COVID‑19 pandemic. However, employment remains slightly below the OECD average, indicating untapped labour market potential. In 2023, around 76% of Koreans aged 25‑64 years were employed, compared with the OECD average of 78%. Similarly, 69% of 15‑to‑64‑year‑old Koreans were employed in 2023, just below 70% in the OECD on average. Although Korea regained the ground lost during the 1997 financial crisis by the mid‑2010s, its pace of improvement has lagged behind the OECD average over the past decade (Figure 2.4). At the same time, long-term unemployment is exceptionally rare in Korea. The share of people unemployed for one year or more is the lowest in the OEC, a trend that has held consistently since 1996. This reflects the country’s capacity to reintegrate jobseekers relatively quickly, even in the wake of major economic shocks. Yet, the share of economically inactive population remains high, suggesting that low registered unemployment may mask deeper participation challenges. As of 2023, 36% of working-age Koreans were economically inactive – neither employed nor actively seeking work (OECD, n.d.[12]). Mobilising this segment of the population, notably middle‑aged women with caring responsibilities and young people aged 15‑29, represents a key opportunity to bolster inclusive growth and enhance Korea’s overall employment performance. Further discussion on youth employment is provided in Chapters 3 and 4.
Korea’s labour market is sharply divided between a small share of secure, high-quality jobs, and more widespread precarious, lower-quality employment. Nearly 27% of Korean employees held temporary5 contracts in 2024 – the second highest share across OECD countries (OECD, n.d.[13]) – reflecting the dominance of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises), which accounted for 80% of business sector employment in 2016, the second highest share among OECD countries (Pareliussen, 2022[14]). Larger firms, which typically offer more secure employment, represented only 14% of employment opportunities in 2024, well below the OECD average of 32%, according to a 2024 report of the Korea Development Institute (KDI) (The Dong-A Ilbo, 2024[15]). Regular workers benefit from strong job security, higher wages and comprehensive social protections whereas non-regular workers – including temporary, part-time, and daily employees – earn just over half the wages of their regular counterparts and have limited access to social insurance and training opportunities (Tam and Xu, 2024[16]). Employment protection for regular workers further exacerbated this divide, inadvertently incentivising firms to rely on non-regular labour for flexibility and cost control. Large productivity gaps exacerbate the segmentation (OECD, 2023[17]; Tam and Xu, 2024[16]): SME productivity averages only one‑third that of large firms, and service sector productivity, where non-regular work is concentrated, reaches just 45% of manufacturing, compared with an OECD average of 85% (OECD, 2020[18]). While productivity disparities between large and small enterprises, as well as between manufacturing and service sectors are common across most OECD countries, in Korea they are among the largest (OECD, 2020[18]).
Selected work and job quality outcome indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Employment rate and long-term unemployment rate: 1996 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Long hours in paid work (all employed): 2000 and 2023 (Korea), 1996 and 2023 (OECD). The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Koreans continue to work long hours, but the gap with other OECD countries has narrowed. In 2000 (first available year) 54% of employed Koreans worked very long hours (i.e. 50 hours or more per week), more than twice the OECD average of 22%. By 2023, this share had fallen to 17%, still above the OECD average of 9.8% (Figure 2.4). Total annual hours remain high: at 1 872 hours per worker, Koreans roughly work 200 hours more per year than the OECD average (Figure 2.5).
Average annual hours worked per worker, 2023 or latest available year
Note: The latest available year is 2022 for Belgium, Colombia and Switzerland, and 2021 for Türkiye.
Source: OECD (n.d.[19]), Average annual hours actually worked per worker (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1v4.
More time spent with professional obligations leaves less time for other activities, such as time for oneself. On a typical day, Korean full-time employed people have 14.8 hours left for time off (i.e. time that can be devoted to leisure and personal care, including sleeping) compared with 15.2 hours on average for OECD peers (OECD, 2024[3]).6 When asked about their satisfaction with the sufficiency of leisure time in a typical weekday, 13% of Koreans were dissatisfied in 2023.7
Life expectancy in Korea has risen steadily and now exceeds the OECD average. A newborn in Korea could expect to live until close to 83 years in 2022, 8.5 years longer than 30 years ago and almost 2 years longer than on average across OECD countries (Figure 2.6). Life expectancy at birth steadily increased from 74.2 years in 1996, below the OECD average, until matching the OECD average in 2003 and surpassing it in 2005. Korea’s rapid and extensive epidemic control, including widespread testing and real-time dissemination information, helped maintain this resilience during the COVID‑19 pandemic, outperforming many other OECD countries (WHO, 2020[20]; Wang, Marquez and Hwang, 2023[21]).8
Other health outcomes and risk factors have improved significantly, but with some challenges. In 2022, 52% of Koreans rated their health as good or very good, up from 43% in 2003, narrowing the gap with the OECD average from 22 to 15 p.p. (Figure 2.6). Smoking has more than halved since 1998, from nearly 31% to 15% in 2022, slightly above the OECD average rate of 13.6%, while obesity remains low at 7.2% in 2023, one‑third of the OECD average, though it rose gradually since 1998 and peaked at 7.4% during the COVID‑19 pandemic, before stabilising around 7%.
Korea has also made progress in mental health: suicide rates spiked following the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis (Figure 2.6), highlighting the impact of economic instability on mental health (OECD, 2023[22]; Frasquilho et al., 2016[23]). The 2011 Suicide Prevention Act led to the establishment of a range of measures to reduce suicide risk (Korea Law Translation Centre, 2011[24]). Nonetheless, at 23.2 deaths per 100 000 population in 2022, Korea still has the highest suicide rate among OECD countries (see Chapter 4 for a further discussion).
Safety has notably improved in Korea. Homicide rates remain the lowest amongst OECD countries since 1996, with fewer than 1 homicide per 100 000 population in 2021 (Figure 2.6). Perceived safety when walking alone at night has risen to nearly 80% in 2022-2023, surpassing the OECD average by 5 p.p. (which Korea overtook in 2017) and up 16 p.p. since 2006-2007. Road safety, long been a challenge for Korea, has also improved substantially: Korea’s road death rate fell by over 80% from 27.8 deaths per 100 000 population in 1996, the highest in the OECD at that time, to near the OECD average (Figure 2.6) thanks to multi-sectoral safety plans (such as the five‑year National Traffic Safety Master Plans (OECD/ITF, 2023[25])), regulatory enforcement (including the 2021 nationwide initiative called “Safe Speed 5030” to reduce speed limits to 50 km/h on main roads and 30 km/h on side roads, especially in densely populated urban areas (Mitra et al., 2021[26])), infrastructure investments, and public education, though vulnerable road users (pedestrians, cyclists, and the elderly) remain at elevated risk (OECD/ITF, 2023[25]).
Selected health, safety and human capital indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Life expectancy: 1996 and 2022 (Korea) and 2023 (OECD). Homicides: 1996 and 2021 (Korea and OECD). Feeling safe: 2006-2007 and 2022-2023 (Korea and OECD) – due to small sample size, data have been pooled over 2 or 3 years. Road deaths: 1996 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Perceived health: 2003 and 2022 (Korea), 2004 and 2023 (OECD). Smoking prevalence: 1996 (OECD), 1998 (Korea) and 2022 (Korea and OECD). Deaths from suicide: 1996 and 2022 (Korea) and 2023 (OECD). Obesity prevalence: 1998 and 2023 (Korea), 1996 and 2022 (OECD). The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Educational attainment levels of the Korean population are exceptionally high. Almost all Korean young adults aged 25‑34 years (98.5%) had at least an upper secondary education, and 70% had attained tertiary education in 2023 – the highest rates among OECD countries, and well above OECD average rates of 86% and 48% respectively (Figure 2.7). Korea’s high educational attainment reflects intertwined economic, policy, and cultural drivers. Strong societal expectations for tertiary education are shaped by a dual and competitive labour market: securing stable, well-paying jobs in large firms or the public sector typically requires a university degree, motivating young people to pursue higher education. Cultural values reinforce this pursuit, with education widely seen as a pathway to social mobility and success (OECD, 2019[27]; 2019[28]; Cho, 2016[29]). The prevalence of private tutoring institutions, or hagwons, further amplifies these pressures, as families invest heavily and students study extensively to gain admission to top universities, improving prospects for secure employment over low-productivity SMEs (OECD, 2022[30]). Economically, a highly educated workforce has been pivotal in Korea’s rapid industrialisation and technological advancement (OECD, 2023[31]), while government policies have expanded access to higher education and improved quality (OECD, 2019[28]).
Korean students’ cognitive skills in mathematics, reading, and science (as measured by the performance of 15‑year‑olds in the Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA) rank among the highest among OECD countries. Since 2000, 15‑year‑olds’ PISA scores have remained stable, even during the COVID‑19 pandemic,9 when most OECD countries saw a decline in performance (OECD, 2023[32]). In 2022, only 7.2% of Korean students scored low10 in all three PISA subjects, less than half of the OECD average (Figure 2.7). This strong performance reflects clear national curriculum standards aligned with PISA, a focus on problem-solving and analytical thinking (OECD, 2024[33]; 2020[34]) and strong cultural and parental emphasis on education, including widespread attendance at after-school private academies (hagwon). At the same time, concerns about student well-being, including high stress, low life satisfaction (OECD, 2023[32]; 2017[35]), declining student motivation and increasing criticism of the high-stakes nature of education (OECD, 2017[36]) have prompted ongoing policies to balance academic excellence with well-being (OECD, 2023[32]). Student well-being is further discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Cognitive skills deteriorate sharply by age in Korea, and Korea ranks below the OECD average in terms of adult skills as measured by the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) (OECD, 2024[37]). In 2022-2023, average adult numeracy and literacy was not only below the OECD average but also below 2011-2012 levels for Korea (Figure 2.7), with 22% of adults at the lowest proficiency in both literacy and numeracy11 (OECD average: 20%). Adaptive problem-solving is particularly weak: 37% score at or below the lowest level (OECD average: 29%), while only 1% reached the highest (OECD average: 5%).12 These gaps partly mirror demographic shifts, including rapid ageing (i.e. Korea experienced the largest increase in the share of 55‑65 year‑olds among participating countries), but are offset by Korea’s substantial increase in tertiary-educated adults over the same period (OECD, 2024[37]). A 2026 joint analysis by researchers from the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and Ewha Womans University finds that the rapid decline in job capabilities with age in Korea is closely linked to the seniority-based wage system. Under this system, wages increase primarily with years of service rather than with skills or performance, weakening incentives for workers and firms to invest in continuous skill development. While the seniority-based component of wage setting has diminished over the past decade, it has not been replaced by mechanisms that adequately reward individual ability or performance. Moreover, wages represent only one element of the broader reward system, which also includes promotion prospects and opportunities to demonstrate and develop competencies (The Chosun Daily, 2026[38]).
Selected skills and human capital indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Educational attainment (upper secondary and tertiary) among young adults: 1997 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Student skills (math) and low student skills (deprivation): 2000 and 2022 (Korea and OECD). Adult skills (numeracy), low adult skills in both numeracy and literacy (deprivation): 2012 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Low adult skills in adaptive problem-solving (deprivation): 2023 (Korea and OECD). No colour coding is associated with low adult skills in adaptive problem-solving (deprivation), as only one data point is available. While only student skills in maths is shown in the chart, student skills in reading and science follow a similar pattern. Likewise for adult numeracy skills and adult literacy and adaptive problem-solving. The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
The way people feel and experience their lives is central to their well-being. Subjective well-being in Korea has improved steadily, though gaps with the OECD average persist. When asked to assess their overall satisfaction with life on a 11‑point scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied), Koreans rated their satisfaction with life at 6.4 in 2023 on average, up from 5.7 in 2013 (Figure 2.8), yet still below the OECD average of 7.3. The gap has narrowed by almost half over the past decade. On daily emotions (or affects), nearly 15% of Korean people reported experiencing more negative (such as worry, anger and sadness) than positive emotions (such as enjoyment, smiling or laughter and feeling well rested) during the previous day in 2022-2023. This “negative affect balance” has fluctuated over the past two decades and declined to near the OECD average in 2022-2023.13
Selected subjective well-being outcome indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Life satisfaction: 2013 and 2023 (Korea) and 2024 (OECD). Negative affect balance: 2006-2007 and 2022-2023 (Korea and OECD) – due to small sample size, data have been pooled over 2 or 3 years. The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Good relationships and social connections14 are also key aspects of well-being and available data indicate that this is an area where action to counteract negative trends could be prioritised in Korea. Perceived social support in Korea remains below the OECD average: in 2022-2023, 8 in 10 Koreans reported having friends or relatives they could count on in times of need, compared with 9 out of 10 on average across OECD countries (Figure 2.9). These shares have remained broadly unchanged since 2006-2007. Further, available time use data from 2009 and 2014 show a reduction in the time Koreans dedicate to socialising with friends and family: from 5.2 to 4.9 hours a week, compared with 6 hours a week on average across OECD countries (Figure 2.9).
National data on satisfaction with personal relationships depict a positive trend until 2023: when asked about their satisfaction with personal relationships, 54% of Koreans aged 13 or more said they were somewhat or very satisfied in 2023, up from 51% in 2017. In parallel, the share of those saying they were somewhat or very dissatisfied declined from 6.4% in 2017 to 5.1% in 2023 (Figure 2.10, Panel A). Loneliness has also declined but still remains prevalent: almost 19% of Koreans aged 19 or more felt somewhat or very much lonely in 2023, down from 22% during the COVID‑19 pandemic (Figure 2.10, Panel B).15 For context, the share of people across OECD countries feeling lonely was 6% in 2022 (OECD, 2025[39]), but this cannot be directly compared due to differences in question wording.16
Volunteering strengthens one’s ties to the community and broadens one’s support network, with benefits not only for the beneficiaries but also for the volunteers themselves, who can acquire knowledge and skills that can enhance their career development or employment prospects. Volunteering is associated with positive physical and mental health, higher levels of life satisfaction and positive moods for volunteers. Volunteering also delivers broad societal benefits by strengthening social capital and contributing to the economy (OECD, 2015[40]). In 2022-2023, 19% of Koreans volunteered for an organisation in the previous month, just below the OECD average of 23% (Figure 2.9), down from nearly 24% in 2006-2007. Volunteering fell after 2013 and returned to its 2014 level in 2022-2023.
Selected social connections outcomes indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Social support, volunteering: 2006-2007 and 2022-2023 (Korea and OECD) – due to small sample size, data have been pooled over 2 or 3 years. Social interactions: 2009 and 2014 (Korea) – the OECD average could not be calculated as data are scattered. The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Percentage of the population
Note: In Panel A, data refer to the percentage of the population aged 13 years or more who replied to the question on satisfaction with their personal relationships, with response options: “very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied”. In Panel B, data refer to the percentage of the population aged 19 or more who replied feeling somewhat or very much lonely to a question on how much the respondent feel lonely, with response options: “very much, somewhat, not very much, not at all”.
Source: Panel A: OECD calculations based on Ministry of Data and Statistics’ Social Survey; Panel B: Korea Social Integration Survey (n.d.[41]), https://mods.go.kr/anse/.
In 2023, close to 39% of Koreans felt they had a say in what the government does, above the OECD average of 30% but down from 55% in 2021, when it was the highest among participating countries in the OECD Trust Survey (OECD, 2024[42]) (Figure 2.11). Electoral participation has rebounded after a decline in the late 1990s and 2000s, from 81% in 1997 to 63% in 2007, supported by measures to broaden the electorate, such as the extension of voting rights to overseas residents in 2012 and lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 years in 2020, which added approximately 530 000 new eligible voters to the electorate (Korea Economic Institute of America, 2020[43]). Voter turnout reached 70% in 2020, 77% in 2022 (7 p.p. above the OECD average (Figure 2.11), and 79% in 2025 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2025[44]).17
Selected civic engagement outcome and social capital indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and the OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Having a say in government: 2021 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). Voter turnout: 1997 and 2022 (Korea), 1996 and 2024 (data are too scattered to create OECD time series, but time points could be calculated). Government stakeholder engagement: 2014 and 2021 (Korea and OECD). Trust in government: 2006-2007 and 2022-2023 (Korea and OECD) – due to small sample size, data have been pooled over 2 or 3 years. The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
Korea also performs relatively well on expert assessments of government stakeholder engagement. On a scale from 0 (no engagement) to 4 (maximum engagement), Korea’s scored 3 in 2021 (Figure 2.11), showing continuous improvement since 2014 and above the OECD average, though this applies mainly to executive‑initiated legislation, which represents only 6% of primary laws18 in Korea; parliamentary bills often lack similar engagement in Korea as in other OECD countries (OECD, 2025[45]).
Trust in government has increased over the long term, from 25% in 2006-2007 to 32% in 2022-2023, though it remains below the OECD average of 48% (Figure 2.11). Peaks in trust coincided with the onset of COVID‑19, reflecting a “rallying around the flag effect” (i.e. a short-term surge in public support for a country’s leaders or institutions during times of national crisis or external threat (Mueller, 1970[46])), a pattern also seen in other OECD countries (OECD, 2024[3]), and in 2018 during inter-Korean diplomatic initiatives (thanks to annual time series from the Ministry of Data and Statistics) (Chang and Kang, 2021[47]). Similar patterns in both levels and trends emerge from the OECD Trust Survey, first conducted in 2021 and repeated in 2023 (Box 2.1), confirming Korea’s comparatively lower trust in government within the OECD context.
Interpersonal trust shows a similar pattern. In 2023, 53% of Koreans aged 19 and over reported trusting others, according to data from the Ministry of Data and Statistics, consistent with findings from the OECD Trust Survey (Box 2.1). While interpersonal trust in Korea has gradually declined since 2013, notable peaks in 2018 and 2021 suggest that effective crisis management and major diplomatic initiatives can bolster trust both in institutions and among individuals (Chang and Kang, 2021[47]; Chan, 2021[48]).
The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (or OECD Trust Survey) captures people’s perceptions of public institutions in their country and the extent to which they trust their government. These perceptions span both everyday interactions with public services and views on how governments handle complex policy challenges. Launched in 2021, the survey was reconducted in October and November 2023 across 30 OECD countries, with results representative of each country’s adult population. The survey is carried out every two years (OECD, 2024[49]).
This report, as well as the 2024 edition of How’s Life?, refers to the OECD Trust Survey as a source only for the indicator on “Having a say in government”, and not for trust in the national government, to allow for an analysis of longer time series, as available from the Gallup World Poll. Trust measures in these two sources differ in survey timing and response scale, but overall patterns are similar (OECD, 2024[50]). According to the OECD Trust Survey, in Korea, 37% of respondents reported high or moderately high trust in the national government in 2023, slightly below the OECD average of 39%.
Additional findings from the OECD Trust Survey offer a more comprehensive view by extending the analysis beyond the national government to a broader range of public institutions. Koreans’ trust levels were notably higher in other areas than in national government, but below the OECD average (except for international organisations): 53% of Koreans expressed trust in other people, 52% in international organisations, and 42% in the police. By contrast, trust in core national institutions was lower, with 36% of people reporting trust in the national civil service, 35% in local government, and 33% in the courts and judicial system. Political parties (20%), the national parliament (21%), and news media (30%) were the least trusted institutions (Figure 2.12).
Percentage of the population with high or moderately high trust
Note: “High or moderately high” corresponds to the aggregation of response options 6‑10 to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust [institution]?”; neutral to option 5 and “low or no” to response options 0‑4.
Source: OECD (2024[42]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results – Country notes: Korea, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results-country-notes_a8004759-en/korea_ab1a95c7-en.html.
Ensuring sustainable management of environmental quality and natural capital remains one of the most pressing well-being challenges for Korea. Korea’s per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and carbon footprint are among the highest across OECD countries. In 2021, Korea’s GHG emissions from domestic production reached 13.1 tonnes per capita, well above the OECD average of 9.2, while its 2020 carbon footprint, measured by CO₂ emissions embedded in domestic final demand, stood at 12.5 tonnes per capita, compared to the OECD average of 10 (Figure 2.13). Notably, both indicators remained below the OECD average until 2010. This shift reflects a combination of structural, economic, and policy related factors. Prior to 2010, Korea’s economy was relatively less carbon-intensive; however, rapid growth, driven by energy-intensive sectors such as electronics manufacturing, and the expansion of coal-fired power plants to meet rising electricity demand significantly increased emissions. While many OECD countries transitioned more rapidly toward service‑based economies and cleaner energy sources, Korea’s economic structure remained energy-intensive and reliant on fossil fuels (IEA, 2020[51]; OECD, 2022[30]). While Korea has made progress on renewable energy, increasing its share in the total primary energy supply from 0.4% in 1996 to 2.6% in 2023, it remains a small part of the energy mix and below the OECD average renewable energy share, which is close to 25%. Moreover, though Korea’s climate policy actions to date have reached a relative decoupling between GDP real growth, and energy use and production-based CO₂ emissions, these have been generally increasing since 2000 (OECD, 2025[52]), while most OECD countries continue to decouple emissions from economic and population growth (OECD, 2024[53]; IEA, 2025[54]).
The share of natural land cover and biodiversity (as measured by the Red List index) have also declined over time and have been consistently below OECD average levels. The share of natural land cover fell below 50% in 2022, down from 55% in 2000 and below the OECD average of 59% in 2022, which instead stabilised over the same period (Figure 2.13). Korea’s Red List Index, which considers the combined extinction risk for birds, mammals, amphibians, cycads and corals, stood at 0.7 in 2020 (on a scale from 0 – all species are extinct – to 1 – all species fall into the least concern category), down from 0.8 in 1996 (Figure 2.13). The risks to biodiversity have continued to increase across virtually all OECD countries since 1996, though at a higher pace in Korea than for the OECD average.
On a positive note, Korea has one of the highest recycling rates among OECD countries, with close to 57% of total municipal waste recycled or composted in 2021, compared with an OECD average rate of 42% (Figure 2.13). Recycling rates have more than doubled in Korea since 1996, a trend also seen across other OECD countries.
Selected environmental quality outcomes and natural capital indicators, time series and point average evolutions, Korea and OECD average, 1996-2024
Note: For each indicator, earliest and latest available years available are as follows. Recycling rate: 1996 and 2021 (Korea) and 2022 (OECD). Greenhouse gas emissions: 1996 and 2021 (Korea) and 2022 (OECD). Carbon footprint: 1996 and 2020 (Korea and OECD). Natural and semi-natural land cover: 2000 and 2022 (Korea and OECD). Red List Index: 1996 and 2020 (Korea and OECD). Renewable energy: 1996 and 2023 (Korea and OECD). The trendlines for the OECD average evolution since 1996 or earliest available year refer to only those countries with data available for every year shown to keep the sample constant across all years. This means that only countries with a complete time series are included and thus are not always directly comparable with the point averages. For details on the circle colour coding applied to each indicator, please refer to Figure 2.1.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[9]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu and supporting OECD databases as outlined in the metadata documentation (OECD, n.d.[10]), https://www.oecd.org/wise/oecd-well-being-database-definitions.pdf.
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← 1. Annual time series available from Korea’s Ministry of Data and Statistics also show that household average net wealth grew since 2013, peaked in 2022 and slightly dropped below 2021 values in 2023 and 2024 (Data and Statistics Research Institute, 2025[63]).
← 2. According to the Ministry of Data and Statistics’ Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions (SFLC) in 2024, deposits constitute the main part of financial wealth in Korea, accounting for 87.3% of it in 2024, followed by stocks (9.8%) and private pension (1.7%).
← 3. For example, in 2024, the loan-to-value limit for housing loans ranged between 30% and 70%, depending on the region, the purpose of buying and the number of properties the lender owns, but the loan-to-value limit for first-time buyers was 80%. The debt servicing-to‑income limit (DSR) – applying to amortisation of housing debt plus interest payments on non-housing debt – ranged between 40% and 60% depending on the region, except for non-metropolitan areas, while it was 60% for first-time buyers (OECD, 2024[2]).
← 4. In the early 2000s, Korea faced a severe credit card crisis, peaking in 2003, driven by government policies aimed at boosting domestic consumption and reducing tax evasion in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Credit card use was actively encouraged through generous tax deductions and relaxed lending standards, intended to formalise cash transactions and expand the tax base. Financial institutions, operating under loose regulatory oversight, issued cards with few restrictions – even to high-risk individuals such as students and low-income earners – causing household debt to rise rapidly. Although signs of distress appeared as early as late 2002, the government responded in mid-2003 with meaningful reforms – including tightened credit screening, withdrawal of tax incentives, and the establishment of debt restructuring mechanisms like the Credit Counselling and Recovery Service. This lag of over a year allowed the crisis to escalate (OECD, 2004[56]; Bank of Korea, 2004[57]; Park, 2007[58]).
← 5. Temporary employees are wage and salary workers whose job has a predetermined termination date as opposed to permanent employees whose job is of unlimited duration. They include: i) persons with a seasonal job; ii) persons engaged by an employment agency or business and hired out to a third party for carrying out a “work mission”; iii) persons with specific training contracts (including apprentices, trainees, research assistants, probationary period of a contract, etc.). For more details, please refer to OECD (2025[64]).
← 6. Data on time off for Korea refer to 2014, the latest available internationally comparable year.
← 7. The data refer to the percentage of Korean people who scored their satisfaction with the sufficiency of leisure time in weekdays as 3 or below, on a scale from 0 to 7, according to the Ministry of Data and Statistics’ Leisure Activity Research (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[41]).
← 8. Between 2020-2021, life expectancy in Korea did not drop, unlike in many other OECD countries. In 2022, while still having a much lower rate of COVID‑19 deaths per million population compared to most OECD countries (Wang, Marquez and Hwang, 2023[21]), excessive mortality due to higher COVID‑19 mortality, population ageing and rising mortality in non-COVID causes (Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2023[60]; Ministry of Data and Statistics, 2023[61]) led to a drop of almost one year in life expectancy. More recent values referring to 2023 show that Koreans’ life expectancy has bounced back to its 2020-2021 levels (OECD, n.d.[59]).
← 9. While the absolute PISA scores for Korea declined between 2018 and 2022, the decline is not statistically significant (OECD, 2023[32]).
← 10. Those with cognitive skills below Level 2 in all three subjects.
← 11. Those at or below Level 1 in both literacy and numeracy, meaning that they can at most understand short simple sentences and do basic math, but struggle with tasks needing multiple steps (such as solving fractions).
← 12. Adults at Level 1 (the lowest proficiency level) can solve simple problems with few variables and little irrelevant information, which do not change as they make progress towards the solution. They struggle with multi-step problems, or those needing monitoring of multiple variables. Adults below Level 1 at most understand very simple problems, typically solved in one step. Adults scoring at Level 4 (the highest level of proficiency), have a deeper understanding of problems, and can adapt to unexpected changes, even if they require a major re‑evaluation of the problem. Overall, there is evidence that the Korean education system does not instill a strong capacity for lifelong learning or critical thinking (OECD, 2026[7]). These competencies are particularly important for literacy in the age of artificial intelligence and in a context where social media is an increasingly prominent source of information. Only 25.6% of Korean students can distinguish facts from opinions and only 32.9% discuss the accuracy of online information at school, both below the OECD average of 47% and 46.9%, respectively (OECD, 2025[62]).
← 13. It ranged between 17% in 2006-2007, down to 12‑14% between 2008 and 2013 and, after a peak back to 17% between 2014 and 2019, it declined to reach levels close to the OECD average in 2022-2023.
← 14. There is increasing awareness of the role social connections play in shaping individual and collective well-being and how public policies can foster, or undermine, the conditions that enable people to connect meaningfully with others. In response to this emerging policy issue, the OECD is strengthening the evidence base on social connectedness and advancing efforts to develop comprehensive measurement guidelines to support policy action (Mahoney et al., 2024[55]).
← 15. 2013-2019 loneliness values for those aged 19‑69 show a decline of those feeling lonely from 29% to 21% (with a drop to 16% in 2018). As loneliness is higher among the elderly, this downward trend is likely to underestimate the levels of those who felt lonely aged 19 or more.
← 16. As part of the Social Integration Survey, the Ministry of Data and Statistics asks respondents to rate their level of loneliness, with response options: Very much, somewhat, not very much, not at all. The OECD aligns with the loneliness question included in the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey, where the following question is asked to the household reference person: “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you been feeling lonely?”, with response categories: “all of the time”, “most of the time”, “some of the time”, “a little of the time”, and “none of the time”.
← 17. The 2025 data are not included in the chart, as the time series is based on data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) which had not published results for 2025 at the time of writing.
← 18. “Primary laws” refers to laws approved by the national parliament or congress. “Subordinate regulations” refers to rules that are approved by the head of government, an individual minister or the cabinet, i.e. by an entity other than the national parliament or congress.