Inclusive and Sustainable Well‑being in Korea

30 Years of OECD Membership and Future Policy Opportunities

Report

21 April 2026

3. Ensuring inclusive and sustainable well-being for Korean men and women throughout their lives: Outcomes by gender, age and education

Copy link to 3. Ensuring inclusive and sustainable well-being for Korean men and women throughout their lives: Outcomes by gender, age and education

Abstract

This chapter takes a deeper dive into inequalities for different population groups within Korea, with a focus on disparities by gender and age, with some attention also given to differences by educational attainment where data allow. Overall, Korea performs exceptionally well across a range of areas of gender and age equity areas including low gender gaps in life expectancy, educational attainment, student cognitive skills, perceived safety, homicide, and low child poverty. Despite progress in recent decades, Korea remains below the OECD average regarding the gender wage gap, female participation in employment and economic and political leadership, old-age poverty, and youth economic inactivity. Counteracting low mental well-being and social connectedness for different population groups – such as high suicide and loneliness rates for youth and older adults – is a particular priority.

Introduction

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Achieving inclusive and sustainable well-being for all entails looking beyond average results and understanding and targeting inequalities across society. Chapter 2 already gave some insights into overall societal inequalities and deprivation levels on selected well-being indicators.1 This chapter takes a deeper dive into inequalities for different population groups within Korea, with a particular focus on disparities by gender and age, with some attention also given to differences by educational attainment where data allow. It identifies areas to safeguard, strengthen, watch closely or counteract, combining comparative well-being performance with data on changes since 1996 (or earliest available year) to inform policy priorities that promote inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea. While not the direct focus for this chapter, the unprecedented pace of demographic change also poses profound implications for Korea’s social, economic, and fiscal systems, and provides a backdrop that will significantly shape well-being outcomes by gender and for all age cohorts (Box 3.1).

Overall, Korea performs well across a range of areas of gender and age equity areas including low gender gaps in life expectancy, educational attainment, student cognitive skills, perceived safety, and homicide. Additionally, Korea has achieved one of the most significant reductions in child poverty amongst OECD countries in recent decades, moving from a poverty rate well above the OECD average in 2011 to below the OECD average by 2022. Improving or stable trends in these strong performance areas should be safeguarded. Korea also performs well in relation to the OECD average in equity aspects of perceived political empowerment, as evidenced by relatively low gender and age gaps in the share of people feeling they have a say in government decision making. However, this last aspect should be watched closely, as gaps have begun to widen in recent years. Gender and age equity areas where Korea has made progress in recent decades but still remain below the OECD average should be further strengthened, including: low female employment, high gender wage gap, low female participation in economic and political leadership, high gender gaps in self-reported health especially for older adults, high old-age poverty, high rates of youth economic inactivity, large gender and age gaps in institutional trust, and large age gaps in social support. Finally, priority efforts are needed to counteract worsening or stagnant trends in gender and age gaps where Korea performs below the OECD average such as gender gaps in time spent in paid and unpaid work, increasing suicide rates for older men and young people, gender gaps in adult cognitive skills, and various trends in negative emotions for different population groups (e.g. rising worry levels for young adults and particularly young women, high levels of stress and experienced pain for older women, low student life satisfaction, increased experience of negative emotions for middle‑aged men, and rising youth loneliness).

Figure 3.1. Korea’s inclusive well-being: International comparison and evolution since 1996
Copy link to Figure 3.1. Korea’s inclusive well-being: International comparison and evolution since 1996

Box 3.1. Korea’s rapid demographic transition

Copy link to Box 3.1. Korea’s rapid demographic transition

Over the past decades, Korea has undergone a rapid demographic transformation, transitioning from one of the youngest OECD countries to one of the fastest-ageing societies (Figure 3.2). The old-age dependency ratio (i.e. the number of individuals aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age defined as those at ages 20 to 64) has risen from just 7.3 in 1964 to 29.3 in 2024 and is projected to quadruple to 122 by 2084, shifting Korea from being the tenth youngest OECD country in 2024 to the oldest by 2049 through 2084 (OECD, 2024[2]). This shift is primarily driven by the twin forces of increasing longevity and declining fertility. Life expectancy has continued to rise, reflecting gains in healthcare and living standards (as reported in Chapter 2). At the same time, total fertility rate in Korea (TFR – i.e. the average number of children women have over their lifetimes), reached a historic low of 0.72 in 2023 – the lowest among OECD countries, down from six children per woman on average in 1960 (OECD, 2025[3]).

This unprecedented pace of demographic change poses profound implications for the country’s social, economic, and fiscal systems, and provides a backdrop that will significantly shape well-being outcomes for all age cohorts. However, there are also individual well-being implications, as the ideal number of children that married Korean women aged 30‑34 years say they desire is around 2 (falling just below the replacement rate of 2.1) since 2021, meaning that the decreasing fertility rate is not necessarily a reflection of personal preference, but rather of structural constraints.

Figure 3.2. From one of the youngest OECD countries to one of the fastest-ageing societies
Copy link to Figure 3.2. From one of the youngest OECD countries to one of the fastest-ageing societies

Percentage of total population by gender

Korean women are highly-educated and highly-skilled, but sometimes face difficulties in combining work and family life after they become mothers. Recognising the importance of strengthening gender equity to halt the decline in fertility rates, the Korean Government has implemented a wide number of policies aiming to facilitate parents’ ability to combine work and family, such as those encompassed in the Fourth Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Ageing Society 2021-2025 (Kim, 2025[5]). These efforts include investment in early childhood education and care, strengthening the availability of paid parental leave, and improved targeting and provision of family benefits. While it is very difficult to reverse declining fertility rates once such a pattern has taken hold, in 2024 Korea did see birth rates increasing for the first time in 9 years, and this trend continued for a second year in 2025. This may in part be due to the positive effect of concerted policy efforts, but may also reflect broader cohort or pandemic recovery effects: Korea experienced a boom in births in thelate 80s and early 90s, and this generation is now reaching prime family-forming age; additionally many marriages were postponed during the COVID‑19 pandemic and rescheduled for more recent years. A 2024 government survey of young adults aged 19‑34 years showed a decline in marriage and childbirth intention among unmarried respondents compared with the same survey in 2022, indicating that the reversal in the birth rate may be short-lived. Births outside of marriage are rare in Korea.

Source: Shin (2023[6]), “Attitudes of Young Adults towards Marriage and Childbearing”, https://kostat.go.kr/board.es?mid=b10104000000&bid=12046&act=view&list_no=432664; OECD (2025[3]), “Korea's Unborn Future: Understanding Low-Fertility Trends”, https://doi.org/10.1787/005ce8f7-en; Lee (2025[7]), “Number of young Koreans living in isolation doubled since 2022, with depression on rise”, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1186659.html; Rashid (2026[8]), “South Korea’s birthrate rises for second year with experts saying ‘echo boomers’ behind boost”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/25/south-korea-birth-rate-increase-rise-echo-boomers.

Gender differences in inclusive, sustainable well-being outcomes

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Korea has made significant strides in narrowing – and in some cases, such as educational attainment, even reversing – many gender inequalities. However, with regards to gender equity in work and family life, Korea stands at a complex crossroads. High levels of economic development and individual autonomy coexist with deeply rooted patriarchal norms. Women increasingly have the means and freedom to pursue life paths that diverge from traditional roles of motherhood and caregiving. However, institutional and cultural structures have not evolved at the same pace, often making it difficult to reconcile professional ambitions with family responsibilities. As a result, many Korean women face a choice between career and caregiving (OECD, 2025[3]). Korea’s pronounced gender divide in perceived health might reflect deeper structural and social factors, including socio-economic inequalities, labour market dynamics, and traditional gender roles, beyond differences in longevity alone (Chun et al., 2008[9]; Kim and Ruger, 2010[10]; OECD, 2021[11]). Strengthening support in combining both professional and family life becomes crucial in Korea’s fast-ageing society, as highlighted also by the Korean Gender Equality Index (KGEI), see Box 3.2. This section discusses Korea’s achievements in enhancing well-being for both men and women and sheds light on areas to strengthen or counteract to further advance gender equality in Korea.

Box 3.2. Korean Gender Equality Index (KGEI)

Copy link to Box 3.2. Korean Gender Equality Index (KGEI)

Developed in 2009 by researchers for the Gender Statistics Information System (GSIS) at the Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI), the Korean Gender Equality Index (KGEI) scores Korea’s gender equality from 0 (for completely inequal) to 100 (for perfectly equal) considering three policy dimensions: 1) gender equal social participation, 2) human rights and welfare for women, and 3) gender equal awareness and culture. To depict the three policy dimensions, the index includes seven categories: decision making, employment, income, education, health, caregiving and gender equality awareness (this last category first included in 2022). Published annually since 2010, the index declined for the first time in 2023, due to worsening public attitudes on gender roles and declining parental leave usage, while the other five categories improved. Due to the revision of the index in 2022, scores before 2022 are not comparable with those from 2022 onwards.

Source: Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI) (n.d.[12]), The Korean Gender Equality Index (KGEI), https://gsis.kwdi.re.kr/en/gdi/gdiInfo.html and Korea JoongAng Daily (2025[13]) “Korea's gender equality index declines in 2023 amid public attitude changes, declining parental leave use”, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-17/national/socialAffairs/Koreas-gender-equality-index-declines-in-2023-amid-public-attitude-changes-declining-parental-leave-use/2287430.

Knowledge and skills

Korea has achieved substantial progress in educational attainment for both men and women over the past three decades, with the most pronounced gains seen in women’s participation in tertiary education. In 1997, only 27% of women and 35% of men aged 25‑34 acquired a tertiary qualification (Figure 3.3, Panel A). The gender gap closed in 2005 (with 51% of both women and men attaining tertiary education) and switched in favour of women from the following year, a trend that has continued in subsequent years. By 2023, tertiary attainment stood at 77% for women and 63% for men, compared with an OECD average of 54% and 41% for women and men respectively.

In terms of cognitive skills, Korean girls outperform boys in reading, while boys and girls perform at similar levels on average in mathematics.2 According to the 2022 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) round, Korean girls outperformed boys by 34 points (Figure 3.3, Panel B), slightly above the global average and above the OECD average (where girls outperform boys by 24 points) – a gap that is roughly equivalent to one year’s schooling (OECD, 2023[14]; 2024[15]). In mathematics, Korea was among the 25 out of 81 participant countries or economies with no gender gap at the age of 15, while boys had a 9‑point advantage on average across OECD countries (OECD, 2023[14]). Between 2012 and 2022, the maths performance of both Korean girls and boys declined to a similar extent, while the OECD average for boys declined slightly more than for girls (OECD, 2023[14]).

When considering choices for later fields of study, men in Korea and in other OECD countries are more likely than women to pursue studies in fields associated with higher labour market outcomes. In 2022, only 17% of female students entering tertiary education in Korea opted for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields, compared to 45% of their male peers (OECD, 2024[16]). This gender gap in field of study reflects a broader pattern across OECD countries, where just 15% of female entrants, on average, choose STEM disciplines, versus 41% of males (OECD, 2024[17]). Despite strong academic performance among girls, many do not translate this success into enrolment in STEM fields, which typically offer more employment opportunities and higher salaries. This gap is partly rooted in lower self-confidence among girls in Korea and across OECD countries in their mathematical and scientific abilities during school, an early divergence that can shape future career trajectories (Encinas-Martín and Cherian, 2023[18]). The underrepresentation of female role models in STEM further reinforces the perception that these disciplines are predominantly “masculine”, limiting girls’ aspirations in such fields (Encinas-Martín and Cherian, 2023[18]).

Figure 3.3. Women excel in education: From school to tertiary levels
Copy link to Figure 3.3. Women excel in education: From school to tertiary levels

Beyond formal education, some gender gaps persist in cognitive skills throughout adulthood in Korea, particularly in numeracy and problem-solving. Results from the 2023 round of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), showed that Korean men aged 16‑65 outperform same‑aged women in numeracy skills (scoring 8 points higher on average, compared with 10 points on average across OECD countries) and adaptive problem-solving (with a 5‑point difference, compared with a 2‑point OECD average difference in favour of men), while no significant gender gap is observed in literacy (compared with a 3‑point OECD average difference in favour of women). In Korea, gender differences in numeracy widen with age, reflecting both larger educational attainment gaps among older cohorts and faster depreciation of women’s numeracy skills over the life course. This pattern is closely linked to lower female labour market participation and occupational segregation, notably women underrepresention in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), where numeracy skills are more intensively used and maintained (Encinas-Martín and Cherian, 2023[18]; OECD, 2019[20]). While these dynamics are observed across OECD countries, gender disparities in Korea are more pronounced, making them a key area for policy action. By contrast, gender differences in literacy proficiency remain relatively small throughout adulthood in Korea, as in many OECD countries, reflecting the transversal nature of literacy as a foundational skill required across education pathways and occupations (Encinas-Martín and Cherian, 2023[18]).

Paid and unpaid work

Women’s employment in Korea has steadily increased over the past three decades, but still needs to be strengthened to close the gap with the OECD average (Figure 3.4). In 2023, 66% of Korean women aged 25‑64 were employed, up from 55% in 1996, but still below the OECD average of 73%. Over the same period, the employment gender gap narrowed from 35 to 19 percentage points (p.p.), but remained among the largest across OECD countries (where the average gender gap was 12 p.p. in 2023) (OECD, 2025[3]).

Figure 3.4. Sustained growth in Korean women’s employment: On the path towards the OECD average
Copy link to Figure 3.4. Sustained growth in Korean women’s employment: On the path towards the OECD average

Percentage of employed aged 25‑64 over the population of the same age

The gap widens sharply as women enter their 30s, more so than in most OECD countries, pointing to untapped potential for economic growth, productivity and societal well-being (IMF, 2022[22]; OECD, 2024[23]; 2024[24]) (Figure 3.5). Korean women’s employment follows an “M-shaped” pattern: employment rates are highest in women’s 20s, sometimes exceeding those of men, but drop steeply in their 30s as many women leave the labour market to marry and raise children (Choi and Lee, 2022[25]; Kim and Park, 2019[26]). While employment rises again in their 40s as some return to work after childrearing, rates remain below those of men and younger women (OECD, 2025[3]). A survey of the Ministry of Data and Statistics corroborates these findings: in 2024 career breaks were most common among women aged 35‑39 (25%), with child-rearing most cited reason for leaving the labour force (41%), followed by marriage (25%) and pregnancy or childbirth (24%) (OECD, 2025[3]).

Figure 3.5. Korean women face a growing gender employment gap in their 30s, larger than the OECD average
Copy link to Figure 3.5. Korean women face a growing gender employment gap in their 30s, larger than the OECD average

Employment rate by gender, over the life course, 2023

The gender wage gap also remains a challenge for inclusive and sustainable well-being in Korea. In 2023, the Korean median wage of men was 29% higher than that of Korean women, down from a gap of 43% in 1996 (Figure 3.6). Still, it remains the largest gap across OECD countries: almost twice the OECD average of 11%. As in other OECD countries, a substantial portion of this gap reflects gender-related disparities in treatment and opportunity, including both unequal pay not linked to performance and anticipatory employer behaviour, whereby lower investment in women’s careers reflects expectations of career interruptions related to family responsibilities (OECD, 2025[3]; n.d.[27]). Such biases, whether conscious or systemic, limit women’s career progression and contribute to persistent disparities in earnings and opportunities. Labour market structures further reinforce wage gaps: women are more likely than men to work part-time and to earn less, reflecting occupational segregation and unequal labour market outcomes (Encinas-Martín and Cherian, 2023[18]; OECD, 2025[3]). Gendered educational choices also play a role, with women under-represented in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and over-represented in lower-paid sectors such as health, welfare, education, and clerical occupations, where career progression is limited (Encinas-Martín and Cherian, 2023[18]).

Mothers experience an average long-term labour income loss of approximately 66% following childbirth, largely due to prolonged career interruptions, while fathers’ earnings are largely unaffected (OECD, 2025[3]; Kim and Hahn, 2022[28]). These losses are amplified by Korea’s seniority-based wage system and Korea’s dual labour market, where women exit regular employment upon becoming mothers and, if they return, do so in lower-paid, non-regular positions. As a result, mothers are three times more likely than fathers to be in non-regular employment. Faced with these constraints, many couples delay or forgo childbearing contributing to Korea’s persistently low fertility (OECD, 2025[3]; 2021[11]; 2022[29]).

Figure 3.6. Closing only slowly: Korea’s gender wage gap in perspective
Copy link to Figure 3.6. Closing only slowly: Korea’s gender wage gap in perspective

Difference between male and female median wage, as a percentage of male wage

There are opportunities to strengthen women’s representation in managerial, economic and political leadership positions in Korea. In 2024, women held just 18% of managerial roles, nearly half the OECD average of 34%, placing Korea among the lowest-performing OECD countries (Figure 3.7), despite notable progress since 2000, when women accounted for only 5% of managers (UNDESA, n.d.[31]). Gender disparities are even more pronounced in corporate governance. In 2022, women occupied only 12.8% of board seats in Korea’s largest publicly listed companies, compared to an OECD average of 29.6% (OECD, n.d.[32]). Political representation also remains limited: as of 2025, women held 20% of seats in Korea’s national lower (or single) house of parliament, more than triple the share in 2002 (6%), but still well below the OECD average of 34%, and among the lowest across OECD Member countries (OECD, n.d.[27]). Removing the persistent structural barriers that hinder women’s advancement into leadership and decision making roles in both the private and public spheres will further strengthen gender inclusion.

Figure 3.7. There are opportunities to strengthen women representation in economic and political leadership in Korea
Copy link to Figure 3.7. There are opportunities to strengthen women representation in economic and political leadership in Korea

Percentage of women

Counteracting the gender imbalance in paid-unpaid work allocation can enhance women’s labour market attachment and leadership potential. Even more than in most OECD countries, Korean women shoulder a disproportionate share of unpaid household and care responsibilities, while men spend considerably more time in paid employment – patterns that reinforce traditional gender roles. Based on data from the 2014 Time Use Survey, Korean women spend over 3.5 hours perday on unpaid work, such as housework and childcare, compared with only 49 minutes for men (Figure 3.8) – a gender gap of nearly 3 hours, exceeding the OECD average gap of just over 2 hours. Conversely, Korean men spend 2.5 hours more per day in paid work than women, well above the OECD average of 1.6 hours. When combining paid and unpaid work, women in Korea, as in most OECD countries, work longer hours than men on a typical day. Gender disparities in time use also translate into differences in satisfaction with leisure time. According to the Ministry of Data and Statistics’ Leisure activity research (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[34]), gender gaps are particularly evident during weekends and holidays. While no significant gender difference is observed on workdays, a higher share of women report dissatisfaction with their leisure time on non-working days (33% of women compared to 29% of men in 2023).

Figure 3.8. Counterbalancing the gender imbalance in paid-unpaid work allocation can unlock full and equal women’s labour market engagement
Copy link to Figure 3.8. Counterbalancing the gender imbalance in paid-unpaid work allocation can unlock full and equal women’s labour market engagement

Gender gap, women minus men, 15‑64 year‑olds, minutes per day

These outcomes are underpinned by gender role expectations and social norms that sustain a traditional model of male providers and female primary caregivers. Data from the World Value Survey indicate that 59% of Korean men and 47% of Korean women agreed or strongly agreed that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce, far above the OECD averages of 18% for men and 13% for women (Figure 3.9, Panel A). Similarly, Korea records the highest share among OECD countries of respondents endorsing more traditional gender roles upholding male dominance in leadership positions: 54% of men and 42% of women agree or strongly agree that men make better business executives than women (compared with the OECD average of 23% and 13%, respectively, see Figure 3.9, Panel B), while 59% of men and 46% of women agree or strongly agree that men make better political leaders than women (more than double the OECD averages of 25% and 16%, respectively, see Figure 3.9, Panel C).

Social norms can evolve across generations. Institutions and labour market structures in Korea were shaped by the values and lived experiences of older generations, which differ markedly from those of younger cohorts (OECD, 2025[3]). Evidence suggests that younger Korean generations hold more egalitarian views. A 2025 online survey published in a report of the Korean National Integration Committee show strong support for women’s labour participation among young working age Koreans aged 25‑44, with nearly 80% of women and around 70% of men expressing support. Similarly, approximately 70% of men and 80% of women in this age group endorse greater male participation in childcare and housework (The Korea Bizwire, 2025[36]).

Figure 3.9. Gender role expectations in Korea continue to sustain the conventional model of men providers – women primary caregivers
Copy link to Figure 3.9. Gender role expectations in Korea continue to sustain the conventional model of men providers – women primary caregivers

Percentage of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 2022 or latest available year

Safety

Overall homicide rates in Korea are significantly lower than the OECD average. In 2021, fewer than 1 in 100 000 Korean men or women were victims of homicide, well below the OECD averages of 7.2 for men and 1.2 for women (Figure 3.10). These low levels reflect a long-term decline: in 1996, Korea’s homicide rates stood at 2.4 for men and 1.5 for women, compared with OECD averages of 15 and 3 per 100 000, respectively (Figure 3.10). Due in large part to Korea’s exceptionally low homicide rates among men, gender gaps in homicides are substantially narrower than in most OECD countries, at times approaching parity – a pattern that remains rare across OECD countries. Potential explanatory factors include the existence of strict firearm regulations in Korea (Hemenway and Miller, 2000[38]), alongside prevalent cultural norms promoting harmony and non-violent conflict resolution, and effective law enforcement (Chung, 2024[39]).

Figure 3.10. The gender homicide gap is very narrow in Korea, due in large part to low male homicide rates
Copy link to Figure 3.10. The gender homicide gap is very narrow in Korea, due in large part to low male homicide rates

At the same time, gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence and online sexual violence and harassment, has gained increasing public and policy attention in Korea, as in many other OECD countries, particularly since the #MeToo movement in 2018 (see Box 3.3). Measuring gender-based violence remains challenging due to under-reporting, social stigma and methodological differences across countries, making it difficult to obtain high-quality internationally comparable data across all dimensions.3 Nevertheless, available evidence points to areas of concern. Nearly 9% of Korean women aged 15 years and over, and 8% of those aged 15‑49 years, reported experiencing intimate partner violence in the past year – well above the OECD averages of 4% and 5%, respectively (Figure 3.11).

Figure 3.11. Intimate partner violence: A pressing concern
Copy link to Figure 3.11. Intimate partner violence: A pressing concern

Percentage of ever-partnered women and girls subjected to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by age, 2018

Box 3.3. Korea’s #MeToo movement and rising public and political awareness of gender-based violence

Copy link to Box 3.3. Korea’s #MeToo movement and rising public and political awareness of gender-based violence

Grounded in American activist Tarana Burke’s work, the #MeToo movement became a viral global social media movement in late 2017, encouraging women to speak out about their experiences of sexual harassment and assault and spurring a broader political and societal mobilisation within the United States and internationally. In Korea, the #MeToo movement gained traction in early 2018 after a female prosecutor, Suh Ji-Hyeon, publicly recounted her experience of sexual harassment by a senior colleague during a live television interview, as well as the professional retaliation she faced after reporting the harassment. Her testimony prompted a wave of disclosures by women across the country, both publicly and anonymously, and brought increased media and public attention to legal cases involving sexual violence and harassment, promoting an increased awareness of the widespread prevalence of gender-based violence against women in Korea.

Intimate partner and dating violence

Intimate partner violence (IPV) represents about half of all forms of violence experienced by Korean women, and leads to severe and long-lasting physical and mental health consequences. These include depression symptoms, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, difficulty trusting others, injury, and physical pain. In extreme cases, women are killed by their partners, with intimate partner femicide receiving increasing media and public attention in the country. The prevalence of IPV in Korea is highest amongst young adults, and dating violence has emerged as a growing concern. Many young women report fear of violent retaliation when attempting to end relationships, leading them to adopt strategies to ensure “safe breakups” such as choosing a public place to reduce risk. In response, the Korean Government has taken steps to combat dating violence and related crimes, like stalking, through recent legislative reforms such as the 2021 Act on Punishment of Crime of Stalking, the 2023 Act on Prevention of Stalking and Protection of Victims.

Digital sex crimes, online harassment, and cyberbullying

Digital safety and online harassment constitute another major challenge for gender equity. Even prior to the emergence of the #MeToo movement, Korean women’s organisations and activists had been advocating for stronger legal responses to address the use of hidden cameras in bathrooms, changing rooms, and other private spaces to covertly record or take photos of women and then post online for profit. In response, the government introduced the “Comprehensive Countermeasures Against Digital Sex Crime” policy package in 2017. Despite these efforts, digital sex crimes and harassment remain pervasive. Particular concern arises from the high incidence of digital crimes involving children and adolescents, as both victims and perpetrators (Kim, Choi and Champion, 2024[41]). One of the most prominent cases, the “Nth Room incident”, involved several dozen women, including minors, who were deceived through fake job advertisements into creating sexually exploitative material that was subsequently distributed online. An estimated 60 000 (predominantly male) individuals were involved in the production, distribution, or possession of this content. More recently, advances in artificial intelligence have facilitated the creation of new forms of exploitation, such as sexually explicit deepfake imagery. In August 2024, investigators uncovered multiple Telegram chatrooms totalling over 220 000 members, largely teenage students, in which non-consensual photos of female classmates and teachers were uploaded and transformed into sexually explicit deepfake content. The psychological consequences for victims of such crimes are severe, sometimes leading to withdrawal from employment or social relationships, and causing suicide ideation, anxiety, frustration, sleep disorders, and depression. While the majority of victims are women in their teens and twenties, the number of male victims is steadily increasing.

Ensuring safe online freedom of expression is a crucial aspect of gender equity, particularly as discriminatory attitudes towards women are often amplified in digital spaces. A 2018 survey found that nearly all Korean women respondents (97%) had been exposed to misogynistic content online. A separate 2022 study found that 69.2% of young women had experienced cyberbullying, rising to 76.8% among those identifying as feminists. Women in public-facing roles, such as entertainment celebrities, social media influencers, journalists, and politicians are especially exposed to online harassment, contributing to adverse outcomes including journalistic self-censorship. withdrawal from public life, reduced participation in political careers and, in some high-profile cases, suicide.

While these trends are not unique to Korea, rising public visibility and awareness of gender-based violence and harassment have similarly been observed across other OECD countries in recent years. Cyberbullying and online harassment are increasingly recognised as issues of concern for both genders, especially for adolescents in Korea as in many other OECD countries. In 2022, 4 in ten Korean teenagers reported experiencing cyberbullying – either as perpetrator, victim or both – up from 3 in ten the previous year. By contrast, only 1 in ten adults reported similar experiences, according to data from the Korea Communications Commission.

Source: Hasunuma and Shin (2019[42]), “#MeToo in Japan and South Korea”, https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2019.1563416; An et al. (2024[43]), “Exploring risk and protective factors of intimate partner violence in Korean young adults”, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0314352; Lee (2024[44]), “Why femicide and dating violence are growing issues in S. Korea”, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3389180; Moon (2024[45]), “Digital Sex Crime, Online Misogyny, and Digital Feminism in South Korea”, https://doi.org/10.1353/GIA.2024.A934902; Jang and Suh (2024[46]), “Cyber Sex Crimes Targeting Children and Adolescents in South Korea: Incidents and Legal Challenges”, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci13110596; Kim, Choi and Champion (2024[41]), “Technology-facilitated Sexual Violence in South Korea: A Content Analysis of a Website for Victims”, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801223117271; Jun (2023[47]), “A Study on the Analysis of and Educational Solution for Digital Sex Crimes in Korea”, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20032450; Lee and Yi (2022[48]), “Intersectional discrimination, bullying/cyberbullying, and suicidal ideation among South Korean youths: a latent profile analysis (LPA)”, https://doi.org/10.1080/02673843.2022.2095214; Yeon Lee and Park (2024[49]), “Unraveling the Digital Threat: Exploring the Impact of Online Harassment on South Korean Journalists’ Professional Roles”, https://doi.org/10.1177/10776990231217448; Zamfir (2024[50]), “Violence against women active in politics in the EU”, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/759600/EPRS_BRI(2024)759600_EN.pdf; Tan and Kim (2019[51]), “Sulli: The woman who rebelled against the K-pop world”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50051575; Korea Communications Commission (2023[52]), “Four out of 10 teenagers have experienced cyberbullying, one more person than last year”, https://www.kmcc.go.kr/user.do?mode=view&page=E04010000&dc=E04010000&boardId=1058&cp=17&boardSeq=54874.

Despite these challenges, perceptions of personal safety in Korea are comparatively high. As in most OECD countries, men are more likely than women to report feeling safe when walking alone at night. In 2022-2023, 84% of Korean men and 74% of Korean women reported feeling safe, both exceeding the OECD averages of 81% and 66%, respectively. Encouragingly, perceived safety has improved steadily for both genders since 2006-2007, with particularly strong gains in Korea. Over this period, Korean women’s sense of safety increased at three times the annual rate observed for men4 – a faster relative improvement than the OECD average, where women’s perceptions of safety improved at around twice the rate of men’s.

Health, emotional well-being and social connections

Life expectancy in Korea surpasses the OECD average for both men and women, and the gender gap aligns closely with the OECD average. In 2022, a newborn girl in Korea could expect to live 86 years and a boy 80 years, compared with the OECD averages of 84 and 78 years, respectively.

However, self-reported health is comparatively low in Korea and particularly among women, resulting in one of the largest gender gaps in self-reported health across OECD countries. Fourteen per cent of Korean women and 10% of Korean men rated their health as “not very good” or “poor”, notably above the OECD averages of 9% and 7% respectively. The resulting gender gap of 4 p.p. is twice the OECD average. Across all age groups – 15‑24, 45‑64, and 65 years and over – Korea consistently exhibits wider gender disparities in self-reported health than the OECD average. This pattern is especially pronounced among those aged 65 and above: unlike in the rest of OECD countries, where the gender gap remains relatively stable across age bands, the gap in Korea is nearly three times larger than in younger groups, driven by a marked deterioration in perceived health among older women (OECD, n.d.[53]).

High suicide rates among both men and women, constitute a particular challenge in Korea. As in other OECD countries, suicide rates among men are more than twice those for women: in 2022, 32 men and 14 women per 100 000 died by suicide, compared with OECD averages of 17 and 6 per 100 000, respectively (Figure 3.12). Following a peak in 1998 in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and a general increase through the 2000s, suicide rates in Korea began to decline at around 2011 for women and 2012 for men, following the Suicide Prevention Act in 2011. However, this downward trajectory has largely stalled since 2017, with progress plateauing for both men and women.

Korea is also witnessing a concerning rise in “lonely deaths” (kodoksa or godoksa), referring to deaths of people living alone who remain undiscovered for a period of time due to social and community isolation. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 3 661 “lonely deaths” were recorded in 2023, up from 2 949 in 2019, with men in their 50s and 60s accounting for over half of all cases (The Korea Herald, 2024[54]). The trend reflects broader structural challenges linked to demographic shifts, including the rapid increase in single‑person households, which reached 7.83 million in 2023, population ageing, urbanisation, and weakening aspects of social connectedness (also refer to the section on disparities in well-being by age) – dynamics increasingly visible across OECD countries (OECD, 2024[1]). Gender differences are particularly stark: in 2022, men accounted for nearly five times as many lonely deaths as women.

Figure 3.12. Suicide rates have been persistently high among both men and women in Korea despite reductions in recent years
Copy link to Figure 3.12. Suicide rates have been persistently high among both men and women in Korea despite reductions in recent years

Per 100 000 population

As highlighted in Chapter 2, a relatively high share of people in Korea report experiencing more negative than positive emotions on a given day, referred to as negative affect balance, compared with the OECD average. In Korea, 14% of Korean men and 15% of Korean women reported more negative than positive emotions, compared with the OECD average of 11% and 14%, respectively. Among Korean men, those aged 30 to 59 are particularly affected, reporting more negative than positive emotional experiences than both their counterparts in most OECD countries and other age groups in Korea (Figure 3.13).

Figure 3.13. Negative affect balance – the experience of more negative than positive emotional states in a given day – is particularly high and increasing for Korean middle‑aged (30‑59) men
Copy link to Figure 3.13. Negative affect balance – the experience of more negative than positive emotional states in a given day – is particularly high and increasing for Korean middle‑aged (30‑59) men

Percentage of the population

At the same time, Korean men are slightly less likely than women to report feeling stressed in daily life: according to data from the Ministry of Data and Statistics (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[34]), nearly 37% of men reported feeling somewhat or very stressed over the previous two weeks, compared with 40% of women in 2024, although these patterns have fluctuated over time (Figure 3.14).

Figure 3.14. Korean women are more likely than men to report feeling stressed in daily life
Copy link to Figure 3.14. Korean women are more likely than men to report feeling stressed in daily life

Percentage of the population

Loneliness patterns reveal a similar gendered divide. Loneliness data from the Ministry of Data and Statistics show that nearly 20% of Korean women reported feeling somewhat or very lonely in 2023, compared to 18% of men (Figure 3.15, Panel A). This gender gap has persisted across all available data since 2020.5 The overall peak in loneliness during the COVID‑19 pandemic was driven largely by women: 1 in 4 reported feeling lonely, compared with fewer than 1 in 5 men in 2021. While the measure is not directly comparable with that used across OECD countries, due to differences in question wording,6 similar gender patterns emerge (OECD, 2025[57]). At the same time, research suggests that men often perceive greater stigma around loneliness and are more reluctant to disclose it, particularly in response to direct questions (Langenkamp and Schobin, 2024[58]; OECD, 2025[57]).

Loneliness is only one of the multiple facets of social connections, which also encompass quality of social interactions and the perceived availability of support (OECD, 2025[57]). In Korea, little gender difference is observed in perceived access to financial or practical support (such as housework-related assistance). However, a notable divide emerges in emotional support: in 2023, 77% of Korean men and 83% of Korean women reported having someone to talk to when feeling discouraged or depressed (Figure 3.15, Panel B). While this share has remained stable for women since 2009, it has declined for men: from 85% in 2019 to 77% in 2023, and the drop particularly pronounced among men aged 30‑39.

Figure 3.15. Opportunities to bridge gender gaps in social support, tackling higher women loneliness and men lower perceived emotional support
Copy link to Figure 3.15. Opportunities to bridge gender gaps in social support, tackling higher women loneliness and men lower perceived emotional support

Percentage of the population

Trust in government and political efficacy

There are signs of potential gender differences in trust in government and political efficacy that may need further investigation. Gallup data show a 5 p.p. gender gap in trust in government, with 34% of Korean men reporting trust in government in 2022-2023, compared with 29% of Korean women. This contrasts with much higher average levels of government trust across OECD countries (47% for men and 48% for women) and a smaller gender gap (Figure 3.16, Panel A). However, the same gender gap does not show in Korean national data with slightly different question wording.7

A slight gender difference is also evident in perceptions of political efficacy: in 2023, 44% of Korean women felt they had little to no influence on government decisions (giving a score of 4 or below on a 0‑10 scale), compared with 42% of Korean men, as reported in the OECD Trust Survey (Figure 3.16, Panel B). This gender gap was not present in the 2021 edition, and both figures remain below the OECD averages of 55% for women and 51% for men. Korean national data from the Social Integration Survey (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[34]) further underscore this gender divide and also show a growing perception of limited influence among women since 2021, with no gap observed in most earlier years.8

Figure 3.16. Further attention may be needed to understand and address possible emerging gender gaps in trust in government and political efficacy
Copy link to Figure 3.16. Further attention may be needed to understand and address possible emerging gender gaps in trust in government and political efficacy

Percentage of the population

Inclusive and sustainable well-being at different life stages

Copy link to Inclusive and sustainable well-being at different life stages

Childhood and adolescence

Fostering positive conditions early in life supports higher individual well-being over the life course. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to fall behind in key dimensions of well-being and development, with persistent impacts on their health, education, and labour market prospects. An OECD analysis of 27 European countries estimated that labour market penalties from early disadvantage, stemming from reduced employment and earnings, cost 1.6% of GDP annually, while the associated health impacts account for a further 1.9% – a combined total equivalent to 3.4% of GDP each year (Clarke et al., 2022[60]).

While many OECD countries have made strides in reducing child poverty, Korea’s progress in this area has been particularly noteworthy. Between 2011 and 2022, the relative poverty rate among children aged 0 to 17 fell from 16.4% to 9.5%, compared with a modest OECD-wide decline from 14.4% to 12.4% (Figure 3.17). Safeguarding lower levels of child poverty can help secure stronger foundations for current and future generations in Korea.

Figure 3.17. Safeguarding Korea’s declining child poverty is essential to sustaining gains in child well-being
Copy link to Figure 3.17. Safeguarding Korea’s declining child poverty is essential to sustaining gains in child well-being

Percentage of children aged 0‑17 with household disposable income below 50% of the national median income

While Korean students demonstrate high cognitive skills and academic performance (see Chapter 2), they face intense social pressure to excel. Driven by the pursuit of top university placements and future career security, students routinely engage in long hours in private tutoring institutions (hagwons). In 2023, an estimated 78.5% of primary and secondary students participated in private tutoring (Ministry of Education, 2024[62]; OECD, 2025[3]; 2024[23]). This intense academic culture leaves little room for recreation. As a result, Korean youth aged 15‑19, along with adults aged 30‑39, report the lowest satisfaction with the quantity of weekday leisure time since 2014: one in five young Koreans aged 15‑19 expressed low satisfaction (i.e. a score of 3 or below on a 0‑7 scale) in 2023. (Figure 3.18).

Figure 3.18. There is clear potential to improve weekday leisure time satisfaction for Korean youth aged 15‑19 and adults aged 30‑39
Copy link to Figure 3.18. There is clear potential to improve weekday leisure time satisfaction for Korean youth aged 15‑19 and adults aged 30‑39

Percentage of the population reporting a score of 3 or below on a 0‑7 scale on satisfaction with the quantity of weekday leisure time

Access to quality play spaces is a cornerstone of child well-being. Between 2016 and 2019, 61% of 10‑year‑old Korean children strongly agreed that there were sufficient places to play and enjoy leisure time in their local area, below the OECD average of 75% (OECD, n.d.[63]). Play areas support children’s physical, cognitive, social, and emotional development, promote motor skills (UNICEF, 2023[64]), mitigate the risk of obesity and related conditions (UNICEF Europe and Central Asia, 2025[65]), encourage active parental involvement (UNICEF, 2023[64]; OECD, 2025[66]), provide opportunities for peer interaction, strengthen social competence and foster a sense of belonging within the community (UNESCO, 2024[67]), promote environmental awareness and reinforce sustainable behaviours from an early age (OECD, 2025[66]).

In highly competitive educational settings, peer relationships can weaken, limiting social development. A 2025 comparative study based on data from the OECD’s 2022 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), conducted by the Korea Educational Development Institute (KEDI), for which only information on international rankings are available, showed that, while student-teacher relationships and students’ sense of belonging to the school in Korea ranked among the strongest across OECD countries (OECD, 2023[68]), peer relationships were notably weaker, placing Korea 36th, near the bottom of the distribution. In the domain of collaboration, Korean students ranked 12th in empathy and 26th in co‑operation, suggesting uneven social-emotional skills: with students performing relatively well in emotional expression (12th) and resilience (19th) (The Korea Bizwire, 2025[69]). According to the OECD Child Well-being dashboard, 81% of 10‑year‑old Korean children felt that they had enough friends – below the OECD average of 84% in 2016-2019 (OECD, n.d.[63]).

In 2022, 22% of Korean students rated their life satisfaction low (between 0 and 4 on a scale from 0 to 10), a persistently high level of dissatisfaction when compared with 23% in 2018 (Figure 3.19, Panel A). By comparison, the share of students reporting low life satisfaction across OECD countries was 18% in 2022, up from 16% in 2018, signaling a broader decline in adolescent well-being. In the Korean context, intensive tutoring and long study hours have been shown to adversely affect mental health and emotional well-being (Xu and Lee, 2023[70]; OECD, 2025[3]).

Social expectations around appearance also emerge early in Korea, with girls aged 10 to 12 especially affected. In 2016-2019, close to 15% of 10‑year‑old and 19% of 12‑year‑old girls reported low satisfaction with their appearance, among the highest across OECD countries for which the data are available (with the percentage of girls being 6 and 9 p.p. higher than for boys in Korea, see Figure 3.19, Panel B). Fewer than half of children in these age groups reported high satisfaction the way they look, the lowest recorded in OECD countries with available data (OECD, n.d.[71]).

Figure 3.19. Low satisfaction with life and appearance among Korean children signal opportunities to further enhance child well-being
Copy link to Figure 3.19. Low satisfaction with life and appearance among Korean children signal opportunities to further enhance child well-being

Percentage

Youth suicide rates are particularly concerning in Korea. Among adolescents aged 15‑19 years, Korea’s suicide rate is among the highest observed across OECD countries (UNICEF, 2025[73]). Between 1996 and 2023 the rate among children aged 0‑14 increased by 84%, the highest cumulative growth rate across all age groups (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism of the Republic of Korea, 2024[74]; Institute, 2023[75]). Suicide became the leading cause of death among young people in Korea for the first time in 2012 (The Korea Times, 2024[76]), compared with third globally in 2021 (World Health Organization, 2025[77]). Contributing factors include academic pressure, mental health challenges, family dynamics and early-age adversities (such as parental divorce, conflict and child abuse) (Park and Ha, 2023[78]), societal expectations and online harassment. The governmental has implemented measures such as the 2011 Suicide Prevention Act, that established a network of suicide prevention and mental health welfare centres across the country, and the 2024 Youth Mental Health Support Program, as part of the broader National Mental Health Investment Support Program (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism of the Republic of Korea, 2024[74]). Nonetheless, ongoing efforts to reduce stigma, improve mental health services, and address systemic issues remain essential to improve adolescent well-being (see Chapter 4).

Young adulthood

Young people in Korea experience better health, higher subjective well-being, and stronger social connectedness compared to older cohorts, a pattern consistent with other OECD countries. Yet, they face distinct challenges that place considerable strain on their well-being. These include intense academic competition, high costs of tertiary education, limited access to affordable housing in the Seoul metropolitan area – home to nearly half of the population – and fierce competition for a small pool of high quality jobs. Against a backdrop of mounting social and economic pressures, a growing number of young Koreans – often referred to as the sampo generation or “three giving-up generation” – are postponing or forgoing courtship, marriage, and childbearing, contributing to Korea’s fertility challenge (OECD, 2022[29]).

The transition from education to employment is particularly challenging. While a university degree is a baseline qualification, it often does not secure a good job in an highly competitive labour market characterised by credentialism, an overemphasis on academic qualifications as proxies for ability, and “education inflation” whereby ever-higher degrees are required for roles that once demanded less thus eroding the value of work experience and non-elite diplomas (OECD, 2022[29]). As a result, the link between objective skills, such as literacy and tertiary attainment, and employment outcomes is weaker in Korea than in most OECD countries, where these indicators typically predict employment and productivity (OECD, 2025[3]). Access to prestigious universities in Korea increasingly reflects family socio‑economic background rather than individual merit, reducing not only economic efficiency, but also social mobility9 (OECD, 2022[29]).

In Korea’s dual labour market, good employment opportunities are limited. Graduates from top tier universities are far more likely to secure high-paying positions, driving intense competition for prestigious institutions (OECD, 2022[29]) and contributing to the highest rate of job-education mismatch across OECD countries, with nearly half of workers employed outside their field of study in 2023 (OECD, 2025[3]; 2024[79]). Persistent high youth disengagement is partially driven by graduates rejecting lower-skilled jobs, which signals lower productivity in a segmented labour market (OECD, 2022[29]). This delays labour market entry, accelerates skill depreciation, and encourages the pursuit of additional studies. In 2023, 13% of tertiary-educated men and 21% of women aged 25‑34 were economically inactive (i.e. not working and either not seeking nor available to work (ILO, n.d.[80])) – one of the highest rates among OECD countries (Figure 3.20). Gendered patterns in economic inactivity are also emerging: national data show that from 2018 to 2024, the NEET rate for young men increased from 13.5% to 15.7%, while the rate for women fell from 18% to 15%. These differences may be attributed to different career strategies, with men often delaying employment to prepare for higher-quality jobs following military service, while women tend to enter the workforce more quickly, often through temporary or irregular employment (The Korea Bizwire, 2025[81]). Overall, youth employment rates are low: in 2023, 28% of Korean youth aged 15‑24 were employed, compared to the OECD average of 42%, while over 40% of Koreans aged 20‑29 worked in non-regular positions offering limited protection (OECD, 2024[23]). Furthermore, young workers, with less firm-specific experience, are particularly vulnerable to job loss during economic downturn (World Bank, 2012[82]).

Figure 3.20. Addressing high inactivity among tertiary-educated 25‑34 year‑olds in Korea presents an opportunity for inclusive labour market engagement
Copy link to Figure 3.20. Addressing high inactivity among tertiary-educated 25‑34 year‑olds in Korea presents an opportunity for inclusive labour market engagement

Percentage of tertiary educated 25‑34 year‑olds who are economically inactive, 2023 or latest available year

Effective labour market integration of young people is essential for their individual economic prospects and well-being as well as for Korea’s long-term economic performance, social cohesion and fiscal sustainability. Youth unemployment and prolonged inactivity can have lasting “scarring effects”, including lower future employment, increased likelihood of non-regular and low-wage work, and adverse impacts on both physical and mental health, as well as overall life satisfaction (OECD, 2022[29]). From a macroeconomic perspective, low youth employment hampers potential output growth and imposes higher fiscal burdens through increased welfare costs and foregone tax revenues. Prolonged periods of inactivity also risk the erosion of skills and human capital, diminishing productivity and weakening Korea’s long-term growth potential (IMF, 2018[84]). Enhancing youth employment opportunities – alongside improving job security and earnings – would strengthen young people’s economic independence, foster greater confidence in their future, and support family formation and childbearing – critical for mitigating the long-term social and economic consequences of population ageing (OECD, 2024[23]). Over the past decade, the relative income of young adults in Korea has declined compared to other age groups, while their debt levels have continued to rise (Figure 3.21).

Figure 3.21. There is scope to enhance financial stability for young Koreans amid trends of falling incomes and rising debt
Copy link to Figure 3.21. There is scope to enhance financial stability for young Koreans amid trends of falling incomes and rising debt

In terms of social connections, young Koreans report the highest levels of perceived social support and satisfaction with personal relationships compared to other age groups, as in most OECD countries. Over 90% of those aged 18‑29 in Korea and across OECD countries on average reported having someone to rely on in times of need, above shares of other age groups in 2015-2023 (Figure 3.22, Panel A). In 2023, 70% of Korean adolescents (aged 13‑19 years) and 63% of young adults (aged 20‑29 years) were satisfied or very satisfied with their personal relationships – higher than older adults, whose satisfaction ranged between 49% and 54% and declined steadily with age. However, while relationship satisfaction has improved over time for older age groups (with the exception of those aged 40‑49), it has largely stabilised among youth (as for those aged 40‑49, see Figure 3.22, Panel B). While overall feelings of loneliness declined across all age groups between 2013 and 2023 in Korea (refer to Chapter 2), this decline was less marked among 19‑29 year‑olds; between 2022 and 2023, loneliness increased solely for this age group, returning to 2021 COVID‑19 pandemic levels (Figure 3.22, Panel C). While caution is needed when comparing loneliness data between countries due to differences in question wording, the recent uptick in youth loneliness in Korea echoes a broader trend across OECD countries (OECD, 2024[1]; 2025[57]).

Figure 3.22. Social connections are relatively strong among young Koreans, yet youth loneliness is growing
Copy link to Figure 3.22. Social connections are relatively strong among young Koreans, yet youth loneliness is growing

Percentage of the population

In line with broader trends across OECD countries, where perceived political efficacy generally declines with age, younger Koreans have slightly higher levels of perceived political efficacy relative to older age groups. In 2023, 41% of young Koreans aged 18‑29 reported a score of 6 or higher when asked to what extent the political system allows people like them to have a say in what the government does (on a scale from 0, “not at all”, to 10, “a great deal”, see Figure 3.23), slightly higher than middle‑aged adults (40%) and older adults (37%), and above the OECD average for the same age group (35%). However, reported levels of political efficacy have declined across all age groups in Korea since 2021, though the drop among young people (7 p.p.) is smaller than among middle aged or older adults (22 and 15 p.p., respectively). Data from the Ministry of Data and Statistics (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[34]), while also indicating a decline, show lower levels of perceived political efficacy among young Koreans aged 19‑29 years compared to other age groups. These discrepancies may stem from differences in question wording.10

Figure 3.23. Perceived political efficacy has declined across all age groups since 2021 in Korea, though the drop has been less pronounced among young people
Copy link to Figure 3.23. Perceived political efficacy has declined across all age groups since 2021 in Korea, though the drop has been less pronounced among young people

Percentage of the population

Better understanding and addressing the sources of increasing levels of worry in young adults, especially young women, can enhance Korea’s subjective well-being. Fourty seven per cent of Korean women and 39% of Korean men aged 18‑29 years reported feeling worried a lot on the previous day, exceeding both the OECD averages for their respective groups (39% and 34%) and the shares observed among older Koreans, which ranged between 30% and 39% over 2015-2023 (Figure 3.24). Increases in worry since 2006-2014 have been more pronounced among young Koreans than in most other OECD countries, rising 7 p.p. for women and 4 p.p. for men, compared with OECD-wide increases of 1 and 2 p.p., respectively.

Figure 3.24. Counteracting increasing worry among young adults, especially young women, can enhance Korea’s subjective well-being
Copy link to Figure 3.24. Counteracting increasing worry among young adults, especially young women, can enhance Korea’s subjective well-being

Percentage of the population

Middle age

As in most OECD countries, middle‑aged adults in Korea are more likely to be employed and earn higher incomes than other age groups, but they are also more exposed to long working hours and higher levels of debt. In 2023, nearly 79% of Koreans aged 35‑54 were employed – the highest employment rate across age groups (OECD, n.d.[85]) – and their income levels exceeded those of both younger adults (under 40) and older adults (aged 60 and over, see Figure 3.21). However, this economic advantage often comes at a cost. Around 18% of middle‑aged Korean workers reported working 50 hours or more per week, compared to 9% among younger workers and 15% among older ones. While these shares have declined significantly since 2000 – they remain well above the OECD averages (10% for middle‑aged and older adults, and 6% for younger workers). Higher incomes facilitate greater consumption and access to credit, yet, the resulting debt remains substantial relative to income, suggesting financial pressures that accompany this life stage (Data and Statistics Research Institute, 2024[86]).

Middle age is typically a period of family formation. In Korea, high costs of housing, education, and private tutoring are significant deterrents to parenthood, contributing to delayed family formation and lower fertility rates (OECD, 2025[3]). Cross-country evidence confirms that rising household expenditure on housing is negatively associated with fertility rates across OECD countries (OECD, 2024[23]). In Korea, housing prices doubled between 2013 and 2019, reducing the likelihood of marriage by an estimated 4% to 5.7% (Kang and Song, 2022[87]). Housing pressures are particularly acute in Seoul and surrounding metropolitan area, home to more than half of the Korean population11 (OECD, 2025[3]). Education-related costs further compound these pressures: in 2023, Korean parents allocated approximately 10% of average household disposable income to private tutoring alone (OECD, 2025[3]; 2024[23]). Empirical studies find a negative correlation between private tutoring expenditures and national fertility rates (Anderson, 2018[88]). Nearly half (49.2%) of Korean parents considered private tutoring a significant financial burden (KEDI, 2022[89]), and 27% cited the cost of their children’s education and care as a major reason for reduced fertility (Low Birth Rate and Aging Society Committee and the Ministry of Culture, 2023[90]). Consequently, many Korean parents opt for fewer children, invest more intensively in each child – a phenomenon known as the “quantity-quality trade-off” (OECD, 2025[3]; 2024[23]).

Strengthening efforts to reduce long working hours in Korea could leave more time for other essential activities such as social interaction, caregiving and leisure – relieving pressures particularly acute in this life stage. Perceived social support begins to decline in Korea as across other OECD countries: in 2022-2023, 85% of Korean adults aged 30‑49 years reported having someone to rely on in times of need, compared to 94% among young Koreans aged 15‑29 (OECD, n.d.[91]). Time pressures are even more pronounced for parents. Full-time work remains the norm in Korea, wheras part-time roles often entails lower pay, limited protections, and atypical contracts. Although Korea’s legal framework for flexible work options, including reduced hours and teleworking, is broadly aligned with OECD standards, uptake remains among the lowest among OECD countries. Organisational culture, insufficient infrastructure, and employee reluctance – due to concerns over income, job security, promotion, or performance evaluations12 – constrain the use of flexible work options (OECD, 2025[3]).

Old age

As Korea undergoes one of the most rapid demographic transitions among OECD countries, ensuring that older people can thrive later in life is emerging as both a vital policy imperative and a profound societal challenge. With older adults set to comprise an increasingly significant share of the population, Korea stands at a critical juncture: how it responds today will shape not only the well-being of its ageing citizens, but the sustainability of its social, economic, and health systems in the decades to come. A thriving old age must become not a privilege, but a shared expectation – underpinned by inclusive policies, resilient institutions, and a reimagining of ageing itself.

Across OECD countries, older adults typically report lower incomes than working-age populations, but higher wealth due to accumulated assets such as housing (Balestra and Tonkin, 2018[92]). After retirement, they benefit from more discretion over time use, leading to higher reported satisfaction with time use than other age groups. More time for leisure and socialising does not translate into stronger social ties though. Social connections often weaken with age, alongside the expected decline in health. In many OECD countries, older people also generally report higher trust in government than their younger counterparts (OECD, 2024[1]; n.d.[91]). While Korea shares several of these broad trends, it also faces distinct and pressing challenges.

Employment rates among older Koreans aged 55‑64 years have consistently exceeded the OECD average since 1996, remaining at or above 60% (Figure 3.25). While the gap has narrowed over time – as more people across the OECD remain in work into their 50s and 60s – Korea continues to stand out. In 2023, employment rates for this age group reached 70% in Korea, compared to an OECD average of 66%. As of 2025, the statutory retirement age is set at 60 in Korea, yet eligibility for the state pension begins at 63, creating a structural gap that shapes late‑career trajectories. In practice, many workers exit even earlier through so-called “honorary retirement” schemes in their early 50s – formally voluntary, but driven by firm incentives under a seniority-based wage system in which pay rises automatically with tenure and can outpace productivity over the life course, rendering older workers relatively costly. While severance payments cushion this transition, many older people continue working out of financial necessity and strong social norms favouring labour force participation, typically re‑entering in non-regular, lower-paid and less productive jobs (OECD, 2022[29]). The result is a fragmented pathway to retirement marked by delayed pension access and heightened labour market duality at older ages. As a result, Korea has one of the highest shares of older adults working beyond the legal retirement age among OECD countries. In 2023, the employment rate among 65‑69 year‑olds and 70‑74 year‑olds stood at 51% and 40%, respectively, nearly double the OECD averages (29% and 17%) (OECD, n.d.[85]). Employment among these older age groups has been rising steadily over time, both in Korea and across the OECD more broadly, reflecting evolving work preferences, financial necessity, and broader demographic shifts.

Figure 3.25. Employment rates among older Koreans aged 55‑64 years have consistently exceeded the OECD average since 1996
Copy link to Figure 3.25. Employment rates among older Koreans aged 55‑64 years have consistently exceeded the OECD average since 1996

Percentage of employed over the population of the same age

Korea’s seniority-based wage system (which can render older workers less attractive to employers as wages rise faster than productivity) and company-specific mandatory retirement ages (which are sometimes below the legal pension age) can curtail careers and limit mobility for older workers. Korea allows firms to set their own mandatory retirement age, which may be below the official pension eligibility age (this is unusual across OECD countries and only Japan has similar approach) (OECD, 2024[93]). Many leave their primary jobs through “honorary retirement” agreements, which are formally voluntary but often encouraged by employers and accompanied by generous compensation packages (OECD, 2024[23]). A 2023 government survey conducted by the Ministry of Data and Statistics (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[34]) found that around 70% of individuals aged 55‑79 years wished to continue working, with those aged 55‑64 years indicating a preferred retirement age of around 70 (significantly above the official pensionable age of 63 (OECD, 2024[23])), with over half of respondents citing financial necessity and the need to support living expenses as a motivation for wishing to work longer. Seniority-based wage practices also depress initial earnings for younger workers, discouraging mobility and limiting intergenerational equity in the labour market (OECD, 2022[29]).

Older Koreans who re‑enter the workforce after early retirement frequently work in insecure, low-paid roles with limited social protection and minimal pension contributions (OECD, 2025[94]; 2018[95]). Job satisfaction among those aged 60 and over is low: in 2023, only 31% reported being satisfied or very satisfied with their job, the lowest rate across all age groups except adolescents (Ministry of Data and Statistics, n.d.[34]). Korea’s pension system exacerbates financial vulnerability, as mandatory pension contributions cease at age 60, while eligibility for pension benefits begins at 63, creating a three‑year coverage gap unless voluntary contributions are made (OECD, 2022[96]). Old-age poverty is relatively high in Korea, despite reductions in recent years (contrasting with a modest upward trend in the OECD average): 40% of Koreans aged 66 and over lived below the relative income poverty line (set at 50% of the national median income), more than twice the OECD average of 16% in 2022 (Figure 3.26). Among those aged 76 years and over, the figure rose to 54%, against an OECD average of 19%. These high poverty rates among older people are in part a legacy of Korea’s relatively recent socio‑economic transformation,13 and as the “baby boomer” generation – who have had more active economic participation and higher participation in the national pension system than the current elderly generation – enters old age, this demographic shift may contribute to a continued reduction in the elderly poverty rate in the future, alongside government policies to strengthen income security for the elderly.

Figure 3.26. Strengthening efforts to reduce older adults’ high income poverty can secure stronger economic well-being in Korea’s ageing society
Copy link to Figure 3.26. Strengthening efforts to reduce older adults’ high income poverty can secure stronger economic well-being in Korea’s ageing society

Percentage of those aged 66 and more with household disposable income below 50% of the national median income

Beyond spending possibilities through income, wealth provides a buffer that can help to smooth consumption and enable longer-term investments (such as in housing). Asset poverty in Korea also exhibits an atypical age pattern. While most OECD countries show declining asset poverty with age, in Korea 19% of individuals living in households headed by someone aged 65‑74 years and 39% of those in households headed by someone over 75 years were asset-poor in 2015, well above 5‑7% among households with working-age heads (i.e. between below 34‑year‑old and up to 54‑year‑old) (Balestra and Tonkin, 2018[92]). More recent analyses accounting for assets through comprehensive “incomisation” (which calculates the annual consumable value of assets, including implicit sources like imputed rent) or through “annuitisation” (which transforms net worth into hypothetical pension-like payouts) suggest that poverty among older Koreans declines substantially when assets are accounted for, narrowing gaps with other OECD countries, though vulnerability remains high (KDI-BOK, 2025[97]). This atypical age profile of asset poverty deepens economic vulnerability in later life and underscores an opportunity for strengthening financial resilience of Korea’s ageing population (Lee, 2023[98]).

Strengthening older adults’ social support and reducing loneliness is key to ensure a thriving ageing society. As in most OECD countries, social support tends to decline with age, but the decline is notably steeper in Korea, particularly among older men: 70% of Korean women and 62% of Korean men aged 60‑69 years reported having someone to rely on in times of need, below the OECD averages of 87% and 88%, respectively in 2015-2023 (Figure 3.27). Among those aged 70 years and over, social support fell to 65% for women and 61% for men, while remaining broadly stable for similarly-aged peers across OECD countries. Encouragingly, social support levels across age groups were consistently higher for the 2015-2023 period than the 2006-2014 period in Korea. Satisfaction with personal relationships also declines markedly with age in Korea and is accompanied by a higher prevalence of loneliness: in 2023, fewer than half of those aged 60 years and over were satisfied with their personal relationships, the lowest share across all age groups consistently over time (Figure 3.22, Panel B). While declining over time and across age groups, feelings of loneliness are correspondingly higher for older Korean adults than their younger peers: in 2023, 24% of Koreans aged 60 years and above reported feeling somewhat or very lonely, a figure that has consistently exceeded those of younger age groups, spiking to 32% during the COVID‑19 pandemic in 2021 (Figure 3.28). While not directly comparable due to different question wording, data for other OECD countries also show that older adults tend to experience greater loneliness than younger peers (OECD, 2024[1]; 2025[57]).

Figure 3.27. Perceived social support declines at a much sharper rate by age for Koreans, and especially Korean men, than the OECD average
Copy link to Figure 3.27. Perceived social support declines at a much sharper rate by age for Koreans, and especially Korean men, than the OECD average

Percentage of the population

Figure 3.28. Loneliness has declined over time for all age groups, but less markedly for those aged over 60, widening the loneliness gap between young and old
Copy link to Figure 3.28. Loneliness has declined over time for all age groups, but less markedly for those aged over 60, widening the loneliness gap between young and old

Percentage of the population feeling lonely

40% of Korean women aged 60‑69 years and 49% of those aged 70 years and over reported experiencing a lot of pain the previous day, higher than both the OECD averages for women in the same age groups (36% and 43%, respectively) and their male peers in Korea (25% and 32%) in 2015-2023 (Figure 3.29). Older Korean women also report higher stress than both older men and other age groups: in 2024, 5% of women aged 60 years and over reported feeling very stressed, compared to a range of 2.4%‑3.4% across other age and gender groups (Figure 3.30). While self-reported stress has declined across all groups since 2008, the pace of improvement has been notably slower for older women. For Korean women aged 60 years and over, the decline in reported stress amounted to just 0.4 p.p., less than half the reduction seen among other groups.

Figure 3.29. Older Korean women are more likely to experience physical pain than same‑aged OECD peers
Copy link to Figure 3.29. Older Korean women are more likely to experience physical pain than same‑aged OECD peers

Percentage of the population

Figure 3.30. Self-reported stress has declined since 2008, but older Korean women have seen less substantial reductions in stress than men and younger age cohorts
Copy link to Figure 3.30. Self-reported stress has declined since 2008, but older Korean women have seen less substantial reductions in stress than men and younger age cohorts

Percentage of the population who replied that their daily life was very stressful over the last two weeks

As across other OECD countries, suicide risk increases by age in Korea, and the highest suicide rates are among those aged 70 years and over, especially men. In 2023, the suicide rate for Korean men in this age group reached 80 per 100 000, exceeding that of any other gender or age group (Figure 3.31). By comparison, rates ranged from just 1.1 per 100 000 among boys aged 0‑14 to 47 among men aged 50‑59. Gender disparities persist across the life course: while suicide rates are higher among girls than boys under 20, men face significantly higher risks from age 20 onwards. These patterns likely reflect a complex interplay of social isolation (Kwon, Jeong and Choi, 2018[99]), economic insecurity (Kim et al., 2024[100]; Raschke et al., 2022[101]), and unmet mental health needs in later life (Kim and Kihl, 2021[102]).

Figure 3.31. Suicide risk increases with age in Korea
Copy link to Figure 3.31. Suicide risk increases with age in Korea

Per 100 000 population, 2023

Data earlier in the chapter noted that Korean men are more likely (by 5 p.p.) to trust government than women overall according to Gallup data from 2022-2023 (see Figure 3.16, Panel A). When pooling data over a longer time frame (2015-2023), and disaggregating by age, the same pattern of Korean men having higher trust in government is evident for younger people (with a 6 p.p. gender gap) and those aged over 60 (7 p.p. gender gap for 60‑69 year‑olds and 5 p.p. gap for those aged 70+), but not for middle‑aged people aged 30‑59 (Figure 3.32). Substantial gender gaps are not evident for the OECD average for any age group. While trust levels generally increase by age for men and women across OECD countries, in Korea trust levels for older women aged 60‑69 dip slightly compared with those aged 30‑59 before increasing again after 70. The gap in government trust between younger and older people is also more pronounced in Korea, and especially for Korean women. Only 28% of Korean women aged 18‑29 trusted government over 2015-2023, below an OECD average of 45% for women of the same age (the largest gap with the OECD average of any age group by gender in this analysis) and for Korean women aged 70+. When comparing with pooled data from an earlier period (2006-2014), while levels of trust seem to have improved over time for younger and middle‑aged men and women, trust levels have declined for men and women aged over 60 in Korea.

Figure 3.32. Korean men have higher levels of trust in government than women in young adulthood and old age but not in middle age, while similar gender gaps are not evident in OECD average data
Copy link to Figure 3.32. Korean men have higher levels of trust in government than women in young adulthood and old age but not in middle age, while similar gender gaps are not evident in OECD average data

Percentage of the population

Differences in inclusive and sustainable well-being by educational attainment

Copy link to Differences in inclusive and sustainable well-being by educational attainment

People with tertiary education consistently report higher levels of well-being than those with only secondary education both in Korea and across OECD countries. The well-being gap by education level is generally similar to the OECD average or narrower, with the exception of social support, where it is larger for Korea (7 p.p., above the OECD average of 2 p.p., see Table 3.1).

			Korea		OECD average		Gap (p.p.)
Indicator	Unit of measurement	Year	At least upper secondary	Tertiary	At least upper secondary	Tertiary	Korea	OECD average
Employment rate	Employed people aged 25‑64, as a percentage of the population of the same age	2022	72	80	77	87	7	10
Good perceived health	Percentage of the population 16 years or over reporting “good” or “very good” health	2022	53	61	68	78	8	10
Social support	Percentage of people who report having friends or relatives whom they can count on in times of trouble	2022-2023	81	87	91	94	7	2
Feeling safe	Percentage of people declaring that they feel safe when walking alone at night in the city or area where they live	2022-2023	80	84	75	77	4	3
Negative affect balance	Percentage of population reporting more negative than positive feelings and states in a typical day	2022-2023	16	13	13	11	‑3	‑2
Feeling of physical pain	Percentage of population reporting experiencing a lot of physical pain the previous day	2022-2023	25	22	27	21	‑2	‑6
Not having a say in government	Percentage of respondents with a score equal to 4 or less, on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal) when asked “How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?”	2023	46	44	55	49	‑2	‑7
Trust in government	Percentage of the population responding “yes” to a question about confidence in the national government	2022-2023	36	41	47	51	5	4
Volunteering	Percentage of the population who declared having volunteered through an organisation in the past month	2022-2023	15	18	20	25	2	5

Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD How’s Life? Well-being Database (n.d.[91]), https://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/fu.

Statlink

Korea has made progress in ensuring foundational education, which reduces risks of poor social and labour market outcomes throughout life: just 1% of 25‑34 year‑olds adults were without an upper secondary qualification in 2023, 13 p.p. below the OECD average and largely unchanged since 2016 (OECD, 2024[16]). However, the country’s highly segmented labour market, where academic credentials and institutional prestige often outweigh practical competencies, limits the earnings premium of higher education. In 2023, Korean adults with a bachelor’s degree earned only 17% more than those with upper secondary education, significantly below the OECD average of 31% (OECD, 2024[16]). This pattern signals diminishing returns to education and underscores the importance of enhancing the alignment between qualifications and labour market value.

While women surpassed men in tertiary education attainment, gender disparities in employment and earnings in Korea remain. Young women aged 25‑34 years with tertiary education are 7 p.p. less likely to be employed than their male peers (similar to the OECD average gap of 6 p.p. (OECD, 2024[16])) and the gap widens to 18.3 p.p. among the broader 25‑64 age group – more than double the OECD average of 7 p.p., which remains relatively stable across cohorts (OECD, n.d.[103]). In Korea, this widening gap is partly driven by the withdrawal of many highly educated women from the workforce following motherhood (OECD, 2025[3]). These inequalities are further reflected in persistent gender wage gaps: among full-time, full-year workers, tertiary-educated women in Korea earn just 73% of their male counterparts’ income, similarly to those with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary attainment (72%) and those with below upper secondary attainment (74%). In contrast, the corresponding OECD averages are 77%, 81%, and 79%, respectively. Since women are more likely than men to work part-time or for part of the year, gender disparities in earnings are even more pronounced when considering all workers, not just those employed full-time throughout the year (OECD, 2024[17]). Addressing these structural imbalances is essential to unlocking the full potential of Korea’s highly educated workforce and ensuring more equitable returns on education for all.

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Notes

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← 1. Such as income inequality and relative income poverty, which show that while these measures remain high in Korea relative to the OECD average, significant progress in inequality and poverty reduction has been made in recent decades. Chapter 2 also explored non-monetary well-being inequalities at Korean societal level where data allowed, principally by presenting information on the percentage of people who experience deprivation, or, in other words, the share of people experiencing a negative outcome on a given indicator below a certain threshold.

← 2. There is no gender gap in science performance in Korea as measured by PISA, as is also the case for the OECD average.

← 3. Accurately measuring the prevalence and impact of gender-based violence (GBV) remains a significant challenge across OECD countries, hampered by underreporting, inconsistent legal definitions, methodological gaps, and the exclusion of vulnerable groups. Many survivors remain silent due to stigma, fear, or lack of trust in authorities. Legal and data collection frameworks vary widely across countries, and standard surveys often overlook older women, women with disabilities and LGBTQ+ individuals (OECD, 2023[108]).

← 4. Data from the 2024 Korean Social Survey confirm these trends for men but indicate lower levels of perceived safety among women – 55% of Korean women reported feeling very or somewhat safe when walking alone at night in 2024. This discrepancy may stem from differences in question wording and the availability of more nuanced response options in the national survey, which may capture a broader range of perceptions. Since the 2020 Korean Social Survey the question is phrased as follows: “How safe do you feel you are when walking alone at night?” with response options “very unsafe/somewhat unsafe/somewhat safe/very safe”, while in Gallup the yes/no question is phrased “Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?”. Until 2018, the Korean Social Survey included the yes/no question “Is there any place near your home that you would feel scared of walking alone at night?”.

← 5. 2013-2019 data referring to the population aged 19‑69 also confirm this pattern, with the exception of 2013, when there was gender parity.

← 6. As part of the Social Integration Survey, the Ministry of Data and Statistics asks respondents to assess their level of feelings of loneliness according to the following response options: “very much”, “somewhat”, “not very much”, “not at all”. The OECD aligns with the loneliness question included in the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey, where the following question is asked to the household reference person: “How much of the time over the past four weeks have you been feeling lonely?”, with response categories: “all of the time”, “most of the time”, “some of the time”, “a little of the time”, and “none of the time”.

← 7. National data from Korea’s Social Integration Survey, however, present a different picture: Between 2013 and 2023, no gender gap emerged in reported trust in government. These national figures are not directly comparable to those from the Gallup World Poll due to differences in question wording – namely, the Korean survey allows for more nuanced responses. When combining the “trust completely” and “trust somewhat” categories, trust levels are higher – 54% for women and 53% for men – but the average share of respondents selecting either option aligns more closely with the Gallup’s binary yes/no format, yielding 27% for both men and women. Data from the Ministry of Data and Statistics on interpersonal trust similarly show no significant gender gap, though trust levels have declined for both men and women over time.

← 8. In 2023, 55% of Korean women and 48% of Korean men aged 19 or more agreed or strongly agreed that they cannot influence what the government does. The data show a gender divide emerging after 2021, with no gap observed in most earlier years (except in 2016 and 2018). These data are not directly comparable with data from the OECD Trust Survey due to differences in question wording. In the Social Integration Survey interviewed people are asked to state if they strongly disagree/ disagree/ neutral/ agree/ strongly agree to the statement “people like me cannot influence on what the government does”. The percentage of people considered in this report are those who reported “agree or strongly agree”. Data referred to 19‑to‑69‑year‑old people between 2013 and 2019 and to people aged 19 or more from 2020.

← 9. For example, the admission rate to Seoul National University, the country’s most prestigious university, is nearly twice as high for high school students in Seoul compared to the national average (OECD, 2022[29]). Success in university entrance exams often depends on attending prestigious high schools and private tutoring institutions (hagwons), which require substantial financial investment, further entrenching educational and social inequalities.

← 10. In particular, the Ministry of Data and Statistics’ measure relies on respondents’ level of agreement with a negatively worded statement, “People like me cannot influence what the government does”, using a five‑point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. This format, which combines agreement scales with negative phrasing, may increase the risk of acquiescence bias, the tendency to agree with statements regardless of their content, and therefore subtly influence response patterns and affect the accuracy of the construct being measured, if respondents do not fully cognitively process the negative formulation (Imperial College London, n.d.[104]; Dykema et al., 2021[105]; Wright, 1975[106]).

← 11. Demand is concentrated in districts such as Gangnam and Seocho, where access to high performing schools and quality private education is perceived as a major advantage. This demand – exacerbated by a growing share of single‑person households over the past two decades – has far outpaced housing supply, driving prices steadily upward.

← 12. Empirical evidence underscores this tension: While flexible working arrangements in Korea have been shown to reduce career interruptions for women, improve job satisfaction, and enhance concentration (Shim and Kim, 2021[107]), they also appear to increase the risk of receiving lower performance ratings – highlighting a persistent mismatch between policy and practice.

← 13. Other factors also contribute to high income poverty amongst elderly, such as a preference for investing in home ownership rather than more liquid forms of financial wealth (Kim, 2025[109]). See also discussion on old-age poverty and associated well-being outcomes in Chapter 4.

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