Resources, capacity, quality assurance and learning systems underpin and enable the practical implementation of whole‑of‑government approaches. By addressing the operational aspects of working across government agencies and departments, this chapter delves into how strategic alignment and institutional frameworks are realised and communicated in practice through sound processes and continuous improvement.
Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co‑operation
Insights and Lessons from Practice
Abstract
Effective whole‑of‑government co‑ordination benefits from dedicated resources and capacity mobilisation,1 yet many lead ministries or agencies struggle to fulfil their co‑ordinating role and safeguard development expertise. Having institutional arrangements and co‑ordination mechanisms in place is not enough; appropriate resources and sufficient staff capacity are critical. Many DAC members face a tension between ambitious whole‑of‑government approaches and limited resources and capacity. Fragmentation, duplication and high transaction costs can occur when the lead ministry or agency operates with insufficient budget, dedicated staff or tools to steer efforts across government and protect core development expertise, particularly in contexts where several entities are engaged. As resources become more constrained, DAC members need to allocate them carefully, identify where sectoral expertise resides and mobilise it efficiently, creating synergies and addressing overlaps, and find ways to remain agile without losing sight of development objectives.
Accessing capability in the international departments of line ministries and investing in sectoral capacities within a lead development ministry improves collaboration. Systems mapping2 helps identify resources and capacity needs across government, and supports workforce planning to ensure line ministries are adequately equipped, particularly when development co‑operation is dispersed in many entities and their involvement is substantial (see Figure 4.1). Korea’s institutional capacity review across the entities managing ODA budgets exceeding KRW 1 billion (USD 770 000) or more, underscored the need to align staffing, skills and organisational structures with growing responsibilities (OECD, 2026[1]; OECD, 2024[2]). In other contexts where line ministries have limited financial and human resources to engage directly with development priorities, the lead ministry can invest in sectoral capacity. In the Netherlands, sectoral ministries face limited funding and small international units, therefore the MFA collaborates with them on an ad hoc basis and maintains technical expertise in central areas of its “Do what we do best” development policy, such as agriculture, food security, and water. This flexible approach reflects resources constraints while allowing the MFA to preserve its internal capacity and leverage Dutch strengths (OECD, 2023[3]; OECD, 2026[4]).
The resources and capacity available in development co‑operation are closely linked to the co‑operation modalities used across government. Ministries of foreign affairs and central government bodies allocate a large share of ODA through core contributions and multi-donor funds, reflecting their strategic co‑ordination mandate for development policy. Development agencies maintain a strong focus on project delivery, in line with their implementing role. By contrast, line or sectoral ministries tend to rely on project‑type interventions and technical assistance, consistent with their sector‑specific expertise, mandates and domestic accountability requirements. Ministries of finance mainly provide core contributions and multi-donor pooled funds, whereas development finance institutions mainly use project-type interventions. Ministries of education, public research institutes and universities make greater use of ODA for scholarships and student costs, reflecting their links to education systems. Overall, institutional mandates shape co‑operation modality choices, with implications for how resources and capacity are distributed across the development co‑operation system (Figure 4.1).
Share (%) of ODA from 2023-2024 average
Notes: The graph includes only DAC Member Countries (excludes the European Union). The number of institutions does not include subnational government entities. It only accounts for ODA Category 10 in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), excluding in-donor refugee costs. Ministries and agencies across the DAC Member Countries were grouped into standardised category names based on their main function.
Source: OECD (2025[5]), Creditor Reporting System, OECD Data Explorer http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
Pooling of funds enables ministries to combine resources and capacity to tackle complex, cross-cutting development challenges. Shared budget lines can support whole‑of‑government approaches by allowing different institutions to address challenges that extend beyond development policy and require complementary actions. Some DAC members have established shared funds, enabling line ministries with technical expertise to collaborate in areas such as climate action, organised crime, and peace and security, often combining ODA and non-ODA resources (Box 4.1).
Denmark:
The Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), jointly managed by the MFA and Ministry of Defence, combines a regional long-term perspective with a mechanism enabling it to provide ODA and non-ODA resources rapidly for crisis responses. Its work is guided by a set of detailed guidelines ensuring that the funds are spent on activities at the nexus of security and development. Since the creation of the PSF, Denmark has improved how it integrates diplomatic, defence and development efforts, collaborating with the ministries of defence, justice, and immigration (OECD, 2021[6]; Stiftung, 2020[7]) and has increased significantly its development assistance to the PSF in the 2026 Finance bill (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2026[8]).
The Netherlands:
The Stabilisation Fund, mainly managed by the MFA with contributions from the Ministry of Defence, finances post-conflict reconstruction activities that promote stability and safety in society, through both ODA and non-ODA (Government of the Netherlands, 2026[9]).
United Kingdom:
The Integrated Security Fund (ISF), is a cross‑government fund that integrates ODA and non-ODA resources to tackle transnational development challenges and security threats, including peace and stability issues and organised crime, such as cybersecurity and terrorism. By pooling funds and expertise from different government structures rather than siloed individual ministry budgets, the ISF brings together former workstreams such as the Conflict Stability and Security Fund, the National Cyber Programme (NCP) and the Economic Deterrence Initiative (EDI), and mobilises more than 20 entities, including the FCDO, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Treasury and specialised agencies to design, deliver and oversee programming. The annual expenditure across the government in 2024/25 blended 35.5% ODA with 64.5% non-ODA funds (UK Government, 2025[10]; OECD, 2024[11]).
Source: OECD (2026[12]), Whole‑of‑government Development Co‑operation, https://oe.cd/6Ez; OECD (2021[6]), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Denmark 2021, https://doi.org/10.1787/6e9b77e5-en; Stiftung (2020[7]), WGA 2020 Country Report – Denmark, https://www.wga-project.eu/docs/2020/country/WGA2020_Denmark_Report.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2026[8]), The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2026, https://um.dk/media/nl5lledn/the-governments-priorities-for-danish-development-cooperation-2026.pdf; Government of the Netherlands (2026[9]) Post-conflict reconstruction, https://www.government. nl/topics/international-peace-and-security/post-conflict-reconstruction; UK Government (2025[10]), Integrated Security Fund: Annual Report 2024/25, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6901fa6fe6e3290939a1d0c9/Integrated_Security_Fund_annual_report_2024_to_ 2025.pdf; OECD (2024[11]), Mid-term Review of the United Kingdom, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/AR(2024)3/17/en/pdf.
Harnessing sectoral expertise helps DAC members build on their strengths, align national and international action and maximise existing partnerships. Development policy benefits from the sectoral and inter-sectoral expertise of line ministries and agencies in addressing development challenges (OECD, 2026[12]; OECD, 2020[13]). For example, Portugal’s Inter-Ministerial Commission for Co‑operation brought together ministries for foreign affairs, health, defence, science, education, labour and social affairs to co‑ordinate a rapid response to COVID-19 (OECD, 2022[14]). Italy’s integrated approach to migration and development draws on line ministries such as the Interior, Labour and Education, ensuring strategic alignment through oversight by the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co‑operation (OECD, 2026[15]). When governments fail to recognise and mobilise expertise that exists outside the lead ministry or agency, they risk duplication, wasted resources, inefficiencies and missed opportunities (see
Targeted training, staff mobility and collaborative initiatives help build cross‑government development capacity. Line ministries have strong sectoral expertise, but may lack familiarity with OECD-DAC standards and principles that require cross‑government efforts,3 especially when development work represents a small part of their portfolio. Training programmes and staff mobility foster knowledge sharing and talent development, improve government-wide development capacity and raise awareness of development effectiveness. DFAT benefits from secondees from other government departments and the Australian Diplomatic Academy is accessible to broader public servants, enhancing development knowledge and skills (OECD, 2026[16]). Italian diplomats sit as advisors in sectoral line ministries, helping improve information flow and awareness on foreign and development issues (OECD, 2026[17]). Spain’s 2024 Royal Decree on the Statute of International Co‑operation Workers promotes horizontal mobility between Madrid and co‑operation offices, and temporary secondments both to and from international organisations and other co‑operation agencies (OECD, 2025[18]). The United Kingdom strengthens development capacity by engaging technical departments in international initiatives. United Kingdom’s Revenue and Customs authority participates in Tax Inspectors Without Borders,4 strengthening development expertise (OECD/UNDP, 2025[19]). These approaches ensure resource alignment and build capacity where it is needed most.
Quality assurance and learning systems underpin whole‑of‑government effectiveness. As multiple ministries and agencies contribute to development objectives, governments need systems that help align efforts, clarify responsibilities, generate evidence and support learning across institutions. Results and evaluation frameworks, knowledge management, data reporting and communication tools enable governments to align efforts, integrate sustainable development dimensions and support decision making, learning and accountability (OECD, 2024[20]; OECD, 2024[21]). Korea’s 2024 DAC Peer Review highlighted how dedicated resources and capacity can enhance quality and learning systems, thereby strengthening whole‑of‑government co‑ordination (OECD, 2024[2]). Finland’s integrates trade and development co‑operation across three priority areas – women and girls, education and climate action - which are based on a robust results-based management and learning systems that generate valuable evidence for decision making and support accountability, learning and communication (OECD, 2024[22]).
Growing scrutiny of ODA spending is increasing demand for stronger quality assurance across government. OECD DAC Peer Reviews, including those for the Netherlands and Switzerland and, show that members are facing growing pressure in terms of accountability, value for money and short-term development results, yet limited resources often restrict thorough cross‑government understanding of systemic change and long-term impact (OECD, 2023[3]; OECD, 2025[23]). While lead ministries and development agencies are often subject to extensive ODA oversight, development activities managed by line ministries or other public entities may receive less scrutiny as ODA represents a small share of their budgets. Uneven scrutiny can create gaps in understanding the quality, results and impact of development co‑operation across government. The United Kingdom has renewed its cross‑government “ODA Board”5 at the ministerial level with the potential to strengthen ODA spending oversight and drive value for money (OECD, 2024[11]; ICAI, 2026[24]) (see Table 2.1. Overview of DAC Member’s formal cross‑government co‑ordination mechanisms).
Shared results frameworks strengthen accountability and learning
Setting shared goals for development co‑operation across all involved entities strengthens accountability if responsibility among actors is clear. By linking inputs to impacts, results frameworks enable governments to align policies with development goals, set priorities, track impact via shared indicators, and measure results consistently for better oversight of development co‑operation (OECD, 2024[20]). The SDG targets and indicators offer a common framework to co‑ordinate government efforts at country level, enabling synergies and collective impact (OECD, 2021[25]). Since line ministries serve other government objectives, clearly defining expected development results and assessing how individual actions interact with other policies helps maintain focus on each actor’s contribution (OECD, 2021[25]; OECD, 2020[13]). Switzerland has developed a comprehensive results system to measure the impact of its international co‑operation. The system uses standard indicators at corporate, country and project level across government units, which enables the aggregation of results and incentivises collaboration within and beyond government agencies (OECD, 2025[23]; OECD, 2021[26]). Finland’s results-based management system outlines theories of change within each priority area, based on aggregated indicators aligned with SDG targets that staff and partners can use as frameworks. While decreasing, Finnish government country programmes are a tool for more co‑ordinated and aligned economic, foreign, security and development policy implementation (OECD, 2024[22]; OECD, 2021[27]). In Korea, such efforts enable KOICA and KEXIM-EDCF to support development expertise beyond the MFA and address silos through shared performance management (OECD, 2024[2]).
Cross‑government evaluations6 can drive coherence and shared understanding of development impact by assessing how each actor contributed to shared objectives. The OECD Recommendation on public policy evaluation emphasises the need for cross‑government evaluation practices and leadership to ensure evaluations are carried out in a systematic manner and inform policy and budget decisions (OECD, 2025[28]). While foreign ministries or development agencies typically lead the evaluation of development co‑operation, they do not necessarily evaluate the work of other entities, particularly where development represents a small part of their mandate. Austria developed an inter-ministerial evaluation policy to ensure evaluations follow similar standards (OECD, 2020[29]). The Netherlands’ Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) assess development co‑operation, foreign policy, and trade. While the IOB sits within the MFA, it operates independently and follows national directives set by the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for national co‑ordination and quality control of policy evaluations (OECD, 2023[30]; OECD, 2026[4]). The United Kingdom – in line with the central government guidance on evaluation, the Magenta Book – is also fostering a common understanding through the FCDO development evaluation policy and 2026-2030 strategy, which mandates portfolio-level monitoring, evaluation and learning to drive coherence across countries and themes, shifting from demand-led to centrally-directed evaluations (FCDO, 2026[31]; FCDO, 2025[32]; Government of the United Kingdom, 2025[33]).
Joint evaluations7 can enhance efficiency, credibility and knowledge sharing, and reduce burden on governments partners (OECD, 2006[34]). Yet, ensuring that all development co‑operation is subject to quality assurance and peer learning depends on the available resources and capacity attributed to development evaluation. Since 2010, joint evaluations have declined, with only 3.3% conducted in 2021 (OECD, 2023[30]). In Switzerland, while SDC and SECO conducted parallel evaluations on private sector engagement and climate, due to different institutional needs, mandates and expectations, both agencies are developing a joint back-stopping mandate to improve evaluation quality and collaboration (OECD, 2025[23]). Germany’s Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) has conducted joint strategic evaluations of government engagement in partner countries, such as the bilateral and multilateral programmes funded by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ) in Iraq (DEval, 2022[35]). Some DAC members have also established independent evaluation bodies with mandates to assess whole‑of‑government development co‑operation (Box 4.2).
Independent evaluation entities support whole‑of‑government approaches by carrying out system-wide assessments that span multiple ministries and agencies, covering entire country ODA portfolios, policy frameworks and cross-cutting thematic areas. By operating independently, these bodies can support development policy coherence and identify synergies and co‑ordination gaps.
France’s Independent Commission for the Evaluation of ODA, conceived by law in 2021, operationalised in 2025 and attached to the MEAE, is composed of parliamentarians and independent experts. The commission assesses ODA strategies, programmes and projects across government and channels to determine their coherence and complementarity of development and sectorial interventions, as well as the effectiveness, financial performance, and alignment with France’s policy priorities and international objectives (MEAE, 2025[36]).
Germany’s DEval conducts independent evaluations of all its development co‑operation activities, assessing strategic coherence and implementation effectiveness across government. DEval was created in 2012, mandated by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and follows the 2023 evaluation policy for German development co‑operation (DEval, 2026[37]; BMZ, 2023[38]).
Norway’s Independent Evaluation Department (Eval) undertakes and commissions independent evaluations of all Norwegian development co‑operation and reports to both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment (Eval, n.d.[39]; Norec, 2024[40]). This evaluation function was transferred from Norad to the Norwegian Agency for Exchange Cooperation (Norec) in 2025.
Sweden's Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) evaluates Swedish development co‑operation policy and implementation across government actors, assessing policy coherence and cross‑government effectiveness. EBA is a government-appointed committee that operates independently from Sida and the MFA, consisting of ten experts and a secretariat (EBA, n.d.[41]).
United Kingdom's Independent Commission for Aid Impact assesses the coherence, value for money and impact of ODA across portfolios, departments and instruments and contributes to reporting to the Parliament. It covers FCDO, as well as other departments engaged in development, including Home Office, Health and Social Care, and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and cross‑government funds like the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and the Prosperity Fund (ICAI, n.d.[42]).
These independent entities are better suited to larger, well-resourced systems, and should complement decentralised evaluation units focusing on project-level evaluations within implementing entities, linked to the scope of their mandate.
Source: MEAE (2025[36]) Decree concerning the operating procedures of the Commission for the Evaluation of Official Development Assistance, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/download/pdf?id=qy2nc9E7NL6Bm2B3XexCdGQFtMjB-7UbD87RGI8K-Oo=; Deval (2026[37]) (2026[37]), Goals and Functions, https://www.deval.org/en/about-us/the-institute/goals-and-functions; BMZ (2023[38]), MZ Evaluation Policy for German Development Cooperation, https://www.bmz.de/en/news/publications/194630-194630; Eval (n.d.[39]), About the evaluation department, https://www.noreval.no/en/about-evaluation; Norec (2024[40]), These are the ones who will evaluate Norwegian development aid, https://www.norec.no/en/news/news/these-are-the-ones-who-will-evaluate-norwegian-aid/; EBA (n.d.[41]), About Us, https://eba.se/en/policy-for-quality-assurance/about-eba/; ICAI (n.d.[42]), About us, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/about-us/.
Using results information and evaluations to shape development policy and strategies requires balancing cross‑government accountability with learning. Results frameworks are commonly used for reporting rather than learning and management (OECD, 2014[43]). Political and accountability pressures can lead to focus on corporate‑level indicators, short‑term results, and loaded reporting systems with limited value for steering and learning (OECD, 2024[20]). Although several DAC members have strong monitoring and evaluation of results within the lead ministry or agency, cross‑government quality assurance and learning systems remain challenging where mandates, incentives and reporting requirements differ. To address these challenges, Germany uses thematic evaluations to inform programme adjustments (OECD, 2025[44]); Finland conducts evaluations of its results-based management system and uses results information to support strategic decisions (OECD, 2024[21]; OECD, 2021[27]); and Korea’s Committee for International Development Cooperation considers evaluations when setting strategies and annual plans (OECD, 2024[2]). Learning from results and evaluations remains inconsistent among DAC members (OECD, 2023[30]). DEval in Germany and Sida in Sweden promote learning through validation workshops or reference groups to discuss evaluation findings, thus involving internal and external stakeholders such as civil society (DEval, 2026[45]; OECD, 2023[46]). To be effective, accountability and learning systems need to be integrated into broader change management strategies that align methods with culture, incentives and structures (Yanguas, 2021[47]).
Culture, knowledge management and digital technologies enable collaboration
Organisational culture and incentives shape how effectively institutions co‑ordinate across government. The way an organisation operates and interacts with others influences the effectiveness of institutional arrangements and co‑ordination mechanisms (Gutterman, 2025[48]). Some DAC members have formal mechanisms for co‑ordination, including committees and working groups, while others have more informal, ad hoc exchanges (OECD, 2020[13]) (see Table 2.1). Organisational cultures and incentives vary among the ministries and agencies involved in development co‑operation, reflecting differences in mandates and degrees of autonomy, and how accountability and learning interact (Esser and Heiner, 2023[49]). Whole‑of‑government co‑ordination combines mandated co‑ordination – involving legal basis or hierarchical authority – with voluntary collaboration, which requires incentives for staff to co‑ordinate with other entities (Beuselinck, 2008[50]; Peters, 2018[51]). Staff may face conflicting incentives in fragmented and competitive environments, which can lead them to prioritise sectoral responsibilities over whole‑of‑government objectives (Cairney, 2025[52]). Incentives such as career progression, professional recognition and travel and networking opportunities can encourage collaboration across government. In Australia, senior executive attention to development outcomes is used as a lever to increase demand for development capability within DFAT and across engaged technical entities (OECD, 2026[16]). Challenges increase when several ministries and agencies are involved, often with different recruitment procedures, contract types, budgets and staffing constraints (OECD, 2020[53]).
Knowledge management policies and systems can facilitate better use of cross‑government expertise. Effective knowledge mobilisation can reinforce the use of data and evidence for development effectiveness, and a collaborative culture that encourages learning and reflection on improvements needed (OECD, 2020[13]). Norway's Knowledge Bank, house in Norad and jointly managed together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serves to pool expertise from over 30 public Norwegian institutions on a range of thematic and sectoral areas, including on fisheries, energy and taxation. The Knowledge Bank structure has helped Norway to foster synergies across different stakeholders, and streamline information sharing, helping therefore to guide the long-term goals for Norway’s technical co‑ordination initiatives (OECD, 2021[54]; OECD, 2020[13]; OECD, 2019[55]) (see Box 4.3.). Cross‑government training and guidance support collaboration, inter-institutional knowledge mobilisation and continuous learning. In Spain, the Secretary of State for International Cooperation leads knowledge management policy, while its development agency AECID and the Foundation for the Internationalisation of Public Administrations have developed knowledge management tools, guidance, working groups and trainings (OECD, 2025[18]).
Digital technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), can improve how knowledge and learning is shared, analysed and used across institutions. While several DAC members generate large volumes of monitoring, evaluation and reporting information, the challenge is not the lack of data and evidence but turning them into usable insights for learning and decision making. Practice shows that technology only delivers value when backed by clear strategies, staff capabilities, principled guidance, inter-operable data systems and an organisational culture that encourages collaboration, experimentation, peer learning and cross‑government knowledge sharing (Box 4.3). AI‑enabled tools can help by scanning large data and evidence repositories, synthesising findings and identifying gaps, but their uptake across DAC members remains limited at the organisational level. Without these enabling conditions, digital systems and AI tools risk reinforcing silos. Inter-operability,8 early involvement of all actors and time to learn and adapt are therefore essential for digital and AI solutions to be effectively incorporated into whole‑of‑government approaches (OECD, forthcoming[56]).
Fragmented digital systems and AI are often cited by members as practical barriers to whole‑of‑government approaches. Finding innovative ways to leverage emerging technologies across the government can maximise knowledge and learning, especially when resources are limited.
Finland – OpenEval: Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs developed OpenEval, an AI‑assisted platform that helps analyse and reuse evaluation findings across government and with external stakeholders. The initiative is embedded in broader complementary efforts, including staff training, AI use guidance, a dedicated task force and continuous feedback, supported by a whole‑of‑government push on digitalisation and AI (OECD, 2025[57]).
Norway – Digital results and statistics systems: Norway’s development agency Norad has developed a digital portal – Bistandsresultater.no – that brings together in a single place development assistance statistics and results information from the agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Climate and Environment, and other official entities. Initially focused on transparency and accountability, the system is evolving into a tool for learning and steering. This work has been supported by investment in strengthening the quality of results information across different Norwegian ODA investments and partnerships, supported by shared guidance, reporting templates and efforts to improve data quality and reuse (OECD, 2021[58]).
Switzerland – Working Aid on AI: Switzerland’s Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) adopted a Working Aid on AI framework to set out principles and actions for responsible AI use in its processes and operations, ensuring alignment with the Swiss Federal Administration’s Strategy for the Use of AI Systems and international standards. SDC participates in whole‑of‑government digital working group, which brings together several line ministries, connecting development and humanitarian perspectives with broader national and global AI initiatives. The Working Aid on AI promotes shared standards, responsible AI use, knowledge exchange, learning and coherence, even with limited resources. It also enables Swiss Representations to embrace and operationalise AI in the same coherent direction (OECD, 2026[59]).
United Kingdom – Results and Evidence eXchange: The FCDO created the Results and Evidence eXchange to improve data inter-operability across departments. It provides a common language for results data, enabling evidence from different programmes to be combined, compared and reused more easily, supporting cross‑government learning and decision making (FCDO, 2026[31]). The 2026-30 Evaluation Strategy encourages using technology, including AI, to gather insights from evidence and spot gaps, with plans in place to strengthen staff skills and guidance for effective use.
Source: OECD (2025[57]), Using AI to make the most of evaluation evidence in Finland, https://oe.cd/6Gx; OECD (2021[60]), Norway’s strategic process to capitalise on the potential of new technology, https://oe.cd/6Gw; OECD (2021[58]), Going digital: The “Norwegian development aid – Statistics and results” portal, https://oe.cd/5OB; OECD (2021[54]), Scaling up government‑to‑government knowledge co‑operation, https://oe.cd/6Gy; OECD (2026[59]), Switzerland’s responsible use of AI in international co‑operation, https://oe.cd/6DT; OECD (2021[61]), REX: the Results and Evidence eXchange, https://oe.cd/5O0, FCDO (2026[31]), Policy paper: FCDO evaluation strategy 2026 to 2030, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-evaluation-strategy-2026-to-2030.
Capturing and sharing tacit knowledge can strengthen whole‑of‑government approaches. AI-powered knowledge management can process explicit, documented knowledge but cannot capture tacit or implicit knowledge from experience or impressions from staff (OECD, forthcoming[56]). Line ministries and agencies can benefit from development co‑operation experience working internationally and engaging with partner countries. Several “small” DAC members, such as Central and Eastern European countries, operate in basic information sharing across government, with limited steering and feedback loops among entities involved (OECD, 2026[62]). Informal exchanges and staff mobility can help transfer tacit knowledge, strengthen trust and collaboration, and build the capabilities needed for effective cross‑government engagement in development co‑operation.
Cross‑government strategic communication9 can align actors around a shared, coherent narrative, yet it often faces structural and resources constraints. When embedded in policy design and implementation, and rooted in shared lexicon and narrative, communication can reduce conflicting or duplicative messages across policy areas such as ODA, trade and climate commitments (OECD, 2021[63]; OECD, 2026[64]). Timely and transparent communication on development co‑operation strengthens trust and legitimacy by making cross‑government results more visible and credible (OECD, 2020[65]; OECD, 2025[66]). Yet, DAC Peer Reviews show that communication is still often treated as an administrative function rather than a strategic policy tool, and siloed communications, bureaucracy, complex governance – including at country level – and limited leadership buy-in remain major challenges (OECD, 2025[66]; OECD, 2014[67]). These challenges are compounded by shrinking ODA budgets for development awareness, which fell from 0.32 % in 2018 to 0.18% of bilateral ODA in 2024 (OECD, 2025[5]). Whole‑of‑government communications policies, strategies, co‑ordination mechanisms and tools can help governments align messages, pool resources and speak with one voice. Germany’s 2026 reform paper, Shaping the future together globally, highlights the importance of strategic communications and a coherent narrative (BMZ, 2026[68]). Canada has adopted a federal identity guideline for international co‑operation assistance, bringing cross‑government actors together under the shared brand “In partnership with Canada” (Government of Canada, 2025[69]; OECD, 2021[63]).10
Targeted communications about the purpose and results of development co‑operation helps build domestic support and trust with citizens and partners. Governments are accountable for public spending and need to show results (Colley, 2026[70]; OECD DevCom, 2024[71]). Alongside falling ODA budgets, development co‑operation faces growing criticism and political pushback, making critical to communicate around the value and effectiveness of ODA investments. Some DAC members use formal channels to report to parliament, such as the Australia's Performance and Delivery Framework annual reporting, Finland’s Development Policy Committee, and United Kingdom’s International Development Committee (OECD, 2026[16]; OECD, 2023[3]). Although citizens continue to favour development co‑operation, support has declined in recent years (OECD, 2025[66]). Since 2020, the share of people who think ODA budgets should be maintained or increased has dropped by 10 to 20% in France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Oh, 2026[72]). Understanding taxpayers’ opinion can help governments tailor communication and sustain support. German’s Opinion Monitor for Development Policy tracks citizens’ attitudes, knowledge and commitment to development and cross-cutting policies such as security, and the country’s global action towards the SDGs (DEval, 2026[73]). For stakeholders and partner countries, strategic communications can protect DAC members’ reputations and mobilise additional private funding by tackling mis- and dis-information (OECD, 2025[66]). Clear points of contact and integrated country strategies that cover whole‑of‑government activities – ODA and beyond – make engagement easier and improve accountability. Team Italy system-wide missions, involving public and private Italian actors, have strengthened visibility and credibility with partner countries (OECD, 2026[74]; OECD, 2026[17]).
Communication tools and channels can help increase transparency, but broader education efforts are necessary to ensure sustain public support. In line with the principles of OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data, digital platforms can support cross‑government communication by making system-wide ODA information accessible. Examples include, Finland’s OpenAid, Sweden’s Openaid and the United Kingdom’s Development Tracker websites, which provide detailed evidence and data visualisations (OECD, 2026[64]). Social media is also widely used across DAC members to raise awareness on the value and impact of development co‑operation, share human and data-driven success stories, engage targeted audiences, promote global citizenship education and combat mis and disinformation (see Box 4.4. ). Colombia’s 2024-2026 strategic communications plan uses co‑ordinated messaging, targeted events, results awards, public campaigns and media partnerships, such as the From Colombia to the World, showcasing government-wide development co‑operation efforts (El Espectador, n.d.[75]; OECD, 2026[76]). Other tools, such as Norway’s use of data and sentiment analysis, can help strengthen shared narratives and understanding of partner perceptions (OECD, forthcoming[56]). Beyond information-sharing, communication also plays an important educational role in raising awareness and building sustain support for development co‑operation (OECD, 2026[64]).11 Ireland’s Development Education approach adopts a cross‑government and partnership-based model, bringing together government, educators, civil society and communities to embed global education across formal and non-formal education (OECD, 2020[77]). Italy’s Inter-ministerial Committee for Development Co‑operation adopted a National Strategy for Global Citizenship Education, followed up by an action plan aligned with the Ministry of Education’s national curriculum, and funding for communication and awareness-raising initiatives (OECD, 2026[17]).
Belgium combines strong co‑ordination, targeted outreach and continuous learning to raise awareness and deliver global citizenship education (GCE).
Strategic co‑ordination: The Directorate-General for Development Co‑operation and Humanitarian Aid leads GCE programme and Enabel co‑ordinates with partners. The GCE programme mobilises other public authorities across the education system at all levels, as well as in cross-cutting topics such as youth, culture and environment, with the regular involvement of civil society and the private sector (DGD, 2024[78]).
Clear target audiences: GCE engages key audiences, including media, educators, policy makers and youth. The Be Global program, led by Enabel, encourages young people to engage in sustainable development.
Evidence-based and innovative: Regular evaluations inform improvements, while partners test digital tools, audiovisual content and new learning approaches. The Be Global program launched a podcast featuring the Foreign Affairs Minister and young advocates to talk about international co‑operation and youth engagement.
Strong public support and communication: With 44% of the public stating that ODA should be increased, against 50% in 2024 (CNCD, 2025[79]), communication focuses on transparency and sharing results through joint actions and “storytelling” by public and non-state actors.
Alongside these strengths, some challenges persist. Communication stays centralised and focuses mainly on success stories, with limited attention to risks and complexity of development efforts. Co‑ordination between Federal communication and GCE services is also limited, constraining efforts to co‑ordinate and communicate a more balanced narrative.
Source: Based on OECD (2020[80]), OECD DAC Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews Belgium, https://doi.org/10.1787/026f1aad-en; DGD (2024[78]), Strategy Note: Global Citizenship Education, https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/2024-10/Strategy-Note-Global-Citizenship-Education.pdf; CNCD (2025[79]), Sondage: Baromètre 2025 de la solidarité internationale, https://www.cncd.be/-barometre-de-la-solidarite-internationale-?lang=fr; Enabel (2025[81]), BeGlobal: Enabel's programme for youth and global citizenship, https://beglobal.enabel.be/?lang=en.
Integrated mechanisms for the collection, reporting and dissemination of development co‑operation statistical data can significantly strengthen accountability, transparency and policy coherence. DAC Statistical Peer Reviews12 show the importance of designating a single lead entity for data collection and co‑ordination, to support consistency, completeness and a shared understanding of development finance data, thereby maximising opportunities for sound downstream policy making. A central reporting institution, with an official, comprehensive and detailed mandate13 that allows it to serve as a one-stop-shop for information on development co‑operation goes a long way in supporting domestic and global accountability and transparency across the government. Beyond an adequate institutional set-up, rigorous processes and modern IT systems are also central to support policy making with appropriate data. Austria’s rigorous quality assurance processes, combining automation and manual checks, have resulted in high-quality reporting (OECD, 2023[82]). Limited resources for statistical systems and functions, uneven technical knowledge of DAC standards across national institutions and staff capacity constraints, combined with multiple domestic and international data requests, remain common challenges. More integrated approaches can help improve data quality, support whole‑of‑government reporting and reinforce shared accountability across institutions.
Co‑ordination requires dedicated resources and capacity. Adequate resources and capacity enable lead ministries to steer cross‑government efforts, safeguard development expertise and avoid fragmentation, duplication and excessive transaction costs.
Mobilising sectoral expertise requires active co‑ordination, capacity building and incentives. Harnessing expertise across government does not happen without deliberate efforts. Systematic mapping of capacities, shared budgets, coupled with staff mobility, targeted training to build international and development expertise, as well as appropriate incentives for collaboration are needed to mobilise expertise efficiently and align national and international action.
Shared results frameworks help align actors around common objectives for long-term impact. Common and simplified results frameworks help governments align whole‑of‑government development efforts around shared objectives and clarify responsibilities. To remain useful, results systems should balance accountability and learning, avoiding excessive reporting requirements and narrow focus on short-term results.
Whole‑of‑government evaluations can strengthen coherence and support joint assessments to inform policy decisions. System-wide and joint evaluations help track collective progress, identify synergies and gaps, and improve understanding of the impact of development co‑operation. Cross‑government evaluation standards and structures with independent oversight can strengthen quality and consistency of evidence to inform decision making. However, cross‑government evaluation efforts are resource-intensive and time-consuming, which can limit their uptake and use.
Translating results and evidence into learning remains challenging and needs a supportive learning culture and effective knowledge management. Better balancing accountability requirements with learning across government requires leadership, effective knowledge management and systems integration into broader organisational cultures and change‑management strategies. Digital technologies (including AI) support effective and timely knowledge mobilisation and use.
Leveraging communication, education and data can strengthen sustained public support and transparency. Strategic communication and education on development co‑operation purpose and results help build shared understanding, coherence and trust with citizens and partners. Quality ODA reporting can enhance accountability, transparency and facilitate dissemination of whole‑of‑government development efforts.
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← 1. In this chapter, “capacity” refers to both human resources and the skills or knowledge needed to carry out a task.
← 2. Systems mapping can also help development co‑operation providers understand how actors interact within their own system and their partnerships with other development actors, although the latter is beyond the scope of this study. For more information on strategic foresight and systems mapping see: https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2023)2/en/pdf.
← 3. Development standards and principles involve legal instruments and principles. Some OECD Recommendations specifically underscore the importance of cross‑government efforts to put them into practice, such as the recommendation on policy coherence for sustainable development; cross‑government efforts to fight corrupt practices; and joined-up humanitarian, development and peace actions.
← 4. As of 2025, the United Kingdom’s tax administration has deployed experts to over 12 Tax Inspectors Without Borders programmes.
← 5. The ODA Board was established in 2022 to monitor ODA spending target. In 2024, its mandate was revised to take a more strategic role of oversight over ODA spending and delivery across government, with the aim of strengthening coherence and impact.
← 6. The OECD Council Recommendation on Public Policy Evaluation recommends Members and non-Members to institutionalise public policy evaluation from a whole‑of‑government perspective by conducting and using evaluations across government, and fostering a culture of learning and accountability within and beyond the executive. Find the Recommendation here: OECD Legal Instruments.
← 7. Joint evaluations involve two or more institutions or partners. There are various degrees of “jointness”, depending on the extent to which individual partners are involved in designing the evaluation, co-operate in the evaluation process, merge their evaluation resources and combine their evaluation reporting. Joint evaluations can help overcome attribution problems in assessing the effectiveness of programmes and strategies. They can also be useful for evaluating coherence, the complementarity of efforts supported by different partners and the quality of co‑ordination. More definitions of key evaluation terms are available here: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results‑Based Management for Sustainable Development (Second Edition).
← 8. Inter-operability of data systems is among the actions stated in the Sevilla Commitment and the Framework of Action on Data for Sustainable Development.
← 9. Elements of strategic communication include, strategies and planning, data and insights, evaluation, campaigns, internal communication. See OECD Report on Public Communication.
← 10. Branding can also undermine local ownership of the development process and risk conveying misleading policy messages. This is a key point of attention, underscoring the need to acknowledge partnerships appropriately. Further insights on good branding practices are available here: Branding Development Co‑operation: Time for a Re-Design? – The SDG Communicator.
← 11. Global citizenship education enables governments to raise public awareness of the links between domestic policies and developing countries, and to build support for development co‑operation and action across society. For more information about Global education, raising awareness and public support see: Global education, raising awareness and public support.
← 12. OECD DAC Statistical Peer Reviews are available here: https://oe.cd/6Ad.qr.
← 13. The mandate should notably include data collection, processing, reporting, dissemination, and whole‑of‑government co‑ordination on development finance data. At country level, DAC members typically assign this role of central reporting institution to the Development Co‑operation Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Finance.