Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co‑operation

2. Steering and co‑ordinating development co‑operation across government

Abstract

This chapter examines how governments strengthen whole‑of‑government co‑ordination for development co‑operation through political leadership, strategic direction and co‑ordination mechanisms. It finds that effective co‑ordination relies on clear mandates, empowered lead institutions and sustained engagement across government. A mapping of DAC members’ co‑ordination mechanisms shows that effectiveness depends on how mechanisms interact, influence decision-making and support policy coherence. It also shows how crises can reveal and reinforce the value of adaptable and well-connected co‑ordination systems.

Political leadership and strategic frameworks as conditions for co‑ordination

Governments sustain co‑ordination when political commitment is anchored in legal and strategic frameworks

Sustained whole‑of‑government co‑ordination in development co‑operation depends on committed leadership and consistent political support. Leadership helps establish a shared vision, mobilise actors across government supporting buy-in, and provide the authority needed to manage competing priorities, resolve inter-institutional tensions and maintain collective accountability (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007[1]; Aoki, Tay and Rawat, 2023[2]; OECD, 2024[3]).

Legal frameworks and high-level political commitment to whole‑of‑government approaches to development facilitate sustained collaboration across government. Experience across DAC members suggests that legal frameworks can reinforce whole‑of‑government approaches by formalising shared commitments, clarifying responsibilities and strengthening incentives for cross‑government collaboration. For example, Austria’s Federal Act on Development Cooperation commits the federal government as a whole to a set of principles for development co‑operation1 (OECD, 2020[4]). Italy’s Law 125/2014 integrates development co‑operation in foreign policy, defines the development co‑operation architecture, and commits to a whole‑of‑government approach (OECD, 2026[5]; Italian Republic, 2014[6]). Korea also shows how a strong legal framework can support whole‑of‑government co‑ordination (see Box 2.1). For other DAC members without explicit mention of whole‑of‑government approach in their laws, responsibility is still highlighted in strategy and policy documents, and often lies with the lead ministry responsible for development co‑operation. The Netherlands for example, demonstrates through their policies a strong commitment to coherence between the political, development and economic dimensions of its foreign policy (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020[7]). Beyond facilitating buy-in for whole‑of‑government approaches, such frameworks can also help maintain continuity over time. Frequent shifts in political priorities can lead to “priority addition”, where new objectives accumulate without replacing existing ones, weakening cross‑government co‑ordination (Daley, Williams and Matthews, 2020[8]; OECD, 2024[3]). Strategic frameworks that enable governments to fulfil commitments while retaining the flexibility to revise priorities are better suited to maintaining continuity2 (OECD, 2024[3]).

Box 2.1. Korea’s legal framework for development co‑operation has evolved overtime, strengthening support for a whole‑of‑government approach

The Framework Act on International Development Cooperation (enacted in 2010) serves as the normative and legal foundation for Korea’s whole‑of‑government approach. It was the first integrated legal basis established to overcome policy fragmentation following Korea’s accession to the OECD DAC. The Act mandates that the government strengthen linkages between bilateral and multilateral co‑operation, and between grants and loans, ensuring consistent policy implementation.

The Framework Act has evolved through critical amendments to align with global standards over multiple rounds of partial amendments over the years 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2018, prior to the 2020 general amendment. The 2018 amendment incorporated the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a legal objective and expanded the scope of values to be centred around human rights, participatory approach and sustainable development.

The 2020 general amendment was a turning point, strengthening the authority of the Committee for International Development Cooperation to adjust and deliberate on policies, establishing the Committee on Grants Strategy as a statutory body, and mandating that evaluation results be reflected in future planning. The amendment establishes grounds for an integrated approach to loans and grants, and evaluation feedback loops became compulsory, which strengthened alignment and consistency throughout the entire process. Most recently, the 2025 revision expanded the scope of inclusiveness and institutionalised the “International Development Cooperation Day” (25 November) to enhance public engagement.

Note: For further information on Korea’s approach to whole‑of‑government co‑ordination, see Korea’s country note

Source: OECD (2026[9]), Whole‑of‑government Co‑ordination in Development Co‑operation Country Notes: Korea.

High-level leadership and clear mandates support effective co‑ordination

The involvement of heads of government can strengthen co‑ordination and political backing in development co‑operation, but it requires careful management of added complexity. Such arrangements can raise visibility, encourage cross‑government buy‑in, and can improve coherence, yet they also bring higher transaction costs and closer scrutiny of decisions and policy trade‑offs (Carey and Crammond, 2015[10]). In Korea, the Office for International Development Cooperation of the Government Policy Coordination, hosted in the Prime Minister’s Office, plays a central role as the secretariat of the Committee for International Development Cooperation, facilitating co‑ordination between the two lead ministries (Foreign Affairs, and Economy and Finance) and ensuring alignment of the 34 other agencies3 with national priorities. The Office for International Development Cooperation acts as the arbiter when tensions or trade-offs arise between actors (OECD, 2026[9]). In Italy, the Prime Minister’s Office growing role in shaping development co‑operation in Africa has increased political attention and support but also increased the institutional complexity of the Italian system4 (OECD, 2026[5]). Similarly, in France the OECD DAC Peer Review also highlights the challenges in managing and sequencing priorities when multiple hierarchical co‑ordination bodies5 are involved in ODA decision making (OECD, 2024[11]).

An empowered lead ministry and well-defined roles enable effective whole‑of‑government co‑ordination efforts. Evidence suggests that when political commitment is reinforced by clear mandates and recognised co‑ordinating authorities, governments are better positioned to sustain collaboration across institutions and over time, particularly in complex policy environments where responsibilities are shared across multiple actors (Cejudo and Michel, 2015[12]; Cázarez-Grageda, 2019[13]). An empowered lead ministry brings actors together, ensures coherence and supports a more co‑ordinated approach to development co‑operation (OECD, 2024[3]). This is illustrated by Australia, where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has an explicit mandate to lead the whole‑of‑government approach to international development (OECD, 2026[14]). Clearly defined mandates and roles complement strategic steering of a lead ministry by supporting decision making and cross-collaboration (OECD, 2024[3]). Spain provides a relevant example, where reforms under Law 1/2023 clarify institutional roles: the State Secretary for International Co‑operation provides a political vision while the Spanish Agency for International Development Co‑operation (AECID) leads on implementation. AECID and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Co‑operation have a clear division of labour over multilateral partnerships for core and non-core development contributions (OECD, 2025[15]).

Inclusive policy processes strengthen ownership across government

Highlighting cross‑government roles in development policy builds buy-in. Bringing together various government departments for the purpose of elaborating a development policy, under sustained leadership of a lead ministry can help stimulate buy-in. For example, in its “A Better World” development strategy, adopted by the government as a whole and endorsed by the Prime Minister, Ireland clearly highlights how different government departments collaborate closely to achieve unified goals of Irish Aid6. Similarly, Italy’s Three-Year Programming and Policy Planning Document – Italy’s central multi-year strategic planning instrument – explicitly reflects contributions from various Italian line ministries and agencies, incentivising all departments in being accountable for Italy’s international co‑operation (OECD, 2026[16]).

Inclusive and well‑governed policy making processes are central to securing cross‑government commitment to development co‑operation. Participatory, inclusive processes bring other government departments closer to development co‑operation and ensure they have a stake. The process of formulating development co‑operation strategies and policies also reflects the level of ownership across government. Italy’s Mattei Plan, for instance, while going beyond development co‑operation, has seen the involvement of the whole‑of‑government in its development, pioneered by the strong leadership of the Prime Minister’s Office. The inclusive process, combined with the high-level political attention, has brought increased interest and commitment to Italy’s foreign assistance programme from across the government, as well as from public and private entities (OECD, 2026[5]). Global strategies such as the climate action strategy developed by the Danish government7 (The Danish Government, 2020[17]) or the global health strategy of the Netherlands (The Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2022[18]) are further examples of approaches that foster coherence and common understanding between sectoral line ministries and ministries of foreign affairs over sustainable development issues.

Co‑ordination mechanisms: translating strategic priorities into collective action

Cross‑government co‑ordination mechanisms shape how development priorities are arbitrated and sustained across ministries

Governments operationalise cross‑government co‑ordination through a range of formal mechanisms and structures. There is no one-size-fits-all mechanism for effective co‑ordination, as development co‑operation systems and government administrations reflect a variety of legal, political and cultural contexts (OECD, 2020[19]).

Five categories of formal co‑ordination mechanisms for development co‑operation emerge across DAC members. These categories are not mutually exclusive: a single country may combine several types of mechanisms, with different bodies performing complementary functions across the policy cycle. Table 2.1. summarises how DAC countries organise these headquarter-based mechanisms along five broad functions, highlighting their purposes, examples, strengths and weaknesses.

The five categories that emerge are:

1. Strategic‑level bodies, which exist in almost all systems, but their influence on development processes can vary depending on how development co‑operation is represented and valued alongside other policy areas.

2. High‑level development‑specific bodies, which have the potential to carry substantial steering and decision-making power; they are most influential when supported by an active secretariat, linked to the budget cycle and incentivise participation of a wide range of actors.

3. Operational co‑ordination bodies, which can become the spaces where strategic and technical alignment are matched, but many lack formal authority to do so.

4. Information‑sharing groups, which are widespread and play a softer role offering visibility and opportunities for consultations but have limited steering power without complementary decision‑making platforms.

5. Project‑level screening bodies, which can prevent duplication of efforts and redundancies, and ensure technical quality and alignment, but risk being procedurally overloaded and with reduced ability to influence strategic choices.

Table 2.1. Overview of DAC Member’s formal cross‑government co‑ordination mechanisms

	Function and roles	DAC examples	Pitfalls and opportunities
Whole‑of‑ government strategic direction (Top-level political and strategic deliberation across all national priorities, including but not limited to development)	Sets broad national priorities, placing development alongside security, foreign policy, and economic strategy. Ensures development is aligned with national strategic objectives. High-level political decision-making with Prime Minister/Chancellery leadership. Cross-ministry participation beyond development-specific portfolios.	Australia: Council of ministers (various across the DAC). Canada: Deputy Minister Committees, chaired by the Clerk of the Privy Council and their members, to discuss the implementation of the government’s policy agenda and priorities. Germany: National Security Council, led by the Federal Chancellery, the council is based on an integrated security concept that encompasses foreign policy, security, development and economic issues. Netherlands: Ministerial sub-councils on Defence, International, National Economic Security, prepares cabinet decisions on defence and economic security, including non-European foreign policy, migration and security and development policy linkages. United Kingdom: National Security Council sits as an inter-departmental body convening a group of ministers, including the Secretary of State for Development, to discuss the government's security objectives and their delivery.	▼ Development may be deprioritised relative to more politically salient policy sectors (defence, security, economy). ● Make development’s contribution to national security and economic resilience more evidence-based and visible. Ensure development representation is formalised.
Development-specific strategy and policy coherence (High-level development co‑ordination bodies shaping development strategy, ODA priorities, coherence, and cross‑government alignment)	Plays substantive role in setting development co‑operation strategy. Ensures alignment across ministries with ODA portfolios. Sometimes arbitrates cross-sector conflicts (trade vs. development, climate vs. economic). Often chaired by Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs. Strategically brings together all ministries and bodies directly concerned with development assistance.	France: Presidential Council for Development, chaired by the president, is responsible for making strategic decisions about development policy. Inter-ministerial Committee for International Co‑operation and Development, chaired by the Prime Minister, jointly managed by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, assembles the Ministries directly concerned by development assistance. Sets out the general framework for France’s development co‑operation activities and determines how the various stakeholders and modes of intervention are to be co‑ordinated. Italy: Inter-ministerial Committee for Development Co‑operation, chaired by the Prime Minister, brings together all line ministries, sets the strategic direction of development co‑operation policies, ensures cross‑government co‑ordination on programming by clearing the development strategy, and is mandated to arbitrate potential conflicts between sectoral policies and development co‑operation goals. Japan: Economic Co‑operation Infrastructure Strategy Council, chaired by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, high-level policy co‑ordination bringing together major ministries. This council serves as an inter-ministerial co‑ordination body for economic co‑operation and infrastructure policies, institutionalising policy dialogue that links ODA with private investment initiatives. Korea: Committee for International Development Co‑operation, chaired by the Prime Minister, sets the comprehensive strategy for international development co‑operation every five years, approves the Annual Comprehensive Implementation Plan, Country Partnership Strategies, and other major ODA policies. It ensures that the budgets of all ministries align with the national ODA strategy.	▼ Strategic mandates not translated into continuous governance or operational enforcement. Infrequent meetings. Limited coherence arbitration in practice, despite formal mandate. ● Strengthen secretariat follow-through Institutionalise ex-ante PCSD screening review for high-risk sectors (e.g. climate, migration). Link strategy approval cycles to annual budget cycles.
Operational ODA co‑ordination and cross-sector alignment (Senior-official level bodies co‑ordinating ODA portfolios, plans, budgets and cross-ministry programmes)	Reviews ministries’ ODA priorities and monitors progress. Co‑ordinates planning cycles and budget discussions across ODA-spending departments. Provides portfolio-level oversight, not full strategy-setting. Ensures cross‑government consistency in programming. Involves senior officials’ participation.	Germany: State Secretaries’ Committee on Sustainable Development, oversees implementation of the German Sustainable Development Strategy, and ODA is explicitly included among the policies to be co‑ordinated; brings together various departments aiming at informing and co‑ordinating international co‑operation policy. Greece: Inter-ministerial Committee for Co‑ordination of International Development Policy, brings together different ministries and is intended to provide overall strategic direction and co‑ordination of Greek ODA and development policy. Hungary: Inter-Ministerial Committee for International Development Co‑operation, responsible for co‑ordinating the development activities of the different line ministries who are entitled to perform their own development projects within their spheres of competence and budgetary capacities. Ireland: Inter-Departmental Committee on Development Co‑operation covers the Irish ODA budget and not only the ODA through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade meeting to discuss each department’s priorities, monitor progress towards delivery of the development strategy and share experiences. Luxembourg: Interministerial Committee for Development Co‑operation provides opinions on the broad outlines of development co‑operation policy, policy coherence for development, and issues affecting developing countries. Routine updates on the flagship activities of the Luxembourg Development Co‑operation and special emphasis on policy coherence. New Zealand: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade along with the Auditor-Generals’ Office regularly convene senior officials from relevant New Zealand Government agencies to co-ordinate delivery of governance-related development assistance in the Pacific. Portugal: Inter-ministerial Commission for Co‑operation, chaired by the MFA, steers policy, ensures whole‑of‑government alignment, and oversees activities involving 57 public entities with ODA budgets. Spain: Inter-ministerial Commission on Sustainable Development Co‑operation and Global Solidarity, chaired by the Secretary of State for International Cooperation, and high-level officials from each ministry as members. Its main roles include co‑ordinating ministerial participation in development co‑operation activities; ensuring alignment between development co‑operation policy and other strategic policy areas across government; and integrating the sustainable development perspective into government-wide policymaking. Switzerland: Interdepartmental Committee for International Development and Co‑operation, hosted and led by the Swiss Agency for Development Co‑operation (SDC), State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and the Peace and Human Rights Division brings together various departments aiming at informing and co‑ordinating international co‑operation policy. United Kingdom: Cross‑government ODA Delivery and Impact Board, co-chaired by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and Treasury, brings together junior ministers from ODA-spending departments to review and adjust government spending, with a mandate to drive strategic coherence and value for money.	▼ Often no formal authority to enforce alignment. Co‑ordination relies on voluntary co‑operation by ministries. Risk of duplication with strategic bodies if mandates unclear. ● Strengthen mandate to approve or pre-screen ministry plans. Introduce joint-programming requirements across ODA-spending ministries. Use digital ODA planning platforms to track portfolios and improve visibility.
Information exchange and visibility and procedural coherence (Bodies focused on transparency, cross-ministry visibility, PCSD monitoring, and procedural co‑ordination)	Exchanges information across ministries. Consolidates inputs into national plans or reports. Provides system-wide visibility of development activities. Performs soft coherence functions (PCSD monitoring, but not arbitration). Technical or working-level participation.	Austria: Inter-ministerial working group on the three-year programme aims to monitor the implementation of the three-year plan in respect to PCSD, as well as ensure coherence between development objectives and objectives from other policy areas. Co-chaired by the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs and the Federal Ministry of Finance. Other Ministries can take a co-chair space depending on the topic. Poland: Development Co‑operation Policy Council, chaired by the MFA, has a role of consultation and information-sharing across ministries and involves an expanding set of delivery and finance actors. Primarily a forum for exchange rather than joint decision-making. Slovak Republic: Co‑ordination Committee for Development Co‑operation aggregates inputs, consolidates plans and ensures system-wide visibility of development activities across institutions; feeds inputs into medium-term strategies and annual plans, primarily to consolidate information rather than to prioritise across portfolios. Slovenia: Permanent Co‑ordination Group for International Development Co‑operation and Humanitarian Assistance shares information and promotes visibility of activities across ministries; supports consultation but plays a limited role in steering choices. Linked to the medium-term programme, but with uneven application across ministries in practice.	▼ Limited impact on actual planning or allocation. No formal authority to require alignment or coherence. May function episodically. ● Building a common understanding of what development co‑operation entails. Bottom-up iterative process supports clearer understanding of roles and responsibilities. Develop areas of practical joint working across government in specific geographies or sectors.
Project-level screening and approval (Technical bodies ensuring alignment, avoiding duplication, and approving major initiatives)	Screens proposals before inclusion in annual plans. Prevents duplication across ministries or agencies. Conducts technical quality assurance. Approves major bilateral, multilateral or concessional loan projects. Aligns loans and grants with national ODA strategy.	Czechia: Council for Development Co‑operation discusses and approaches development strategies; information exchange, consultation and co-shaping of policy orientations. Consulted on the Development Co‑operation Strategy and related methodologies, supporting co‑ordination of planning processes rather than portfolio-level allocation choices. Italy: Joint Committee, functions as the main operational approval body, authorising all multilateral initiatives, bilateral initiatives above Euro 2 million, and all concessional loans. Korea: Inter-Agency Grants Committee, (Chair: Second Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs): reviews and co‑ordinates grant projects; prevents duplication among over 30 implementing agencies. Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) Fund Management Council, (Chair: Minister of Finance and Economy, MOFE): deliberates on the overall policy direction and operational principles of Korea’s concessional loans, in line with national ODA strategies. Project identification, implementation and evaluation are delegated to Exim Bank of Korea. Cross-Ministry Project Deliberation Committee, (Chair: Director General of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, MOFE): deliberates on requests from ministries and agencies for linking grant and concessional-loans during project identification and selection, supports collaboration across government and between public and private actors.	▼ Fragmentation across multiple committees risks inefficiency. Heavy procedural load slows implementation. Late-stage screening reduces ability to shape upstream prioritisation. ● Introduce unified, digital project pipelines. Develop early-stage prioritisation filters. Consolidate grant and loan vetting functions.

Note: Does not include informal bodies, nor bodies that include non-state actors.

Source: Author’s elaboration of extensive literature review of policy documents and secondary sources. See reference list.

The effectiveness of co‑ordination mechanisms depends on decision-making influence, incentives and connectivity

The mapping in Table 2.1 points to some recurring patterns in how governments organise and sustain cross‑government co‑ordination for development policy.

The value of cross‑government co‑ordination mechanisms lies in their ability to shape policy decisions across government. Across countries, no single co‑ordination model emerges as consistently more effective than others. Inter-ministerial co‑ordination mechanisms add the greatest value when they shape priorities, negotiating positions and policy trade-offs before decisions are finalised. Arrangements that operate primarily as information-sharing platforms after positions have been established have more limited scope to strengthen policy coherence or align government action behind development objectives.

Regular information exchange across government enables co‑ordination mechanisms to align actors around a coherent vision. Despite differences in institutional design, cross‑government mechanisms pursue a common objective of fostering greater coherence and consistency across government action. Communication channels support this objective by creating vertical and horizontal feedback loops, connecting implementation experience to decision making, and building awareness of development priorities across ministries and public entities (See Chapter 4). Cross‑government communication channels therefore need to be established at the right level and used at the right time to make engagement and collaboration a strategic priority (OECD, 2025[20]; OECD, 2014[21]).

Sustained engagement across government requires incentives that extend beyond formal participation. Cross‑government bodies typically bring together actors whose primary mandates lie outside development co‑operation. Clear mandates, political backing and accountability arrangements help ensure that ministries and agencies consider the wider impacts of their policies and engage in co‑ordination as a strategic exercise rather than a procedural requirement.

Formal inter-ministerial mechanisms represent only one part of cross‑government co‑ordination. Governments frequently complement these arrangements with working-level, issue-specific and ad hoc structures that address cross-cutting policy challenges. Often focused on specific cross-cutting themes, such arrangements have been found to be particularly helpful in aligning and integrating policies. In New Zealand, for example, inter-departmental working groups formed to address specific policy coherence issues have proven effective in identifying potential adjustments (OECD, 2023[22]). Tasks forces promote horizontal collaboration and can significantly advance multiple issue areas, yet they are often limited in their decision-making power. For these to be successful, they need to be supported by vertical accountability lines that support the delivery of joint results (Laws, 2022[23]).

Greater alignment between development policy co‑ordination and broader PCSD arrangements offers an important opportunity to strengthen coherence across government. While these mechanisms are often established separately, both seek to manage policy trade-offs, reconcile domestic and international objectives and ultimately support implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Luxembourg's experience suggests that stronger institutional linkages between PCSD and development co‑operation co‑ordination bodies can help bridge policy communities, improve consideration of transboundary impacts and promote a more integrated approach to policy coherence (Box 2.3).

Box 2.2. Strengthening cross‑government co‑ordination: Luxembourg’s experience linking PCSD and Development Policy

Aligning PCSD and development policy co‑ordination mechanisms enables governments to manage trade‑offs, connect domestic and international priorities, and advance the SDGs more coherently.

Governments typically rely on two distinct but complementary types of co‑ordination bodies.

• PCSD co‑ordination mechanisms are often mandated to work on the domestic implementation of the SDGs while ensuring coherence across sectoral policies and with international agendas.

• In contrast, development policy co‑ordination bodies focus more specifically on cross‑government alignment around development policy and implementation.

Luxembourg offers an example of how these different bodies can strengthen each other. Luxembourg’s National Plan for Sustainable Development includes as an action point greater co‑ordination between the Inter-departmental Commission on Sustainable Development, which is explicitly mandated to promote PCSD, and the Inter‑ministerial Committee for Development Co‑operation, which is mandated to provide opinions on development co‑operation policy and to help ministries consider the international and transboundary impacts of policies. Joint meetings between the two bodies, albeit often only focused on information exchange, have the potential to provide opportunities to enhance coherence across sectoral policies, as well as between domestic and international priorities (OECD, 2023[24]).

Strengthening co‑ordination mechanisms, supported by shared objectives, performance indicators and common policy frameworks, helps governments manage trade-offs, share information and allocate responsibilities effectively.

Source: OECD (2023[24]), Driving Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development: Accelerating Progress on the SDGs, https://doi.org/10.1787/a6cb4aa1-en; OECD (2025[25]), OECD Development Co‑-operation Peer Reviews: Luxembourg 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/3713cf73-en.

Co‑ordination mechanisms play an important role in times of crisis

Cross‑government co‑ordination mechanisms often become critical enablers of rapid, system-wide responses to international or development crises. Working under pressure or compressed decision-making time can lead ministries and agencies to come together in innovative ways and make interdependences more visible (Aoki, Tay and Rawat, 2023[2]). Lessons show how moments of crisis can be opportunities to unlock exceptions to more rigid procedures or rules, test more integrated ways of working, and foster a coherent national response (OECD, 2025[26]; Carayannopoulos, 2016[27]). Australia’s crisis management framework provides a concrete example of when in international crisis, the Inter‑Departmental Emergency Task Force, chaired by DFAT at the Deputy‑secretary level and linked to central decision‑making, enables senior officials to co‑ordinate international and domestic response elements and rapidly inform ministers (Australian Government, 2025[28]).

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the value of co‑ordination mechanisms for delivering coherent and adaptable responses. Bilateral development partners adopted a variety of whole‑of‑government arrangements, including crisis taskforces, inter-ministerial platforms and multi-stakeholder partnerships. Evaluations point to the importance of clear mandates, strong political backing and access to technical expertise. Countries adopted different models, but common challenges emerged around maintaining coherence across institutions with different priorities and operating under rapidly changing circumstances. Experiences from Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain and the United States suggest that co‑ordination mechanisms played a critical role in aligning actors, managing trade-offs and enabling governments to mobilise resources quickly in support of development and global health objectives8 (OECD, 2025[26]).

Crises can also strengthen co‑ordination by creating a shared sense of purpose. In several contexts, emergency responses have enabled governments to mobilise actors and establish ways of working that prove difficult to achieve under routine conditions. Lithuania's response to Ukraine offers a notable example (Box 2.3).

Box 2.3. Lithuania’s whole‑of‑government response to support Ukraine

Lithuania’s development co‑operation system is highly decentralised and faces consistent co‑ordination challenges. The MFA faces challenges in leading co‑ordination because it manages less than 10% of Lithuania’s ODA. The central mechanism for co‑ordination of government efforts on development is the National Development Co‑operation Commission, which lacks a strategic role and is largely focused on information sharing.

By contrast, Lithuania’s support to Ukraine demonstrated the potential for more effective co‑ordination and alignment. Lithuania’s Inter-institutional Working Group for Ukraine’s Recovery and Reconstruction convenes regularly and engages in substantive discussions, while the Government‑approved Strategic Guidelines for Lithuania’s Engagement in Ukraine’s Reconstruction and Recovery serve as the central framework guiding and aligning activities across institutions. The appointment of an Ambassador-at-Large for Ukraine’s reconstruction signals direct and high-level engagement with relevant ministries and agencies. A dedicated flexible fund for reconstruction, combined with the MFA’s proactive leadership in shaping all projects and programmes, has allowed the MFA to actively mobilise and engage experts from multiple institutions, ensuring their meaningful contribution to the design and implementation of activities. The MFA has also developed an almost real-time dataset that consolidates and updates monthly information on all Lithuanian institutional support to Ukraine.

Source: Government of Lithuania (unpublished[29]) OECD DAC Mid-term Review Self-assessment.

Countries with established or adaptable co‑ordination frameworks are better equipped to respond rapidly and coherently to global crises. Evidence from both COVID-19 and responses to Ukraine highlights the importance of co‑ordination structures, clear responsibilities, and preparedness arrangements that can be activated when crises emerge (OECD, 2025[26]). Beyond supporting immediate responses, these experiences suggest that crises can offer valuable lessons for strengthening co‑ordination arrangements and improving coherence over the longer term.

Key takeaways

• Political leadership and clear mandates create the conditions for effective whole‑of‑government co‑ordination. Governments are better able to sustain collaboration across institutions when political commitment is reinforced by legal and policy frameworks, clear responsibilities, recognised co‑ordinating authorities and shared strategic objectives.

• Co‑ordination mechanisms are most effective when they influence decisions and manage trade-offs across government. Co‑ordination mechanisms create the greatest value when they shape priorities, exchange knowledge, inform policy choices and support the alignment of competing objectives across sectors.

• Strategic, operational and technical co‑ordination bodies fulfil different functions. Their contribution is strongest when mandates are clearly defined, roles are complementary and communication channels support information flows across government.

• Sustained engagement across government requires incentives, accountability and shared ownership. Cross‑government co‑ordination extends beyond participation in a co‑ordination body. Clear incentives and inclusive policy processes help maintain engagement from actors whose primary mandates lie outside development co‑operation.

• Established and adaptable co‑ordination mechanisms enable better crisis response. Countries with established or flexible co‑ordination frameworks are better positioned to mobilise coherent responses. It is easier to overcome institutional silos when strong political direction and cross‑government collaboration are combined.

References

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[15] OECD (2025), Mid-term Review of Spain, ONE Members & Partners, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/AR%282024%293/6/en/pdf.

[25] OECD (2025), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Luxembourg 2025, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3713cf73-en.

[20] OECD (2025), Re-building trust in international development co-operation: The role of communications, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9b2b1660-en.

[26] OECD (2025), Strategic Joint Evaluation of the Collective International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/680e2786-en.

[11] OECD (2024), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: France 2024, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/102d5469-en.

[3] OECD (2024), Steering from the Centre of Government in Times of Complexity: Compendium of Practices, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/69b1f129-en.

[24] OECD (2023), Driving Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development: Accelerating Progress on the SDGs, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a6cb4aa1-en.

[22] OECD (2023), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Netherlands 2023, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/67b0a326-en.

[19] OECD (2020), Development Insights: DAC peer learning brief on working across government, ONE Members & Partners, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2020)46/en/pdf.

[4] OECD (2020), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Austria 2020, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/03b626d5-en.

[21] OECD (2014), Engaging with the Public: 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews and the Network of DAC Development Communicators, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2014/11/engaging-with-the-public_g1g4d97a/9789264226739-en.pdf.

[17] The Danish Government (2020), A Green and Sustainable World, https://um.dk/media/j3lljb4z/a_green_and_sustainable_world.pdf.

[18] The Netherland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (2022), Dutch Global Health Strategy 2023-2030, https://www.government.nl/documents/publications/2023/03/29/dutch-global-health-strategy.

Notes

← 1.  An evaluation of Austria’s whole‑of‑government approach also confirmed a “fundamental willingness” of staff from multiple departments to implement whole‑of‑government approaches to development. For further information: https://www.oefse.at/fileadmin/content/Downloads/Publikationen/Briefingpaper/BP37a-from-poly-crisis-to-policy-coherence.pdf

← 2.  See for example New Zealand’s guidance on “Setting and Managing for Government Priorities”, which helps elected governments set whole‑of‑government priorities. It recommends limiting priorities to a manageable number, defining clear and measurable outcome targets, and establishing clear accountability structures across ministries and agencies. For more information see: https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/assets/DirectoryFile/Report-Setting-and-Managing-for-Government-Priorities.pdf.

← 3.  In the Korean system the number of line ministries and agencies involved in ODA delivery may vary year on year. This count refers to 2025 and does not include sub-national entities.

← 4.  The recent OECD DAC Peer Review advises Italy to preserve clear lines of responsibility in an already complex co‑ordination system.

← 5.  In the case of France, this refers to the roles of the Presidential Council for Development (chaired by the President) and the pre-existing Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (chaired by the Prime Minister).

← 6.  The strategy, adopted by the government with endorsement from the Prime Minster, commits to increasing the capacity of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to integrate gender equality, and aims to do so by working across government on a variety of strategies such as the National Strategy for Women and Girls, Gender Budgeting, National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, and Women’s Economic Empowerment.

← 7.  The Strategy was developed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Food, Ministry of Higher Education and Science, and Ministry of Transport and Housing.

← 8.  Germany’s Emergency COVID-19 Programme had a crisis committee mechanism that acted as control unit for the programme and supported internal coherence but lacked systematic monitoring and learning from results. The Netherlands’ inter‑ministerial taskforces (MFA and Ministry of Health) enhanced co‑ordination yet faced challenges from differing priorities and ad hoc political decisions. In the United States, USAID and the State Department jointly supported efforts to develop sustainable financing options for global heath security. South Africa’s foreign ministry provided coherent leadership, while Mexico’s development agency effectively co‑ordinated cross‑government action and regional engagement. In New Zealand, the response was delivered by a cabinet mandate that ensured alignment across all government agencies under one overarching strategy. Spain’s inter‑ministerial co‑ordination, complemented by a multi‑stakeholder platform, fostered coherence and inclusive participation, giving the space for articulating the capacities and interests of the different ministries, as well as providing a rapid and flexible response. See Strategic Joint Evaluation of the Collective International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/680e2786-en.