This chapter examines why whole‑of‑government co‑ordination has become increasingly important in development co‑operation. It highlights how global challenges and growing institutional complexity require governments to manage interdependence across policy areas and actors. It also shows that responsibility for development is increasingly dispersed across government, strengthening the need for effective co‑ordination mechanisms that can connect strategic priorities, financing decisions and implementation efforts.
Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co‑operation
Insights and Lessons from Practice
Abstract
The development co‑operation landscape is increasingly complex, requiring clearer strategic direction and more deliberate co‑ordination. Development co‑operation is characterised by interconnected global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, rising geopolitical tensions, conflict, food insecurity and global health risks. These issues cut across policy domains and are shaped by decisions that are taken across areas ranging from foreign affairs and development to trade, finance, energy and security. Better understanding and addressing complex and multidimensional problems requires more holistic, cross‑sectoral approaches involving a wider range of actors and stakeholders as part of the development co‑operation ecosystem (Lundsgaarde and Keijzer, 2018[1]; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007[2]). No single institution can effectively address these challenges alone, increasing the need for whole‑of‑government approaches that align objectives, manage trade-offs and mobilise complementary expertise.
Development outcomes are increasingly shaped by a diverse set of actors
Official development assistance (ODA) is declining at a time when development finance is becoming more diverse in its actors and instruments. In 2025, ODA amounted to USD 174.3 billion, a 23.1% decrease from 2024 and the largest annual contraction on record (OECD, 2026[3]; OECD, 2025[4]). ODA is projected to decline further by 6.9% in 2026 (OECD, 2026[5]). At the same time, growing attention in Members’ overall contribution to sustainable development, reflects a broader view of international co‑operation in which ODA is only one component of support to partner countries (OECD, 2026[6]).
The changing composition of development finance is reflected in the growing importance of flows beyond ODA. In 2024 non-concessional finance reached USD 94.4 billion, a 75% increase from 2023, while private finance mobilised through official interventions rose to a record USD 75.1 billion (OECD, 2025[7]). These trends are accompanied by the involvement of a wider range of public institutions in development co‑operation, including entities whose primary mandates and objective lie outside development policy. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Members are required to manage a growing number of actors, instruments and expectations while ensuring that development co‑operation’s core mandate, effectiveness and standards are not diluted (OECD, 2026[6]).
Across the DAC, there are at least 2091 government entities involved in development co‑operation (Figure 1.1). Between 2014 and 2024, 14 DAC members experienced an increase in the number of institutions disbursing ODA according to official reporting to the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS)2. This diversification can bring new opportunities for innovation, collaboration and mobilisation of expertise. However, it can also increase the challenge of maintaining coherence and ensuring that development objectives remain aligned across actors with different mandates.
Note: The graph includes only DAC Member Countries (excludes the European Union). The number of institutions does not include subnational government entities. It only accounts for ODA Category 10 in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), excluding in-donor refugee costs.
Source: (OECD, 2025[8]), Creditor Reporting System, OECD Data Explorer http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
In many DAC members, a significant share of development assistance is managed outside the lead ministry. Across DAC Countries, around 15% of bilateral ODA in 2023-24 was disbursed by actors other than the lead ministry or development agency. For multilateral development co‑operation, the share increases to nearly 45%, partly due to the significant role ministries of finance play in managing contributions to multilateral development banks, vertical funds and EU institutions3 (Figure 1.2). As a result, responsibility for development co‑operation is frequently distributed across multiple institutions. Alignment between strategic discussions and implementation is necessary to ensure coherence across the different entities that disburse ODA and with the government’s development objectives, international commitments and partner country needs.
Note: The graph includes only DAC Member Countries (excludes the European Union). The number of institutions does not include subnational government entities. It only accounts for ODA Category 10 in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), excluding in-donor refugee costs. Ministries and agencies across the DAC Member Countries were grouped into standardised category names based on their main function.
Source: (OECD, 2025[8]), Creditor Reporting System, OECD Data Explorer http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c.
Co‑ordinating across government provides necessary but not sufficient basis for policy coherence for sustainable development
Achieving policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD)4 entails robust whole‑of‑government co‑ordination (OECD, 2023[9]). For DAC members, PCSD means encouraging different policies to work together in delivering greater overall benefits, finding a balance between national policy priorities and internationally agreed goals, and taking into account trans-boundary and long-term effects of policies on developing countries (OECD, 2019[10]). Whole‑of‑government co‑ordination provides the governance framework through which this coherence is pursued, by ensuring that ministries, agencies and policy instruments work consistently towards shared objectives.
Strengthening coherence helps ensure that DAC members’ ambitions are aligned around common objectives. In a landscape where ODA is shrinking and governments are increasingly drawing on a wider range of financial and non-financial instruments to pursue development, foreign policy, economic, climate and security objectives, it is important to consider which mechanisms can promote coherence across this broader set of interventions. As responsibility for engaging with partner countries becomes more dispersed, governments face growing challenges in maintaining a coherent overall approach. Limited scrutiny over some forms of non-concessional finance can further complicate efforts to assess coherence across policies and instruments (McKenzie, 2026[11]). It is crucial to ensure that ODA and other non-concessional flows are working towards common objectives that reinforce partner countries’ development priorities, while being honest about what ODA can achieve (OECD, 2026[12]). Whole‑of‑government approaches can help ensure that the combined effect of a government's financing, policies and international engagement reinforces partner-country priorities and sustainable development objectives.
Whole‑of‑government co‑ordination helps turn diversity into development impact
Whole‑of‑government co‑ordination provides a practical mechanism for translating policy ambitions into action. Ministries of foreign affairs, ministries of finance, development agencies, other line ministries and specialised bodies all play a role in development co‑operation. They fund bilateral programmes, offer peer-to-peer assistance, support and govern multilateral organisations and oversee domestic policies with significant impact on developing countries. Especially as the systems strengthening approach5 to development is being prioritised among some DAC members, good co‑ordination among different parts of a government is viewed as increasingly necessary (Aly, Gulrajani and Pudussery, 2026[13]; UK International Development Committee, 2026[14]; Glennerster, 2026[15]). Through co‑ordination, a government can combine its assets and maximise its contribution to global sustainable development (OECD, 2026[16]; Cázarez-Grageda, 2019[17]).
Effective whole‑of‑government co‑ordination can transform institutional diversity from a source of fragmentation into a source of added value. The report shows how governments can better balance trade-offs across policy areas and align the contributions of different institutions by establishing shared objectives, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and creating mechanisms for consultation and joint decision making. This can strengthen the coherence and credibility of a government's engagement, reduce transaction costs for partner countries, and help ensure that the combined effect of policies, financing and technical co‑operation supports sustainable development objectives. In the absence of such mechanisms, fragmentation can lead to inconsistent policy signals, diminished development impact, duplication of effort and increased transaction costs for partner countries. In a context of constrained resources, DAC members will need to make deliberate choices about which aspects of co‑ordination to prioritise to ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs.
Whole‑of‑government co‑ordination in development co‑operation refers to an integrated, cross‑governmental approach where various government entities, such as ministries and agencies at both headquarters and in-country offices, work together to align their efforts, policies and resources to achieve coherent, unified goals in development co‑operation.
The figure below summarises the key factors, discussed throughout the report, that support the effectiveness of whole‑of‑government approaches.
References
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[1] Lundsgaarde, E. and N. Keijzer (2018), “Development Cooperation in a Multilevel and Multistakeholder Setting: From Planning towards Enabling Coordinated Action?”, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 31, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-018-0143-6.
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← 1. Excludes local and municipal governments.
← 2. The data are subject to the quality of the reporting by the Members, which can lead to overcounting or undercounting. When the data report “miscellaneous/other ministries”, this is recorded and counted as one entity, but can in reality include multiple ones. Often, even though reporting to OECD is centralised and reported under one government line, government budget documents showcase that spending is going through multiple ministries, therefore the CRS can only provide a partial picture. Finally, some members record some funds or activities that fall under the governance of other agencies (and are therefore not standalone entities) as a singular agency in the CRS. This is a limitation that applies to all calculations in this report.
← 3. Ministries of finance can play a central role through their responsibility setting overall ODA volumes, approving budget allocations. Multilateral contributions are directed in particular to international financial institutions and, for EU Member States, non-discretionary assessed contributions to the EU budget. Contributions to the United Nations are generally also managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and financing to some specific UN agencies of vertical funds may be delegated to line ministries.
← 4. PCSD is an approach that aims to integrate the dimensions of sustainable development throughout domestic and international policymaking.
← 5. The systems strengthening approach aims to support the development and performance of a public system in partner countries by building on existing systems and strengthening long-term sustainability, co‑ordination and capacities tends to be associated with more technical co‑operation, peer-to-peer learning and knowledge exchange between counterpart ministries.