This chapter examines how whole‑of‑government approaches are reflected across countries, sectors and policy themes in development co‑operation. It shows that country-level co‑ordination provides an important test of whether governance arrangements support coherent action and development results. Drawing on DAC members’ experiences, the chapter highlights the role of country strategies, embassies and co‑ordination mechanisms in aligning actors around shared objectives. It finds that cross-cutting priorities such as climate, biodiversity, gender equality, health and fragility can mobilise broader engagement across government. It argues that whole‑of‑government approaches deliver the greatest value when they connect specialised expertise, different institutions and multiple delivery instruments around common development objectives.
Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co‑operation
Abstract
Country level co‑ordination is a litmus test of the robustness of whole-of government approaches
Developing whole‑of‑government objectives for priority countries can reduce fragmentation and the associated transaction costs in partner countries. Multiple parts of the same government often engage in one partner country with bilateral and multilateral partners. When unaware of each other’s operations this can create duplication and inefficiency (Allen et al., 2020[1]). For partner countries, fragmented support increases the burden on administrative capacities, increase transaction costs and can risk undermining the effectiveness of development co‑operation (OECD, forthcoming[2]; Guffler, 2020[3]; OECD, 2005[4]). As recommended to Poland in its 2023 OECD DAC Peer Review, developing clear whole‑of‑government objectives in each priority partner country is key to better guiding efficient and effective programming (OECD, 2023[5]).
Country strategies can drive coherence by setting a shared direction for development outcomes. Investing in the development of country strategies and the mapping of a DAC Member’s entire portfolio (bilateral and multilateral) in each partner country requires time and resource commitment but has the potential to identify synergies and duplications (Aly, Gulrajani and Pudussery, 2026[6]). Such a process provides an opportunity to connect different parts of a provider’s engagement in a partner country and to clarify how these contribute to shared objectives. Ireland for example has developed new Global Ireland Regional Strategies built on a whole‑of‑government approach (Government of Ireland, 2026[7]). The Netherlands uses multi-annual country strategies, discussed in whole‑of‑government country platform meetings1, to align government engagement across sectors and actors in partner countries (OECD, 2026[8]). Canada is undertaking a mapping exercise, attempting a better overview of all the activities it funds in each country, including activities funded through earmarked contributions to multilateral organisations and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (OECD, 2025[9]). At the same time, the absence of country strategies can make it harder for other government departments to contribute at country level in a co‑ordinated manner. The 2019 OECD DAC Peer Review of Norway recommended that the development of country strategies would help to further strengthen whole‑of‑government functioning and co‑ordination, while building on considerable efforts made by the embassies to develop a work plan that highlights linkages (OECD, 2019[10]).
Beyond country-level objectives in joint strategies, co‑ordination can also be strengthened through complementary organisational arrangements. Italy has recently adopted an innovative practice to build and deliver whole‑of‑government objectives, through the development of system-wide country mission to translate political ambition into co‑ordinated delivery in partner countries (see Box 5.1.). At headquarters, two regional whole‑of‑government offices in Australia’s DFAT – for the Pacific and for Southeast Asia - have direct benefits for improving a coherent approach to each region. These regional offices sit within DFAT but benefit from secondees from a range of different government departments (OECD, 2026[11]).
Since 2023, Italy has introduced system-wide country missions as a practical tool to translate political ambition into co‑ordinated delivery.
Led by the Director-General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation MAECI, these missions benefit from high-level political leadership and aim to ensure system-wide alignment from the outset. They bring together the full spectrum of Italian actors involved in international co‑operation, including the Italian Agency for Development Co‑operation (AICS); Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Italy’s development finance institution); relevant line ministries such as economy and finance, the interior, agriculture and environment; Italian embassies; Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero (Italy’s export credit agency); Societá Italiana per le Imprese all’Estero (which supports Italian firms abroad); civil society organisations (CSOs); private sector representatives, as well as international organisations. For missions to Africa, they also benefit from the presence of Mattei Plan Task Force representatives from the Prime Minister’s Office. Recent missions have involved 50-60 participants and covered several countries in a single itinerary, such as the 2024 visit to Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia.
These missions have shown that:
This approach reduced fragmentation and transaction costs. Missions have enabled partners to engage simultaneously with a broad range of Italian actors, including MAECI, AICS, financial institutions and line ministries.
Whole-of-system engagement adds value when paired with structured follow-up. Bringing together a wide set of actors boosts dialogue and credibility. Clear processes for documenting decisions, assigning responsibilities and tracking progress are needed to ensure mission outcomes lead to concrete actions and sustained collaboration.
Coherence has improved across the Italian system. Authorities report that more than half of newly developed initiatives originate from ideas generated during these missions, reflecting improved upstream alignment and greater joint programming.
Source: OECD (2026[12]), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Italy 2026, https://doi.org/10.1787/6b00e143-en; OECD (2026[13]), “Team Italy” missions driving more unified partner country engagement, https://oe.cd/6zw.
Joined-up embassies and country offices play an important role in ensuring whole‑of‑government approaches are translated at the country level. Embassies can promote coherence and reduce fragmentation particularly when supported by other government actors, such as development agencies’ country offices. Co-locating staff, clarifying responsibilities and providing access to specialised expertise can strengthen collaboration. Belgium’s “one-roof policy”, which hosts Enabel within embassy premises while maintaining autonomy, has strengthened interactions between heads of co‑operation and local representatives, and facilitated the division of tasks to ensure representation and engagement with partner governments (OECD, 2020[14]). The Netherlands have sought to reflect a whole‑of‑government approach in embassies by deploying expertise from across government according to country priorities. In Côte D’Ivoire, for example, agri-food specialists from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature support embassy operations, while defence attachés, security advisers and responsible business conduct experts provide expertise at country and regional levels (OECD, 2023[15]; OECD, 2026[8]). Similarly, Denmark has deployed specialised staff in selected embassies, such as Nigeria, to strengthen capacity to advance and monitor climate investments (OECD, 2024[16]). For members with limited country presence, size and resources limit possible approaches for whole‑of‑government co‑ordination at the country level, therefore it is advisable to focus on selected, priority countries (OECD, 2026[17]).
Some DAC members have created specific in-country arrangements to co‑ordinate amongst governmental actors in a country or region. Clear focal points and strong leadership by the ambassador and head of co‑operation supports the achievement of whole‑of‑government co‑ordination and the creation of a one-country vision, helping to reconcile other diplomatic priorities with development priorities. In Australia, this is fostered by the role of heads of mission in the embassies that oversee all of Australia’s engagements in the respective country, including where other government agencies are present at the country level. The Senior Responsible Offices also support co‑ordination efforts by driving alignment and integration between the development programme and Australia’s strategic objectives and broader engagement in a country or region (OECD, 2026[11]). France introduced “local development councils” in 2022 in a positive effort to strengthen France’s country engagement with local partners. These councils have the potential to be strengthened in order to co‑ordinate all involved actors Team France around policy objectives and common results defined at the country level (OECD, 2024[18]). Finally, Belgium and Sweden developed a comprehensive approach to support co‑ordination specifically in conflict-affected countries (Box 5.2).
Belgium
Belgium has developed a comprehensive approach to foreign policy for crisis response. Following the adoption of a strategy note on this “comprehensive approach”, Belgium has set up nine related taskforces, including those dedicated to the Sahel, the Great Lakes, and the Syrian and Iraqi crises. Led by the heads of post, these taskforces provide an integrated framework for co‑ordinating inter-departmental support provided by Brussels and ensuring that common positions, guidance and support are reflected in the field. They generally comprise officials from the Federal Public Service and ministerial offices, with other public services invited depending on the issues addressed. In Mali, co‑ordination between the Sahel taskforce and the post in Bamako helped strengthen synergies between diplomatic, defence and development components, including through the partial reorientation of the development programme towards stabilisation issues jointly identified by the diplomatic attaché and representatives of partner institutions.
Sweden
Sweden’s engagement in Ukraine is a foreign policy priority and involves a variety of Swedish institutions. Its 2023-27 reconstruction and reform co‑operation strategy for Ukraine is Sweden’s largest bilateral development country programme, worth USD 990 million (SEK 9 billion). ODA to Following an 18.1% increase in 2025 (preliminary data), ODA to Ukraine is set to increase further in the coming years. Anchored in Ukraine’s priorities, Sweden’s support spans budget support, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and EU integration and reform efforts. Sweden’s engagement in Ukraine is co‑ordinated by a dedicated secretariat in the MFA, Sida, and the embassy in Kyiv, with the embassy serving as the main focal point. Other Swedish actors, including Swedfund, Business Sweden, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Swedish Institute, operate within a common framework. Sweden also participates in the “Ukraine Donor Platform” to promote international co‑ordination.
Source: OECD (2020[14]) OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Belgium 2020, https://doi.org/10.1787/026f1aad-en; OECD (forthcoming[19]), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Sweden 2026.
Geographic ODA allocation across government could be better guided to ensure coherence and relevance
Allocations by line ministries vary significantly across income groups, pointing to different priorities across government. LDCs and LMICs are prioritised by a good number of line ministries. Notably, ministries of agriculture and ministries of health channel over 50% of their resources to LDCs, which indicates potential alignment with poverty reduction objectives. LMICs receive important shares, especially from ministries of finance, ministries of infrastructure and transport and national research institutes. The high level of support to UMICs by the ministries of labour and social affairs, ministries of culture and ministries of interior raise the question as to whether ODA is the most effective resource to be used in these cases, rather than potentially shifting to other forms of economic co‑operation. These disparities suggest the need for clearer cross‑government guidance, ensuring ODA allocations reach those most in need according to development priorities and partner countries’ needs.
Note: The graph includes only DAC Member Countries (excludes the European Union). The number of institutions does not include subnational government entities. It only accounts for ODA Category 10 in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), excluding in-donor refugee costs. Unallocated ODA disbursements are removed Ministries and agencies across the DAC Member Countries were grouped into standardised category names based on their main function.
Source: (OECD, 2025[20]) Creditor Reporting System, OECD Data Explorer http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c
Coherence across development co‑operation is reliant on the alignment between bilateral and multilateral allocations. Whole‑of‑government approaches can facilitate dialogue on multilateral priorities and support alignment between resource allocation, often led by Ministries of Finance, and broader development objectives, typically led by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and development agencies2 (OECD, 2026[21]). Co‑ordination is strengthened when engagement with multilateral organisations is connected across governing boards, headquarters and country programmes, helping align bilateral and multilateral portfolios in support of partner-country priorities (OECD, 2024[22]). This is especially relevant when different ministries provide earmarked funding to multilateral organisations. An example is Ireland’s Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, which leads the government’s relationship and funding to the World Food Programme and reh Food and Agriculture Organisation (Government of Ireland, 2026[23]). It is also common that line ministries directly contribute to vertical funds. Denmark’s ministries of Foreign Affairs and Environment for example sit jointly on the board of the Green Climate Fund, contributing their own expertise and networks (OECD, 2021[24]). Visibility across government over these contributions can help ensure that dialogue with multilateral partners reflects the full scope of national engagement and informs future decisions on both core and non-core funding3 (OECD, 2026[21]).
Coherent multilateral positions enable DAC members to be more impactful. For partners, it can often be confusing to have to interact with diverse agencies of the same country. Speaking with “one voice” is an exercise in fostering coherence through established information sharing and other co‑ordination mechanisms that has visible benefits for partners receiving development or other forms of foreign support. Sweden and Switzerland have a particularly elaborate system of checks and balances to ensure all ministries are aware and are buying in to one common government position (see Box 5.3).
Sweden
Sweden has developed a highly formalised whole‑of‑government system that ensures the government speaks with one coherent voice across all policy areas and levels. A central feature of this model is the principle of collective ministerial authority: no minister may instruct a government agency alone. Instead, all instructions and decisions must be taken collectively by the government, requiring a quorum of at least five ministers. A clear but elaborate system of co‑ordination also ensures that all Swedish representatives in bilateral and multilateral exchanges are aware of and are stewards of the position of the government as a whole. This process allows Sweden to ensure its representatives are speaking with one coherent voice across multilateral fora.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s “elevator approach” aims to enhance the effectiveness of Swiss multilateral support. The approach is designed to align Switzerland’s global funding strategies with its operational experiences, ensuring coherence and effectiveness. The method involves channelling insights from country-level engagement with multilateral organisations upwards to focal points in headquarters and Swiss representatives on relevant boards to inform funding decisions and governance participation in multilateral organisations. As it goes back down, the elevator approach can feed information and learning from strategic engagement in governing bodies back into Swiss country-level collaboration with multilaterals.
Source: Interviews; Government of Sweden (2023[25]), Development Assistance for a new era, https://www.government.se/contentassets/b4067f9e566b4e4e8c621087f2225a0b/development-assistance-for-a-new-era--freedom-empowerment-and-sustainable-growth-accessible.pdf; OECD (2025[26]), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Switzerland 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/b83b7007-en.
Whole‑of‑government engagement is strengthened by both shared policy priorities and structured co‑operation mechanisms
Clearly defined cross-cutting priorities can help mobilise a wider range of ministries and institutions in implementation around shared development objectives (Figure 5.2). When backed by high-level political attention and dedicated resources, cross-cutting priorities such as gender and environment can become focal points for whole‑of‑government co‑ordination (OECD, 2014[27]). As shown in Figure 5.2 cross-cutting priorities and themes tend to receive support from a broad range of government departments and agencies involved in ODA across the DAC. This highlights the value of strategies that systematically integrate cross-cutting objectives across development co‑operation portfolios. Luxembourg's 2021 co‑operation strategy, for example, strengthened the integration of environmental, climate and gender equality considerations, contributing to an increase in bilateral commitments addressing all three objectives simultaneously, from 6.5% in 2021 to 9.2% in 2023 (OECD, 2024[28]). Similarly, Slovenia has drawn on expertise from its Ministry of Environment to develop tools that mainstream climate considerations across its development co‑operation portfolio (OECD, 2026[17]).
Sustained whole‑of‑government engagement on thematic areas often requires structured mechanisms that make participation by sector ministries possible and purposeful. While cross-cutting priorities can create incentives for collaboration, dedicated programmes can provide the structures through which ministries and public agencies engage systematically in development co‑operation. Denmark's Strategic Sector Cooperation, for example, mobilises expertise from sectoral ministries and public authorities through long-term government-to-government partnerships in areas such as energy, environment and water, supported by dedicated resources and formalised roles for participating institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2026[29]). Similarly, Norway's Knowledge Bank Programmes co‑ordinate technical co‑operation across government and brings together a range of sector-specific programmes that connect Norwegian public institutions with counterpart organisations in partner countries through long-term institutional partnerships (Norad, 2020[30]). By embedding collaboration in such structured mechanism, governments can broaden ownership of development co‑operation across ministries, strengthen policy coherence and facilitate more sustained forms of inter-ministerial engagement.
Note: The graph includes only DAC Member Countries (excludes the European Union). The number of institutions does not include subnational government entities. It only accounts for ODA Category 10 in the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), excluding in-donor refugee costs. Ministries and agencies across the DAC Member Countries were grouped into standardised category names based on their main function. Excludes unallocated categories, consolidates smaller sectors, and excludes the Development Agency and MFA. WASH = Water Sanitation Hygiene
Source: (OECD, 2025[20]), Creditor Reporting System, OECD Data Explorer http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/3c
Environment, climate and biodiversity
Climate and environment are among the policy areas where whole‑of‑government engagement is most prominent involving a wide range of public actors in strategy formulation, financing and implementation. DAC members have institutionalised these priorities in their development co‑operation three main ways: through stand-alone policies, through mainstreaming across projects and programmes, and through climate-related targets. Some countries, such as Poland, have adopted a stand-alone climate strategy that outlines their commitment to supporting climate action in developing countries. Others, like Germany, have integrated the Paris Agreement and 2030 Agenda into the centre of their development policy. France and Korea have embedded climate targets within their broader strategies, emphasising green growth or aiming for a significant portion of their ODA to contribute directly to climate action (OECD, 2024[31]). Canada, as part of the Global Affairs Canada Transformation Implementation Plan has committed to work with partners in delivering whole‑of‑government approaches to climate change, the green transition and critical minerals4 (Government of Canada, 2026[32]). Japan's experience5 suggests that dedicated institutional mechanisms, combined with peer learning and cross-ministerial engagement, can help translate biodiversity commitments into broader development planning and implementation (OECD, forthcoming[33]). Evidence from implementation further highlights the value of co‑ordinated action across government. Luxembourg's support to Cabo Verde (Box 5.4) and Korea's Bali electric vehicle package6 (OECD, 2026[34]) demonstrate how different ministries and implementing partners can combine financing, technical expertise and policy support to advance partner countries' climate priorities through more integrated approaches.
Gender equality
Gender equality appears particularly well positioned to foster whole‑of‑government engagement, as it is a cross-cutting policy priority and increasingly embedded beyond development agencies. Gender equality receives high levels of support from across central governments, DFIs, ministries of health and ministries of education (see Figure 5.1). In several DAC members, feminist foreign and development policies have further strengthened this whole‑of‑government dimension by requiring gender equality objectives to be mainstreamed across government portfolios and institutions, aiming to establish a comprehensive and institutionalised approach to feminist diplomacy efforts (OECD, 2022[35]). Norway's Gender Equality for Development programme7 illustrates how such priorities can be translated into institutional practice. The programme draws on expertise from a range of public institutions, including the Ministry of Culture and Equality, the Directorate for Children, Youth and Families and Statistics Norway, while also engaging research institutions and other ministries according to partner-country needs (Norad, 2024[36]).
Luxembourg is piloting a whole‑of‑government approach to development co‑operation in Cabo Verde through the implementation of the national Development-Climate-Energy Indicative Co‑operation Programme, which is closely aligned with the country's national priorities. The approach involves providing additional financial resources from the Climate and Energy Fund managed by the Luxembourg Ministry for the Environment, Climate and Biodiversity. Although this approach has probably generated higher transaction costs due to intensified interministerial co‑ordination, it has enabled Cabo Verde to obtain direct access to Luxembourg’s technical experts in climate and energy policy. This has provided valuable support for its national strategy in climate negotiations.
By providing sector budget support, Luxembourg uses Cabo Verde's national systems for public financial management and procurement, which are considered robust and transparent. In this way, Luxembourg is not only contributing to the achievement of sectoral objectives, but also building the capacity of local institutions to manage resources autonomously and sustainably.
In planning the sixth Indicative Co-operation Programme, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Luxembourg Embassy, and the agency LuxDev have the opportunity to work closely with partners in Cabo Verde to choose the most appropriate modalities for assistance. The selection should be based on clear criteria and partner analysis, and modalities could range from direct management or implementation to delegated assistance, or sectoral or general budget support depending on what is most appropriate for the context.
Source: OECD (2025[37]) OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Luxembourg 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/3713cf73-en; OECD (2024[38]), Luxembourg and Global Gateway investments in Cabo Verde, https://oe.cd/5Sx.
Education
Education ministries play an important role in shaping and delivering development co‑operation in the education sector, when their engagement is aligned with wider government and partner country priorities. In several DAC members, ministries of education are responsible for complementing the roles of development agencies and ministries of foreign affairs with sector expertise, policy leadership and ODA financing. In France for example this role is institutionalised with an explicit mandate for the Ministry of Education to lead on education as a priority for French co‑operation8 (OECD, 2024[18]). At the same time, across the DAC, the large share of scholarships and imputed student costs withing education ODA underscores the need for strategic oversight to ensure alignment with partner-country priorities and broader development goals. Austria, Czechia, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, show a relevant involvement of their education ministries in development co‑operation (Box 5.5). Ministries of education also engage directly at country level. Italy’s co‑operation with Ethiopia under the Piano Mattei demonstrates how education ministries can contribute to whole‑of‑government approaches through technical partnerships, vocational training initiatives and institutional exchanges aligned with partner-country priorities9 (Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 2025[39]; Ministero dell'Universitá e della Ricerca, 2026[40]; Il Sole 24 Ore, 2023[41]).
Scholarship and imputed student‑cost ODA represent substantial shares of bilateral ODA in several Central and Eastern European providers, especially Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia are often managed outside development co‑operation lead institutions1. Because these flows can be weakly connected to partner-country needs and broader development objectives, they require strategic steering. They can also provide a practical entry point to bring education actors into development planning cycles and to discuss scholarships and student costs in relation to geographic priorities, complementarity and expected results.
Experience from Czechia showcases how ODA for scholarship and student costs can demonstrate a developmental focus through partner-country value and learning on outcomes. Czechia adjusted scholarships to mitigate “brain drain” risks (i.e. the risk of emigration of talent from the country), linked scholarships more closely to development co‑operation, and redesigned education support to strengthen partner-country universities. The Slovak Republic and Slovenia are also exploring how to assess outcomes and improve the developmental relevance of education‑related ODA.
1. In 2024, scholarship-related ODA -scholarships/training in donor country and imputed student costs- accounted for USD 16.6 million, or 28.8% of bilateral ODA, in Slovenia; USD 160.3 million, or 21.7%, in Poland; USD 2.5 million, or 6.7%, in the Slovak Republic; and USD 4.1 million, or 1.7%, in Czechia (OECD, 2025[20]).
Source: OECD (2026[17]), Whole‑of‑government Co‑ordination in Development Co‑operation Country Notes: selected Central and Eastern European DAC members, OECD (2023[42]), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Czech Republic 2023, https://doi.org/10.1787/eba15a0b-en; OECD (2023[43]), The Czech Republic uses evaluations to strengthen scholarships and deepen partnerships with universities, https://oe.cd/6Gz.
Health
Health illustrates both the value of specialised cross‑government expertise in development co‑operation and the need to connect this expertise to wider development foreign policy objectives. Health is among the sector where line ministries provide substantial technical and financial contributions, particularly in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the United Kingdom, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) was the third-largest ODA-spending government department in 2024, financing health research and security, and engaging multiple technical actors across the government (ICAI, 2024[44]). While reviews have identified scope to strengthen operational co‑ordination and information sharing with FCDO and other departments, DHSC's activities remain closely aligned with broader UK development objectives, also demonstrating attentiveness to supporting research that is ODA-eligible and relevant to health challenges in low- and middle-income countries (ICAI, 2024[44]). Italy has launched a structured, long-term collaboration among Italian administrations engaged in global health. The agreement recognises the complementary roles of each institution and draws on technical expertise in migrant health, vulnerable populations, and tackling health inequalities, with priority areas in Africa, linked to the Mattei Plan. The focus on the joint action ranges from capacity building and service delivery to research and prevention and is a signal of Italy’s effort to move beyond siloed action (INMP, 2026[45]). Integrating health priorities with other foreign policy goals can often be challenging in practice, yet Australia offers an innovative example though the establishment of a whole‑of‑government Indo Pacific Centre for Health Security (Box 5.6).
Australia has strengthened its role as a leader in global and regional health by investing into neglected diseases and building strong cross‑government structures, notably through the Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security. Established in 2017, the Indo-Pacific Centre for Health Security is an example of Australia’s sound whole‑of‑government co‑ordination aimed at strengthening regional health security. Explicitly acknowledging that Australia’s health security is linked to the health security of the Indo-Pacific region further supported the buy-in for this initiative from across government.
The Centre therefore brings together sector experts and representatives from other Australian government departments such as Treasury and the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing. One example of this cross‑governmental collaboration is the investment in “Partnerships for a Healthy Region”, which, thanks to the support of diverse Australian government agencies and other partners, is addressing a variety of cross-cutting priorities like gender equality, disability and social inclusion, One Health, climate and environmental change, and community engagement. Specific guidance notes have been developed to clarify how each technical and policy angle can contribute to programme delivery.
Through such mechanisms, the Centre provides a coherent platform for whole‑of‑government co‑ordination, enabling Australia pool expertise across departments, translate different policy priorities into operational guidance, and respond more coherently to complex health security challenges in the Indo‑Pacific.
Source: Australian Government (2026[46]), Partnership for a Healthy Region, https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.au/partnerships-healthy-region; OECD (2026[11]), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: Australia 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/c58230a4-en; Australian Government (2026[46]), Partnership for a Healthy Region, https://indopacifichealthsecurity.dfat.gov.au/partnerships-healthy-region; Australia Minister for Foreign Affairs (2017[47]), Indo-Pacific Health Security Initiative, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/media-release/indo-pacific-health-security-initiative.
Conflict and Fragility
Whole‑of‑government approaches to conflict and fragility have been a key area of effort for DAC members, though they remain difficult to implement in practice given differing mandates, organisational cultures and resource constraints. Experience in contexts such as Afghanistan illustrates how a lack of strategic dialogue across development ad peace pillars ca weaken coherence and limit the effectiveness of interventions, underscoring the need for stronger mechanisms to align objectives and approaches (OECD, 2022[48]; World Bank, 2011[49]; Andersen, 2016[50]) Recognising the inter-dependence between security, governance and development policy has led many members to strive for more integrated and coherent approaches to fragility or to conflict-affected countries (OECD, 2008[51]). Better integration can be achieved when relevant actors plan and deliver jointly under a shared strategy, as demonstrated by Switzerland, where the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Peace and Human Rights Division co‑ordinate programming through embassies and build on each other's comparative advantages (OECD, 2025[26]). Effective approaches require political leadership, incentives for collaboration and joint analysis and planning to build a shared understanding of context and objectives, in line with the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus (OECD, 2019[52]; Swithern and Schreiber, 2023[53]). Mechanisms such as country platforms, financing strategies, joint budget lines (see Box 4.1.) and integrated planning frameworks can help align priorities, strengthen dialogue and reduce fragmentation across agencies (OECD, 2008[51]; OECD, 2022[48]). Evidence from EU Member States suggests that while most countries have adopted explicit or implicit whole‑of‑government approaches, translating these commitments into operational practice remains challenging (Blockmans and Debuysere, 2020[54])
Civil society and civic space
A coherent approach to engaging with civil society organisations and protecting civic space in partner countries requires strong whole‑of‑government co‑ordination across key ministries. Multiple line ministries collaborate with civil society organisations to implement development programmes. Strengthening existing co‑ordination platforms can help mainstream civil society and civic space considerations, for example, as seen in Portugal through the use of an interministerial co‑ordination mechanism that explicitly includes civic space consideration in the exchanges with line ministries (OECD, 2022[55]). Ministries of foreign affairs and development agencies could, through similar mechanisms, further sensitise public officials, including those working in embassies and country offices, on the impact of their work and modalities of engagement in civil society and civic space. By engaging ministries working on areas such as security, trade, energy, migration and the environment, governments can anticipate and mitigate potential negative impacts and promote a “do‑no‑harm” approach (OECD, 2025[56]). The OECD has developed a toolkit and practical guidance for governments wishing to adopt a comprehensive, strategic and co‑ordinated whole‑of‑government approach to protecting and promoting civic space in partner countries (OECD, 2024[57]; OECD, 2025[56]).
Country-level co‑ordination exemplifies robust whole‑of‑government approaches. Shared country objectives, strong embassy or agency country office leadership and dedicated co‑ordination mechanisms help connect actors around common development outcomes and reduce fragmentation in partner countries.
Greater institutional diversity increases the value of strategic visibility across government. Differences in geographic allocations, engagement across income groups, sectoral priorities and multilateral contributions illustrate the importance of understanding where and how different parts of government deploy ODA, providing a basis for more coherent engagement.
Cross-cutting priorities can create powerful incentives for cross‑government collaboration. Issues such as climate change, biodiversity, gender equality, health security and fragility create incentives for ministries and agencies to work across silos when objectives, responsibilities and resources are clearly aligned.
Sectoral mapping can reveal where stronger whole‑of‑government approaches are most relevant and feasible. Where multiple ministries, agencies, DFIs and financing channels are already active in the same sector, governments can better understand complementarities, identify gaps and approach their engagement as a coherent offer to partners rather than a collection of separate interventions.
Whole‑of‑government approaches require coherence across delivery instruments as well as institutions. Stronger alignment between bilateral programmes, multilateral engagement, technical co‑operation, development finance and policy dialogue helps translate strategic objectives into more coherent support for partner countries.
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← 1. These are co‑ordination meetings led by the country desks within the regional departments who convene every 6-8 weeks, bringing together a range of stakeholders from diverse MFA staff from headquarters and country offices, other involved ministries, RVO, Invest International and FMO.
← 2. In this case alignment refers to considerations about resource allocations taken across departments which can be to reinforce, complement or appropriately diversify each other.
← 3. When approached strategically and supported by analytical tools such as portfolio similarity analysis, these measures not only improve internal consistency but also enhance the overall effectiveness of multilateral development co‑operation, see https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD(2022)6/en/pdf
← 4. Global Affairs Canada has set out the following actions to achieve this outcome: 1. With Environment and Climate Change Canada, Natural Resources Canada and other partners, better integrate climate, environmental and energy priorities across Canada’s international strategic engagement, including on critical minerals, the green transition, supply chains and investment promotion; 2. Increase climate literacy across GAC via training, leveraging the Open Insights Hub and strengthened knowledge management; 3. Develop and present actionable options to deputy ministers for strengthening GAC’s strategic contribution to whole-of-government leadership on climate change, the green transition and critical minerals; 4. Implement decisions to strengthen leadership on climate change, the green transition and critical minerals.
← 5. In 2023, JICA created the Office of Sustainability, which represented a significant organisational shift aimed at anchoring and mainstreaming environmental and social sustainability, including biodiversity, across Japan’s development co‑operation portfolio (See: https://www.jica.go.jp/english/information/notice/2023/20230403_01.html) The Office acts as a co‑ordinating hub to factor biodiversity into sectors beyond environmental programmes, while Japan’s Biodiversity Fund supports regional workshops that bring together environment, finance, planning and other ministries. The emphasis on peer‑to‑peer exchange and regional learning communities further supports institutional learning beyond individual projects, helping governments align biodiversity objectives with national development priorities.
← 6. For more details on the Bali electric vehicle package see: [insert link when available of KOR country note].
← 7. This is an example of the Knowledge Bank Programmes.
← 8. In 2023-24 59% of French ODA to education was disbursed by the Ministry of Education.
← 9. In Ethiopia for example, the Ministry of Education and Merit and the Ministry of University and Research have adopted more active roles through Memorandum of Understandings covering technical and vocational education and training, partnerships between technical institutes and Higher Technological Institutes (ITS Academies), and secondary-school exchanges.