Whole‑of‑Government Approaches to Development Co‑operation

3. Implications of institutional set ups for development policy co‑ordination

Abstract

This chapter explores how institutional design shapes whole‑of‑government co‑ordination. It finds that the distribution of policy authority, budget responsibilities and implementation functions influences how governments align actors, manage trade-offs and pursue coherent development objectives. Drawing on a typology of four institutional models across DAC members, the chapter highlights how different configurations create distinct incentives, risks of fragmentation and governance requirements. The analysis underscores the importance of aligning co‑ordination mechanisms with institutional realities, connecting budget processes to strategic priorities, and ensuring clear roles and responsibilities. Experiences from South-South co‑operation providers offer additional insights into integrating development co‑operation within broader national policy frameworks.

Governance models for development co‑operation across government

Institutional design shapes how whole‑of‑government co‑ordination functions

Institutional set ups differ across DAC members and shape how whole‑of‑government co‑ordination is pursued. The way development co‑operation is organised across government has important implications for whole‑of‑government co‑ordination. Different institutional arrangements influence how actors work together, align priorities and manage trade-offs across policy areas (OECD, 2009[1]; OECD, 2020[2]). Understanding these institutional set-ups helps explain both the opportunities and challenges of co‑ordinating development co‑operation across government. The country notes accompanying this report highlight in-depth the institutional arrangements and co‑ordination mechanisms of six development partners.

The distribution of policy authority, budget control and implementation responsibilities across government institutions shapes the co‑ordination requirements and institutional dynamics of whole‑of‑government approaches. These dimensions determine where policy decisions are made, who allocates development resources, and which actors are responsible for delivering development co‑operation. The role of line ministries is particularly important, as it varies across institutional configurations and influences how whole‑of‑government approaches are operationalised in practice. Table 3.1 provides an analytical framework for understanding possible different configurations of policy authority, budget control and implementation responsibility.1

Table 3.1. Analytical framework for policy authority, budget control and implementation responsibility

Policy authority
Centralised single entity	Shared policy authority	Multi-actor policy
One ministry (usually MFA or a dedicated development ministry) holds the main mandate and leads strategy; line ministries contribute inputs but do not co‑decide core development.	Policy authority is split between two core actors (e.g. MFA + agency, MFA + Finance), sometimes with joint strategies and co‑signed decisions. Consultation/co‑ordination mechanisms are in place.	Multiple ministries or agencies have meaningful policymaking roles (e.g. sectoral strategies, parallel portfolios), yet there likely is one overarching lead ministry policy.
Budget control
Single budget holder	Central envelope with delegated sub-budgets	Multiple primary budget holders
One ministry holds the vast majority of ODA and makes allocation decisions; other ministries have only small, ad hoc lines, maybe joint funds.	A central ministry, MFA or finance ministry retains control over the budget, but (sometimes significant) sub‑envelopes are delegated to agencies or sector ministries under ex-ante agreed criteria.	Several ministries or agencies control large, relatively autonomous ODA‑relevant envelopes (e.g. MFA, Finance, Interior, sector ministries), with limited central control, often ex-post.
Implementation responsibility
Single integrated implementer	Embassy/agency-led implementation	Line ministry implementer
The main ministry (often MFA) runs most programmes directly, with embassy management at varying degrees of delegated authority + other implementing partners.	Stronger country presence, agency and or embassy manages the bulk of programmes and contracts, under policy guidance from the ministry. Line Ministries contribute somewhat systematically, especially in larger administration.	Sector ministries implement significant volumes of co‑operation (e.g. environment, justice, interior, health), often via peer‑to‑peer arrangements, twinning technical assistance, (in parallel to the main line of implementation).

Across the DAC, four models of whole‑of‑government development co‑operation can be identified based on how policy authority, funding and implementation responsibilities are organised. The four models are an approximation constructed from observed combinations of roles and responsibilities of different actors in DAC members. The four models are set out in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2. Typology of whole‑of‑government institutional set ups among DAC members

Model 1 Centralised single ministry	Policy leadership, resource allocation and strategic oversight are concentrated in one ministry. Other ministries contribute technical input but do not shape core decisions Implementation is carried out through embassies at varying degrees of autonomy with considerable oversight by lead ministry. Participation of line ministries is ad hoc and selective
Model 2 Delegated implementation	Policy authority is held by a lead ministry, sometimes shared with the agency or ministry of finance. A central budget envelope exists, with substantial sub‑delegation under agreed rules. The agency and/or embassies manage most programmes; line ministries participate selectively through delegated windows or technical co‑operation.
Model 3 Dual institutional anchor	Policy authority is shared between two or more core actors, often involving MFA and Finance. Large budget envelopes sit with multiple institutions. A central agency or pillar implements a significant share of ODA, alongside targeted line‑ministry delivery.
Model 4 Managed pluralism	Beyond the lead ministry, several ministries pursue sector‑specific development objectives linked to their mandates. Budgets are fragmented across multiple autonomous envelopes. Alongside central implementing agency or embassies, line ministries implement directly, often through peer‑to‑peer, twinning or technical assistance modalities.

Model 1: Centralised single ministry

A single ministry, often the ministry of foreign affairs, serves as the clear central authority for policy, budget and implementation while the level of involvement of other ministries is ad hoc. In this model, a single ministry holds the primary mandate for development co-operation, leading policy and the majority of budget allocation as well as implementation. While line ministries may provide inputs to strategies or access small ad hoc joint funding mechanism, they do not typically co-own development policies or strategies. Programmes are generally implemented under the ministry’s guidance through embassies and other partners with line ministry involvement varying according to resources and administrative capacity (see Chapter 5).

In some DAC members, the development function is integrated within the broader foreign affairs functions and in some cases linked to trade policy. For example, in Denmark, the responsibility for development policy and implementation is housed primarily in the development policy department, but is also integrated across each of the other departments in the foreign ministry. Australia and the Netherlands have a similar approach, with development, foreign affairs and trade fully integrated. This arrangement can support faster decision-making and clear alignment across development co‑operation activities (for instance, between multilateral and bilateral ODA, or between humanitarian and development co‑operation) (OECD, 2009[1]).

Centralised budget mechanisms can create opportunities for upstream co‑ordination across government. Often, DAC members in this model used budget processes as a strategic moment to align contributions from different ministries around common development objectives. By connecting policy dialogue and budget decisions upstream, such arrangements can help guide how non-lead ministries deliver development assistance and strengthen alignment around shared development outcomes (Gulrajani and Calleja, 2021[3]). Canada's International Assistance Envelope (IAE), for example, provides a whole‑of‑government framework through which Global Affairs Canada and the Department of Finance co‑ordinate international assistance allocations across departments and agencies, providing visibility over forward spending priorities across government2 (OECD, 2025[4]; Global Affairs Canada, 2024[5]). Similarly, the Netherlands' homogeneous budget framework brings together ODA and non-ODA international expenditures under a common strategic framework linked to foreign policy priorities (Tweede Kamer, 2025[6]).

Consolidation can help in fostering coherence but is not equivalent to, nor a substitute for whole‑of‑government approaches. Despite the growing number of actors involved in ODA, several DAC members, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, have consolidated development functions within foreign ministries to improve efficiency and strengthen links between development and foreign policy (Gulrajani, 2018[7]). Evidence on consolidation points toward mixed results in terms of achieving performance improvement and coherence (Calleja and Zattler, 2024[8]). For example, while consolidation in Iceland improved coherence and knowledge sharing, the arrangement was later reversed over concerns about protecting the long-term development priorities3 (OECD, 2023[9]). Countries with this centralised authority tend to rely on high‑level political bodies and integrated workflows as co‑ordination modalities. Consolidation is therefore not a substitute for a structured co‑ordination architecture that enables effective whole‑of‑government approaches. The main challenge for this model is ensuring that strong central control does not crowd out meaningful co-ownership by line ministries on cross‑cutting issues that require their expertise and substantive engagement.

Model 2: Delegated implementation

Policy authority remains primarily concentrated within the lead ministry, but delivery and parts of the budget are delegated to the implementing development agency, embassies or line ministries in a structured manner. Policy leadership usually is located in one ministry, often the MFA, but may be shared with a development agency through joint strategies, co‑signed policy documents, or shared governance arrangements. A central budget envelope is held by the lead ministry or ministry of finance, while significant sub‑envelopes are delegated to the implementing agency or sector ministries under ex‑ante agreed criteria. The development agency and/or embassy network manages a greater share of programmes and contracts under policy guidance, with line ministries involved mainly through delegated, partnership programmes or technical co‑operation rather than as autonomous implementers. These systems combining a ministry, agency and other actors often require both strategic joint bodies and operational committees for co‑ordination.

In this configuration, successful whole‑of‑government steering depends on clear roles, responsibilities and delegated authority, supported by governance arrangements that provide consistent policy direction across the system. This model can combine central strategic control with operational flexibility. Development agencies often serve as important co‑ordination nodes, linking headquarters and country operations while facilitating the participation of line ministries in programmes and technical co‑operation. In this case, it is important to have joint governance arrangements and clear mandates to avoid fragmentation of policy signals to other parts of government. DAC members such as Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain and Switzerland exhibit elements of this model through significant delegated responsibilities for development agencies or embassies. Czechia and the Slovak Republic illustrate that having an agency entails both potential advantages and operational challenges. In both countries, there is an ambition for the role of the agency to evolve further, by enabling them to implement programmes on behalf of line ministries more systematically and consistently. Increased capabilities and resources would be required to achieve this (OECD, 2026[10]).

Model 3: Dual institutional anchor

This model combines shared policy leadership and dispersed budget authority with an operational core. Policy authority is typically shared between two central actors, often the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of finance; while line ministries may have defined roles in specific sectors A central budget envelope may exist, but significant budget authority remains dispersed across multiple ministries with relatively autonomous spending lines. While some expenditures are planned and allocated as ODA from the outset, others are subsequently reported as ODA after disbursement. One or more agencies and strong country presence manage substantial shares of the programmes implemented by line ministries in specific sectors, creating a mixed landscape.

France and Korea are two countries that follow some of the characteristics of this model. In France, policy formulation is jointly overseen by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty. Most of the implementation of the bilateral portfolio is led by the AFD Group (Agence française de développement, including Expertise France and Proparco), while various ministries and local authorities also run their own programmes. Policy formulation for French development co‑operation is undertaken through a multi-layered structure that brings together the President, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (OECD, 2024[11]). The main strategic directions are adjusted and confirmed regularly, thereby institutionalising the consistency and coherence of policy. Korea’s development co‑operation is characterised by a dual institutional structure, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for grants and the Ministry of Finance and Economy responsible for concessional loans, under the overall co‑ordination of the Committee for International Development Co‑operation. Actual implementation is carried out by Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) (grants, reporting mainly to Foreign Affairs), the Export-Import Bank of Korea (Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) loans, reporting mainly to Finance), and over 34 other central agencies.

Sharing responsibilities can require more complex co‑ordination arrangements. Co-ordination mechanisms therefore tend to be more elaborate and may include joint strategies, co-signed policy documents, cross-membership on agency boards and structured dialogue platforms with line ministries. Such structure allows the effective use of ministry-specific expertise, but a key issue is managing trade‑offs between autonomy and coherence, and ensuring that central policy directions are still being followed by dispersed budget‑holders.

Model 4: Managed pluralism

While a lead ministry, often the ministry of foreign affairs, retains an important steering role, authority over policy, budgets and implementation is deliberately distributed across government.. Several ministries have meaningful policymaking roles, often reflecting their own sectoral strategies (e.g. environment, energy, justice, health, education) and different portfolios that intersect with development objectives. The lead ministry influences overall development policy but shares agenda-setting authority with other ministries. In Sweden, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads on development policy while thematic strategies are shaped across government (OECD, forthcoming[12]). Multiple line ministries also control sometimes large ODA envelopes, with relatively autonomous decision‑making under their own authority, as is the case for Hungary (Government of Hungary, 2024[13]). Often, these contributions are accounted as ODA after they have been already autonomously allocated by line ministries. Line ministries are also frequently involved directly in implementation, often through peer-to-peer programmes and technical assistance, not necessarily with the support of the embassy or agency but rather through parallel structures. Some DAC members that tend to follow this model, albeit with variations, are Austria, Greece and Hungary.

Dispersed authority increases the importance of mechanisms that provide visibility and strategic oversight across actors. Where multiple ministries manage development co‑operation resources, lead institutions may struggle to maintain a comprehensive overview of activities and ensure alignment with broader development objectives and partner-country priorities. Lithuania illustrates this challenge, as line ministries can allocate development co‑operation resources directly from their own budgets and report only after implementation (Government of Lithuania, unpublished[14]). To address similar risks of fragmentation, some DAC members have established formal review and approval mechanisms. Portugal, for example, requires public development co‑operation projects to receive prior approval from Camões (OECD, 2022[15]) (OECD, forthcoming[16]), while Korea reviews projects proposed by implementing institutions against national ODA strategies before incorporating them into its annual implementation plan (OECD, 2026[17]). Such arrangements help strengthen coherence where budget authority is distributed across multiple actors.

While this model enables broad engagement across government, it also creates significant co‑ordination challenges that require strong governance mechanisms. Governments may pursue multiple objectives that are not always internally coherent. Ensuring coherent strategies, preventing duplication or contradictory interventions, and aligning sectoral logic with an overarching development policy are particularly important when authority is dispersed, as strengthened co-ordination mechanisms can mitigate the fragmentation often associated with siloed administrative systems (Scott and Gong, 2021[18]). The experience of Poland and Slovenia shows a specific challenge for smaller dispersed systems: the lead ministry needs to distinguish between flows that offer limited scope for steering4, and flows where co‑ordination can improve development impact. Across some of the Central and Eastern European providers, this is particularly important for scholarships (see Chapter 5), earmarked contributions and technical co‑operation, where alignment with partner-country priorities and results is not automatic (OECD, 2026[10]).

What DAC members can learn from South-South providers’ institutional arrangements and co‑ordination mechanisms

South-South co‑operation (SSC) providers have unique experience integrating development co‑operation into national priorities and other policy areas. National SSC systems vary according to each country’s institutional set up (UNCTAD, 2025[19]). While SSC providers are diverse, they share a dual role as both recipients and providers, which gives them in-depth understanding and experience across the full value chain5 of incoming and outgoing development co‑operation. Their development co‑operation systems are grounded in the central government political and strategic direction, integrated within foreign policy and domestic sectorial economic and social policies and strategies. Rather than treating development co‑operation as a siloed commitment, SSC providers embed it at the presidential or highest political level, supported by lead ministries and agencies that co‑ordinate among other ministries across the government (APC-COLOMBIA; UNDP, 2022[20]). SSC providers often combine technical assistance and capacity building with trade and diverse financing instruments. Technical and knowledge exchanges are more common in Africa and Latin America, while trade, investment and development finance are prominent in Asia (Besherati and MacFeely, 2019[21]; Roa, 2020[22]). Many SSC providers draw on expertise in a range of sectors based on their own development trajectory when delivering co-operation.

South-South co‑operation (SSC) providers often extend whole‑of‑government approaches into whole-of-society models from the outset. As part of broader national development efforts, SSC providers bring together line ministries, sub-national authorities and non-state actors around shared strategy and priorities, anchored in a strong narrative and political support for development co‑operation (GPI on Effective Triangular Co-operation, 2019[23]). South-South co‑operation principles6 including national ownership, equitable partnerships, and multi-stakeholder engagement, which are complementary to the principles of effective development co‑operation7 and support policy coherence, inclusive partnerships and progress towards the SDGs (Roa, 2020[22]; UNOSSC, n.d.[24]). Colombia’s development co‑operation agency (APC-Colombia) co‑ordinates line ministries, public entities at national and local level, and non-state actors through sectoral and territorial multi-stakeholder working groups that support planning, implementation and knowledge exchange. Colombia’s Multi-Actor Platform for the SDGs further promotes intersectoral co‑ordination and strategic partnerships across government and non-government actors (OECD, 2026[25]). Similarly, Indonesia advocates for innovative approaches that scale and accelerate national, regional and international SDG implementation, and that advance sustainable development in line with environmental objectives (OECD, 2026[26]) (see Box 3.1.)

Box 3.1. Colombia’s and Indonesia’s co‑ordinated South-South co‑operation

Colombia

• Institutional set-up: Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides diplomatic stewardship of SSC, the Presidential Agency for Development Cooperation (APC-Colombia), serves as the technical and financial co-ordinator, and the National Planning Department co‑ordinates and monitors across the government and at all levels the formulation and implementation of national development priorities.

• Co‑ordination mechanism: Established in 2022, the National System for International Co‑operation of Colombia (SNCIC in Spanish) is the governance instrument for ensuring co‑ordination and strategic complementarity. It operates through three governance levels: strategic (policy guidance), programmatic (technical co‑ordination), and operational (implementation and monitoring), articulating national and sub-national entities, as well as the private sector and non-governmental actors

• Funding structure: Through the Cooperation and International Assistance Fund (FOCAI), APC-Colombia provides technical and financial co‑operation, as well as humanitarian assistance. Colombia shares expertise in agriculture, peace and security, and other social policies. The agency assesses the viability of SSC programmes before funds are committed, based on an institutional agreement of members of the directive level. Proposals are demand-driven and must promote knowledge generation, capacity building and technical, scientific, or technological exchange. (OECD, 2026[25]).

Indonesia

• Institutional set-up: Four main ministries are involved, the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State Secretariat. Together, these four ministries provide strategic guidance and policy direction for the country’s development co‑operation agenda, while relevant sectoral line ministries implement their activities. The Indonesian AID, under the Ministry of Finance, is the agency mandated to manage Indonesia’s international development assistance.

• Co‑ordination mechanism: The National Coordination Team, established in 2010, is the co‑ordination mechanism of Indonesia’s SSC system. It leads on strategy, cross‑government co‑ordination, and is responsible for conducting monitoring and evaluation of programmes, and ensures effective execution of SSC and sectorial ministries implement activities.

• Funding structure: Indonesian AID is the only entity managing SSC resources. Since 2019, Indonesian AID has extended support to 87 countries, in the form of grants and budget support, and through scholarships. Indonesian AID is exploring the possibility of extending loans to partner countries. Indonesia uses blended finance to create enabling environment for private investment in development countries (OECD, 2026[26]).

Both Colombia and Indonesia demonstrate that effective whole‑of‑government co‑ordination requires a clear strategic direction, supported by lead ministries or agencies involving stakeholders beyond the central government. This institutional set up uses, combine financing mechanisms that cross ministerial boundaries with knowledge management systems that enable technical assistance, and monitoring frameworks that capture non-financial contributions.

Source: OECD (2026[26]), Development Co‑operation Profiles: Indonesia, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co‑operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/indonesia_2de3e355-en.html#section-d1e174; OECD (2026[27]), Development Co‑operation Profiles: Colombia, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co‑operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/colombia_32c7d65f-en.html; OECD (2026[25]), Whole‑of‑government Co‑ordination in Development Co‑operation Country Notes: Colombia.

SSC providers, such as Colombia and Indonesia, also face challenges due to the complexity of their systems. While centralised models facilitate co‑ordination and mobilisation of expertise, they rely heavily on political steering and are vulnerable to political changes of priorities. The duality roles and multistakeholder nature of SSC countries also adds complexity to the equation. Data systems remain a major constraint, especially where monitoring, evaluation and information management system are weak, affecting the regularity, accuracy and completeness of data (Besherati and MacFeely, 2019[21]), as well as dual load of administrative costs, due to differences in data gathering and reporting methodologies (Roa, 2020[22]). The Bridging Data Systems for Financing for Development initiative under the Sevilla Platform for Action, co-led by Colombia, Norway and the United Kingdom, offers an opportunity to reduce reporting burdens and improve interoperability of data systems, while stronger collaboration, a new UN measure for South-South co‑operation and improved Total Official Support on Sustainable Development reporting are reshaping the data ecosystem (OECD/IsDB, 2025[28]). Digital and AI tools could also help improve reporting and consistency (see Chapter 4).

Key takeaways

• Institutional arrangements shape the incentives, relationships and co‑ordination requirements of whole‑of‑government approaches. The distribution of policy authority, budget control and implementation responsibilities determines how governments organise co‑ordination, manage trade-offs and align actors around shared development objectives. DAC members organise these functions in different ways.

• Different governance structures create different co‑ordination challenges and require different institutional responses.

  • Systems with a larger number of actors and more dispersed responsibilities typically require stronger steering functions, clearer accountability arrangements and more structured co‑ordination mechanisms.

  • Centralised systems do not automatically result in increased cross‑government co‑ordination and policy alignment if these are not deliberately planned.

• Budget processes provide an important mechanism for whole‑of‑government co‑ordination and can strengthen strategic steering across government.

  • Bringing discussions on resource allocation upstream helps governments align contributions from different ministries around shared development objectives, clarify expectations and identify trade-offs before implementation begins.

  • When budget responsibilities are more dispersed, mechanisms that improve visibility and oversight become increasingly important for maintaining coherence.

• Integration within broader national policy frameworks can strengthen ownership and co‑ordination of development co‑operation. Evidence from South‑South co‑operation providers shows that embedding development co‑operation within national strategies and foreign policy, and co‑ordinating it through strong central leadership and multi‑stakeholder mechanisms, can support more co‑ordinated and coherent action across government and beyond.

References

[20] APC-COLOMBIA; UNDP (2022), Assessing Development Effectiveness for South-South Cooperation (SSC): Perspectives from the Global South, UNDP, https://www.apccolombia.gov.co/sites/default/files/2022-12/PNUD.pdf.

[21] Besherati, N. and S. MacFeely (2019), Defining and Quantifying South-South Cooperation, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ser-rp-2019d2_en.pdf.

[8] Calleja, R. and J. Zattler (2024), A Merger in the Making? What Germany Should Learn From the Department Mergers of the Past, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/merger-making-what-germany-should-learn-department-mergers-past.

[5] Global Affairs Canada (2024), Statistical Report on International Assistance: Fiscal Year 2022-2023, https://international.canada.ca/international-canada/assets/pdfs/international-assistance-report-stat-rapport-aide-internationale/2022-2023-en.pdf.

[13] Government of Hungary (2024), Hungary Helps Program Act, https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/f/08/83000/Act%20LXXXIX%20of%202023%20on%20the%20Hungary%20Helps%20Program.pdf.

[14] Government of Lithuania (unpublished), OECD DAC Mid-term Review Self-assessment, Unpublished.

[23] GPI on Effective Triangular Co-operation (2019), Triangular Co-operation in the Era of the 2030 Agenda: Sharing Evidence and Stories from the Field, https://triangular-cooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Final-GPI-report-BAPA40.pdf.

[7] Gulrajani, N. (2018), Merging development agencies, https://media.odi.org/documents/11983.pdf.

[3] Gulrajani, N. and R. Calleja (2021), Can we better manage donor insitutions for tackling global challenges?, https://media.odi.org/documents/Can_we_better_manage_donor_institutions_for_tackling_global_challenges_september.pdf.

[27] OECD (2026), Development Co‑operation Profiles: Colombia, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/colombia_32c7d65f-en.html.

[26] OECD (2026), Development Co‑operation Profiles: Indonesia, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/indonesia_2de3e355-en.html#section-d1e174.

[25] OECD (2026), Whole-of-Government Co-ordination in Development Co-operation Country Notes: Colombia, https://doi.org/10.1787/05846ace-en.

[17] OECD (2026), Whole-of-Government Co-ordination in Development Co-operation Country Notes: Korea, https://doi.org/10.1787/05846ace-en.

[10] OECD (2026), Whole-of-Government Co-ordination in Development Co-operation Country Notes: selected Central and Eastern European DAC Members, https://doi.org/10.1787/05846ace-en.

[4] OECD (2025), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Canada 2025, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fcd70ea1-en.

[11] OECD (2024), OECD Development Co‑operation Peer Reviews: France 2024, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/102d5469-en.

[9] OECD (2023), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Iceland 2023, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a1552817-en.

[15] OECD (2022), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Portugal 2022, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/550fb40e-en.

[2] OECD (2020), Development Insights: DAC peer learning brief on working across government, ONE Members & Partners, https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2020)46/en/pdf.

[1] OECD (2009), Managing Aid: Practices of DAC Member Countries, Better Aid, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264062689-en.

[16] OECD (forthcoming), OECD DAC Mid-term Review: Portugal.

[12] OECD (forthcoming), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden 2026, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris.

[28] OECD/IsDB (2025), Global Perspectives on Triangular Co-operation 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f713f2ce-en.

[22] Roa, L. (2020), Synergies to Increase Impact: South-south Co-operation and the Effectiveness Agenda, https://www.effectivecooperation.org/group/gpedc-programme-work-action-area-23-supporting-country-led-development-effectiveness-south-0 (accessed on 5 June 2026).

[18] Scott, I. and T. Gong (2021), “Coordinating government silos: challenges and opportunities”, Global Public Policy and Governance, Vol. 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-021-00004-z.

[6] Tweede Kamer (2025), Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking 2026 (Homogeneous Group for International Cooperation 2026), https://open.overheid.nl/overheid/openbaarmakingen/api/v0/attachment/15f4bc2d-ebdc-407f-bc5a-e4a19853487e.

[19] UNCTAD (2025), Manual for the framework to measure South–South cooperation: Technical and procedural aspects, https://unctad.org/publication/manual-framework-measure-south-south-cooperation.

[24] UNOSSC (n.d.), About South-South and Triangular Cooperation, https://unsouthsouth.org/about/about-sstc/ (accessed on 5 June 2026).

Notes

← 1.  While the categories identified in Table 3.1 are an approximation, they provide concrete parameters to understand whether systems are centralised and thus integrated by design, have shared responsibilities, or have a proliferation of actors.

← 2.  The envelope does not account for flows delivered through sub-national (provincial, territorial, municipal) channels, nor does it include funding allocated through other government expenditures (e.g. first-year costs of refugees from developing countries in Canada); non-budgetary items (e.g. bilateral debt forgiveness); or imputed values (e.g. developing country students studying in Canada).

← 3.  In Iceland, between 2020-22, a joint directorate covering international affairs and development co‑operation had increased the coherence between foreign policy and development co‑operation decisions, and enabled knowledge sharing between diplomatic staff and development officials; however the MFA then reverted to two separate directorates to protect development policy by de-linking it from political priorities after assessing that consolidation had the potential to jeopardise the long term poverty-focused approach to development assistance

← 4.  Such as assessed EU and core multilateral contributions

← 5.  Value chain is understood as the full lifecycle of development co‑operation, from policy, planning, programming and financing, to implementation, monitoring and evaluation and back again to decision making and adaptation.

← 6.  The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) outlines the guiding principles of South-South co‑operation: respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit. For more information on the role SSC and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, as discussed in the Second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Co‑operation (BAPA +40) in 2019, see: https://triangular-cooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Final-GPI-report-BAPA40.pdf.

← 7.  Country ownership, results, inclusive partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability