Development Co‑operation Profiles: Chinese Taipei
Table of contents
Chinese Taipei is committed to international development co‑operation, with the overarching goal of improving the well-being of its partner countries; reducing poverty; promoting human security; and safeguarding universal values such as peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Chinese Taipei emphasises a mutual benefit and demand-based co-operation approach with its global partners. Its co-operation is mostly provided bilaterally, with a regional focus on Central America and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Oceania. Chinese Taipei’s total official development assistance (ODA) (USD 445.7 million, preliminary data) increased in 2025, representing 0.05% of gross national income (GNI).
This profile presents verified data on Chinese Taipei’s development assistance allocations. See the Development Co-operation Profiles.
The 2023 White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy guides Chinese Taipei’s development co-operation policy, with the four overarching objectives of: 1) fostering friendly ties and achieving mutual benefits with its partner countries; 2) expanding and deepening Chinese Taipei’s participation in the international community; 3) becoming a reliable partner in global sustainable development; and 4) contributing professional expertise pragmatically. The White Paper also sets out regional strategies for Chinese Taipei’s co‑operation in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australasia; Central Asia; the Middle East; Africa; and Central and Eastern Europe, and for strengthening collaboration with the private sector and civil society organisations.
The International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) implements Chinese Taipei’s development co-operation. TaiwanICDF’s priority thematic areas include public health and medicine, small and medium-sized enterprises, the environment, agriculture, education, and information and communication technologies.
As part of its strategy, Chinese Taipei also actively engages in multilateral organisations to advance sustainable development, notably through regional development banks,1 including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and the Inter‑American Development Bank.
Chinese Taipei provided USD 445.7 million (preliminary data) of ODA in 2025 (USD 423.7 million in constant terms), representing 0.05% of GNI.2 This was an increase of 5% in real terms in volume and a decrease in the share of GNI from 2024. Within Chinese Taipei’s ODA portfolio in 2024, 99.2% was provided in the form of grants, 0.8% was extended as loans.
Chinese Taipei channels all of its ODA bilaterally. In 2024, Chinese Taipei ranked high among other official providers beyond the DAC on financial amounts mobilised from the private sector.
Notes: This table only includes information about ODA data-related DAC recommendations. ODA: official development assistance; GNI: gross national income; DAC: Development Assistance Committee.
Chinese Taipei provided all of its ODA bilaterally in 2024.
In 2024, Chinese Taipei’s bilateral spending declined compared to the previous year. It provided USD 400.3 million of gross bilateral ODA (which includes earmarked contributions to multilateral organisations). This represented a decrease of 18.6% in real terms from 2023.
In 2024, country programmable aid amounted to USD 34.5 million, or 8.6% of Chinese Taipei’s gross bilateral ODA, compared to the non-DAC country average of 43.1%.
In 2024, Chinese Taipei channelled its bilateral ODA mainly through public sector.
In 2024, Chinese Taipei’s bilateral ODA primarily focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. USD 20.9 million was allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean and USD 9.9 million to Oceania, accounting respectively for 5.2% and 2.5% of gross bilateral ODA. USD 6.3 million was allocated to countries in Africa.
In 2024, 7% of gross bilateral ODA went to Chinese Taipei’s top 10 recipients. Its top 10 recipients are in Latin America and the Caribbean(Belize, Guatemala, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia), Africa (Eswatini) and Oceania (Palau, Fiji, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu). The share of gross bilateral ODA not allocated by country was 91.8%.
In 2024, Chinese Taipei allocated the highest share of gross bilateral ODA (6.7%) to upper middle‑income countries in 2024, noting that 91.8% was unallocated by income group. LDCs received 0.5% of Chinese Taipei’s gross bilateral ODA (USD 1.9 million). Additionally, Chinese Taipei allocated 1.4% of gross bilateral ODA to land-locked developing countries in 2024, equal to USD 5.8 million. Chinese Taipei allocated 5.2% of gross bilateral ODA to small island developing states (SIDS) in 2024, equal to USD 20.7 million.
The distribution of Chinese Taipei’s ODA in net terms in relation to “ODA per person in extreme poverty”3 was USD 0.1 in lower middle-income countries (LMICs) and USD 1.4 in upper middle-income countries.
Support to contexts with high and extreme fragility was USD 7.9 million in 2024, representing 2% of Chinese Taipei’s gross bilateral ODA. Learn more about the States of Fragility platform.
In 2024, the largest sectoral focus of Chinese Taipei's bilateral ODA was production sectors. Investments in this area accounted for 40.6% of bilateral ODA disbursements (USD 162.5 million), with a strong focus on support to agriculture, forestry, fishing (USD 118.2 million), industry, mining, construction (USD 23.8 million) and tourism (USD 20.5 million). ODA for social infrastructure and services totalled USD 145.2 million, with a focus on health and population (USD 42.9 million). Economic infrastructure and services amounted to USD 57.8 million (14.4% of bilateral ODA).
In 2024, Chinese Taipei allocated 9.6% of bilateral ODA (USD 38.5 million) to social protection support. Learn more by exploring the Reducing poverty and inequalities through ODA data explainer.
In 2024, total official and private flows from Chinese Taipei to developing countries amounted to USD 407.2 million in net terms. Official sources accounted for USD 386.2 million, while USD 21 million originated from private sources.
To help build markets in developing countries and incentivise greater mobilisation of private resources for development, many providers, including Chinese Taipei, have established development finance institutions (DFIs) and similar vehicles that extend private sector instruments (PSI). PSI represented 1.2% of Chinese Taipei’s ODA in 2024 while the DAC average stood at 1.9%.
In 2024, TaiwanICDF extended USD 5 million in the form of PSI to developing countries.4 Of this, mezzanine finance instruments accounted for 100%.
In 2024, USD 5 million (100%) of Chinese Taipei’s private sector instruments were allocated to lower middle-income countries. Chinese Taipei’s PSI primarily supported projects in the banking and financial services (100%).
Chinese Taipei uses leveraging mechanisms to mobilise private finance for sustainable development. In 2024, TaiwanICDF mobilised USD 21.5 million from the private sector through direct investment in companies and special purpose vehicles, as well as simple co-financing.
Private finance mobilised by Chinese Taipei in 2024 mainly targeted middle-income countries, representing 81.4% of its total mobilised, noting that 18.6% was unallocated by income group.
Mobilised private finance by Chinese Taipei in 2024 related mainly to activities in the health sector (40.3%), as its top sector.
Learn more by exploring the Mobilisation of private finance for development dashboard.
Total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD) is an international statistical standard that monitors and increases the transparency of all official and officially supported resources for financing the SDGs received by developing countries (Pillar 1) and for addressing global challenges (Pillar 2). In 2024, activities reported by Chinese Taipei as TOSSD totalled USD 405.3 million, marking a 19% decrease compared with the previous year.5 Chinese Taipei’s TOSSD activities mostly targeted SDG 17 (partnerships for the Goals), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth) and SDG 4 (quality education). Activity-level data on TOSSD by recipient are available at: https://tossd.online.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has overall responsibility for Chinese Taipei’s international development co-operation. The International Cooperation and Development Act, adopted by the government of Chinese Taipei in 2010, designated TaiwanICDF as the main institution responsible for implementing its development co-operation. TaiwanICDF’s co-operation activities are centred around lending and investment; technical co-operation; humanitarian assistance; and international education and training. It partners with 32 countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. TaiwanICDF has 20 technical missions in 19 countries. Beyond TaiwanICDF, the MOFA and other ministries also provide development co-operation.
In 2023, the MOFA updated its national ODA Database in line with the latest OECD Creditor Reporting System, which serves since 2010 as the database to collate information on international co-operation and development from relevant government agencies.
The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development placed a renewed emphasis on strengthening the effectiveness of all forms of development co-operation by upholding and elevating the Effectiveness Principles. Adherence to these principles is measured through the partner country-led monitoring exercise of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Chinese Taipei participated in the 2023-2026 monitoring round through its reporting to one partner country, Guatemala. Its results can be found here.
Access the full list of providers of development co-operation at: Development Co-operation Profiles.
Chinese Taipei Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://en.mofa.gov.tw.
International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF): https://www.icdf.org.tw/wSite/mp?mp=2.
2023 White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/cl.aspx?n=3927.
Chinese Taipei has been reporting to the OECD since 2004 at the aggregate level and since 2023 partly at the activity level.
The methodological notes provide further details on the definitions and statistical methodologies applied, including the grant-equivalent methodology, core and earmarked contributions to multilateral organisations, country programmable aid, channels of delivery, bilateral ODA unspecified/unallocated, bilateral allocable ODA, the gender equality policy marker, and the environment markers.
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← 1. Backed by Chinese Taipei’s ODA. Cited in the 2023 White Paper.
← 2. DAC members adopted the grant-equivalent methodology starting from their reporting of 2018 data as a more accurate way to count the donor effort in development loans. See the methodological notes for further details.
← 3. Aid per person in extreme poverty is calculated by dividing net ODA (bilateral and imputed multilateral) by the population in extreme poverty in each country. It estimates how much ODA each person in extreme poverty would receive if total ODA was divided evenly among the extreme poor. This metric does not measure the amount of ODA actually received by each person in extreme poverty, nor does it measure how much ODA goes to poverty reduction. It instead highlights patterns in total ODA allocations relative to the number of people living in extreme poverty in each country. Group averages are calculated based on a weighted average of aid per person in extreme poverty and the number of people in extreme poverty for each country in the group. See the methodological notes for further details.
← 4. In 2023, the DAC agreed on revised reporting methods for measuring PSI in ODA based on ODA grant equivalents. Members may, however, take up to two years to transition to the new methods, with their PSI continuing to be accounted for on a net ODA basis during the transition period.
← 5. This amount does not include mobilised private finance by Chinese Taipei.