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for increased critical public support

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**Public Opinion Research,
Global Education and
Development Co-operation Reform:
In Search of a Virtuous Circle**

by

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**Public opinion and international development co-operation
in OECD DAC Member countries:
summary of trends**

1. Public support in OECD DAC Member countries for helping poor countries has remained consistently high for almost two decades: there is no aid fatigue.
2. Donations from the public to development and emergency NGOs have been increasing, mostly in reaction to emergencies and natural disasters in developing countries.
3. Concern among the public about aid effectiveness exists alongside continued high support for aid.
4. The relationship between public support and ODA volumes is complex, but a positive correlation exists at the national level between satisfaction with ODA volume, and reaching or bypassing the UN target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income.
5. People's understanding of poverty and development issues remains very shallow. Public awareness about ODA and development co-operation policies is also low.
6. Awareness does increase significantly as a result of global education, awareness raising campaigns, public debate and media focus.
7. The majority of people identify the media as a primary source of information about developing countries, although there is some evidence of scepticism about the nature of the information.
8. Official expenditure on global education and on information about national aid programmes has been increasing in some OECD countries, but remains very low.
9. Better educated, more aware, young and urban dwelling individuals are stronger supporters of development co-operation.

Policy conclusions

Citizens in OECD countries unambiguously support more solidarity and justice at the international level: if they were better educated and knew more about global development issues, they could provide informed, critical support to reformers in their country, so as to foster more vigorous, more efficient and coherent development co-operation policies. Engaging critical public support in the fight against global poverty requires:

1. **better and more internationally comparable data on public opinion and international development co-operation**, for closer and more coherent monitoring of trends. This can be achieved through closer co-ordination among DAC Member countries Information Units.
2. a significant **stepping up of investment in global education**, including determining adequate targets for spending.
3. more transparent information on development co-operation policies, which also requires a significant **increased investment in information services**. OECD countries have taken steps in that direction, some as part of a more general move towards a more consultative and participatory type of governance at home.

I. The global anti-poverty consensus: driving the reform of international co-operation

A strong global political consensus on the importance of fighting poverty was incarnated by the adoption of the *Millennium Development Goals* in 2000.¹ Virtually all international institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN and its agencies, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), etc., have rallied to the “global anti-poverty consensus”. The 2001 *World Development Report* of the World Bank called for a sharp increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in order to meet the Goals. The WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha (November 2001), the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (March 2002) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (September 2002) all made poverty reduction and sustainable development global priority objectives, and sought common strategies to reach them.

Africa in particular is in the media spotlight and on the agenda of policy makers through the promotion by African leaders of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an initiative aimed at accelerating development and reducing poverty on the continent. It was one of the main topics of the Kananaskis G8 summit in June 2002, which adopted an Africa Action Plan.

This global consensus seemed to gain additional impetus, in the aftermath of the attacks on the United States in September 2001:²

“In the wake of the tragedy of September 11th, facing these challenges –the eradication of poverty, the promotion of inclusion and social justice, bringing the marginalized into the mainstream of the global economy and society– and taking multilateral action to meet them, are more important than ever.” (James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, Sarajevo, October 19, 2001).

It may therefore seem a paradox that, for all these strong political declarations and commitments, global aid flows to developing countries have been declining continuously since the early 1990s. Indeed, the volume of ODA as a share of the combined gross national income (GNI) of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Member countries fell from 0.33 per cent in 1992 to 0.22 per cent in 2001, far from the 0.7 per cent share they have committed to. Even at the time of writing this paper, net ODA across OECD countries was still declining, by 1.4 per cent in real terms in 2001.

However, in the same year, looking closer into the figures, it appears that 13 of the twenty-two DAC Member countries actually reported a rise in ODA in real terms, including nine EU Member states.³ This may signal a reversal in the decline of aid flows, and possibly an early concretisation of the commitment to reaching the MDGs.

¹ The Millennium Development Goals were adopted in the Millennium Declaration at the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2000. Their overriding objective is to halve the proportion of the world’s population living in poverty (www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). On progress towards the goals, see the Paris 21 website « A better world for all », at www.paris21.org/betterworld/, as well as the World Bank’s website at www.developmentgoals.org/.

² Remarkably, some surveys conducted soon after the attacks indicated an increase in support for aid to developing countries (see for example the case of Japan in Mc Donnell *et al.*, forthcoming).

³ See OECD DAC ODA statistics at www.oecd.org/dac/stats. “A Mixed Picture of Official Development Assistance in 2001: The US Becomes the World’s Largest Donor Again; Most EU Members’ Aid Also Rises. [...] The fall in current dollar terms from \$53.7 billion in 2000 to \$51.4 billion in 2001, results in part from falls in the exchange rates of some currencies [of which the Yen] against the United States dollar. In real terms, ODA remained relatively stable, with a slight fall of 1.4 per cent.” (13/05/2002).

Beyond the issue of ODA *volumes*, two critical factors of success for reaching the goals and halving world poverty by 2015 are the *quality and effectiveness* of aid, and the *coherence* of policies in relation to development. These policy challenges arguably form the most comprehensive reform agenda of international co-operation to date.

Faced with these challenges, the « development community » has been mobilising. Development co-operation is being revised, stimulated by a renewal of critical analysis by specialised institutions and academics (the « Dollar report »)⁴, independent civil society organisations (the report on « The Reality of Aid »)⁵ and by donors themselves (the DAC reports)⁶. These new approaches include a gradual shift from project aid to programme aid and budgetary support, innovative institutional mechanisms to involve « new actors » (NGOs, local communities, local governments, the private sector), an emphasis on ownership by the beneficiaries, the fight against corruption, and effective co-ordination and harmonisation of their practices. This list is not exhaustive.

This work argues it is not enough. To bring about the changes that world poverty alleviation entails, stronger democratic support by citizens is necessary. Our research demonstrates that there is little reason to fear that invoking public support may slow or hinder the reform of international co-operation in pursuit of the MDGs: on the contrary, public support has remained consistently high for two decades, and is a precious constituency.

When the last *Public Opinion* book was published by the Development Centre and the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, at the end of the 1990s, proponents of the “aid fatigue” argument thought of the public as scrupulous taxpayers who needed full reassurance of money well-spent (Smillie & Helmich, 1998).⁷ Despite clear evidence of no ‘aid fatigue’⁸, the next logical step was to invoke public scepticism to justify the freezing or reduction of ODA levels, as observed in several OECD countries over the last decade. In the new Millennium, however, more positive arguments are being heard: an international development Minister calling for bolder political commitment to development and poverty alleviation, argued in 2002 that “People would support us if they knew what we do with the [Official Development Assistance] resources”.⁹

Yet grasping public attitudes and opinion about official aid and development co-operation is immensely difficult. What does the “public” really think? How much does it actually know,

⁴ World Bank (1998); Collier and Dollar (2001). See also the World Bank website « Assessing Aid : Rethinking the Money and Ideas of Aid »: www.worldbank.org/research/aid/overview.htm.

⁵ Established in 1993, the *Reality of Aid* project brings together several NGOs which regularly publish an independent and critical assessment of international aid. See www.devinit.org/realityofaid/.

⁶ The OECD Development Assistance Committee regularly reviews the performance of each members’ development co-operation policies in the context of its peer reviews (www.oecd.org/dac/).

⁷ “Aid fatigue” originally described public disillusion with humanitarian aid. Only later was it used to name the presumed reluctance of citizens vis-à-vis development aid in general. The argument was even referred to by the head of an aid recipient country, who commented that introducing good governance conditionality in the post-Lomé EU-ACP agreement might be “the best way to re-motivate public opinion in Europe which clearly shows signs of *aid fatigue*” (Speech of the President of Nigeria at the ACP-EU Joint Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria, 20-23 March 2000; www.europarl.eu.int/intcoop/acp/abuja2000/pdf/press/mon/am/en/default.pdf).

⁸ There was actually little evidence, if any, of the assumed positive correlation between the level of public support and changes in ODA. Experts have argued instead that this “fatigue” might be mostly a projection of policy makers’ own fatigue into the public domain (Smillie *et al.*, 1999; Stern, 1998). Similarly, the 2001 UN-ESCAP report saw the reluctance of the donor countries’ taxpayers as a possible cause for the decline in ODA, but mostly because of misinformation: “It is not, perhaps, unreasonable to assume that the taxpayers in donor countries are not very much aware of the quantitative smallness of their contribution. One way of dealing with aid fatigue may, therefore, be for the governments of donor countries to educate the public in this regard. In addition, the donor governments could undertake serious efforts to make the public better informed of the mutuality of interests”. (UN-ESCAP, 2001). On the aid fatigue argument, see also Olsen (2001).

⁹ Speech by Clare Short, British Secretary of State for International Development, at a conference organised by the Spanish EU Presidency on “Democracy and Development” (Valladolid, 7th March 2002).

and understand, about development, poverty or international co-operation? Does public opinion have an impact on the way development co-operation policies are devised and implemented? Seeking firm answers to these questions, one is rapidly confronted with a frustrating scarcity of data. There is no systematic polling and monitoring of public attitudes towards these issues across OECD DAC Member countries.

This paper is based on a forthcoming book—a sequel to volumes published in 1996 and 1998—which attempts to clarify the issues by bringing together national public opinion polls of public support for foreign aid (see Tables 2 and 3).¹⁰ Its clear conclusion, based on the most complete evidence available to date, is that public support for international development co-operation in OECD DAC Member countries has remained consistently high for almost two decades, and that there is scope for informing and engaging citizens much more actively in this area.

II. Public opinion and international development co-operation: recent trends and stylised facts

A changing context: globalisation and the globalising “civil society”

The public’s perception of global development and poverty issues, and of international development co-operation policies in OECD DAC Member Countries, is shaped by several determinants, which vary strongly across countries. These include the country’s type of institutions and long-term socio-economic choices, its political and economic weight in the world (the United States, Japan), colonial history and links with ex-colonies (France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal,...), its own history of poverty, famine or conflict (Ireland, Spain, Greece), awareness about international development co-operation issues (Switzerland), etc.¹¹ Also, the study reveals—as have earlier studies—a correlation between perceptions of economic well being and support for ODA: in bad times or in a sentiment of economic crisis, public opinion is likely—although not bound—to be less supportive of an increase in ODA.

Moreover, factors affecting public opinion vary in time. Indeed, since the previous study in 1998, policy changes or dramatic events have occurred which could be expected to have an impact. Among them are the perceived acceleration of globalisation, and the rising influence of the “globalising civil society”.

The turn of the century saw *globalisation* occupy centre stage in the public debate, both at national and global levels. In OECD Member countries, fears of negative impacts on security, welfare, culture, food security, social cohesion, jobs, etc., all grew rapidly through the 1990s into the new Millennium. Alongside these immediately “self-centred” concerns, though, issues of more global relevance, such as the protection of the environment, growing global

¹⁰ *Public Opinion and the Fight against Global Poverty*, by Mc Donnell, Solignac Lecomte and Wegimont (eds., forthcoming) is the third book published by the Development Centre on public attitudes about international development co-operation. The first one, *Public Support for International Development* (Foy & Helmich, 1996), was produced jointly with the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The second one, *Public Attitudes and International Development Co-operation* (Smillie & Helmich, 1998) was published in collaboration with the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe, as is this forthcoming one.

¹¹ See Lumsdaine (1993) for evidence on the correlation between welfare states, ODA flows and public support for ODA, and Noël and Thérien (2002) on the links between public opinion and national and global justice in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.

inequality, human rights violations involving international criminals, etc., also gained prominence.¹²

Global development and poverty issues are thus bound to be increasingly framed in broader debates and perceptions about globalisation. While fears of it may result in a shift from an altruistic to a more egoistic attitude of the public vis-à-vis poor countries' fate, an increasing sense of interdependence between regions and cultures may spur new forms of solidarity and commitment to social change at the global level.¹³ In that context, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw innovative individual behaviours on the verge of being mainstreamed, such as the consumption of "fair trade" products.¹⁴ As the study shows, both effects—negative and positive—are actually observed in DAC Member countries, without affecting the level of the persistently high overall public support for development co-operation.

Hope for some form of world-wide, democratic response to the challenges of a more integrated planet did not merely fuel advocacy by "traditional" NGOs (e.g. on development and the environment), they prompted a larger, very heterogeneous movement critical of governmental and inter-governmental institutions—including the WTO, the international financial institutions, the EU, the G8, etc.—, perceived as unable to provide the sort of global governance that global challenges require.¹⁵ New communication technologies allowed individuals and organisations to address those issues across borders, creating a new breed of non-governmental organisations, which Scholte (1999) defines as the "globalising civil society":

Global civil society encompasses civic activity that: (a) addresses transworld issues; (b) involves transborder communication; (c) has a global organisation; (d) works on a premise of supraterritorial solidarity. Often these four attributes go hand in hand, but civic associations can also have a global character in only one or several of these four respects.

These new actors were particularly efficient in making policy debates—once seen as reserved for experts and technocrats—spill over onto the world wide web, and, using more "traditional" means of expressing concern, onto the streets.¹⁶ That they should have been hastily labelled as "anti-globalisation" is a contradiction in terms, since they are arguably a vivid illustration of globalisation itself. Unlike humanitarian and development NGOs, these organisations rarely conduct activities in the field.¹⁷ Their actions are mostly aimed at influencing the policy debate, to the point where they provided a link between humanitarian and development NGOs and outright political activist groups.¹⁸

¹² An attempt to conceptualise those concerns lies with the UN concept of 'Global public goods', which stems from the idea that 'we have entered a new era of public policy, defined by a growing number of concerns that straddle national borders' (Kaul *et al.*, 1999; www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/).

¹³ According to a 1999 United Kingdom opinion poll, over two-thirds of the public think that Third World poverty could have damaging effects on the United Kingdom (DFID, 2000).

¹⁴ Little accurate data on "fair trade" is available, but sources indicate a growth in awareness and actual purchases, as well as a growing influence on business practices (Tallontire, Rentsendorj and Blowfield, 2001). According to the European Fair Trade Association, the annual aggregate net retail value of fair trade products sold in Europe exceeded 260 million euros in 2001, up 30 per cent from 1998, with peaks in certain products. For example, fair trade bananas represent 15 per cent of the Swiss market (EFTA, 2002).

¹⁵ Sixty-five per cent of respondents in a French survey say they support the so-called 'anti-globalisation' movement (Fougier, 2001).

¹⁶ Examples include the 1999 Ministerial meeting of the WTO (Nov/Dec, Seattle: 50,000 demonstrators); the 2000 meeting of the World Bank and the IMF (November, Prague: 9,000), the 2001 meeting of the G8 (July, Genoa: 200,000) and EU summits (December 2000, Nice: 60,000; June 2001, Göteborg: 20,000).

¹⁷ Other than "soft" ones, such as awareness raising, training, networking or information dissemination.

¹⁸ Anheier *et al.* (2001); Solagral and UNESCO-Most (2002).

One potential consequence of the formation of such transnational movements could be the surfacing of cross-border strands of public opinion, mirrored by the fragmentation of national public opinions along various socio-economic lines. Some of the country case studies in the book actually demonstrate the latter. The former—transnational public opinion—however, is difficult to analyse systematically, for data is very often collected at national levels only. One exception is the European-wide Eurobarometer survey, which regularly collects homogenous data across EU countries.

This new vigour of civil society may also provide fresh channels for raising public awareness on development and poverty issues, and promote new forms of action by citizens in developed countries in solidarity with poor populations in developing ones. The *Jubilee 2000* movement, which called for the cancellation of third-world debt, is a case in point. However, only a fraction of these new actors actually aim to support or influence international development co-operation, and those who do have yet to translate into sustained, efficient political pressure in favour of more ambitious and more efficient development co-operation policies.

Public support for official aid: consistently high

This section synthesises the data collected across OECD DAC Member countries. It distinguishes between *public support for official aid* and *public satisfaction with levels of official aid* (see Tables 2 and 3 respectively at the end of this paper). Current trends as assessed by polls in OECD countries confirm this point: public support for aid has remained high and stable for two decades, and there is no sign of general aid fatigue among the public. Figure 1 shows that a large majority of OECD citizens support the principle of giving aid to developing countries. Running between 70 per cent and 88 per cent support, the average support over thirteen countries comes to 80.4 per cent. This is marginally higher than the 80 per cent average found by Stern in the EU in 1995, which itself was two per cent higher than that found in the same region in 1983 (UNDP, 1998).


Within the small segment of respondents who do not support ODA, the main argument put forward is that ‘we should solve our own problems of poverty, unemployment and economy’, followed by suspicion that aid does not lead to poverty reduction, or go to the neediest, and instead benefits corrupt governments.¹⁹

Trying to link those levels of public support with ODA levels almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that the former does not have a direct influence on the latter. Indeed, on the whole, and in spite of some differences among OECD Member countries, foreign policy decisions, and more particularly those relating to aid and international development co-operation are hardly influenced, at least directly, by the general public’s preferences. Governments’ strategic priorities, perceptions of political leaders and decision makers, the influence of domestic vested interests and specific pressure groups, or the role of other government departments and actors in the public domain, appear to be much more influential factors.²⁰

¹⁹ Eurobarometer 50.1 in INRA (1999).

²⁰ Olsen (*Ibid.*). On the determinants of aid allocation, see also Berthélemy and Tichit (*forthcoming*).

Figure 1. Public Support for the Principle of Providing Aid to Developing Countries in Thirteen OECD DAC Member Countries (in percentages, 2001)



Notes: * 1999.
** 2000.

Source: Table 2 and individual country notes in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming).

Awareness and understanding of development issues and policies remain limited

Humanitarian assistance appeals more to the public than development aid

In most cases, the overwhelming support for foreign aid is based upon the perception that it will be spent on remedying humanitarian crises. The UNFPA/MORI (2001) survey of 13 European countries indicates a bias towards humanitarian concerns against all other dimensions—with the exception of the environment—such as international trade, governance or democracy issues. In response to the question *What would you say were the two or three most important problems facing the world as a whole, today?* the top three responses were:

- (i) environment /global warming (average 31 per cent, an increase of six per cent since 1996),
- (ii) famine / starvation / malnutrition / hunger, and war / national / international conflict / violence (average 30 per cent), and
- (iii) poverty (21 per cent).

To the same question asked in 1996, environmental concerns came second, after famine and starvation. Public opinion, while consistent, does change over the years. By contrast, the level of importance placed on other development-related issues is quite low. For example, *Third*

World debt/trade barriers/increasing gap between rich and poor countries was selected by nine per cent of respondents, followed by *Consumerism/materialism/personal consumption* (3 per cent) and *Democracy (lack of)/need for democracy/collapse of communism/dictatorships* (4 per cent). Other interesting changes from 1996 were that concern about *unemployment* declined by 14 percentage points, down to four per cent of responses, and *natural disasters* increased by 12 percentage points, up to 16 per cent.

Box 1
The Case for Aid:
The Public's Motives across OECD DAC Member Countries

- The majority of the Japanese public see Africa and South Asia as priority regions for ODA because of poverty and malnutrition.
- For Australians, moral responsibility is the main motive behind aid, although the most recent public opinion poll found that support for long-term development aid was greater than for emergency aid, where reducing poverty is regarded as one of the most important issues facing the world today.
- Over 80 per cent of Austrians support aid because it is the right thing to do, and natural disasters are one of their main concerns.
- The Canadians are most comfortable with foreign aid for basic human needs. At the same time, they place the greatest importance on foreign policy goals of protecting the global environment and pursuing world peace.
- In the United Kingdom, poverty eradication in developing countries is a moral issue for 68 per cent of the survey population.
- Combating world hunger receives greatest support in the United States.
- In Switzerland, a distinction is made between development co-operation and humanitarian aid, the latter supported by more respondents than the former, but both at very high levels (80 per cent and 92 per cent respectively).
- Voluntary contributions in Italy target three priorities: medical research (37 per cent), war victims (35 per cent) and emergency aid (27 per cent). Solidarity actions with developing countries rank fourth (18 per cent).


Source: Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming).

Awareness about official aid

When Europeans are asked how much the government spends on overseas aid from the national budget, approximately one third of respondents do not know. Another third will choose between 1-5 per cent and 5-10 per cent. The smallest proportion will mention less than one per cent.²¹ The consistent trend across OECD countries is to overestimate the aid effort. Why is this the case? Have donor efforts to inform their populations been ineffective or insufficient?

²¹ Eurobarometer 46.0 and 50.1, in INRA (1997, 1999).

Figure 4. **Expenditure on information and development education**
(in USD per capita and percentage of total ODA, 2001)



Notes: * OECD DAC estimation of total ODA in 2001 (provisional data).

** EU budget line B-7-6000 funding only for NGOs.

Source: Country notes in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming).

Development agencies actually find it difficult to communicate and educate the public about these issues. Beyond annual reports and official statements, —typically a press release when ODA volume increases— there is limited officially led public discussion about the level of ODA, and in most countries, NGOs tend to be more effective than governments at stirring the debate over development matters. There are a few notable exceptions:

- Among OECD DAC Member countries, the Danes are probably the best-informed citizens about their agency for development co-operation. Denmark has pursued an active information and communication policy since the beginning of Danish ODA in 1955. More than 90 per cent of the population know that DANIDA is the agency for development co-operation, and over half the population estimated the correct percentage bracket for ODA in 2001 – a greater proportion than in any of the other countries surveyed (UNFPA/MORI, 2001).
- In Norway, upon the completion of a large campaign about NORAD, the latter moved up to second place —from fourth— in public awareness about national actors in development issues, after the Norwegian Red Cross.
- Similarly in Sweden, there is a detectable link between awareness about the aid agency and information activities.

- In the United Kingdom, where there are strong opinion leaders and an active civil society for international co-operation, the public seem to be more informed in 2001 about poverty in the world. Increasing trade and investment is mentioned by 59 per cent as a way of providing support to developing countries.
- Finally, the Dutch government shifted policy away from sending experts overseas towards increasingly involving local expertise in developing countries, to which the Dutch public spontaneously disagreed. When the arguments for the policy shift were given in the opinion poll, the new policy received backing from the majority of respondents. Beyond those exceptions, global education and communication activities in most DAC Member countries remain, as already pointed out in previous editions of this study, poorly funded (Table 1 and Figure 4). As a percentage of its ODA, Belgium is the only country reaching the UNDP target of two per cent government expenditure on public education (Stern, 1998). The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden are the highest per capita spenders, and the biggest donors in terms of ODA volume —the United States and Japan— are the lowest. However, there is increasing debate in some OECD and Council of Europe Member countries in regard to the adequate funding of global education.

Table 1. **OECD donors expenditure on Information and Development Education**
(USD million)

Country	Year	Total spending on Information, PR & Development Education	Per cent of total ODA*	Expenditure per capita
Australia	2001/02	1.2	0.15	0.06
Austria	2001	2.9	0.63	0.35
Belgium	2001	17.7	2.00	1.72
Canada	2001	6.4	0.40	0.2
Denmark	2001	10.0	0.62	1.86
Finland	2002	1.2	0.31	0.24
France**	1998	2.2	0.03	0.04
Germany	2000	5.0	0.10	0.06
Greece	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Ireland	2002***	2.8	0.90	0.72
Italy	2000	4.0	0.20	0.07
Japan	2002	6.8	0.07	0.05
Luxembourg	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Netherlands	2002	33.4	1.05 (2001)	2.09
New Zealand	1999/00	0.2	0.20	0.05
Norway	2001	8.8	0.65	1.96
Portugal	N/a	N/a	N/a	N/a
Spain	2000	7.9	0.44	0.20
Sweden	1999	13.7	0.86	1.54
Switzerland	2000	4.9	0.53	0.67
United Kingdom	2002	10.2	0.22	0.17
United States	2002	0.7	0.0006	0.002
EC****	2000	20.9	0.35	0.06

Notes: * Taken from DAC estimation of total ODA in 2001 (provisional data).
 ** France: co-financing to NGOs for development education projects.
 *** ODA level for 2001 used; same applies for other countries where 2002 expenditure is not provided.
 **** EU budget line B-7-6000 funding only for NGOs.
 Source: Country notes in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming).

There is however a positive correlation between better awareness and higher expenditure on global education and information activities: higher spenders have in general higher ODA/GNI ratios, and show signs of slightly better awareness. Better evaluation of global education in the coming years, through networking and co-ordination, should enhance the ability of global educators to demonstrate its positive impact on public knowledge.²²

Finally, opinion poll results suggest that, starting from a very low base, any additional information does make a substantial difference in people's assessment of the issues. In the United States, a poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA, 1995) found that Americans believed the government was spending 18 per cent of the Federal Budget on foreign assistance. Other polls show estimations as high as 30 per cent. Respondents were then asked how they would feel about the United States spending one per cent of its budget, i.e. more than the actual level: there was a decrease from the 75 per cent who said that the government was already spending too much (based on the overestimation) to only 18 per cent thinking it would be excessive. Effectively, support increased for providing more aid. Interestingly, in Canada, when told that the government actually spends between 1 and 2 cents of every tax dollar on aid, 10 per cent of respondents shifted from 'too much' to 'not enough'.

Awareness about other global development issues

It has already been established that most people in OECD DAC Member countries believe that ODA *is* humanitarian assistance. Citizens place much less focus on the issues that form the agendas of donors, such as access of poor countries to markets, reform of agricultural policies, education, capacity building, gender equality, environmental sustainability, infrastructure, etc., even when given the choice in questionnaires. All the same, evidence in the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands shows an increase in the number of respondents pointing to international trade, debt relief and good governance in recipient countries as solutions for poverty reduction.²³

More generally, across OECD DAC Member countries, awareness about issues such as debt relief, fair trade and taxation of international financial flows (the Tobin Tax debate) seem to improve, emulated by global education, by NGO campaigns, public debate among opinion leaders and media coverage.²⁴ Support for development co-operation and awareness are indeed correlated:

1. Those convinced about the importance of development co-operation, display a strong or very strong interest in global development issues, and show a good or very good knowledge of problems occurring in developing countries. They feel that support to developing countries is important or very important.

²² It is in that perspective that the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe has been facilitating the networking of national global education co-ordinating bodies, under the Global Education Network Europe (GENE). In partnership with BMZ (Germany), the Development Education Association (United Kingdom), Komment (Austria), Rorg (Norway) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, it has initiated a working group on "Sharing Good Practice and Theory in Global Education Evaluation: Improving Quality and Raising Standards." See www.globaleducationeurope.net.

²³ In a 1999 Swiss poll about how to solve the problems of developing countries, 64 per cent mentioned reforming international economic structures and 69 per cent suggested importing agricultural products from these countries. In the United Kingdom, increasing trade and investment was chosen as a way to help by 59 per cent of respondents, after providing financial support (71 per cent) and reducing war and conflict (68 per cent). Canadians also think it is important to promote trade (93 per cent). Interestingly, 60 per cent or more of respondents in opinion polls on trade and protectionism—rather than polls on trade and development co-operation—express negative views on the role of international trade (Mayda and Rodrik, 2002).

²⁴ See for instance the case of France in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming).

2. Those indecisive about development policy, are less aware of problems occurring in developing countries and view support to developing countries as not very important.
3. Those indifferent towards development policy display low interest or none at all in development issues, show poor or no knowledge at all of problems occurring in developing countries, and view support to developing countries as not important.²⁵

Analysis of the demographic determinants of public opinion shows that better educated respondents are more aware and supportive of development co-operation. In Norway and Australia, for example, support is highest among women, younger people, the highly educated and people living in urban/densely populated areas. Similarly, on the issue of public attitude towards international trade, Mayda & Rodrik (2002) establish, by way of a simple correlation between attitudes and demographic characteristics, that education and income are positively correlated with pro-trade attitudes, as well as urban-dwellers and younger age-groups.²⁶ This could be instructive for the targeting of global education.

Information about development: TV rules

The media, predominantly television followed by print, is the primary self-identified source of information for populations in OECD countries (about 80 per cent on average). Using broadly targeted media campaigns to build public awareness about global issues may be tempting, but where research has been conducted, it shows high levels of public scepticism about the media as an independent source of information on the developing world. Television in particular is perceived negatively by the public. Moreover, its alleged tendency to “sensationalise” crises and its bias towards negative images deem it a threat to the work of development educators, and a source of frustration for experts.

Evidence from the United Kingdom and Italy suggests that there is discrimination in media coverage of developing countries towards sensationalism. Focus on war and famine, in particular, tend to overshadow all other development related issues. Where ‘normal’ coverage of developing countries existed in the United Kingdom, it has decreased since 1990, and the Italian press is also shown to devote less attention to developing countries than in the past. In the United Kingdom, coverage is not so much about life and culture in developing countries, as it is about travel and tourism, wildlife, and “survival” reality shows. According to media editors and producers, audiences are not interested in programmes about developing countries, and several journalists state that development is too boring to cover.

There is a demand, however, for more positive imagery and reporting. In the United Kingdom, more than half of respondents want a more balanced coverage of developing countries. In Switzerland, as developing countries suffered an increasingly negative image, the Swiss Agency for Development Co-operation responded by means of a country wide, colourful and enthusiastic campaign about positive realities in Africa, meeting a very positive public response.

²⁵ See the case of Germany in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming).

²⁶ The paper’s main finding is particularly interesting: in countries well endowed with human capital, like Germany and the United States, higher levels of education are associated with pro-trade views, while in those less well endowed, like the Philippines and Bangladesh (the poorest countries in the model), higher levels of education are actually associated with anti-trade views.

III. The challenge of engaging public opinion

Should it be considered a problem that citizens in OECD countries, albeit supportive of international development co-operation, are so unaware of the challenges of development and poverty in the world, and so disconnected from the formulation and implementation of related policies? Arguably yes, at least for two main reasons. Firstly, in democratic countries, awareness and understanding by citizens of public policies—and of the issues they are aimed at addressing—is a desirable objective *per se*. Secondly, it is hard to understand why the « development community » in the OECD—Ministers of co-operation, bilateral aid agencies, NGOs, etc.—could remain seated on top of such a pool of solidarity and generosity, such a sense of global interdependence, leaving it unexploited, whereas it could provide a precious impetus in favour of more vigorous, coherent and more efficient development co-operation policies.

This challenge of engaging citizens as a force for policy reform is backed more broadly by the OECD's initiative to promote good governance in its Member countries through greater involvement of citizens as partners in policy making. This initiative, which promotes a triple approach of information, consultation and active participation of citizens, is aimed at sustaining and improving both the *legitimacy* and the *efficiency* of public policies, which are made increasingly complex by a set of factors, including the process of globalisation.²⁷

What should be done, then to reinforce public support for international development co-operation, and engage it in the global anti-poverty consensus? To begin to answer this question, the OECD Development Centre, SIDA and Ireland Aid, gathered a group of experts and practitioners in Dublin in October 2001.²⁸ Based on earlier results of our study on public opinion, and on additional data and analysis contributed by researchers, donor agencies and NGOs, participants came up with three sets of recommendations: (i) to increase public awareness about development and poverty (ii) to improve the transparency of development co-operation policies and (iii) improve the efficiency of development co-operation. Given the topic of this Congress this paper refers to the issue of increasing public awareness about development and poverty.

Increase public awareness about development and poverty

Action requires knowledge

An important reason why public opinion and attitudes fail to influence policy making in this area is precisely that, with a few exceptions, public awareness and understanding about *global development and poverty issues* remains very shallow. This is important, as experience shows that there is no influence without action, and no effective action without sufficient prior awareness.²⁹ Several examples show that when the public is well informed about an issue, it is more likely to act: the protection of the environment, gender equality, the third-world debt cancellation, etc., were all subjects of active information campaigns before they could gather substantial public support.

On the broader issue of development and poverty alleviation, however, the consensus on the strategic importance of reaching the Millennium Development Goals remains largely confined to a bureaucratic elite. They provide a yardstick to assess progress towards poverty reduction,

²⁷ OECD (2001) ; see also www.oecd.org/puma/citizens.

²⁸ See www.oecd.org/dev/opinion.

²⁹ See Yankelovich (1991) and Klingemann and Römmele (2002).

and a focus that should help them communicate more effectively about the complex realities of development and poverty. Our forthcoming study shows, however, this is hardly the case yet: the MDGs so far largely remain an un-tapped opportunity to peg more vigorous efforts to inform and engage the public. The global anti-poverty consensus they are spearheading has not trickled down to national public debates, which remain —with a few noticeable exceptions— rather rare and unsophisticated. Only a few national governments substantially support the efforts of UN agencies to inform the public (e.g. Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Hopes that this opportunity will eventually be seized remain largely with the governments of donor countries, but also with the vigorous civil society movements and global educators. They face three main challenges: (i) increase funding for public awareness raising (ii) effectively reach audiences and to that end (iii) improve public opinion research.

Funding public awareness raising

OECD governments do not allocate enough resources to increase public awareness and improve its understanding of these issues. UNDP had suggested years ago that 2 per cent of ODA should be allocated to outreach, yet today it actually remains a mere fraction of this. As Ian Smillie pointed out, the entire combined information and development education budgets of all OECD countries in 1996 was less than the marketing budget for fashion house Chanel's launching of the perfume *Egoïste*, and 40 per cent of all spending on information and development education happened in just two countries - Sweden and the Netherlands. The NGO World Vision (Australia branch) spends more on public outreach (excluding fundraising) than USAID spends in total on development education matching grants in the United States. More, in fact, is being done to inform the public about development co-operation by NGOs than by governments. Better tools and more resources are thus necessary (see Box 2), but they will not bear any real impact unless they are accompanied by greater co-ordination, networking, sharing of best practice, and structural support.

Box 2 Funding for Global Education

One may debate the late Julius Nyrere's proposal that 100 per cent of aid should be spent on development education as the most effective way to develop social cohesion and fight poverty globally, but there is a growing recognition that the levels of funding for development or global education are inadequate in most countries. A number of civil society actors have been calling for increased funding, with set percentages of ODA to be reached progressively in several countries: 3 per cent of ODA in Norway, 2 per cent in Germany, 5 per cent of bilateral aid (equivalent to approximately 3 per cent of ODA) in Ireland.³⁰ Development thinkers are also calling for governments and intergovernmental bodies to dedicate a specific and increased percentage of ODA to create a more critically informed public opinion (Edwards, 1999). Tying development education funding to percentages of ODA levels does pose problems (e.g. when ODA falls, a stable level of global education funding looks like a relative increase). However, the existing link between public support for ODA and development education suggests that such budgetary commitments are feasible. Other suggestions include a per capita target, or a link between target percentages of ODA and budgetary commitments from the Ministry of Education, to integrate global education fully into education systems. Obviously increased funding is not enough. Improved co-ordination at all levels, sharing of best practices and quality monitoring are required if global education is to realise its potential. There are currently some fruitful examples of international networking for increased and improved global education in and between Council of Europe Member countries.

³⁰ Called for by Rorg, the Norwegian coalition of development education NGOs, in Norway; Venro, the German coalition of Development NGOs, in Germany; and Dochas, the Irish coalition of development NGOs, along with youth organisations, trade unions, and the main political parties in Ireland. For further analysis of trends towards a percentage of ODA to global education, and a typology of argumentation, see Hoeck and Wegimont forthcoming).

Effectively reaching the public

Not only should the concepts be sufficiently clear, and the messages be pertinent, but strategies must be developed to ensure that these messages also reach and influence decision makers. This means targeting elected officials, but also the corporate sector, the media, etc. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) provide innovative opportunities for enhancing outreach, as recently demonstrated by the success of One World (www.oneworld.net), an independent web-based platform of information focusing on global issues, which recently became one of the main information providers for the generalist Yahoo portal. However, more information from the media does not translate directly into better awareness and knowledge: global education is necessary to build critical awareness about development issues. The experience of the North-South Centre in 44 European countries suggests two primary routes by which the “publics” of Europe might be more fully engaged in the global poverty debate by way of critical knowledge about global issues: non-formal education systems associated with engaged civil society, and formal education.

Improving public opinion research

Just as development co-operation is impossible without a common agenda, and partnership and ownership by “recipient” countries, so too is a global education agenda without partnership with the public. Assuming that the development “community” has the answers to global issues, and should craft the “right” messages for public opinion is not only untrue, but counter educational, and is likely to be rejected by educators in schools and in other civil society structures (see a typology of traditional messages in Box 3).

Box 3 Messages about development assistance

Negative images aimed at triggering compassion (the starving baby image) are much decried. They “work” in terms of raising awareness of and money for emergencies, but they create an impression of hopelessness, that people over there are incapable of doing it for themselves.

The multiplication of television channels has led to an increase in the supply of positive images (as well as negative). Feel-good messages reinforce positive thinking and behaviour, but they may not be enough to make more than an incremental difference in both attitudes and understanding.

A slightly refined version of this is the ‘social dues’ argument - ‘We owe them’, as recently used by Canada’s finance minister about the ‘transfer payments’ between better-off Canadian provinces and others.

Another common approach has been to promote aid as being ‘good for business’, and business as ‘good for development’. This approach has been used in many countries to encourage support from the private sector, although its efficiency is doubtful: businesses that benefit from tied aid contracts are rarely seen defending aid against budget cuts.

A newer approach related to the concept of *Global Public Goods* promoted in the UN could be spelled out as: ‘what is good for them is also good for us’.

Some argue a stronger wakeup call is needed: a ‘global public bads’ approach. In addition to positive stories about development, opinion leaders and educators should be more explicit in building understanding that *our* long-term security is very much dependent on *theirs*. What is bad for them is bad for us.

The educational content of awareness raising activities must be informed by what the public knows, and by gaps in that public knowledge. Heads of information in development co-operation departments and agencies of OECD DAC Member countries should therefore genuinely undertake to listen and monitor carefully the characteristics of public opinion and attitudes, their diversity and their evolution over time. Experience suggests that certain publics are interested in global education that starts with their specific concerns, and links these concerns to global development issues. People thus would rather mobilise for justice rather than charity, and for a “concrete” objective, where they feel they can “make a difference”. This may open encouraging perspectives for the promotion of a *human rights-based approach to development*, as articulated by the United Nations and for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.³¹

Public opinion research is an important input for the development of global education programmes. The data will be of assistance in identifying knowledge gaps; the information and education needs of the public; potential target groups by nature of their support and awareness levels, and by monitoring the impact of global education.³² However, there is a frustrating scarcity of data (see box 4) and too little is known about global education’s impact on public opinion and awareness. This is recognised by development information providers and global educators but a research agenda has yet to materialise.

Available evidence shows that citizens in OECD DAC Member countries want more solidarity and justice in the world. They support international development co-operation, and if they were more and better informed, they could be a precious constituency for its reform and improvement. There lies an opportunity for governments —especially those that have pledged to increase their ODA— to kick-start a virtuous circle of transparency and reform, and effectively rise to the challenge of global poverty reduction.

However, improving the delivery of information and global education is only possible if we understand better the opinions and attitudes of the public towards those issues in the first place; how they form and how they change. Good, comparable data is still too scarce. Current efforts at monitoring public opinion more closely should thus be supported, as a first step towards engaging citizens of richer countries in the fight against global poverty.

³¹ See ODI (1999), and the UN website www.unhcr.ch/development/approaches.html. See also the European Strategy Framework for Increasing and Improving Global Education to the Year 2015, proposed for adoption at the Maastricht Europe-wide Global Education Congress 2002 (www.globaleducationeurope.net/).

³² For example surveys show that respondents with higher education tend to be more aware of global issues and more supportive of ODA.

Box 4
Addressing data limitations at the OECD

To assess the trends public support for international development co-operation quantitatively, our research draws from the answers to two different questions asked in most related OECD countries' surveys:

[1] Do you think that the current level of ODA is too high, too low or just right? Should be increased a lot/a little, stay the same, decrease a lot/a little?

[2] Do you think that your country should provide development assistance to poorer countries?

Positive responses to either of these two questions mean that respondents support the provision of development assistance. The data presented in this work distinguishes between the two questions when figures are available. Important variables such as the state and nature of the domestic economy and institutions, partisan politics, history, international relations, etc. are also taken into account to interpret changes in these figures.

This attempt is weakened by limited, or lack of, consistent and homogenous, thus truly comparable, data. Some countries have simply not conducted any survey. Where data exists for several countries for a particular year, questions are phrased differently in each country, making the comparison of results difficult. Besides, scientific surveying problems well-documented in public opinion literature will arise, such as the courtesy bias; the fact that opinions can be stated without understanding of the topic; or are based on false information and perceptions about the topic, etc. In questionnaires, for instance, ODA expenditure is rarely presented in relation to expenditure in other sectors. Too little information is given for deeper conclusions to be drawn about individual opinions, and qualitative analysis relies on much deduction. Open questions are few. As a result, as Smillie recalls in the Canadian country note in the book, survey findings often appear contradictory or ambiguous. Similarly, Risse-Kappen (1991) had noted that "surveys alone are a weak basis to come up with trends in public opinion."

At an experts' meeting organised by the Development Centre with the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) and Ireland Aid (Dublin, October 2001), it was concluded that until comparable, consistent, regular polling of public attitudes in OECD DAC Member countries towards international development co-operation is undertaken, it will be difficult to monitor and interpret trends. In response to this, participants from the development co-operation agencies agreed that their next annual informal meeting of DAC Heads of information would address the subject of comparable public opinion data. This meeting took place in the OECD in May 2002 to "explore the desirability and feasibility of conducting a joint DAC survey of public opinion about international development co-operation and/or the Millennium Development Goals."

Most agreed there would be value in conducting a joint public opinion poll, and that it would be useful to have comparable data across DAC Members. To this end a small facilitation group was set up—the Public Opinion Polling (POP) Group—to develop some common questions that Members could use in their national public opinion polls. This could be a starting point for a possible co-ordination of a joint public opinion poll, drawing from existing questions in national opinion polls, and for the development of comparable data across OECD DAC Member countries.

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Table 2. **Public Support for Development Assistance / Helping Poor Countries in principle as percentage of respondents and ODA as a percentage of GNI**

Country: Support ODA/GNI	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Australia	-	-	-	-	72	-	-	-	84	-	-	85	-
Austria ¹	0.34	0.38	0.37	0.35	0.34	0.36	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.25	-
Belgium	-	-	60	71	-	66	62.5	-	56.6	86	-	83	-
Canada ²	0.25	0.34	0.30	0.30	0.33	0.33	0.24	0.26	0.22	0.26	0.23	0.25	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	67	-	55	-	-	-	-
Finland ³	0.46	0.41	0.39	0.39	0.32	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.35	0.30	0.36	0.37	-
France	-	-	-	79	64	57	-	62 / 80	75	-	-	-	83
Germany	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.45	0.43	0.38	0.32	0.34	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.23	-
Greece ⁴	-	-	-	-	-	75	83.1	73	83.6	-	-	-	-
Ireland	0.94	0.96	1.02	1.03	1.03	0.96	1.04	0.97	0.99	1.01	1.06	1.01	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	77.2	34	69.9	51	60	-	-
Japan	0.65	0.80	0.64	0.45	0.31	0.32	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.33	-
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	78.1	-	70	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	0.60	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.55	0.48	0.45	0.41	0.39	0.32	0.34	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	75.2	-	69.6	-	75	-	-
Norway	0.42	0.40	0.38	0.36	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.27	-
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	90.0	-	87.3	-	-	-	-
Austria ¹	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.15	0.20	0.19	-
Belgium	89	-	-	-	-	-	91	-	82	95	-	-	-
Canada ²	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.20	0.25	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.33	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	87.3	-	78.4	-	-	-	-
Finland ³	0.31	0.30	0.34	0.31	0.27	0.15	0.20	0.11	0.20	0.15	0.13	0.14	-
France	78.8	8.29	80.3	78.2	79.2	78.7	79.8	75.7	70	71.6	64.4	74.5	-
Germany	0.31	0.32	0.30	0.27	0.29	0.28	0.20	0.22	0.28	0.35	0.28	0.23	-
Greece ⁴	-	-	-	-	-	-	91.3	-	75.1	-	-	-	-
Ireland	0.21	0.33	0.26	0.35	0.40	0.36	0.44	0.55	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.80	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	-	-	-	-
Japan	0.92	0.88	0.86	0.82	0.76	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.79	0.84	0.82	-
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	-	-	-
Netherlands	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.25	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	77	-	-	-	85	-	84	-	-	88	-	88	-
Australia	1.17	1.13	1.16	1.16	1.01	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.91	0.80	0.83	-

Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.6	-	77.7	-	-	-	
	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.28	0.34	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.25	
Spain	58	-	-	-	67	-	94.2	-	95.1	-	84	-	
	0.20	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.30	
Sweden	65	65	54	63	62	59	52	-	-	-	-	-	
	0.91	0.90	1.03	0.99	0.96	0.77	0.82	0.76	0.71	0.7	0.80	0.76	
Switzerland ⁵	-	-	-	-	75	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80
	0.32	0.36	0.45	0.33	0.36	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.35	0.34	0.34	
UK	-	85	75	-	-	81	-	-	-	-	69	71	
	0.27	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.32	0.32	
United States	(a)	41	-	-	45	-	-	-	47	-	-	-	
	(b)					80					79		
		0.21	0.20	0.20	0.15	0.14	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	

- Notes:
- 1: Austria, 1999: the question ‘Is development co-operation right?’ was added to a survey on fair trade: 86 per cent of respondents said it was right.
 - 2: Canada, 1997: National budget deficit was eliminated in 1997. A marked increase in support for development assistance is observed between the first poll in February 1997 and the second one in August.
 - 3: Finland 1997 and 1999 percentage of population that consider foreign aid to be an integral part of foreign policy.
 - 4: Greece became a member of the DAC in 1999.
 - 5: Switzerland, 2002: support for humanitarian aid is at 92 per cent.
- n/a Not available.

Sources: All ODA as percentage of GNI figures are taken from OECD DAC Development Co-operation Reports (2000, 1996 and 1994); figures not available for 2002. Public opinion figures for Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom: see country notes in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming). Public opinion figures for all other EU Member countries are taken from Eurobarometer 46.0 and 50.1 (1996 and 1998). The question asked in Eurobarometer was: “In your opinion, it is very important, important, not very important, or not at all important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” The figure in the Table is the sum of respondents saying it is very important and important. Public opinion figures for the United States: (a) taken from Reilly (1999); percentage of positive responses to the question: “Are you in favour of development assistance?”. (b) taken from Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), 1995 and 2000 polls; percentage of respondents who favoured the ‘principle’ of providing aid.

Table 3. **Public Support for an increase in or maintenance of the current volume of ODA and ODA as a percentage of GNI**

Country:	Support ODA/GNI	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	-	-	74	
	0.35	0.34	0.36	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.25		
Austria	-	-	-	34.3	-	36.9	-	-	-	(74)	
	0.30	0.33	0.33	0.24	0.26	0.22	0.26	0.23	0.25		
Belgium	-	-	-	40.5	-	36	-	-	-	(57)	
	0.39	0.32	0.38	0.34	0.31	0.35	0.30	0.36	0.37		
Canada ¹	57	-	49	-	-	58	-	70	-		88
	0.45	0.43	0.38	0.32	0.34	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.23		
Denmark	-	-	-	44.2	-	47.9	-	-	-	(78)	
	1.03	1.03	0.96	1.04	0.97	0.99	1.01	1.06	1.01		
Finland	-	-	-	64.5	-	54.8	30	-	-	(93)	74
	0.45	0.31	0.32	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.33		
France	59	63	58	48	-	62	64	-	-	(96)	
	0.63	0.64	0.55	0.48	0.45	0.41	0.39	0.32	0.34		
Germany	-	-	-	39.8	-	39.7	-	-	-	(83)	
	0.36	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.27		
Greece ²	-	-	-	71.3	-	67.9	-	-	-		
	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	0.15	0.20	0.19		
Ireland	-	-	-	73.3	-	66.6	-	-	-	(78)	
	0.20	0.25	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.33		
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	69	-	-	(85)	
	0.31	0.27	0.15	0.20	0.11	0.20	0.15	0.13	0.14		
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68	-		
	0.27	0.29	0.28	0.20	0.22	0.28	0.35	0.28	0.23		
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
	0.35	0.40	0.36	0.44	0.55	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.80		
Netherlands	-	84	-	89.3	-	82	-	-	-	(81)	79
	0.82	0.76	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.79	0.84	0.82		
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
	0.28	0.34	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.25		
Spain	-	-	-	79	-	79	-	-	-	70 (87)	
	³³ 0.28	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.30		
Sweden	-	-	-	-	58	63	65	66	68 (85)		
	0.99	0.96	0.77	0.82	0.76	0.71	0.7	0.80	0.76		
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-	-	76	-	-	(84)	
	0.33	0.36	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.35	0.34	0.34		
UK	-	-	-	-	-	84	72	73	72 (84)		
	0.31	0.31	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.32	0.32		
United States ³	-	-	79	-	-	-	-	-	-	81	
	0.15	0.14	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11		

- Notes:
1. Canada 2000 and 2002 responses upon being informed about the volume of ODA.
 2. Greece became a member of the DAC in 1999.
 3. Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), 1995. When respondents were asked how they would feel if the United States spent one per cent of its budget on foreign aid, 33 per cent said this would be too little and 46 per cent said it would be about right, the same goes for 2001, 13.2 per cent thought that 1 per cent of the federal budget on aid would be 'way too little', 24.1 per cent 'a bit too little' and 43.5 per cent 'about right'.
- n/a Not available.

Sources: Public opinion figures for Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands (except for 1996), Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom: see country notes in Mc Donnell *et al.* (forthcoming). All other public opinion figures for EU Member countries are taken from Eurobarometer 46.0 and 50.1 (1996 and 1998). The question asked in Eurobarometer was: "Do you think the aid provided by X Country should increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, decrease a lot, don't know?" The figure in the Table is the sum of respondents saying it should increase a lot and a little. No information on the level of aid was provided for the relevant country. However, the previous question asked the respondent to provide his own estimate of how much government X spent on aid. Additional public opinion figures in brackets for 2001 are taken from UNFPA/MORI (2001).