



Climate Change Financing and Aid Effectiveness

Tanzania Case Study

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Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism COP
Parties CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (DFID)
DoE	Department of Environment
DPG	Development Partner Group
ENVIRONET	The Network on Environment and Development Co-operation
EU	European Union
GBS	General Budget Support
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoT	Government of Tanzania
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFMS	Integrated Financial Management System
IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment (University of Dar Es Salaam)
JAST	Joint Assistance Strategy Tanzania
JET	Journalists Environmental Association
LDC	Least Developed Country
LGA	Local Government Authority
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MMS	Mkukuta Monitoring System
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Plan
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NEMC	National Environment Management Council
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
PBA	Programme Based Approach
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMO-RACG	Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Governance
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
SEKAB	Svensk Etanolkemi of Sweden
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VPO	Vice President's Office
WP-EFF	OECD DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness
ZSGRP	Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction on Poverty

Executive Summary

Introduction

This report is one of six that have been commissioned by the OECD/DAC and the African Development bank (AfDB) as part of a regional study on climate change finance¹. It follows from (and is coordinated with) a similar set of case studies undertaken in Asia, initiated by the Bangkok-based Centre for Development for Development Effectiveness (CDDE) facility² of UNDP, and in collaboration with OECD/DAC. This work seeks to strengthen the management of funding for climate change using the framework of the internationally agreed Aid Effectiveness principles.

The analysis is based upon a review of literature and data, supported by a number of stakeholder interviews in country, with government officials, donors, civil society and the private sector. It draws on previous work undertaken on the political economy of climate change in Tanzania by Agulhas in 2010³. This report can only begin to raise key issues and is meant to be a prompt for discussion. As well as setting out the current position, it identifies challenges and makes recommendations.

It and the other African country assessments will be brought together into a synthesis report that will seek to stimulate debate in the region and internationally to strengthen how the continent responds to climate change. Findings from the country studies will be discussed in a workshop to be held in September 2011, with a view to influencing the country and regional response.

Background

Tanzania is a signatory to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. As a Least Developed Country (LDC) Tanzania produced a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) in 2007 to meet with UNFCCC requirements. The country has been an active participant in the Conferences of the Parties (COP) and in 2010 Tanzania associated itself with the Copenhagen Accord. The Minister of Environment further emphasised Tanzania's commitment to adaptation to climate change during the recent COP 16 in Mexico, referring to adaptation as "*our highest priority*".

In 2006 the government and 19 donors signed the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST). The strategy provides a medium-term framework for managing country level cooperation between the government of Tanzania and its development partners⁴. It underscores a commitment to work jointly towards improved aid effectiveness.

Poverty levels in Tanzania are high and challenges remain to the achievement of development objectives, although some progress has been made. An estimated one third of Tanzania's population of 43 million continue to live below the poverty line of \$1.1 per day⁵.

¹ The others are Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa.

²Supported by the Asian Development Bank, Government of Korea, Government of Japan, Swedish SIDA. More information can be found www.aideffectiveness.org

³ Nigel Thornton and Herbert Meena "The Political Economy and Drivers of Change of Climate Change in Tanzania" August 2010 for DFID.

⁴ Development Partners Group, 2011,

⁵ Data from 2007, latest year available

Tanzania is already experiencing an increase in extreme weather conditions with higher incidences and more prolonged periods of flooding and drought as a result of climate change, both of which have significant economic costs for Tanzania. Flooding in 2005/06 is estimated to have cost up to 1% of Tanzania's GDP. More recent analysis indicates that such costs could be as high as 2% of annual GDP by 2030⁶. The extent to which sea level will rise along Tanzania's coastline is not yet clear, although prediction models indicate that a 0.5m rise could lead to a loss of 247km² of land, including in the Tanzania's economic capital Dar es Salaam.

These impacts disproportionately affect the poor who are least able to mitigate risk. Climate change in Tanzania is projected to affect the country's vital water resources, crop production and food security, as well as energy supplies. As one recent study noted *"If Tanzania's farmers and farming practices do not adapt, the impacts of climate change will be extreme and they will ripple through the country's entire economy as so many other sectors are dependent on agriculture"*⁷.

The Role of Government

Tanzania's development needs are documented in the Vision 2035, the country's long-term development strategy. National growth and international competitiveness, improved livelihoods, widespread peace and stability, and quality education for all⁸ are outlined as priority development areas. There is currently only limited awareness of climate change within the Government of Tanzania, and only minimal understanding of the potential impacts climate change could have on Tanzania's wider development. Government ministries remain focused on more 'traditional' development priorities in order to meet citizen needs. Fast-start climate change financing should therefore seek to align with these priorities to both address urgent development needs and reduce future climate vulnerability.

Climate change does not yet feature in Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), better known by its Swahili name the Mkukuta, although a recent update of the strategy for implementation during 2010/11 to 2014/15 does include increased reference to environmental issues. In 2007 the government produced a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) to meet its international requirements as a signatory to the UNFCCC. The NAPA is not a strategic policy document however, and has been unable to motivate or guide national efforts to address climate change.

The development of a national climate change strategy could help to increase awareness around the wider implications of climate change, and the need therefore for climate change to be addressed across all sectors. The government has not yet developed such a strategy although it reports intention to do so. A national strategy would provide a platform for more strategic cross-government engagement around climate change with an increased number of actors able to identify linkages between climate change and existing (and planned) development activities.

Engagement with climate change is currently too narrowly focused amongst a few technical experts. The Department of Environment (DoE) in the Vice President's Office (VPO) is the government co-ordinating agency for climate change and dominates government's response on all issues relating to climate change. The National Focal Point for the UNFCCC is the DoE. A new Permanent Secretary (PS) and Director have recently been put in place although it is too

⁶ The Economics of Climate Change in Tanzania, DFID 2011

⁷ Muyeye Chambwera, "Cultivating Success: the need to climate-proof Tanzanian Agriculture" IIED 2009

⁸ National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP)

early to assess how this might influence government commitment to climate change in Tanzania. A National Climate Change Steering Committee structure is already established within the DoE but is yet to function. Environmental officers have also been installed within each line ministry but are not yet focusing on climate change issues.

National reporting on climate change does not take place within government. The absence of a national climate change strategy and a lack of reference to climate change in the Mkutuku means there is no national framework against which to report on climate change. Almost all reporting to date (even though formally from government) has been prepared by donors and civil society organisations.

The VPO has recently announced plans to produce a national climate change strategy. However, it remains unclear when this strategy will be developed and how it might be implemented.

The Role of Donors

Progress to date has largely been donor-driven, and (given the lack of a co-ordinating national strategy), has been generally piecemeal and fragmented. A Development Partners Group (DPG) on environment currently has a sub-sector DPG on climate change to facilitate strategic discussion and planning by donors. However, given the duplication of donors in the two groups it is expected that the climate change DPG will be formally reabsorbed back into the wider environment DPG in the near future. There is currently no formalised joint working mechanism between donors and government on climate change in Tanzania.

A recent drive to increase donor coordination around climate change through the sector level DPGs has resulted in synergies being sought for increased joint working across the sectors. Initial focus will be on water and agriculture where the most commonalities have already been identified. There is no formal commitment to align this work with government priorities although potential for doing so is expected to emerge as and when a national climate change strategy is in place. The government expressed interest in developing such a strategy in early 2011 although no formal timeline or process has yet been agreed.

Funding for climate change is provided bi-laterally and to a limited extent through global funding mechanisms. It is delivered as grants, loans and increasingly as technical support for building sustainable institutional capacity around climate change. Donors provide an estimated 40% of their support through general budget support in Tanzania, although currently only a very limited amount of this funding is believed to be channelled to climate change activities.

The Nature of Climate Change Financing

Tanzania's response to climate change has to date been limited and the government has little awareness of the possibilities for future climate change financing, particularly for mainstreaming adaptation. A select number of individuals within government have followed recent international debates on climate change through the COP 15 and COP 16 but information and awareness is not being shared across government. Donor activities have not yet focussed on developing systemic ownership for climate change across government, although an ongoing donor exercise to identify synergies for climate financing could help to encourage increased

ownership at the sector level. Donor support for a national climate change strategy could also help to identify drivers within senior government.

However, the government's main focus at present is neither on mitigating the effects of climate change nor preparing for future adaptation to safeguard the country's development. Instead it has homed in on international commitments to additionality and is occupied with ensuring that climate change finance is additional to existing ODA commitments and does not impact on general budget support. In practice however, this focus remains at a political level and is not yet supported by the technical capacity to identify or communicate effectively around additionality at the national or sector levels.

Funding for climate change currently comes into Tanzania through a number of project level activities, including some financing for activities within wider sector programmes. Support is not clearly identified in the budget at this time. It is therefore difficult to identify and track funding allocated specifically for climate change activities at the national level. Although a number of external monitoring channels exist, for example the OECD DAC's creditor reporting system and the Climate Funds Update, these systems are not harmonised and information collected is not reflected at the national level. The government should consider introducing a comprehensive climate change expenditure framework in order to capture financial data internally. Markers for tracking climate change mitigation and adaptation within national budgets could also be considered⁹.

Where Tanzania is already accessing global funding mechanisms, for example for REDD, donors are continuing to provide a large amount of administration support to manage these funds on behalf of the government. There is currently little interaction with the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Planning around such funding.

Conclusions

Climate change remains an internationally driven agenda in Tanzania despite the potential for significant climate change financing to assist in meeting national development priorities, particularly in relation to food security and energy. The majority of funding for climate change comes through bi-lateral donor support and only small amounts of funding have yet been accessed from available global funding mechanisms. The Tanzanian government has been slow to capitalise on the potential for climate change financing and as a result donors have been unable to align behind government priorities for climate change. A future national strategy on climate change could begin to address this.

A recent study on the economics of climate change in Tanzania concludes that the country has a large existing adaptation deficit which requires urgent action¹⁰. The current response will need to be scaled up dramatically if Tanzania is to meet the challenge. This will require government to take a strong political lead to drive the climate change agenda and create awareness for climate change activities across all levels of the government. Only when the plans and mechanisms for delivering on climate change are in place can the international community begin to scale up financing to meet the country's need. Until that point, assistance is expected to remain donor-driven and fragmented.

⁹ This could be based on the OECD DAC's Creditor Reporting System (CRS)

¹⁰ Economics of Climate Change in Tanzania, 2011

1. Introduction

Climate change financing has emerged in response to the need for ‘adequate, predictable and sustainable’¹¹ financing to address climate related issues, particularly in developing countries¹². Since 2002 more than 20 global funds have been established, with donor partners pledging around US \$30 billion at the Copenhagen Conferences of Parties (COP) 15 for 2010-2012 as a Fast Start programme, and US\$ 100 billion annually by 2020 as long-term finance. Making the most of these resources will require increased capacity globally for coordination, implementation and monitoring. Putting in place effective country-level governance arrangements to properly manage these resources will be critical.

The OECD/DAC and African Development Bank (AFDB) has commissioned a number of country level studies in Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Cameroon, South Africa, Ghana and Morocco). This work follows from (and is coordinated with) a similar set of case studies undertaken in Asia, initiated by the Bangkok-based Centre for Development for Development Effectiveness (CDDE) facility¹³ of UNDP, and in collaboration with OECD/DAC. Together these reports provide a preliminary assessment of existing mechanisms for climate change financing in Africa. Each report provides an analysis of existing national arrangements and sets out country specific recommendations. Individual country reports will be brought together into a synthesis report which will provide an overview of the enabling environment for climate change financing across the continent.

We have learnt much over the last decades about what makes external financing for development work better, and what inhibits it from doing so. This report places climate change financing within the wider development context, and in particular in relation to the Aid Effectiveness principles articulated in the Paris Declaration (PD) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). In doing so it looks at existing climate change financing mechanisms in Tanzania and assesses the extent to which principles of aid effectiveness are being applied.

The analysis is based upon a review of literature and data, supported by a number of stakeholder interviews in country, with government officials, donors, civil society and the private sector. This was, however, a rapid exercise, and is not a comprehensive study. It can only begin to raise key issues and is meant to be a prompt for discussion. As well as setting out the current position, it identifies challenges and makes recommendations.

2. Country Context

What development challenges is Tanzania facing?

After gaining independence from the UK as a republic in December 1961, the United Republic of Tanzania was established as a full union between Zanzibar and the former Tanganyika in 1964. Since 2000 the implementation of ‘sound macroeconomic policies and financial reforms’ by the government has helped Tanzania to experience high annual economic growth rates of between 5 and 7%¹⁴. The global economic recession in 2008 had some impact on Tanzania, in

¹¹ UNFCCC 2007, Bali Action Plan

¹² OECD 2009, Climate Change and Development: Key Principles to Inform Climate Change Financing

¹³ Supported by the Asian Development Bank, Government of Korea, Government of Japan, Swedish SIDA. More information can be found www.aideffectiveness.org

¹⁴ World Bank, Tanzania Country Profile, 2011

particular reducing revenues from tourism, although the country maintained a growth rate above 5% for 2009. Tanzania is still heavily dependent on donor support with 40% of the government's recurrent budget reportedly financed from ODA, most provided through general budget support (GBS).

Politics in Tanzania has been relatively stable since the early 1960s, despite outbreaks of election related violence in Zanzibar. Tanzania held its fourth multi-party general elections in October 2010 in which the incumbent President Kikwete was re-elected with 61.7% of the vote. Women remain underrepresented in public life, although some measures of positive discrimination are in place, such as reserved seats in parliament (23% of the total) and quota systems for female students in some universities. Gradual progress is being made and in 2010 women held 30.7% of seats in Parliament.

Stable politics and good economic growth over the last decade have not had a corresponding effect on poverty in Tanzania. Poverty levels are high and challenges remain to the achievement of development objectives, although as can be seen below, some progress has been made. In 2007 (the latest year when figures are available) one third of Tanzania's population of 43 million lived below the poverty line of \$1.1 per day. In 2010 65% of the country's urban population resided in slum areas¹⁵. Current annual population growth rates of around 3% pose a significant challenge to future development, increasing the pressure on institutions that are already struggling to deliver basic services such as health, clean water, and education. A growing population will also put pressure on the country's natural resources.

Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in Tanzania

MDG 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

The proportion of underweight children under 5 fell from 29% to 22% between 1999 and 2005 whereas income poverty has only fallen slowly from 38.6% below the national poverty line in 1991 to 33.4% in 2007, despite rapid economic growth.

MDG 2: Achieve universal primary education:

Primary school enrolment rose from 53% in 2000 to 99.6% in 2008.

MDG 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

The rise in primary school education has happened while maintaining broadly equal numbers of boys and girls but boys outnumbered girls in secondary and tertiary education.

MDG 4: Reduce child mortality

Under 5 child mortality fell from 146 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1999 to 108 in 2008.

MDG 5: Improve maternal health

Maternal mortality rates are extremely high and levels have changed little in the last 20 years despite a recent downward trend from 920 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 790 in 2008.

MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

The proportion of people living with HIV/AIDS has stabilized. It was around 7% in 2003/04 and around 6% in 2007/08.

¹⁵ UNSTATS, 2011

MDG 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

Access to an improved water source is slowly falling and investments in new water points have not been able to keep up with population growth and urbanisation. Similarly the proportion of the population with access to improved sanitation has remained static at a low 24% over the last 20 years.

MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development

Part of this MDG aims to make available the benefits of new technologies, including communications. In Tanzania, the number of mobile phone subscribers increased rapidly from 1 for every 100 people in 2001 to 30 in 2008.

UNSTATS: April 2011

Reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remains elusive even in areas such as income poverty and access to safe drinking water previously considered within reach. The preparation of the next Poverty Reduction Strategy presents a good opportunity to address these questions.

What climate change is Tanzania experiencing?

Tanzania's position just south of the equator results in a complex annual climate. The north and east of Tanzania experiences two distinct wet periods – the 'short' rains in October to December and the 'long' rains in March to May, whilst the southern, western and central parts of the country experience one wet season that continues October through to April or May.

Tanzania is already experiencing an increase in extreme weather conditions with higher incidences and more prolonged periods of flooding and drought. Mean annual temperature has increased by 1°C since 1960, an average rate of 0.23°C per decade¹⁶. Longer term impacts have also been noted on the slopes of Kilimanjaro which has lost 300km² of its high altitude forest over the last 100 years¹⁷. A 2005 study by the OECD reported a 10% increase in the number of forest fires on Kilimanjaro in recent years. Salination of water supplies is also taking place in productive farmland along the coast. Extreme weather events are occurring more regularly and are expected to reduce the long-term growth of millions of people and their livelihoods.

What will be the expected future change?

The mean annual temperature is projected to increase by 1.0 to 2.7°C by the 2060s, and 1.5 to 4.5°C by the 2090s. The range of projections by the 2090s under any one emissions scenario is 1.5-2.0°C. The specific impacts of climate change on rainfall patterns have been estimated with less certainty. Those parts of the country that experience two rainy seasons (the north and east) are predicted a rainfall increase between 5% and 45%, whilst those areas with only one rainy season (the south, west and centre) are likely to see a decrease in rainfall of 5%-15%¹⁸. Extreme weather events including drought, flooding and tropical storms are expected to increase in frequency and intensity. Malaria prevalence is also expected to increase in higher-altitude areas as average national temperatures increase.

¹⁶ C McSweeney et al, UNDP Climate Change Country Profile, School of Geography and Environment, University of Oxford

¹⁷ Hemp, 2006

¹⁸ Initial National Communication for Tanzania, 2003

Climate change in Tanzania is projected to affect the country's vital water resources, crop production and food security. Higher temperatures and decreases in rainfall are likely to affect soil moisture in a number of areas which will lead to increased prevalence in crop disease. Reductions in productivity due to changing weather patterns and soil quality will affect staple crops such as maize in addition to export goods such as coffee and cut flowers. Maize production is expected to decline by 33% across the country¹⁹. Energy supplies will also be affected to some of Tanzania's main towns and industries as changing precipitation levels and increased temperatures combine to reduce runoff from the Pangani and Ruvu rivers, which provide more than 50% of the country's electricity through hydropower.

What social and environmental impacts of climate change can we expect?

The adverse impacts of climate variability have already been witnessed through extreme weather events such as the major droughts of 2005/6 and flooding in 1997/8, both of which had significant economic costs for Tanzania. Costs from the 2005/6 drought have been estimated at 1% of Tanzania's GDP. More recent analysis indicates that these costs could be as high as 2% of annual GDP by 2030²⁰.

Those most likely to be affected by climate change impacts are the poor, both in rural and urban areas, who are unable to access the resources needed to adapt. Pastoral communities in Tanzania are already travelling beyond traditional grazing areas in search of water, a trend expected to increase conflict between communities as competition over scarce natural resources grows²¹. People's health will also be affected by climate change. Increasing incidence of malaria, already one of the top three causes of death in Tanzania, is expected and increased or prolonged periods of rainfall could lead to epidemics of dysentery, cholera and meningitis.

The extent to which sea level will rise along Tanzania's 800km coastline is not yet clear, although prediction models indicate that even a 0.5m rise could lead to a loss of 247km² of land, including in the Tanzania's economic capital Dar es Salaam. Other effects of sea-level rise include the salinisation of key river delta areas. The increasing unreliability of hydropower energy will affect the electricity and service provision for the growing number of domestic and industrial users²².

Climate change is likely to impact heavily on two of the country's largest exports, tourism and agriculture. The tourism industry is dependent on the country's biodiversity, which will be made increasingly vulnerable. Researchers predict that impacts on Tanzania's agriculture sector will reduce the nation's total GDP by 0.6-1% by 2030 and warn that without meaningful adaptation in the sector this could rise to 5-68% by 2085. *"If Tanzania's farmers and farming practices do not adapt, the impacts of climate change will be extreme and they will ripple through the country's entire economy as so many other sectors are dependent on agriculture"*²³. Currently, agriculture accounts for 45% of GDP and 80% per cent of employment.²⁴ Secondary impacts of relatively small changes in agricultural production can be severe.

The recent Economics of Climate Change in Tanzania report sponsored by the UK government and published in January of this year, states that the *'combined effects of current climate vulnerability and*

¹⁹ African Centre for Technology Studies, Addressing Climate Change in the Development Process in Tanzania, 2006

²⁰ The Economics of Climate Change in Tanzania, DFID 2011

²¹ Tanzania National Adaptation Programme for Action, 2007

²² NAPA, 2007

²³ Muyeje Chambwera, "Cultivating Success: the need to climate-proof Tanzanian Agriculture" IIED 2009

²⁴ Ibid

future climate change are large enough to prevent Tanzania achieving key economic growth, development and poverty reduction targets, including the planned timetable for achieving middle income status’.

What is the context for making the most of external finance in Tanzania?

In 2006 the government and 19 donors signed the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST). The strategy serves as the medium-term framework for managing country level cooperation between the government of Tanzania and its development partners²⁵. It underscores a commitment from both parties to work together towards improved aid effectiveness.

The Principles of the Paris Declaration

Ownership

Ownership is the foundational principle of the Paris Declaration. Development is something that must be done by developing countries, not to them. Policies and institutional reforms will be effective only so far as they emerge out of genuinely country-led processes. External assistance must be tailored towards helping developing countries achieve their own development objectives, leaving donors in a supporting role.

Alignment

Under the Paris Declaration, the principle of alignment refers to two important changes to aid practice. The first is that donors should base their support on the partner country’s development priorities, policies and strategies (‘policy alignment’). The second is that aid should be delivered as far as possible using country systems for managing development activities, rather than through stand-alone project structures (‘systems alignment’).

Harmonisation

Harmonisation refers to cooperation between donors to improve the efficiency of aid delivery. Donors are aware that multiple initiatives by different donors, each with their rules and procedures, can be very draining for developing country administrations. To reduce the transaction costs of aid, donors have been developing a range of new approaches, including programme-based approaches, pooled funding arrangements, joint country plans and other common arrangements.

Managing for Results

Managing for results is a general principle of management that involves using information about results systematically to improve decision-making and strengthen performance. In the development field, it means ensuring that all development activities are orientated towards achieving the maximum benefits for poor men and women. It means ensuring that all initiatives, from individual aid projects through to national development strategies, are designed so as to generate performance information and use it for continuous improvement.

Mutual accountability

Mutual accountability is perhaps the most controversial of the Paris principles, and the most difficult to put into practice. It suggests that, in a true development partnership, there are commitments on both sides of the relationship, and both donors and partner countries should be accountable to each other (‘mutual’ accountability) for meeting those commitments. However, there are also many other accountability relationships involved in the development process that need to be taken into account.

One of the innovative aspects of the Paris Declaration is that commitments are reciprocal in nature, applying both to donors and to developing countries. This is an advance on its predecessor, the Rome

²⁵ Development Partners Group, 2011

Declaration, where the commitments were all on the donor side, and to traditional aid practices where the obligations were mostly on recipients. Reciprocal commitments create for the first time the possibility of mutual accountability.

Development partners recognise the positive impacts JAST has had towards increasing aid effectiveness, particularly in aligning aid to national development priorities and enhancing government leadership for development management. Discussions are underway around the shape of a successor process of joint engagement.

Tanzania participated in the 2006 and 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Surveys and is currently participating in the final 2011 Survey, scheduled for completion by the end of March 2011. Conclusions from the 2008 Survey indicate that whilst Tanzania has made overall progress towards meeting the Paris Declaration 2010 targets, more work is needed on alignment. Areas cited for increased focus included the reporting of aid on budget, aid predictability, and the use of national systems by donors.

At a global level the 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey found that progress being made on aid effectiveness was insufficient to meet international commitments and targets by 2010. Recommendations focused on strengthening country ownership and capacity, increasing accountability over development resources, more cost effective aid management, for example through Programme-Based Approaches (PBAs), and a stronger division of labour (DoL)²⁶. It is important to draw on this evolving policy direction when considering recommendations for strengthening the governance arrangements of climate change financing²⁷ (see below). The following principles have been developed by the OECD/DAC to encourage lesson learning from previous development experience and ensure complementarity between development and climate change objectives in the future²⁸.

OECD DAC Key Principles to Inform Climate Change Financing	
Ownership	Activities in response to climate change should be country-driven and be based on needs, views and priorities of partner countries. National sustainable development strategies and climate change policies should be taken into account where they exist. Recipient countries should lead in establishing and implementing their climate change strategies in a broad consultative process ensuring full integration into policies, plans and programmes in all relevant sectors
Alignment	Climate change financing needs to be integrated into countries' own planning and budgeting mechanisms to ensure genuine ownership. Where possible, new and additional climate change financing is
Capacity Development	Capacity development is critical to ensure that recipient countries have the sufficient capacity to absorb and manage climate change financing
Harmonisation	To reduce administrative costs, it is important that the international community coordinates their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid proliferation and duplication of funding mechanisms. A shift to programmatic approaches can help.
Managing for Development Results	The Bali Action Plan acknowledged the challenge of yielding actual results on the ground and stressed the need for actions to be undertaken by Parties to implement the convention to be "measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV)"

The following considers Tanzania's current activities in the light of these principles.

²⁶ OECD 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration

²⁷ See for comparison Nigel Thornton 2010, Climate Change Financing and Aid Effectiveness: Cambodia Country Analysis

²⁸ Climate Change and Development: Key Principles to Inform Climate Financing, OECD DAC, 2009

What has been the government's response to climate change?

The immediate needs for building adaptive capacity and enhancing resilience against future climate change in Tanzania have been estimated at US\$100-150 million per year. Added to this is the funding required to address current climate risks, estimated at an additional cost of US\$500 million per year (presented as 'a conservative estimate').²⁹ These findings have only recently been published and it is therefore too soon to determine how government will respond. Without a clearly identified approach for building up climate change resilience, it is unlikely that future escalations in economic and social costs can be avoided. Financing needs of up to US\$1 billion per year are not considered unreasonable by 2030.

The government's response to climate change to date is starkly at odds with the financial needs and implications set out above. It is early days. A combination of limited local knowledge on climate change and the lack of reference to climate change across national development priorities have resulted in the government not yet being held accountable by the people of Tanzania on climate change. Instead climate change remains a technical issue, and there is little knowledge nor demand for the challenge to be dealt with systematically.

Awareness within government on climate change is extremely limited outside of the Vice President's Office (VPO) and its Department of Environment (DoE). The VPO has full authority over the climate change agenda in Tanzania and has (according to many respondents) not been proactive in sharing knowledge and information outside of its offices. This has impacted hugely on initial donor efforts to integrate climate change into the wider development agenda. Government reshuffles following the 2010 elections provided an opportunity for new strides to be made in disseminating information on climate change and raising awareness across government, although current indications suggest any changes to 'business as usual' will be incremental.

3. Ownership

The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey states that ownership is critical to achieving development results. Tanzania has made significant progress in developing both medium and long-term national development strategies, although recommendations from the 2008 Survey focused on the need for government to build sustainable capacity for implementing these development strategies. Further evidence from planning, reporting and budgeting processes also indicated that donors still maintained a large degree of the initiative and that domestic ownership needed to be strengthened³⁰.

Tanzania is a signatory to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In 2010 the government also committed to implementing the Copenhagen Accord. The UNFCCC requires that each country has a National Focal Point and a national Climate Change Committee. Similarly, as a Least Developed Country (LDC), Tanzania has also been required by the UNFCCC to produce a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), again co-ordinated by a focal point in the Vice President's Office (VPO). The intention is for these focal points to act as a point of engagement with the global agenda, and also that they seek to ensure a coordinated domestic response (for instance through the NAPAs). The Focal Point for REDD is the Director Forest

²⁹ The Economics of Climate Change in Tanzania, DFID 2011

³⁰ OECD DAC Paris Monitoring Survey 2008

and Beekeeping Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The Division of Environment (DoE) in the VPO has emerged as the key agency for these international interactions with the Director of Environment currently designated as the UNFCCC focal point³¹.

However, it remains questionable how many people in Tanzania are actually aware of these commitments, included officials within government, and what these have translated to in terms of nationally driven action around climate change. Indeed, there are relative few specialists engaged with the agenda, and the agenda appears fundamentally to be ‘donor driven’.

Outside of government individuals in Tanzania are becoming increasingly aware of *climate related issues* (for example the changing seasonality of rainfall, degradation of water sources, and the impacts of soil erosion). Their concern is not climate change itself, but what these particular environmental impacts mean for their day-to-day existence. Climate change financing should seek to support this prioritisation by addressing climate change in relation to both immediate survival and longer-term welfare and development needs. The 2009 BBC World Trust ‘climate hearings’ in Tanzania³² reported that while citizens do not link environmental impacts to changes in global weather patterns or carbon emissions; other explanations are often provided. These include changes being “God’s will” or caused by local witchcraft, or in some cases as products of tangible local activity such as deforestation. “Climate change itself is not yet an organising concept for individuals in Tanzania and there is little awareness that climatic problems – now or in the future – are likely to have causes that extend beyond Tanzania.”³³

As a result, there is no broad demand for politicians to own the agenda of climate change, and no domestic accountability pressures for achievements. A lack of political awareness has resulted in climate change in Tanzania being driven in response to internationally led agendas, not necessarily linked to national priorities. Donors have therefore largely defined the institutional response to climate change evident in the country today. Domestic ownership for climate change has therefore been driven less by an understanding of need than an emerging awareness of available international resources that can be accessed.

International efforts to install climate change as a political issue within government have resulted in certain parts of the domestic bureaucracy being privileged above others, most notably the Division of Environment (DoE) in the Vice President’s Office (VPO). Informally, the process of climate change negotiations have also been seen by some individuals, including elected officials, as an opportunity to benefit in terms of status, allowances and international exposure. This has skewed incentives for political engagement around climate change.

Whilst consultative structures have been established, for example the Climate Change Steering Committee and Technical Committee, and the NAPA Committee, and task forces put in place it is not clear how functional such structures are in practice. The extent to which they truly encourage national ownership for climate change is also unclear. In Tanzania other ministries, for example the Ministries of Water and Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, and the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC), have participated in these wider structures to a greater or lesser degree at the behest of the focal points, although often after encouragement by donors.

³¹ The post holder for the last 10 years was moved from this position as this assignment was being undertaken, and it is not yet clear who will carry the focal point role in the future.

³² Daniel, L (Ed) 2009 “*Tanzania Talks Climate: the public understanding of climate change*”. BBC World Service Trust, British Council

³³ Ibid

Few discussions around climate change have yet to take place in the formal political system, with the exception of a briefing to the Parliamentary Select Committee after the COP 15 in 2009. Whilst climate change was mentioned briefly in the ruling party's manifesto for the recent 2010 elections, it was in generic terms; emphasizing the importance of wildlife and forestry to the nation since independence in terms of tourist attractions, but also its importance in safeguarding the air, soil and water environment surrounding us as well as for the country to contribute in combating global climate change³⁴. Politicians are not yet playing a role in setting the policy agenda for Tanzania's response to climate change.

There do appear, however, to be examples where individual politicians have taken it upon themselves to influence policy and budgets, (for instance in relation to lifting tariffs on green technologies), but these are rare exceptions, and not in the public domain.

An area where climate change has begun to appear directly within national politics is in relation to Tanzania's external communications, although this has again been driven by the government's interactions with donors and the international architecture for climate change. The President has, on several occasions, made public comments on climate change when speaking to international or regional audiences, for example to the East African community or IFAD³⁵. The Minister of State for Environment was also asked to participate in a Tanzania TV video funded, but not initiated, by DFID prior to Copenhagen in 2009.

However, climate change is notably absent from the government's own national development architecture. Tanzania's overall development framework and long-term social and economic development goals are set out in the National Vision 2025 and the Zanzibar Vision 2020. The National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) provides the long-term framework for guiding these development and poverty reduction visions. Tanzania's medium-term strategy is further outlined in two additional documents: the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) 2006-10 and the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (ZSGRP) 2007-10. These strategy documents, commonly identified as NSGRP/ZSGRP, lay out detailed goals, operational targets and strategies to meet the long-term objectives identified in the Vision 2025/Vision 2020 and the NPES.

Although the NSGRP/ZSGRP was developed after Tanzania became a signatory to the Kyoto protocol, neither document includes reference to climate change. Whilst environment is included as a cross cutting issue in the national development architecture, climate change is notable by its absence.

At the sector level climate change is not yet mainstreamed into sector policies and activities, for example it is not included in available documentation on the government's Kilimo Kwanza campaign "Agriculture First". In particular cases, such as the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (specifically the Forestry and Beekeeping Division), efforts have been made to strengthen the knowledge base of individuals with a view to impacting on future policy for climate change. In the case of the Ministry of Agriculture, a "cell" in the Unit of Environment has received specific climate adaptation training and individuals have also been trained at the District level. However, to date knowledge within the bureaucracy remains limited and when staff are transferred it is not uncommon for any knowledge previously gained

³⁴ CCM Manifesto 2010 para 43

³⁵ Personal communication

to be lost.

Policies relating to climate change are not yet sufficiently developed or integrated into the work of line ministries and their sector programmes. Although a number of individual Ministers (such as the previous Minister for Water Affairs) do have some personal knowledge of climate change issues, or have engaged in relevant sectors in which climate related issues have emerged, overall Ministerial engagement has been limited. Ongoing donor activities to integrate climate change into priority sectors, for example in water and agriculture, are expected to increase Ministerial and wider government awareness. This work could be strengthened by the development of a national strategy for climate change which could begin to drive a more systematic approach to climate change with clear incentive for engagement.

At present there is no national climate change strategy for Tanzania despite donor calls for such a document. The current NAPA reflects the donor driven nature of climate change in Tanzania and is not a strategic government document from which activities are driven. Instead it provides a wish list of activities that are poorly quantified and not timebound. The VPO has recently recognised the need for a national climate change strategy, a positive step albeit externally influenced. However, it is not yet clear how this strategy will be developed by the government and no timeframes are in place for its delivery. Donors are working with the VPO to gain clarity on these issues although some scepticism exists as donors would like to see responsibility for development of the strategy shared more broadly than the VPO and DoE. Concerns are centered around the existing lack of incentive for the VPO to broaden the climate change approach in relation to power and resource sharing structures. The extent to which civil society, line ministries and the private sector are consulted during the development of a national strategy will provide a good indicator of whether these power structures are likely to change. Stakeholders should seek to engage in this process from the beginning.

Funding has been identified by a number of donors including the World Bank, DFID and Denmark for the development of a national climate change strategy. Ideally the climate change strategy will provide clear leadership on adaptation, mitigation and the needs for cross-sector financing of climate change activities. There is also potential for this strategy to address priority development needs within sectors such as agriculture and energy whose success is ultimately dependent upon a robust climate change response. This will require increased engagement from the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Department to prioritise climate change activities and change financing according to need. Challenges are expected, not least in relation to the current lack of capacity within government to identify and cost additionality.

Additionality

1. In Kyoto project-based mechanisms (i.e Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation projects) *additionality* describes that a carbon dioxide reduction project would not have occurred had it not been for concern for the mitigation of climate change. It is thus beyond “business as usual” project. To qualify funding, a project has to demonstrate additionality.

1. *Additionality* for climate change financing can also refer to donors providing funds beyond “business as usual” ODA levels, in order to enable communities and countries to adapt to climate change impacts. This means identifying the additional cost to development programmes and projects that adapting to climate change will require. It is also an area of considerable international debate, since developing countries argue, as they did at COP15 in Copenhagen, that this financing should not be classed as ODA.

The absence of national recognition for climate change within government's medium and long-term development plans has impacted on climate related activities at the local government levels. Local level responses to climate related impacts are currently coordinated by civil servants without any training or specialist knowledge on climate change. Strengthened climate change awareness would allow civil servants to support local communities to adapt to climate change through existing activities focused on priority areas such as food security and water availability, both of which are closely related to climate change. Local government training programmes should therefore seek to integrate climate change and/ or develop a separate climate change component for existing training programmes.

Global economic changes have had an impact on Tanzania, notably through the development of biofuels. The lack of a clear policy in the country, however, has provided scope for predatory actions of specific companies which led to a ban on biofuel production. There has been little sectoral engagement with climate change issues in other priority sectors such as tourism, horticulture, and agriculture. Climate change does not feature in the policies or workplan of the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture nor apparently in the work of the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries. Beyond events driven by international funding mechanisms (specifically the CDM) or funded by donors, for example around renewable energy, little has been done to consider the role of the private sector in relation to climate change.

Business leaders in Tanzania appear to have been more exposed to the issues of climate change through participation in regional events and international contacts, for example through the East African Community³⁶, than through any domestically driven awareness. Influential individuals in the private sector are becoming increasingly interested in the challenges and opportunities associated with climate change in Tanzania but this has not yet made an impact on the collective response of the private sector. Notably Reginald Mengi (who owns the IPP group and has interests in much of the private media in the country³⁷, was chairman of the National Environmental Management Council, is Chairman of the East African Business Council and has been chair of the Confederation of Tanzanian Industry), has made public statements on climate change issues in the past, including calling on politicians to take the lead in policy formulation.

Tanzania has considerable potential for renewable energy production (specifically wind, solar, geothermal and biogas). Hydropower is a key element in domestic energy production. The lack of a comprehensive industrial development policy for Tanzania is seen to hamper the scope for positive low-carbon growth in partnership with the private sector. Where there are policies in place, such as in relation to infrastructure, links to climate change have yet to be established in spite of the considerable funding available for additional investments relating to adaptation.

Advocacy on climate change at the regional level is being driven through the Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) which networks African civil society from 43 countries. PACJA seeks to advocate, lobby and create awareness on the need to integrate climate change into laws, policies and practices in broader sustainable development and poverty reduction strategies in African countries³⁸. This could provide an important platform for discussion and

³⁶ For instance the April 2010 EAC investment forum had a session on the impact of climate change.

³⁷ The Guardian, The Sunday Observer, The Daily Mail, and the Financial Times in English and Nipashe, Nipashe Jumapili, Alasiri, Kasheshe, and Taifa Letu in Swahili, Independent Television Ltd., East Africa Television, Radio ONE, Sky-FM (in a joint venture with BBC) and East Africa Radio.

³⁸ Pan African Climate Justice Alliance Website, 2010

lobbying around cross-border resources and also on the opening up of the East African Community.

Without the growing international focus on climate change and the stringent demands of the international climate change architecture, it is unlikely that climate change would yet feature as a political issue in Tanzania. The international community has been critical in driving climate change activities in Tanzania. However, the lack of real domestic political salience means that policy development, co-ordination and implementation remains fundamentally constrained. It is not yet owned. In recognition of these constraints donors are increasingly focusing their efforts on raising awareness across all echelons of government in order to create domestically driven pressure for government to take ownership of the climate change agenda.

Challenges to increased ownership include:

- Knowledge and awareness around climate change currently centralized in VPO
- No national strategy or response framework for climate change
- Climate change is an externally driven agenda, existing mechanisms built around international architecture
- Focus remains access to finance, not achievements in support of Tanzania's development

Opportunities for increased ownership include:

- Government restructure post late 2010 election, new staff members in VPO and DoE
- Commitment from VPO to develop a national climate change strategy, although timelines and engagement around this remain unclear
- Increased donor awareness of the need to work beyond the VPO and engage stakeholders from across government, civil society and the private sector.
- Potential to broaden knowledge based on existing national awareness of climate related impacts

4. Alignment

The 2006 Paris Declaration Baseline Survey for Tanzania showed 90% of total general aid disbursements recorded in the government budget, indicating a good level of alignment between donor strategies and financing and government priorities as set out in the NSGRP/ZSGRP. The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey results report a slight decline in this total, with 84% of total aid disbursed recorded in the national budget.

As in most African countries, external funding to Tanzania operates on three levels; global funding streams (which may be from global funds or out of donor headquarters), local bilateral funding, and regional programmes (notably those funded by the IDRC, for example the Climate Change Adaptation in Africa Programme supported by Canada and the UK).

In Tanzania an annual public expenditure review (PER) and the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) provide the mechanisms through which the NSGRP/ZSGRP is translated into specific activities and budgets for implementation. To facilitate more strategic resource allocation, a computerised Strategic Budget Allocation System has been adopted in all ministries, departments and agencies. The government has developed a database that allows local

government authorities to formulate MTEF plans and budgets linked to the NSGRP, and to subsequently monitor their expenditure and implementation. The introduction of an integrated financial management system (IFMS) has also provided an important step towards the production of more timely and accurate revenue and expenditure data³⁹.

Despite improvements in financial management systems a number of challenges remain that continue to impact upon donor use of country systems, particularly in accounting and financial reporting, and especially at the local levels. Approximately 40% of all external funding is provided through general budget support which is fully integrated in the national budget process. The rest (the majority of which still being recorded on budget), is channelled for implementation through Ministries or at the local level. Gaps are evident between actual disbursements and the annual budget estimates, resulting from problems with tracking expenditure, in particular the non-GBS funds provided through basket and project funding⁴⁰. It is hoped improvements in data management will begin to overcome these problems. However, these challenges presently undermine the management of government services and impact upon the intended allocation of resources⁴¹. Donor assessments indicate the need for further strengthening of capacity in government institutions and systems.

Table 1: Example of current commitments for climate change from Global funds in Tanzania (US\$m)

Project	Fund	Amount	From	Disbursed	Theme
Tanzania Energy Development and Access Project (TEDAP)	GEF 4	6.50		6.50	Mitigation – general
FA with Ministry Finance and Economic Affairs + TA	Global Climate Change Alliance	2.93	2010	0.08	Multiple
National Adaptation Plan (NAPA)	LDC Fund	0.20		0.20	Adaptation
Mainstreaming climate change in integrated water resource management in Pangani River Basin	Special climate change fund	1.00		1.00	Adaptation
Developing core capacity to address adaptation to climate change in productive coastal zones	LDC Fund	3.10		3.10	Adaptation
Conserving mountain forests	International Climate initiative	3.25	2009	3.25	Mitigation – REDD
Mini-grids based on small hydro-power sources to augment rural electrification	GEF 4	3.35		3.35	Mitigation – general
UN REDD national programme – Tanzania	UN-REDD	4.28	2010	4.28	Mitigation - REDD

Source: www.climatefundsupdate.org

Capacity constraints within government are cited by external funders as the reason for establishing and maintaining project implementation units (PIUs). Through JAST, the government, together with donors initiated a process of action for strengthening national capacity for project management and to gradually phase out PIUs. Increasing efforts are being made to integrate the implementation of projects within government executing agencies,

³⁹ OECD DAC Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008

⁴⁰ OECD Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008

⁴¹ OECD DAC Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008

although remuneration issues have been highlighted as an ongoing challenge to effectiveness of delivery⁴². At the same time, Programme Based Approaches (PBAs) are becoming more common in Tanzania which has begun to encourage greater alignment. External funders are currently working to identify how their support for climate change could be mainstreamed into sector level PBAs, for example in water and agriculture.

⁴² OECD DAC Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008

Table 2: Summary of existing donor commitments For Climate change Activities (US\$ m)			
Donor	Timeframe	Committed	Planned
DFID	2009-2014	1.30	15.61
EU	2010-2014	3.90	
Finland	2009-2015	13.30	14.52
Norway	2009 – 2013	49.05	52.28
One UN	2009 – 2015	3.40	14.36
UN REDD	2010 – 2012	4.20	
UNDP/ UNEP	2009 – 2015	8.40	
UNIDO	2011 – 2015		3.40
USAID	2010 – 2012	2.50	5.00
World Bank	2011		.50
Totals	2009 – 2015	86.05	105.67

Source: Donor mapping study, 2011

Whilst donors continue to allocate funding for climate change, it is currently not possible to capture climate change financing on the government budget. Aid being provided through budget support is allocated by government for national development priorities, with very little of this funding going to climate change activities as such. Where climate change financing is included in wider sector programmes it is not yet reported on separately. The government does not earmark climate change finance at this time, nor does it have sufficient capacity to identify additionality costs; therefore it is not possible to include adaptation costs in the budget for new programmes. There is potential to introduce a policy marker for climate change in Tanzania to facilitate government tracking of mitigation and adaptation funding in the future. This could be based on the existing OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System.

Capacity problems within government, and more clearly the lack of a focused national climate change strategy and the absence of climate change within wider national development policies, continue to hinder alignment of external climate change financing behind government priorities. However, donors have pledged (in principal) their commitment to increase alignment once a national climate change strategy is in place. Although this commitment is in line with aid effectiveness principles there is recognition that developing a strategy and actually implementing it are very different things. Donors would therefore like to see the strategy articulated into implemented action plans. On the other hand, the recent evaluation of UK and Irish Support to Tanzania notes that cross-cutting issues such as climate change have often been sidelined by donors in the context of the broader aid dialogue with government⁴³. Supporting a domestic climate change strategy will require commitment on both sides.

The lack of a domestic climate change strategy, and the different mechanisms of finance provision, result in donors promoting both their individual interests and projects whilst simultaneously supporting the international mechanisms and vertical funding channels in which they are stakeholders. This incoherence can result in the creation of parallel activities and funding streams for similar activities, as have been evident in climate change financing in the forestry sector in Tanzania (see in the section on harmonisation below).

The absence of a national strategy for climate change in Tanzania means there is currently no formal mechanism for donor coordination with government on climate change. In the run-up to

⁴³ Paul Thornton et al "JOINT IRISH AID AND DFID COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION TANZANIA 2004/05-2009/10"

COP 15, however, a number of donors expended considerable effort to encourage Tanzania’s participation in the international negotiating process, particularly in the context of the lack of a fully coherent African approach. Despite these efforts engagement between the government and those donors supporting climate change remains largely based on personal relationships between individuals. Most meetings on climate change are carried out on a bi-lateral basis although most donors acknowledge the need for a more coordinated approach. Joint engagement around the proposed national climate change strategy could facilitate this.

Table 3: Examples of projects and funding periods
(see Annex A for full list)

Project	Funder	Implementer	Total (US\$m)	Start	End
Civil Society Advocacy Fund	DFID	CSOs	4.6	2011	2014
DPG Secretariat	DFID	DPG –E	0.08	2010	2011
Adapting to climate change in coastal areas	EU	Sapieza, University of Rome, Ardhi University, DSM municipalities	1.00	2011	2013
Global Climate Change Alliance	EU	NGO, CSO, University	2.90	2010	2014
Civil Society Support	Finland	CSOs	2.64	2011	2015
Agribusiness support	Finland	Liwale and Newala Districts	2.34	2010	2014
REDD – community demonstrations	Norway	Districts, NGOs, private sector	25.67	2009	2013
REDD – research, training and education	Norway	Universities, IRA	16.15	2009	2012
Joint programme environment and climate change	One UN	Various	3.40	2009	2011
Small grants programme	UNDP	CSO, NGO, training and research institutes	1.00	2011	2015
Sustainable landscapes pillar	USAID	AWF, JGI, TCMP, WWF	1.50	2010	2012

To date the donor approach in Tanzania has been very much supply driven. It has not, fundamentally, built local ownership around which external support can co-ordinate nor sought to build domestic accountability that will drive ownership. The international climate change architecture has played a role in this dynamic, with central allocations for specific purposes (for example for REDD) often being time-bound and subject to pressure from international capitals. Whilst Tanzania is a signatory (and therefore participant in) the international conventions and mechanisms such as the UNFCCC⁴⁴ and UN REDD⁴⁵, as an individual country it has limited power to influence the global “rules of the game” for climate change financing. It is not, for example, a member of the Transitional Committee for the establishment of the Green Fund which was established as a result of COP 16. Furthermore, the global mechanisms governing how countries such as Tanzania access funds (for instance the Clean Development Mechanism, REDD, the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility Funds) are arguably set in international capitals.

Mechanisms for accessing the range of climate funds available are all managed out of international agencies based in northern capitals. The dominant institutions are the UN

⁴⁴ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

⁴⁵ United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation

(particularly the UNDP), the World Bank and the EU. Tanzania has to initiate specific processes and implement structures defined by these international organisations if it wishes to participate in the global response and access the available funds. However, donors are beginning to provide technical assistance to line ministries to help build the capacity of individuals and systems to manage the response to climate change. Much of this work is contracted through national and regional providers (such as the Institute for Resource Assessment of the University of Dar es Salaam).

The Ministry of Finance is not yet engaging in joint meetings around environmental issues and climate change. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, the Ministry of Finance is reported to be unaware of the potential funding available for climate change activities in Tanzania. A national climate change strategy, if properly costed, could provide a basis for increased engagement from the Ministry. There is also potential for a piece of work to cost the amount of money Tanzania is currently *not* receiving from global financing for climate change.

There has been reluctance from government to discuss climate change financing, in part linked to a fear that existing ODA commitments will be ‘diverted’. In the context of donors’ recent relationship with government, where a proportion of the 2010 budget support allocation has been withheld, offers of additional funding for climate change are problematic. There is a live discussion between external partners and government about the efficacy of financial support and the willingness of government to implement policies and action in line with agreed commitments. The unfortunate misallocation of up to \$30m Norwegian funding in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism has been central to this debate, and has acted as a disincentive to some bilaterals to increase their allocations. In order to ensure future climate change financing is additional to existing ODA the government will need to take a stronger lead in building capacity for identifying additionality, strengthening reporting capacity and working with stakeholders to identify mechanisms for channelling future funding.

The predictability of donor funding for climate change in Tanzania is also an issue that needs to be addressed. Many donors report they must demonstrate tangible results through active projects on the ground. All donors are, however, sensitive to the potential for (as one respondent put it) “massive white elephants” that might be funded through climate change financing. However, in operation it appears that the dominant incentive for donors has been to show that commitments and aid allocations have been released as planned. This has helped to ensure consistency over the short-term but longer term predictability is less forthcoming. Whilst donors have committed huge amounts of financing for climate change on the global stage, how these commitments translate down to the country level remains unclear.

Challenges to increasing alignment:

- Lack of a national strategy makes alignment problematic
- Government priorities are environment focused, Ministry of Finance is not leading on the coordination of climate change financing
- Technical challenges remain in government financial management systems that restrict donor use of national systems

Opportunities for increasing alignment:

- Increased commitment by donors to support national priorities, including emerging priorities for climate change

- Potential to decentralise management of funds to allow local level co-ordination in line with identified national priorities
- Improve the ability to identify climate finance through earmarked funding for adaptation and mitigation activities

5. Harmonisation

The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey notes states that the JAST has allowed donors to coordinate their activities more closely and thus, make good progress towards increased harmonisation⁴⁶. However, at the global level there is little evidence that joint assistance strategies have automatically resulted in a fully harmonised donor approach. Individual donors often place different emphasis on the aid effectiveness commitments as set out in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, which results in mixed commitments towards implementation.

General international lessons indicate that donor harmonisation is problematic if a) donors cannot align behind a coherent partner government strategy and b) there is little delegation. As one donor respondent noted “a lot of us depend as donors on having a [partner] government with a clear strategy (it’s how we’ve been taught to work). Two things can be a problem; either what we have [in Tanzania] isn’t a strategy, or where there is a strategy, we don’t believe in it. That’s more difficult, and not unique to climate change. What that leads to is a more fragmented approach.” However, donors are making progress through ongoing efforts to build a more coherent approach to climate change.

Donors are currently coordinating support for climate change through the Environment sector Development Partner Group (DPG) which meets monthly, although a separate climate change sub-sector DPG also exists. Recent recognition that participants in each group were largely the same led to a workshop in March 2011 to discuss re-integration of the climate change group back into the environment DPG. Respondents were expectant that the merger would take place. An externally funded secretariat position has helped to strengthen coordination of the environment DPG although interactions between the group and its government counterparts tend to operate on a more ad hoc basis according to perceived needs. A joint strategic note has recently been developed to set out donor priorities in the absence of a strong government lead in this sector. The three focus areas identified include environment, climate change and natural resource management.

Each individual DPG group, set up at the sector level, has developed their own preferences for engagement with the government and it remains at the discretion of each group how often they meet with and interact with government.

In 2010 donors commissioned a number of studies on climate change in Tanzania to develop an informative picture of the current politics, social and economic dynamics, and existing financial pledges and commitments for climate change financing. This work is being built upon in 2011 as donors are working jointly to pull all these pieces of research together to inform a more strategic donor approach in 2011 and beyond. An increased sense of optimism is reported amongst donors as this work commences and opportunities are arising for climate change activities to really drive awareness and strengthen institutional capacity for climate change.

⁴⁶ Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey, 2008

A recent mapping study, finalised in early 2011, has provided a practical tool for identifying where challenges and opportunities for scaling up climate change activities across government might exist. The mapping clusters all climate change related activities according to the priorities identified in the NAPA (see table below for the Forest/Wildlife sector). This has identified areas of overlap, notably between the water, agriculture and energy sector where initial synergies can be readily identified and built upon. Those areas that are more exclusively focused on climate change include institutional strengthening, private sector development and increasing civil society awareness and engagement around climate change.

Sector	Institutional Strengthening		Private Sector	Advocacy	Research
	(Central Government)	(LGA)			
Forest/ Wildlife/ REDD+	REDD, <i>Institutional strengthening, Norway, Mitigation, 2011-13, USD 11,900,000</i>	REDD, <i>Public, private and community demonstration projects (incl. Decentralised CC Partnership), Norway, Both, District/Local, 2011-13, USD 20,060,000</i>	<i>Private Forestry and Carbon Trading, Finland (Joint Programming with Norway), Mitigation, 2011-15, USD 13,200,000</i> Committed USD Planned USD 13,200,000	Finland, Mama Misitu, mitigation, 2011-15, USD 2,640,000 Planned USD 2,640,000	<i>REDD research, training and education, Norway, Both, National, 2011-13, USD 6,800,000</i> <i>Biomass Inventory (co-funding with Norway), Finland, mitigation, USD 1,320,000</i> <i>Committed USD 1,320,000</i> <i>Planned USD 6,800,000</i>
	REDD Policy Development, Norway, Mitigation, 2011-13, USD 3,230,000	LIMAS (Lindi Mtwara Agribusiness Support), Finland, Mitigation, 2010-14, USD 2,340,000			
	REDD financial mechanism support, Norway, Mitigation, USD 8,500,000	UN REDD (UNDP, FAO, UNEP), Mitigation, 2010-12, USD 4,200,000			
	UNDAP/One UN, 1.3 National Governance Framework for REDD, Mitigation, 2011-15, USD 7,500,000				
	NAFORMA, Finland, Mitigation, 2009-11, USD 1,980,000 Committed USD 4,880,000 Planned USD 31,130,000				

Extract from Donor Mapping Study Key: Committed Planned (pipeline)

Stronger donor coordination and increased sharing of information are expected to reduce the opportunities for arbitrary action by individuals in the bureaucracy. Bi-lateral donor relationships outside of the DPG are also strong and have contributed to a growing interest in joint programming for climate change. While there is no official division of labour for climate change activities in Tanzania, informal coordination around programming has evolved naturally. Donors are now seeking to build on this, where appropriate increasing the use of and access to global funding pools to do so. The possibility of a full joint programme has also been raised with apparent intentions to move towards basket funding where possible.

Recent examples of joint working include Danida's consideration of channelling their financing for civil society through DFID's civil society fund which provides a basket funding mechanism for advocacy on environmental issues. In turn DFID is considering merging their REDD programme with the Norwegian REDD programme which is already operational. A funding mechanism to provide climate change financing down to the local levels is also being explored by Norway and DFID that aims to link with the ongoing work of other donors across a wide range of sectors.

There is currently no systematic approach amongst donors for capturing and reporting on additionality. Each donor has different requirements, often determined by their headquarters. DFID for example has recently established a central Global Climate Fund, mandated to monitor

all of DFID's climate change projects and activities. DFID is therefore required to report back to this board on additionality within each of its country programmes. Other donors have a less rigorous approach to reporting, although this does not mean they take additionality less seriously in practice at the country level.

Challenges to increased harmonisation:

- No national climate change strategy
- Uncoordinated approach from government with poor communication notably with the Ministries of Finance and Planning
- No national forum where donors jointly negotiate with government

Opportunities for increased harmonisation:

- Possibility to formalize joint working further through a heads of missions agreement
- Desire among (predominantly bilateral) funders to move towards joint financing where possible and harmonise existing programmes and projects
- Potential to develop common standards for reporting on additionality at the country level

6. Managing for Development Results

The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey notes that Tanzania has already met the 2010 target of having largely developed good practice in the area of results management, quality of information and in-country monitoring and evaluation. However, recommendations included the need for this data to be increasingly used to inform planning and budgeting processes.

In 2006 the government approved the national Mkukuta Monitoring System (MMS). The purpose of this system is to provide a transparent performance assessment framework for the NSGRP. Since introducing the MMS more explicit performance reporting requirements have been developed and incorporated into the 2007/08 plan and budget guidelines. These specify a more analytical and accessible series of reports, consistent with NSGRP and other national reporting requirements. Information for the MMS is expected to derive from self-performance assessments conducted by ministries and local government agencies, and supported by independent surveys and analytical work⁴⁷. However, in practice this system has been less effective than expected, particularly at the local levels.

There is no national framework for reporting results on climate change. This is largely related to the absence of a national strategy for climate change and the lack of reference to climate change in the government's national development strategies and priorities. Climate change is therefore missing from the national results architecture. To date results on climate change have been captured either by bi-lateral donors reporting on their individual or joint programmes or through reporting on global funding triggered by international requirements. No joint reporting is currently done by government and donors.

The international system requires participating governments to produce specific reports on climate change, such as the National Communication on Climate Change, that demonstrate how

⁴⁷ OECD DAC Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008

the government is responding to climate related challenges. The production of such documentation, whilst presented as the government's own, has largely been outsourced to Non-State Actors (NSAs) such as CEEST for the national communication. The Institute for Resource Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam (IRA) has also been actively engaged in supporting the government on documentation for the REDD programme.

Challenges to strengthened management for development results:

- No national reporting framework for climate change
- Lack of joint monitoring of climate change results by government and DPs
- Current reporting driven by international climate change architecture, not locally driven

Opportunities for strengthened management of development results:

- Potential for government and donors to build upon capacity for research, monitoring and reporting that exists within civil society
- Seek to strengthen existing government reporting systems in order to prepare them for reporting on future climate change financing as standard
- Proposed national strategy provides opportunity to include a reporting framework to track and report progress at sector and national levels.

7. Mutual Accountability

The 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey reports a well-developed system of mutual accountability in Tanzania, closely linked to the work of the International Monitoring Group (IMG). This group is made up of local and international consultants and conducts biennial reviews on donor and government to monitor progress against individual and collective commitments⁴⁸. The JAST also includes an Action Plan and Monitoring Framework for measuring progress on aid effectiveness. A next step for further strengthening mutual accountability would be through increased participation of non-state actors (NSAs) in the development process.

While mutual accountability is reported to be effective at the national level, there is little evidence to suggest that mutual accountability has been considered around climate change as a specific issue. In reality this is largely due to a lack of awareness around climate change within wider government departments and amongst Tanzania's citizens. Again, since there are few joint commitments on climate change, processes such as the IMG have yet to systematically engage with climate change as an issue. Donors and those government officials active around climate change, most notably the VPO, are therefore not being held to account on their actions.

The nature of international financing for climate change and the lack of common targets with government have largely resulted in the dominant accountability relationship being to the providers of funding for disbursement, rather than to the citizens of Tanzania for mutually agreed outcomes.

⁴⁸ OECD DAC Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008

Civil society in Tanzania is not yet organised around climate change although there is potential for climate change to become increasingly integrated into existing civil society interests. To date only a limited number of Civil Society Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations claim to advocate and work on behalf of the population on climate change issues at local and national levels. Social mobilisation and advocacy by national organisations has tended to focus on particular interests, for example on forestry and agriculture, and is therefore yet to tackle the government on climate change specifically. Likewise there has been little sectoral engagement with climate change issues by the Private Sector, for example around tourism and horticulture. If the private sector was to mobilise around climate change it could provide a powerful body for holding the government to account on its actions and delivery.

However, systematic political mobilization is taking place around targeted environmental issues in Tanzania, often supported by international or internationally backed NGOs. Common examples are often related to conflicts between business interests (including multilaterals) and local communities' natural resources. Recent occurrences include protests over the contamination of water sources by mines, for instance in the Tigithe river during 2009, and protests against the activities of the Swedish company SEKAB in relation to biofuel production in the Rufuji valley. Issues related to government action, for instance government attempts to resettle nomadic pastoralists displaced by a lack of water, have also led to resistance. However, links between these issues and climate change remain tentative in Tanzania and should be strengthened.

Donors also have a role to play in becoming more accountable to the government, particularly through strengthening the predictability of their climate change financing. Reporting on funding commitments is recognised globally as a challenge to aid effectiveness, not least because individual donors are restricted by their own internal requirements, procedures and timeframes for approving country programmes. At the global level international commitments for climate change financing are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. How this works out in different countries is uncertain. Given general concerns over the predictability of external funding in Tanzania, it may be that these new funds will provide a more regular stream of finance than has been seen to date.

Those in government who have the potential to access considerable external funds, as available for climate change activities, are subject to particular pressures to see that these are distributed 'appropriately'. Decision-making in Tanzania is often described as neopatrimonial.

What is Neo-Patrimonialism?

“a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service but of private property. Relationships with others likewise fall into the patrimonial pattern of vassal and lord, rather than the rational-legal one of subordinate and superior, and behaviour is correspondingly devised to display a personal status, rather than to perform an official function”⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Clapham, Christopher (1985) “*Third World Politics An Introduction*” London Helm, cited in Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) “*Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept*” GIGA Research Program: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems.

What is defined as ‘appropriate’ may vary from time to time, sometimes being in line with formal policy priorities, sometimes not. Observers note that in Tanzania the lack of demand from citizens for accountability around climate change has encouraged counter-productive dynamics in how to use external funds.

Little incentive currently exists to actively develop collective accountability approaches, for instance a joint government policy framework for climate change. Rather the incentive is to use the power or resources that accompany climate change knowledge and financing to control the activities and flow of resources that currently exist. Donors need to work with the government to develop a mutual understanding of how changes in these behaviours could potentially lead to increased funding in the future.

To date Non-State Actors (NSAs) have predominantly played the role of technical service providers in the development of a national response to climate change, for instance providing input into the NAPA and REDD processes. Some, such as the Institute for Resource Assessment (IRA) at the University of Dar es Salaam, are research institutions which are quasi-independent of the state. They have acted as the clients of both donors and government in providing technical knowledge on specialist issues. Their work has included assisting with research and design, delivering projects, building capacity and acting as co-ordinators of activities. There has been little awareness or promotion of the role such NSAs could play in holding the government to account around climate change, most likely related to the mutual benefits of existing working relationships.

However, opportunities are beginning to emerge for civil society to increase their engagement around climate change. Improvements in communications have strengthened advocacy networks and have helped to put the pieces in place for a more co-ordinated approach to climate change at local and national levels once the issue begins to gain political traction. Funders, such as DFID, are providing support for civil society to become more active in playing this role.

During the last decade, the media in Tanzania has advanced from being almost non-existent to providing an abundance of press, radio and TV outlets, the vast majority being privately owned. Those that can afford it can have unlimited access to international sources of information. The media is developing a growing awareness around climate change, especially around the recent COP 15 and COP 16 meetings. The Journalists Environmental Associate of Tanzania (JET) has also networked and reported on sustainable development and environmental issues and includes climate change among its key concerns. JET is currently training other journalists on how to report effectively on environmental issues to strengthen media capacity in this area. There is considerable scope for further engagement by the media, particularly in relation to investigative reporting, and in demonstrating the links between local impacts and international causation.

A critical mass of mobilisation around climate change is required before sufficient accountability measures will be put in place to ensure climate change actions take place in the public interest. To date climate change has remained too narrowly the realm of experts rather than including wider society. In particular, private sector interests, with their disproportionate impact on political life, have been notably neglected.

Challenges to strengthening mutual accountability:

- Limited engagement of non-state actors to date, climate change not yet an organising concept for CSOs

- Lack of awareness amongst wider government and citizens on climate change has limited capacity to hold government and donors to account
- External requirements and processes imposed on individual donors
- Primary accountability of donors for disbursement

Opportunities for strengthening mutual accountability:

- Potential to link existing systematic political mobilisation around environmental issues with climate change
- Improved communications networks and emerging media interest around climate change expected to raise awareness and increase domestic demand for climate change activities, although this will be a gradual process

Opportunity for private sector to increase their engagement around business related issues and become a strong driver of accountability

8. Conclusion/ Recommendations

Climate change remains an internationally driven agenda in Tanzania. Within government there is only minimal understanding of the potential impacts climate change could have on Tanzania's development. Engagement to date has focused too narrowly within a select group of technical experts. There is an urgent need to address this balance by building climate change *leadership* across a broad range of senior political leaders and increasing climate change awareness across government, civil society and the private sector.

Access to available global funding has been limited in Tanzania and the government appears to have insufficient awareness of the possibilities for future climate change financing, particularly for mainstreaming adaptation. Although Tanzania developed a National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) in 2007, the lack of a national climate change strategy has resulted in fragmented and piecemeal progress on climate change activities in the country. Recent government plans to develop a national climate change strategy should be supported by donors, civil society and the private sector to ensure a strong platform for targeted joint action in the future. However, it is not yet clear how or when this process will unfold.

In the absence of a national strategy donors are attempting to increase coordination around climate change through the sector level DPGs. Synergies are currently being sought for increased joint working on climate change across different sectors, with an initial focus on water and agriculture where potential for joint working is highest. Donors have indicated their commitment to climate change financing in Tanzania and should consider further formalising this commitment once a national climate strategy is in place, for example through a Heads of Mission Statement. Gains on harmonisation will only be fully realised once donors are able to align behind a strong nationally led agenda.

The current national response will need to be scaled up dramatically if Tanzania is to adequately address current and future climate change risks. Government will be required to take a strong political lead to drive the climate change agenda and create awareness for climate change activities across all levels of government. The development of a national strategy for climate change could facilitate this leadership but the VPO and DoE will need to open this process up to a wide range of stakeholders. Only when the plans and mechanisms for delivering on climate

change are in place can the international community begin to scale up financing to meet the country's need.
END

Annex A: Climate change Activities by donors (2010 Mapping study)

Programme	Activity/Output	DP	Partner	Focus area	Adaptation / Mitigation	Geographic scope	Timeframe	Committed (USD)
CC Programme	CC Programme	DANIDA	Various	Institutional capacity strengthening	Both	National	2010-14	
Follow-up on NAPA	Follow-up on NAPA	DANIDA	DOE	Institutional capacity strengthening	Adaptation	National	2007-11	1,000,000
DFID CC 2011-14	Civil Society Advocacy fund	DFID	CSO	Advocacy	Both	National	2011-14	
DFID CC 2011-14	Institutional Strengthening programme	DFID	VPO, MOFEA, sectors	Institutional capacity strengthening	Both	National	2011-14	
DFID CC 2011-14	Climate Innovation Centre	DFID	Private Sector, Universities	Private Sector Development	Both	National	2011-14	
DFID CC 2011-14	REACT	DFID	Private sector	Private Sector Development	Both	National	2011-14	
DFID CC 2011-14	Decentralised CC Partnership (UK REDD)	DFID	Districts	Public, Private, Community Projects (incl. DCCP)	Adaptation	District/Local	2011-14	
DFID CC 2011-14	Water Resource Management	DFID		Water Resource Management	Adaptation	Regional	2011-14	
DFID TZ	Climate Change Forum	DFID	TNRF/OXFAM	Advocacy	Both	National	2010-11	277,858
DFID TZ	Climate Witness film and World Environment Day	DFID	WWF	Advocacy	Both	National	2009-10	179,515
DFID TZ	DFID CC screening of portfolio and initial thinking on PRBS	DFID		CC screening of own programmes	Adaptation	DPG-E	2010	28,098
DFID TZ	DFID Strategic Programme Review (SPR)	DFID		CC screening of own programmes	Adaptation	DPG-E	2010	54,635
DFID TZ	DPG Secretariat	DFID	DPG-E	DPG-E support	Both	DPG-E	2010-11	78,050
DFID TZ	Support for Copenhagen Climate Change Conference COP 15	DFID	VPO/One UN	Institutional capacity strengthening	Both	National	2009	39,025
DFID TZ	Economics of Climate Change in Tanzania	DFID	SEI/Dewpoint	Studies & Research	Adaptation	National	2010	530,740
DFID TZ	Civil Society Scoping study for climate change governance	DFID	KPMG	Studies & Research	Both	National	2010	39,025
DFID TZ	Political Economy and Drivers of Change Analysis of CC in Tanzania	DFID	KPMG	Studies & Research	Adaptation	National	2010	57,757
DFID TZ	CC Vulnerability and Poverty	DFID		Studies & Research	Adaptation	National	2010	15,610

Programme	Activity/Output	DP	Partner	Focus area	Adaptation / Mitigation	Geographic scope	Timeframe	Committed (USD)
	Assessment							
Adapting to Climate Change in coastal Dar es Salaam	Develop capacities of DSM municipalities in understanding CC issues and develop methodologies to adapt to CC in unplanned urban coastal settlements	EU	Sapienza University of Rome, Ardhi University, DSM Municipalities	Institutional capacity strengthening	Adaptation	District/Local	2011-13	1,000,000
Global Climate Change Alliance	Set up of a limited number of <i>eco-villages</i> where innovative and community-based adaptation and mitigation measures will be tested	EU	NGO, CSO, University, Research	Community Based Adaptation/Mitigation	Both	District/Local	2010-14	2,900,000
Biomass Inventory (co-funding with Norway)	Biomass Inventory (co-funding with Norway)	Finland	Norway	Studies & Research	Mitigation	National	2011	
CSO support	Mama Mitsu	Finland	TNRF + other CSOs	Advocacy	Mitigation	National	2011-15	2,640,000
Joint Programming with Norway	Private Forestry and Carbon Trading - Bridging Phase	Finland	MNRT/FBD	Private Sector Development	Mitigation	District/Local	2010	1,056,000
Joint Programming with Norway	Private Forestry and Carbon Trading	Finland	MNRT/FBD	Private Sector Development	Mitigation	District/Local	2011-15	
LIMAS (Lindi Mtwara Agribusiness Support)	CC component (conservation farming and sustainable forestry)	Finland	Liwale and Newala Districts (Lindi and Mtwara Regions)	Private Sector Development	Mitigation	Regional	2010-14	2,340,000
National Forest Programme	PFM, REDD readiness	Finland	MNRT/FBD, PMO-RALG	REDD	Mitigation	National	2009-11	1,980,000
National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment of Tanzania (NAFORMA)	National Forest Resources Monitoring and Assessment of Tanzania (NAFORMA)	Finland	MNRT/FBD	Studies & Research	Mitigation	National	2009-12	5,280,000
Sustainable Management of Land and Environment (SMOLE)	Zanzibar CC strategy development	Finland	Depts. of Survey and Urban Planning, Land Administration and Registration, Environment, and Commercial Crops and Forestry	Land Management	Mitigation	Zanzibar	2010-14	

Programme	Activity/Output	DP	Partner	Focus area	Adaptation / Mitigation	Geographic scope	Timeframe	Committed (USD)
REDD	Institutional strengthening, including MARV	Norway	IRA, others	Institutional capacity strengthening	Mitigation	National	2009-13	170,000
REDD	Programme Management Support	Norway	–	Programme Management	Both	DPG-E	2009-13	510,000
REDD	Public, private and community demonstration projects (incl. Decentralised CC Partnership)	Norway	Districts, NGOs, private sector	Public, Private, Community Projects (incl. DCCP)	Both	District/Local	2009-13	25,670,000
REDD	REDD Policy Development	Norway	Various	REDD	Mitigation	National	2009-13	2,295,000
REDD	REDD financial mechanism support	Norway		REDD	Mitigation	National		0
REDD	UN REDD Tanzania	Norway	UNDP, UNEP, FAO	REDD	Mitigation	National	2009-13	4,250,000
REDD	Research, training and education	Norway	Universities, IRA, others	Studies & Research	Both	National	2009-13	16,150,000
One UN JP on Environment and CC (UNDP, UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO)	One UN JP on Environment and CC (UNDP, UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO)	One UN	Various	Institutional capacity strengthening	Both	National	2009-11	3,400,000
UNDAP, E CC Outcome 1 - Key MDAs and LGAs integrate climate change adaptation and mitigation in their strategies and plan	1.3 National Governance Framework for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) and capacity to manage programmes for reducing the loss of forest carbon in place	One UN		REDD	Mitigation	National	2011-15	
UNDAP, E CC Outcome 1 - Key MDAs and LGAs integrate climate change adaptation and mitigation in their strategies and plans	1.4 Select LGAs incorporate climate change adaptation programmes in their plans and budgets	One UN		CC mainstreaming	Both	District/Local	2011-15	

Programme	Activity/Output	DP	Partner	Focus area	Adaptation / Mitigation	Geographic scope	Timeframe	Committed (USD)
UNDAP, E CC Outcome 1 - Key MDAs and LGAs integrate climate change adaptation and mitigation in their strategies and plans	1.5 Hazard risk reduced in targeted communities, including climate change adaptation	One UN		DRR	Adaptation	District/Local	2011-15	
UNDAP, E CC Outcome 1 - Key MDAs and LGAs integrate climate change adaptation and mitigation in their strategies and plans	1.1 National capacity and strategies for climate change adaptation in place	One UN		Institutional capacity strengthening	Adaptation	National	2011-15	
UNDAP, E CC Outcome 1 - Key MDAs and LGAs integrate climate change adaptation and mitigation in their strategies and plans	1.2 National Capacity to adopt and implement mitigation strategies for a low carbon and resource efficient development path enhanced	One UN		Institutional capacity strengthening	Mitigation	National	2011-15	
UN REDD (UNDP, FAO, UNEP)	Governance of REDD Capacity building for REDD Access to new international funding (REDD+) Capacity to manage REDD at district level (Payment for Ecosystem Services) Broad stakeholders support for REDD (awareness)	UN REDD	VPO, IRA, MNRT, FBD, LGAs, CSO	REDD	Mitigation	District/Local	2010-12	4,200,000
GEF	Transformation of the Rural Photovoltaics (PV) Market (removing barriers for solar energy)	UNDP	MEM, Private Sector	Renewable Energy/Rural Elect.	Mitigation	District/Local	2010	642,500
GEF	Mainstreaming CC adaptation into IWRM in the Pangani Basin	UNDP	IUCN, others	Water Resource Management	Adaptation	Regional	2010-11	1,000,000

Programme	Activity/Output	DP	Partner	Focus area	Adaptation / Mitigation	Geographic scope	Timeframe	Committed (USD)
UNDP Africa Adaptation Programme	- Climate Change leadership - Long term planning capabilities and tools (capacity development) - CC adaptation policies mainstreamed - CC financing local/international - Research and knowledge	UNDP	VPO, Education, MOFEA, TMA, IRA, 3 districts	Institutional capacity strengthening	Adaptation	National	2010-12	2,900,000
UNDP Small Grant Programme (OP5)	UNDP SGP, Operational Phase 5, only Climate Change USD 1m (excl. CBD USD 1.6m, Land Degrad. USD 1m)	UNDP	CSO, NGO, research and training inst.	Community Based Adaptation/Mitigation	Adaptation	District/Local	2011-15	1,000,000
	Capacity Building for CDM (UNDP-UNEP)	UNDP-UNEP	VPO, Private Sector, TIC?	CDM	Mitigation	National	2009-12	400,000
GEF, Developing Core Capacity to Address Adaptation to Climate Change in Productive Coastal Zones (Implementation of NAPA priorities)	1 - SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPACITIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION ANALYSIS (LGAs) 2 - BROADENING STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT FOR VULNERABILITY REDUCTION (central govt/ interministerial) 3 - PILOT ON INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE AND RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT 4 - KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING (universities, research institutes etc)	UNEP	VPO	Institutional capacity strengthening	Adaptation	National/District	2011-14	3,100,000
GEF	Mini-Grids Based on Small Hydropower Sources to Augment Rural Electrification	UNIDO	MEM, REA, TANESCO	Renewable Energy/Rural Elect.	Mitigation	District/Local	2011-15	

Programme	Activity/Output	DP	Partner	Focus area	Adaptation / Mitigation	Geographic scope	Timeframe	Committed (USD)
Adaptation pillar	Regional integrated vulnerability assessment for river basins and agriculture; Improved understanding of climate variability and change; Decision support tools and information systems for water and agriculture; Increased resiliency to climate shocks for water and agriculture; Improved climate and weather forecasting; Improved water management systems (water permits for agriculture, Ruami-Ruvu)	USAID	Agriculture development regions TMA Universities MOAFC and extensions MOWI International Institutions	Studies & Research	Adaptation	Regional	2010-12	1,000,000
Sustainable Landscapes Pillar	Reduced net GHG emissions from the land use sector (CC earmarked funds to CC components of NRM activities)	USAID	AWF, JGI, TCMP, WWF	Land Management	Mitigation	District/Local	2010-12	1,500,000
World Bank Climate Change Portfolio	National Climate Strategy Development (with DANIDA)	WB	VPO, Others	Institutional capacity strengthening	Both	National	2011	
World Bank Climate Change Portfolio	Study tour for TZ institutional capacity	WB	VPO, Others	Institutional capacity strengthening	Both	National	2011	
World Bank Climate Change Portfolio	MACEMP (Marine and Coastal Environment Management Project)	WB	??	??				
World Bank Climate Change Portfolio	Charcoal Stoves	WB	??	??	Mitigation			
	Total							87,013,030

