Pandemics are among the most disruptive risks facing societies. The COVID‑19 pandemic claimed nearly 7 million lives worldwide between 2020 and May 2023 and caused global gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to contract by around 4% in 2020 relative to 2019 levels, a decline comparable to that of the 2008 global financial crisis. Rapid urbanisation, deforestation, intensive farming, extensive and often unregulated wildlife trade and rising demand for air travel are all increasing the risk of future pandemics, making the question not whether another pandemic will occur, but when.
This report demonstrates the value of investing in pandemic preparedness and response (PPR) measures that enable a rapid and effective response during the early phases of an emerging epidemic outbreak. Using the OECD Strategic Public Health Planning Model for PPR, it simulates five outbreak scenarios, including Ebola-like, avian influenza-like, influenza A-like, coronavirus-like and measles-like and quantifies the health and economic consequences of inaction. The analysis focusses on the early stages of outbreaks when no pharmaceutical interventions or vaccines are available at scale. Without effective mitigation, outbreaks could claim the lives of between more than 1% of the population in a coronavirus-like outbreak and more than 5% during an influenza A-like outbreak, with demand for critical care in the OECD exceeding available hospital capacity within one to two months. Similarly, GDP would contract by between 2.7% in a coronavirus-like outbreak and 16.2% in a measles-like outbreak.
The report also shows what works. Early implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), core public health measures ranging from physical distancing, hand hygiene and mask wearing to ensuring safe domestic and international travel, with strong public support is central to protecting population health and the economy. Even the least stringent package, “Safer contact”, which combines community-based infection prevention and control (IPC) with voluntary quarantines, could avert at least 40% of deaths if effectively implemented, while limiting GDP losses. A layered approach (the “Reduced contact” package) that combines community-based IPC measures with teleworking, domestic travel limitations and mandatory quarantines, would avert most deaths, cushion economic losses and limit the need for school closures or international travel restrictions in most scenarios and countries.
Strengthening PPR capacity is both achievable and compelling. The report estimates that an investment of USD PPP 7.1 billion per year across OECD countries (USD PPP 2.6 billion per year in the EU/EEA), or around USD PPP 5.9 per capita, would be needed to reinforce country-level PPR foundations in priority areas such as building and maintaining a national stockpile of personal protective equipment and hygiene supplies, strengthening the implementation of physical contact-reducing NPIs such as physical distancing measures and strengthening disease surveillance capacity through wastewater surveillance.
Many PPR investments are inherently dual use: the same infrastructure that protects health and the economy during outbreaks also enhances routine health services, speeds detection of other health threats and builds public trust in institutions in normal times. Acting before the next crisis is therefore essential to reduce avoidable loss of life, build resilient health systems and safeguard long-term economic performance.