The Ocean Economy to 2050

5. The future ocean economy: A significant departure from historical trends

Abstract

This chapter examines global forces shaping potential developments in the ocean economy. Factors such as population growth, climate change and environmental pressures, trade and globalisation, the energy transition, technological advancements, and geopolitical dynamics –

along with their interactions – are affecting ocean economic activities and the state of ocean health. The magnitude and direction of the effects of some of these shaping forces have been modelled in isolation of each other to compare how they may affect ocean economic growth and result in divergences from historical patterns.

Introduction

The previous chapters set out the historical trends in ocean economy since the mid-1990s as captured by new OECD statistics as well as a baseline projection of the ocean economy to 2050 that assumes historical trends in labour productivity continue.

A key question for the future is whether the ocean economy and its components will continue along the same trajectory as their historical trends would suggest to 2050. Global developments over the last decade and assessments of short-, medium- and long-term prospects suggests this is unlikely.

This chapter reviews current and emerging changes in the forces shaping the global economic, environmental, and political context. The effects of several of these drivers on future ocean economic growth have been modelled independently from each other under the assumption that all else remains equal in order to compare their magnitude and direction. Namely result from recent literature have been used to alter the trajectories of the economic factors underlying growth in ocean economy activity groups as described in Chapter 4. This modelling suggests certain drivers have more substantial effects than others on future ocean economy trajectories relative to the baseline projection where historical patterns continue.

Global forces shaping the long-term outlook for the ocean economy

Several drivers affecting the trajectory of the ocean economy in past decades stand out as particularly influential. These drivers have tended to evolve slowly over time:

• World population continues to grow but its rate of expansion is slowing markedly; the share of the working-age population is declining; population ageing is progressing at ever faster rates; urbanisation looks set to increase more quickly than previously expected; and the regional distribution of population growth to 2050 is shifting with almost all of it due to take place in emerging market and developing economies (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2024[1]).

• Climate change. Temperatures have risen by about 1.1C since 1880 but the bulk of that warming has taken place since 1975 and the last decade saw the fastest rise on record. Moreover, disturbingly rapid deteriorations have been occurring in key climate indicators such as ocean temperatures, ice cover, sea levels, and ocean acidification. Recent assessments suggest that several key climate tipping points could occur sooner than originally estimated (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022[2]; OECD, 2022[3]; Heuzé and Jahn, 2024[4]).

• World trade expanded swiftly between the turn of the century and the advent of Covid-19. However, while it grew twice as fast as global output over the period 1990-2011 (at an average rate of around 3%) it has slowed considerably since (Ohnsorge and Quiglietta, 2023[5]). In parallel, trade has undergone significant structural changes too with a strong rise in services exports (D’Andrea and et al., 2024[6]). Moreover, developments in global trade agreements have stalled. After decades of reduction in trade barriers, negotiations have grown in complexity and partial agreements have multiplied non-tariff barriers to trade and other import restrictions have also risen (World Trade Organization, 2024[7]).

• Productivity growth. Growth in global labour productivity has slowed markedly in the last 15 years or so. Aggregate labour productivity growth rates declined from a peak of 2.7 % in 2007, just ahead of the global financial crisis, to a low of 1.5 percent in 2016, recovering slightly to less than 2% p.a. in the two years that followed (Dieppe, 2021[8]). The slowdown was most severe in emerging market economies, where the pace of convergence towards levels in the advanced economies slackened.

At the same time, other major drivers are embarked on structural change of a magnitude that is better described as systemic:

• The world energy system has started a process of transformation driven first and foremost by concern about climate change. In recent years, the move to a more sustainable global energy future has gathered pace (International Energy Agency, 2021[9]). Significant declines in the relative shares of all fossil fuels; a sustained surge in renewable energy (on-shore and off-shore wind, solar, batteries, biofuels) and low-carbon energy (e.g. hydrogen); and major investments in innovation, energy efficiency improvements, and carbon capture are all expected.

• Metals and minerals are important for the energy transition and the industry will be called upon in the coming years to meet the widely expected surge in demand. High prices for scarce resources could result in technological innovation and resource substitution. This is very likely only achievable with deep structural shifts in both the demand for and supply of critical inputs. Increased investment, production and processing volumes, diversification of sources of supply, including recycling of existing metals, and improved rates of innovation will be required.

• The global food system is struggling to address multiple urgent objectives – reducing hunger and malnutrition to zero, vastly improving efficiency of production, storage and distribution, lowering its environmental footprint, safeguarding biodiversity, and adapting to climate change (FAO, 2020[10]).

• The speed of change in science and technology worldwide has been remarkable in recent years. Rapid advances have been made in fields ranging from genetics and biotechnology, new materials, and robotics, to digitalisation, visualisation, computer science, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) (OECD, 2019[11]). They have been enabled by fundamental changes in funding, organisation and availability of infrastructure for scientific research and international advances. ICT and digitalisation show gradual, steady advances on some indicators, and explosive development on others (Stevens, Jolly and Jolliffe, 2021[12]). For example, numbers of internet users worldwide have more than doubled over the last decade; more than three-quarters of the world’s population now own a mobile phone; and 95% of the global population are now covered by at least a 3G network (OECD, 2024[13]). Artificial Intelligence has experienced rapid growth in recent years, assisted by government funding of AI-related R&D which has grown at spectacular rates over a period of under two decades (Yamashita et al., 2021[14]). And the landscape of the space sector has changed almost beyond recognition in recent years, providing new means to monitor ocean economic activities and selected ocean processes from space (OECD, 2023[15])

• Finally, the geopolitical landscape appears to be headed for further disruption. While some of the fundamental trends, challenges and risks characterising its contours twenty years ago are still very present, others have intensified and/or have taken on a new dimension. The decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world since the early 1990s went into reverse around 2013-14, notably in Africa, Asia, Middle East and Europe, reaching a record high in 2020 (Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, 2022[16]). Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, mounting tensions in crucial sea corridors and armed combat have considerably darkened the prospects of a return to a more peaceful era. Moreover, analysis suggests that several factors are combining to bring about a deterioration in the quality of democracy, while a decline has also been observed in the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms. The same period has reportedly seen regime changes, fuelling concerns about the prospect of a new era of geopolitical block-building (Hartmann and Thiery, 2022[17]). New drivers now also appear to be at work which foreshadow the opening of new fronts in geopolitical competition and/or confrontation. In particular, the spotlight has turned on the growing vulnerabilities of supplies of energy, food, metals, and minerals critical to the global energy transition. Added to this are growing geoeconomic trends in many parts of the world driven by countries’ search for greater autonomy in key sectors, reduction of supply-chain vulnerabilities, and reshoring of industries.

In sum, the global policy environment is heading towards a more uncertain and more challenging future. As long-term prospects undergo change, so too do those of the ocean economy.

The potential effects of a changing global context on the ocean economy

The future ocean economy will be influenced by shifts in demand and productivity affecting all sectors and through direct activity-specific impacts. Five major forces shaping the future ocean economy are presented in more detail below– world population trends, the climate and environment, geopolitics, the transformation of the energy system, and technology and digitalisation. The likely long-term changes occurring in each of them will vary in pace and probable impact. They result in projections that differ from the baseline projection in Chapter 4 that is based on historical trends. The effects of possible future scenarios will be explored further in Chapter 6.

World population trends

Slowing global population growth, higher rates of urbanisation, the growing share of the elderly, and the concentration of the new additions (1.9 billion by 2050) to the world population in emerging market and developing economies (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2024[1]) can be expected to affect all domains of the ocean economy.

Population ageing is a global phenomenon. Almost every country in the world is experiencing growth in the size and share of older persons in their population. The proportion of the global population aged 65 and older is projected to rise from 9.7 per cent in 2022 to 16.4 per cent in 2050. Between 2000 and 2020 the global elderly population grew by 72%; the projection for 2020 to 2040 points to an increase of 80% (UN DESA, 2020[18]).

Urbanisation too is expected to increase at a faster rate than projected ten years ago. The UN estimates of total urban population growth by 2030 and by 2050 have been revised upwards: from 4,984 million to 5,167 million, and from 6,252 million to 6,680, respectively (UN DESA, 2018[19]). The rate of urbanisation worldwide has also continued to increase over the period under review here – from 51.6% in 2010 to 56.2% in 2020. The share of people living in urban settings by 2050, estimated at around 66% in 2015, is now projected to reach 68.4% (UNCTAD, 2021[20]). Almost all that growth will take place in the developing world, with the number of urban dwellers in poor countries likely to rise by 1.0 billion to more than 2.5 billion by 2040. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will account for close to half and one-third respectively of the additions.

The possible effects of lower population growth on ocean economy production through to 2050 have been modelled. The baseline projection (Chapter 4) assumes that growth in hours worked in each ocean economic activity in each country converges towards the United Nations’ median working-age (15 years to 64 years) population projection for each country through to 2050. The UN also produces lower plausible estimates of working-age population growth which can be used instead of the median. Figure 5.1 compares the results of using the UN’s lower country-level working-age population growth estimates to the results from historical trends. The chained volume index from the projection is set as the baseline at zero so that each line in Figure 5.1 represents how the chained volume index calculated using the UN’s lower population projection deviates from the same metric estimated using the UN median population projection. A negative value therefore implies that real terms growth in gross value added is lower than in the baseline projection and does not imply negative growth rates. The shaded areas give the 80% projection interval estimated by the model. Under the assumption of lower population growth, real terms gross value added in the global ocean economy finishes the projection period on average 17% lower than it would do under the higher population growth rate assumption inherent to the baseline projection, using historical trends (Panel A). ‘Offshore oil and gas extraction and offshore industry’ is expected to deviate the most from the baseline projection, averaging a 25% reduction by 2050 (Panel E). This implies that the global gross value added for this sector would reach only three-quarters of the real-term level projected under the scenario of higher population growth. All other globally aggregated ocean economic activity groups do not substantially deviate from the baseline projection – ranging from negative 4% by 2050 in ‘offshore wind and marine renewables’ (Panel F) to negative 11% in ‘marine and maritime industry trade, transport and R&D services’ (Panel G).

Figure 5.1. Assuming lower population growth creates small deviations from the baseline projection in most ocean economic activity groups

Global ocean economic activity group gross value added chained volume indexes under lower population projections relative to baseline projection chained volume indexes

Note: Gross value added chained volume indexes for the overall economy and each ocean economic activity group are calculated under the lower UN population projection. The relative index is then calculated as the ratio of each chained volume index to the baseline projection chained volume indexes setting the baseline projection chained volume indexes equal to 0. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity. The shaded areas represent the 80% projection interval estimated by aggregating the lower and upper bounds of the estimated prediction intervals in growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity growth by ocean economic activity in each country.

Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.

Climate and environment

Extreme weather and slower onset transformations like sea-level rise and global warming are increasingly threatening communities worldwide with the economic toll projected to intensify over the next decades.

In 2024, the ocean experienced its warmest year on record with an annual mean temperature of 20.95°C for the global ocean (Mercator, 2025[21]). Globally, sea ice volume hit a record low with the Arctic's winter sea ice extent ranking among the lowest in the past 30 years and the Antarctic recording its second-lowest maximum extent ever observed. Regionally, the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea saw their highest sea surface temperatures since 1991. Nearly the entire Mediterranean and North Atlantic are affected by marine heatwave events (Plan Bleu, 2025[22]).

Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to rise and current Nationally Determined Contributions fall far short of keeping temperature increases within limits set in international agreements (OECD, 2024[23]). While 105 countries have pledged net-zero targets covering over 80% of global emissions, most are not legally binding, and substantial ambition gaps remain (OECD, 2024[23]). Recent OECD analysis of IPCC Sixth Assessment Report scenarios shows that to limit warming to 1.5°C, GHG emissions should peak before 2025 and reach net zero between 2050 and 2100. To meet the Paris Agreement goals, emissions would have to drop by 14% and 42% by 2030 to align with 2°C and 1.5°C targets respectively. Even with full implementation, current Nationally Determined Contributions place the world on a path toward temperature rises of 2.5°C to 2.9°C above pre-industrial levels by century’s end. Average global temperatures over a decade have already risen more than 1°C above pre-industrial levels. This change is substantial, as it takes immense heat to warm the ocean, atmosphere, and land. Historically, a 1°C –2°C drop triggered the Little Ice Age (NASA, 2024[24]).

The economic impacts of climate change are expected to escalate from 2030 through 2050 (IPCC, 2021[25]) with the most severe effects anticipated in developing countries and vulnerable regions (IPCC, 2022[26]). Risks that are irreversible as temperature rises include species extinction, coral reef degradation, and loss of small islands and coastal settlements due to sea level rise. Small Island Developing States face existential threats from sea-level rise and extreme weather events, leading to eventual displacement of communities. Urban populations in low elevation coastal zones has been growing faster than other zones, leaving 14% of urban populations vulnerable to rising sea levels and storm surges (OECD/European Commission, 2020[27]). The propagation of economic disruptions due to weather extremes along supply chains will lead to supply shortages and increased prices in all countries (Quante et al., 2024[28]; Cevik and Gwon, 2024[29]). However, those in tropical regions are expected to be disproportionately affected and face greater economic challenges. Developing countries, particularly in Africa, Asia, and South America, are expected to incur economic damages from disasters ranging from USD 290 billion to USD 580 billion annually by 2030 (Markandya and González-Eguino, 2019[30]).

It is not possible to consider all the possible effects of climate change on the ocean economy in this report. However, recent literature on the economic effects of temperature and precipitation variability can be used to infer the potential consequences of climate change on ocean economic growth (Waidelich et al., 2024[31]; Kotz, Levermann and Wenz, 2024[32]; Callahan and Mankin, 2022[33]).

Kotz, Levermann and Wenz (2024[32]) estimate that climate change could reduce average global incomes by 2050 by approximately 19% (population-weighted average),independent of future emission choices. This equates to around USD 38 trillion in annual damages in comparison with a baseline without climate-change impacts (with a likely range of 11%–29% or USD 19–59 trillion). This would constitute a permanent income reduction globally. The estimates do not consider sea-level rise and make no attempt to value assets that are not currently measured in gross domestic product such as non-market ecosystem services. More analysis is detailed in Chapter 6.

To gauge the potential effects on the performance of the ocean economy, the OECD has used estimates of expected changes in income resulting from certain consequences of climate change as suggested in the literature. In particular, mean percentage changes in regional income per capita in 2050 under a 2°C emissions pathway suggested by Kotz et al. (2024[32]) are adjusted for population growth and converted to an annual average. They are then applied to the gross value added (GVA) growth rates estimated through the hours worked and labour productivity growth models outlined in Chapter 4. The results from this exercise are compared to the results from the baseline projection through to 2050 in Figure 5.2.

Should the regional income effects of climate in Kotz et al. (2024[32]) prove accurate across all ocean economic activity groups, the global ocean economy will on average finish the projection period 37% lower in real terms GVA than the baseline projection would suggest (Panel A). All ocean economic activity groups experience substantial declines in real terms GVA on average relative to the baseline projection. The range is from a 34% reduction in ‘maritime shipbuilding and maritime equipment manufacturing’ (Panel C) to a 38% reduction in ‘offshore oil and gas and offshore industry’ (Panel E).

Figure 5.2. Should the effects of climate change suggested by recent literature be realised then all ocean economic activity groups will be negatively affected relative to the baseline projection

Global ocean economic activity group gross value added chained volume indexes adjusted for climate change effects estimated in other literature relative to baseline projection chained volume indexes

Note: Gross value added chained volume indexes for the overall economy and each ocean economic activity group are calculated under the assumption that regional climate effects are in-line with those estimated by Kotz et al. (2024). The relative index is then calculated as the ratio of each chained volume index to the baseline projection chained volume indexes setting the baseline projection chained volume indexes equal to 0. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity. The shaded areas represent the 80% projection interval estimated by aggregating the lower and upper bounds of the estimated prediction intervals in growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity growth by ocean economic activity in each country.

Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.

Geopolitical landscape

Recent trends in the geopolitical landscape point towards a more contested world and less effective international collaboration on future global issues. Potential implications for the ocean economy could be considerable.

Recent geopolitical upheavals have contributed to disruption in numerous ocean economic activities. Among the most directly concerned by the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine are the marine seafood industries, maritime trade and maritime ports, and oil and gas companies disengaging from Russia. Given the scale of the disruptions, international production and supply strategies are being reassessed. Moves to strengthen self-sufficiency are increasingly evident among some of the major players in key areas of the ocean economy. Impacts on trade flows and trade composition are to be expected, with knock-on effects for maritime transport and maritime ports.

Many critical metals and minerals – crucial for the expansion of renewable energy sources and energy infrastructures – are highly dependent on a small number of major producing and processing countries (IEA, 2024[34]). Such geographic concentration of sources of essential raw materials exposes supplies to risks of disruption. The planned roll-out of offshore wind and expansion of other marine renewables is especially exposed to the risk of such supply disruption. Market forces can also pose a threat in cases where demand is out of kilter with supply by a large margin. These issues and their impacts on seabed mining are discussed further in Chapter 6.

Finally, despite several recent successes, global governance in general is being challenged by ever greater complexity and, in recent years, by a mixed record on effectiveness. This also applies to ocean economy governance as outlined in Chapter 2. Negotiations around agreements of major import for ocean health and the ocean economy – e.g. the global plastics treaty – are somewhat delayed. Some, though signed – such as the High Seas Agreements – still require ratification by signatory countries and remain short on the specifics of implementation, threatening their entry into force. Long-established international accords such as the Arctic Treaty are experiencing operational difficulties. The lack of enforcement and management of many MPAs and the absence of any biodiversity protection in many cases calls into question the effectiveness of the recent accord to protect 30% of total marine space by 2030 (Pike et al., 2024[35]).

The stakes for ocean health and the ocean economy are high. Safeguarding and restoring the future health and resilience of the marine environment will depend on the effective functioning of international cooperation and collaboration.

Geopolitical tensions can have very broad economic impacts, such as disruption in national production processes, as well as radical changes in the scale and the composition of demand. To understand the potential ramifications of one particular aspect of geopolitical conflicts on the performance of the ocean economy, expected changes in income resulting from the implementation of bilateral trade barriers suggested in the wider literature have been used. In particular, the cumulative percentage changes in regional real income suggested by Góes and Bekkers (2022[36]) are converted to an annual average before being applied to the GVA growth rates estimated through the hours worked and labour productivity growth models outlined in Chapter 4. The results from this exercise are compared to the results from the baseline projection through to 2050 in Figure 5.3.

Should the regional income effects of the implementation of bilateral tariffs estimated by Góes and Bekkers (2022[36]) prove accurate, the global ocean economy would on average finish the projection period 11% lower in real terms gross value added than the baseline projection would suggest (Panel A). No ocean economic activity group experiences substantial average declines in real terms gross value added relative to the baseline projection. The largest reduction compared to the baseline projection occurs in ‘offshore oil and gas extraction and offshore industry’ at 12% (Panel E). The lowest reduction is experienced by ‘marine and coastal tourism’ with a 9% reduction on average (Panel H).

Figure 5.3. Trade disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions estimated in the wider literature and applied to the ocean economy result in relatively small deviations from the baseline projection in most ocean economy activity groups

Global ocean economic activity group gross value added chained volume indexes under bilateral tariff regimes relative to baseline projection chained volume indexes

Note: Gross value added chained volume indexes for the overall economy and each ocean economic activity group are calculated under the assumption that the effects of bilateral tariff barriers on regional income suggested by Góes and Bekkers (2022[36]) are realised. The relative index is then calculated as the ratio of each chained volume index to the baseline projection chained volume indexes setting the baseline projection chained volume indexes equal to 0. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity. The shaded areas represent the 80% projection interval estimated by aggregating the lower and upper bounds of the estimated prediction intervals in growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity growth by ocean economic activity in each country.

Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.

Global energy system

Recent years have proved an eventful time in the energy sector and the coming decades hold out the prospect of fundamental change to the global energy system.

Limiting global warming requires major changes to energy systems with cuts in fossil fuel consumption, greater use of low- and zero-carbon energy, more electricity and alternative fuel carriers, and less investment in fossil fuel infrastructures. Multiple energy supply options and technologies that are alternative to fossil fuels are available or are expected to contribute to the energy system in the future. They include wind, solar, nuclear power, hydropower, bioenergy, and carbon capture and storage. The combination of a growing momentum behind clean energy technologies and structural economic shifts around the world has important repercussions for fossil fuel industries. In the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), designed to provide a sense of the prevailing direction of energy system progression, the share of fossil fuels in global energy supply, which has been fluctuating for decades around 80-85%, declines to 73% by 2030 (IEA, 2023[37]).

The prospect of systemic change in global energy has far-reaching implications for the world economy and the ocean economy. The effects will work directly for some ocean economic activities through changes in demand and supply patterns, for others indirectly through knock-on effects, and for all through the pressing need to use energy more efficiently.

The potential changes in future ocean economic performance caused by a global energy transformation has been explored through two channels. The first converges countries towards the net-zero labour productivity growth path suggested by the OECD’s latest long-term projections (OECD, 2023[38]). The second adjusts the gross value added growth rates for the ‘offshore oil and gas extraction’ and ‘offshore wind’ activities to account for their future expected shares of the energy mix in countries under the same net-zero scenario. Figure 5.4 displays the results of this exercise. In general, most ocean economic activity groups are not substantially affected by the change in labour productivity suggested by the OECD’s net-zero scenario. This is mainly because the aggregate expected effects of the transition on labour productivity as compared to the baseline are small in magnitude. Adjusting the baseline projection GVA growth rates to recognise shifts in the energy mix on ‘offshore oil and gas extraction and offshore industry’ (Panel E) and ‘offshore wind and marine renewables’ (Panel F) has much more substantial effects however.

By 2050, when the OECD long-term scenario assumes net-zero is achieved, real-terms GVA is reduced by 66% on average from the baseline projection in ‘offshore oil and gas extraction and offshore industry’. This is the largest average reduction from the baseline projection experienced by an individual ocean economic activity group of any of the shaping forces modelled in this chapter by a factor of two. The largest average increase over the baseline projection is also generated by this shaping force and occurs in ‘offshore wind and marine renewables’. On average, adjusting baseline projection GVA growth for the increase of wind electricity generation in the energy mix results in a 2.2-fold increase in real-terms GVA in ‘offshore wind and marine renewables’ by 2050.

On balance, the effect on the global ocean economy is negative due to the relative levels of GVA in the affected ocean economic activity groups. The global ocean economy would on average finish the projection period 32% lower in real terms GVA than the baseline projection based on historical trends would suggest should these labour productivity and energy mix effects be realised (Panel A).

Figure 5.4. Introducing a global energy transition drives major changes from the baseline projection in energy-related ocean economic activity groups

Global ocean economic activity group gross value added chained volume indexes under a net zero energy system relative to baseline projection chained volume indexes

Note: Gross value added chained volume indexes for the overall economy and each ocean economic activity group are calculated under the assumption that the effects of net-zero labour productivity growth and changes to the energy mix are realised. The relative index is then calculated as the ratio of each chained volume index to the baseline projection chained volume indexes setting the baseline projection chained volume indexes equal to 0. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity. The shaded areas represent the 80% projection interval estimated by aggregating the lower and upper bounds of the estimated prediction intervals in growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity growth by ocean economic activity in each country.

Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.

Technology and digitalisation

The contribution of science and advances in technology to ocean economic development depends on the ability of individual activities to adopt and integrate technological changes into their operations. Much also depends on the fundamental nature of the technologies themselves. The broadening of infrastructure for digital technologies and satellite observation systems and the pace of innovation in ocean economy applications has accelerated in recent years. Ocean economic activities are reaping the benefits of the remarkable surge in global internet coverage and access to broadband. Similarly, the recent rapid expansion of in-orbit satellite infrastructure has enhanced the capabilities and services offered while at the same time increasing their availability to new groups of ocean users. Such improvements in satellite capacity are strengthening the availability of satellite communications and earth observation, as well as navigation, remote sensing and precision location (Stevens, Jolly and Jolliffe, 2021[12]).

The development and diffusion of marine sensing and imaging has resulted in new smart sensors, processes and techniques that are producing major improvements in sensitivity, accuracy, stability, and resistance to harsh ocean conditions (Stevens, Jolly and Jolliffe, 2021[12]). The development of fixed and mobile multifunctional sensing and imaging platforms is progressing in tandem, as researchers bring to market new systems (Ireland Marine Institute, 2023[39]). Autonomous surface vessels such as gliders are following suit and, more recently, airborne drones are adding to the range of vehicles available. Larger autonomous vessels such as ships are now also emerging. Artificial intelligence is just beginning to permeate all areas of the ocean economy. Its growth is particularly pronounced in ocean exploration, science and research, but it is also gaining ground in subsea operations using autonomous and semi-autonomous devices.

To proxy for the adoption of more efficient technologies on ocean economic performance through to 2050, the OECD has modelled an increase in the contribution to GVA growth from growth in capital services per hour worked. Projections of productive capital stock, trend employment and working age population from the OECD’s long-term baseline projections are used to estimate future productive capital stock per hour worked – the benchmark towards which all ocean economic activities in all countries converge. Chapter 4 suggests that the contribution of growth in information and communication technology (ICT) capital services to GVA growth is low relative to non-ICT capital services in ocean economic activities. Forcing convergence towards the growth rates suggested by the OECD’s long-term baseline productive capital stock therefore represents a substantial increase in the productivity of the ocean economy capital stock.

All ocean economic activity groups experience a substantial increase in real-terms GVA relative to the baseline projection (Figure 5.5). At the lower end of the range are ‘maritime transport and maritime ports’ and ‘offshore oil and gas and offshore industry’ which finish the period around 39% higher on average that they would do in the baseline projection. The largest effect – at 42% in 2050 – occurs in ‘maritime shipbuilding and maritime equipment manufacturing’ and represents the largest positive average effect on ocean economic performance of any of the shaping forces. As a result, the global ocean economy reaches 2050 40% higher than it would do without the catch-up productivity growth.

Figure 5.5. Catch-up investment in productive capital stock would have large positive effects on ocean economic activity groups relative to the baseline projection

Global ocean economic activity group gross value added in chained volume indexes under capital services input growth prioritisation referenced to 2015 relative to baseline projection chained volume indexes

Note: Gross value added chained volume indexes for the overall economy and each ocean economic activity group are calculated under the assumption that contribution of capital services growth converges with the growth rate of productive capital stocks implied by the OECD’s long-term baseline projections. The relative index is then calculated as the ratio of each chained volume index to the baseline projection chained volume indexes setting the baseline projection chained volume indexes equal to 0. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity. The shaded areas represent the 80% projection interval estimated by aggregating the lower and upper bounds of the estimated prediction intervals in growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity growth by ocean economic activity in each country.

Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.

Summary

The ocean economy is facing a range of disruptive changes over the coming decades which imply a significant departure from its previous trajectory.

The magnitude and the direction of the effects of various shaping forces on ocean economy growth were modelled in order to be able to compare their severity. This suggests that different ocean economic activity groups will be affected in different ways and to varying degrees. Particularly exposed to impending changes are the offshore energy activities including ‘offshore oil and gas extraction’ and ‘offshore wind and renewables’.

Combining qualitative information with quantitative projections of the potential effects of the various global forces shaping the ocean economy’s future suggest that the isolated effects of climate change, the global energy transition, and science, technology and innovation are particularly influential.

The next chapter – Chapter 6 – presents two alternative scenarios which place the main focus on the three most influential drivers identified above.

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