This chapter provides an overview of some recent advances in the continually evolving policy frameworks and ocean governance systems surrounding the ocean economy. From national policies and multilateral agreements to recent scientific and technological progress and the implications for ocean governance, it provides context for the following chapters. It also highlights less-known aspects having an impact on the ocean economy, such as increasing ocean territorialisation, industry concentration and industrialisation, and the growth of illegal activities at sea, the so-called “dark ocean economy”.
The Ocean Economy to 2050
Abstract
Recent years have seen the overall environment of the ocean economy and the ocean on which it depends undergo considerable change. Powerful forces have been building up which are increasingly affecting the ocean economy. Foremost perhaps among these forces are climate change, slowing population growth and ageing, mounting obstacles to the largely open international trade system, a shifting geopolitical and geo-economic landscape, technological progress, and an accelerating world energy system transition. These global forces shaping the future of the ocean economy are addressed at some length later in the report.
Largely as a response to many of those global changes, the policy frameworks and governance mechanisms surrounding the ocean and the ocean economy, have been strengthening. The ocean economy is undergoing significant transformations, driven by technological advancements, economic expansion, environmental challenges, and shifting governance structures. As the economic importance of the ocean and its resources grows, so too, does the complexity of governing their use in a sustainable and equitable manner in order that ocean health is preserved, and fragile marine ecosystems are conserved and restored.
This chapter provides a brief overview of the evolving policy landscape and ocean governance systems shaping the ocean economy, as context-setting for the chapters that follow. It examines recent regulatory and policy developments at national and multilateral levels, and some of the opportunities and challenges associated with ocean scientific and technological progress. It also explores relatively new trends such as growing ocean territorialisation, industry concentration, and the expansion of illicit activities at sea.
The ocean economy encompasses a broad range of ocean economic activities, including marine fisheries, aquaculture, maritime transport, offshore energy, marine and costal tourism, and emerging sectors such as marine biotechnology (OECD, 2016[1]). Together, these activities generate significant economic value, providing employment and supporting livelihoods, particularly in coastal communities. Their expansion has been facilitated by technological innovation, increased private sector investment, and policy initiatives aimed at fostering sustainable growth in the past twenty years or so.
However, the rapid evolution of the ocean economy presents governance challenges that require coordinated national and often international responses. The increasing demand for marine resources, coupled with the growing economic stakes in ocean industries, has led to tensions between economic development and environmental protection. Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution further compound these challenges, necessitating integrated governance frameworks that align economic, social, and environmental objectives (OECD, 2025[2]). Ensuring the long-term sustainability of the ocean economy requires a policy environment that fosters responsible investment, promotes innovation, and strengthens resilience to external shocks.
National ocean policies
National policy frameworks play a critical role in shaping global ocean governance (OECD, 2016[1]). Countries have adopted diverse approaches to regulating marine activities, from integrated ocean management to sector-specific policies for fisheries, energy, and maritime transport. While some countries have established dedicated ocean economy strategies, others have embedded ocean governance within broader economic or environmental policies (OECD, 2020[3]).
Achieving policy coherence in national ocean strategies is a complex endeavour, often hindered by overlapping jurisdictions, conflicting interests, and resource constraints (OECD, 2025[4]). The OECD identifies several challenges, including the alignment of national policies with regional and international frameworks, coordination among various governmental agencies, and the integration of scientific data into policymaking (OECD, 2016[1]). For example, discrepancies between national regulations and international commitments can lead to enforcement gaps, undermining conservation efforts and sustainable resource use.
The effectiveness of ocean policies depends on institutional coordination, regulatory enforcement, stakeholder engagement, and regular evaluation of the policy instruments in place (Karousakis, 2018[5]; OECD, 2020[3]). They also require reliable and standardised data on the ocean economy, integrated within broader national economic accounting frameworks (Jolliffe, Jolly and Stevens, 2021[6]; Jolliffe and Jolly, 2024[7]). The development of ocean thematic accounts, which systematically capture ocean-related economic activities within national accounting systems and eventually connects with ocean environmental accounting, represents a significant step forward in assessing the importance of the ocean both via macroeconomic statistics and natural capital accounting (UNESCAP and GOAP, 2021[8]; OECD, 2019[9]).
Financial support to ocean management is key as well (OECD, 2020[3]). Developing countries face particularly difficult conditions, with less than 1% of official development assistance going to ocean-related projects. The OECD Guidance for Development Partners aims to enable a sustainable ocean economy transition in developing countries. It provides advice and recommendation to ensure that the ocean-related support is well-targeted, effective, and coherent (OECD, 2025[10]).
Overall, best practices highlight the importance of multi-stakeholder collaboration, adaptive management approaches, and cross-sectoral policy integration in achieving sustainable ocean governance and management (Ocean Panel Secretariat, 2021[11]).
Multilateral policy frameworks
The governance of ocean resources at international level is inherently complex involving multiple national jurisdictions, regulatory frameworks, and stakeholder interests (OECD, 2016[1]). Some multilateral agreements apply to quasi-all countries governing parts of the activities occurring in, above, and beneath the ocean’s surface and water column. Others are regional, covering specific ocean economic activities such as regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). These seventeen organisations and their memberships, sometimes overlapping, are responsible for sustainably managing fish stocks including migratory ones like tuna (FAO, 2020[12]). Coherence across different governance mechanisms remains challenging, with still gaps for controlling commercial activities occurring in the high seas (Blasiak and Claudet, 2024[13]).
At the multilateral level, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as the foundational legal framework governing maritime zones and the rights and responsibilities of states. Recent policy initiatives reflect growing international recognition of the need for enhanced ocean governance to address biodiversity conservation, sustainable resource use, and equitable benefit-sharing, as shown in Box 2.1.
The Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). This accord (called sometimes the “high seas treaty”) aims to strengthen the sustainable governance of the high seas, which constitute 54% of the Earth's surface, by introducing mechanisms for establishing marine protected areas (MPAs), conducting environmental impact assessments (EIAs), and ensuring the equitable sharing of marine genetic resources. The agreement opened for signature in September 2023 and will enter into force once ratified by 60 states, as of February 2025, 21 countries have ratified it.
The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework was adopted at COP15 in December 2022 by the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Its sets out multiple targets for halting and reversing nature loss, including the 30x30 target—aiming to protect at least 30% of terrestrial, inland, and marine areas by 2030. It has reinforced the importance of ocean and marine conservation, integrating key ocean sustainability goals into broader global biodiversity commitments (OECD, 2025[2]). It is now in the implementation phase, with countries working to translate its targets into national biodiversity strategies and action plans.
The International Maritime Organization Strategy on Reduction of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions from Ships – This strategy adopted by all 174 member states of the International Maritime Organization, sets out targets—including a reduction of at least 50% in total greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 relative to 2008 levels—with the long‐term goal of phasing out emissions of shipping entirely (International Maritime Organization, 2023[14]).
The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies is aimed at eliminating subsidies that contribute to overcapacity, overfishing, and illegal fishing. Despite recent progress, a legally binding agreement has not yet been reached. Many issues remain under discussion—such as setting appropriate transition periods, distinguishing between beneficial support and harmful subsidies, and establishing effective compliance mechanisms (OECD, 2025[15]).
The Global Plastics Treaty negotiations are ongoing aimed developing an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment. A comprehensive approach is taken to address the full life cycle of plastic, including its production, design, and disposal (OECD, 2022[16]; OECD, 2024[17]).
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) Mining Code – ISA is working on drafting comprehensive regulations for deep seabed mining with its Member States, with negotiations still underway. While draft provisions exist, a legally binding mining code has not yet been adopted, as discussions continue concerning environmental safeguards, resource management, and revenue-sharing mechanisms (International Seabed Authority, 2024[18]).
The London Protocol aims to protect the marine environment by prohibiting the dumping of wastes at sea, except for a specified list of permissible materials. It entered into force in 2006, ratified by 89 Parties. In 2013, the Protocol was amended to prohibit the placement of matter into the sea for marine geoengineering activities, specifically ocean fertilization, unless explicitly authorized under a permit system. Since 2022, a process is ongoing to evaluate and potentially regulate four emerging marine geoengineering techniques: ocean alkalinity enhancement, macroalgae cultivation for carbon sequestration (including artificial upwelling), marine cloud brightening, and surface albedo enhancement using reflective particles, because of their potential for “deleterious effects that are widespread, long-lasting or severe; and […] the considerable uncertainty regarding their effects on the marine environment, human health, and on other uses of the ocean” (IMO, 2023[19]).
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1998, it designates Antarctica as a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”. The Protocol sets strict measures to protect the Antarctic environment, including a prohibition on mineral resource activities (other than for scientific research), stringent waste management rules, and requirements for environmental impact assessments for any human activities. There are today ongoing negotiations to set up large marine protected areas to conserve the region’s unique biodiversity. The Protocol is due for a review in 2048, 50 years from its entry into force. (Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, 2024[20]).
Other agreements are important for ocean governance, such as the Hong Kong Convention on recycling of ships (IMO, 2024[21]).
Scientific and technological progress and its implications for ocean governance
Scientific and technological progress is playing a transformative role in shaping the ocean economy, providing new information and knowledge, and driving efficiency, sustainability and competitiveness across various ocean economic activities, but also bringing new governance questions to the forefront.
The ocean science-policy nexus
Interaction between ocean science and policymaking is fraught with challenges, primarily due to the multifaceted nature of governance structures and the wide variety of ocean-related sciences (IOC, 2017[22]). Effective policymaking necessitates the integration of robust scientific data; however, translating scientific findings into actionable policies is often impeded by communication gaps, differing priorities among stakeholders, and the inherent uncertainties within scientific research. These challenges can lead to delayed responses to environmental issues and hinder the implementation of sustainable ocean management practices (Ocean Panel Secretariat, 2021[11]).
The ocean sits indeed at the nexus of very diverse scientific disciplines, from oceanography to climate science, and biodiversity. These interconnected fields offer insights that underpin a comprehensive science-policy interface. However, integrating the varied communities and processes presents a significant challenge. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), all play a role in bridging these divides to address the complex interplay between the ocean and the broader Earth system (IPBES, 2019[23]; IPCC, 2018[24]; IOC, 2020[25]). New proposed initiatives such as the International Platform for Ocean Sustainability (IPOS) are also trying to contribute to these efforts (Ocean Sustainability Foundation, 2024[26]). Looking beyond the third United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3) taking place in June 2025 with a particular focus on science, all these platforms should provide more opportunities to share best practices and align research objectives with policy needs.
The United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030) aims to contribute to bridge these gaps by fostering a collaborative framework. This initiative promotes partnerships among governments, scientific communities and other stakeholders to generate and disseminate ocean knowledge that can be acted upon by policymakers. The Barcelona Statement, issued during the UN Ocean Decade Conference held in April 2024, took stock of the progress three years after the Decade’s start. It identified three sets of priorities for the different ocean scientific communities: targeted ocean knowledge and science generation to inform management decisions, improved marine pollution monitoring and ocean observations infrastructure; and cross-cutting issues such as co-designing initiatives and embracing all knowledge systems (IOC-UNESCO, 2024[27]).
Ocean observations supporting ocean governance
New capacities to monitor the ocean have brought novel opportunities for improved ocean management, as well as governance challenges. Satellite monitoring, new types of in-situ observing systems, artificial intelligence, environmental DNA, and big data analytics have significantly improved the capacity of ocean observations to support science but also to bring socio-economic benefits to a wide variety of users (OECD, 2019[9]; Malde et al., 2020[28]). Sustained ocean observations enable for instance policymakers to establish the bounds of the economic use of the ocean more effectively and help to achieve the conservation and sustainable use of the marine environment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2019[29]). Advanced digital twins of the ocean represent the next step for using various compilations of data for ocean science and ocean management objectives (Mercator, 2025[30]).
As an illustration, the Argo system involves some thirty countries, with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leading many of the developments in close cooperation with the American manufacturers (Rayner, Gouldman and Willis, 2019[31]). Argo forms a global array of almost 4 000 robotic profiling floats that measure the temperature and salinity of the upper 2 000 meters of the ocean (Wong et al., 2020[32]). New generations are being deployed with around 400 floats able now to measure six types of biochemical parameters, and others able to dive down to 6 000 meters to provide information on water column profiles (González-Santana et al., 2023[33]). The Argo system – like many other ocean observing systems – brings crucial data that contribute to monitor the ocean, feeding into weather and climate models, as well as generating additional socio-economic benefits, as ocean data collected once can be reused by a broad range of actors as demonstrated by OECD analysis of marine data value chains (Jolly et al., 2021[34]; Jolliffe and Aben Athar, 2024[35]).
To maximise the benefits from ocean observation, data collection and dissemination are needed over long periods. Some universally accepted data protocols are in place to facilitate data collection and sharing, such as the International Hydrographic Organization’s standards and guidance on bathymetric data that contribute to map the world’s seabed with inputs from national hydrographic organisations and from ocean industries (Nippon Foundation-GEBCO, 2022[36]). The Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) and the International Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange (IODE) of UNESCO-IOC contribute as well to standardise marine data formats (GOOS, 2018[37]; IOC-UNESCO, 2024[27]). However, ocean observing and data management infrastructures come at a cost and the effective implementation of FAIR principles (Findability, Accessibility, Interoperability, and Reusability) is complex, given the variety of marine data, the diversity of stakeholder interests, the corporate rules limiting diffusion of data (e.g. from oil rigs), and data sovereignty laws and security issues that often limit cross-border sharing (Tanhua et al., 2019[38]; IOC, 2017[22]; European Marine Board, 2021[39]). Security risks play a growing role, particularly in maritime surveillance, naval operations, and deep-sea infrastructure data, as also explored in Chapter 5. Governments and defence agencies may impose restrictions on real-time oceanographic data sharing due to national security concerns, creating tensions between transparency objectives and confidentiality needs.
Despite the remarkable progress made to date in ocean observing systems, real-time observations and local to global coverage for many types of ocean data remain insufficient. Some locations are not well covered, such as the Southern Ocean and even some of the most advanced countries coastal information from seabed and marine-ecosystem mapping is lacking (Clem et al., 2024[40]). Gaps in observations of important parameters – such as measurement of biological parameters or ocean carbon – also limit the volume and quality of information available to many governments and other stakeholders for their ocean strategies. The result is a reduction in the understanding of the marine environment leading to decisions that are not properly informed. This call for sustained and improved ocean observations was mentioned in the context of the OECD Scientific and Technological Policy meeting at Ministerial level, held on April 2024. The adoption of the 2024 Ministerial Declaration emphasised the need for transformative science, technology and innovation policies to help meet the challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, featuring ocean health as one of the priorities (OECD, 2024[41]).
Ocean engineering advances
Recent advances in ocean engineering have enabled the development of swarms of autonomous underwater vehicles and floating offshore wind farms (OECD, 2019[9]). Innovations in marine bioprospecting have led to the discovery of novel pharmaceutical compounds, biofuels, and sustainable aquaculture feed alternatives (OECD, 2017[42]; Thompson, Kruger and Thompson, 2017[43]). The quasi-monthly discovery of new marine species in the deep ocean and the rapid development of biotechnology is opening new frontiers in marine resource utilisation, while a biodiversity protection regime still needs to address the ethical and equity implications of genetic resource exploitation (Inniss, Simcock and United Nations., 2016[44]; Crespo et al., 2019[45]; Blasiak et al., 2018[46]).
The deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies is also increasingly considered an important tool for fulfilling commitments to climate targets, as outlined by the IPCC (IPCC, 2022[47]). However, scaling up CDR at the pace required to offset residual emissions by mid-century presents significant challenges, as the effectiveness and possible irreversible damages of CDR technologies are still hard to gauge (see Box 2.2 mentioning the London Protocol on geoengineering projects). They would not substitute for necessary carbon emissions reductions, but rather act as complementary measures to mitigate hard-to-abate emissions (Smith et al., 2023).
All these technological developments are beneficial for ocean science and for the development of many ocean economic activities. But by their nature, they also bring up many questions about their potential impacts on the ocean environment.
The growing intersection of public and private sector interests
The governance of ocean economic activities increasingly involves a complex interplay between public and private sector actors, as the number of commercial uses of the ocean increases. Governments play a central role in setting regulatory frameworks, establishing marine spatial planning mechanisms, and investing in critical infrastructure to support sustainable ocean development. At the same time, private sector stakeholders—including multinational corporations, start-ups, and impact investors—are driving innovation, capital investment, and market-driven solutions to ocean sustainability challenges.
Public-private partnerships have emerged as an effective mechanism for promoting sustainable ocean industries, particularly in areas such as offshore energy, marine conservation finance, and sustainable fisheries management. For example, blended finance approaches, which leverage public funding to mobilize private investment, are being used to support marine protected areas and ecosystem restoration projects (OECD, 2020[3]). Additionally, voluntary industry initiatives, such as the Poseidon Principles for responsible shipping finance and the Global Tuna Alliance for sustainable fisheries, demonstrate the increasing role of corporate responsibility in ocean governance (UN Global Compact, 2019[48]). Financing remains a major issue. The Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles from the United Nations Environment Programme is a guiding framework for investors, banks and insurers to channel finance into more sustainable environmental practices (UNEP FI, 2020[49]).
Despite these positive developments, attaining the appropriate balance between public and private interests remains problematic. While private sector engagement can drive efficiency and innovation, ensuring that corporate activities align with social and environmental priorities requires regulatory oversight, transparency, and accountability mechanisms. Governments must play a proactive role in setting clear policy signals, aligning economic incentives with sustainability objectives, and fostering multi-stakeholder dialogue to achieve an equitable and resilient ocean economy.
There are around 3 800 maritime ports around the world, and approximately one-third are situated within a tropical zone highly exposed to the most severe impacts of climate change (Economist Impact, 2023[50]).
There are 939 container ports globally receiving regular liner shipping services. Shanghai was the most connected port in 2020, with 288 direct connections, followed by Busan (274 direct connections), Antwerp (268) and Rotterdam (264) (Hoffmann and Hoffmann, 2020[51]).
Some 105 500 vessels of 100 Gross Tonnage and above transport goods across the ocean, with oil tankers, bulk carriers, and container ships accounting for 85% of total capacity (GT is a measurement of a ship’s overall internal volume) (UNCTAD, 2023[52]).
Some 5 600 container ships are operating globally, with the fleet having experienced large growth over the past decades. In 2021, about 1.95 billion metric tons of cargo were shipped globally, up from approximately 100 million metric tons in 1980 (UNCTAD, 2023[52]).
There are about 450 sea cable systems spanning more than 1.5 million kilometres. Over 98% of international communication occur via submarine cables and nearly 200 000 km of new cables were installed in 2024 alone (ITU, 2024[53]; ITU, 2024[54]).
Ocean governance operates across multiple policy dimensions, each with distinct implications as seen in the previous sections. National and regional policies shape regulatory frameworks, directly influencing marine resource management and economic activities, while multilateral frameworks address transboundary challenges, requiring international coordination to manage shared ocean resources and spaces. Current scientific and technological progress should enhance sustainability and efficiency in principle, but it also raises new governance issues, including regulatory adaptation and equitable access. Meanwhile, the growing public-private sector interplay in the ocean domain is growing and is becoming more complex, as governments sometimes must catch up to set the right regulatory frameworks while private actors drive innovation and investment. Aligning these many policies through integrated governance will be essential to balancing ocean economic growth and sustainable resource management in the future. This is especially relevant considering some of the deep-seated structural changes that the ocean economy is undergoing, as described in the next sections.
The global ocean economy is undergoing changes driven by territorial expansion, industry concentration and industrialisation, and by the rise of illicit activities at sea with the growing presence of a “dark ocean economy”. States are increasingly asserting sovereignty over marine resources, leading to geopolitical tensions but also opportunities for improved ocean management. Simultaneously, large-scale industries are consolidating market power, raising concerns about economic equity and environmental sustainability. And illicit activities such as Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and maritime trafficking pose growing risks to security at sea. These developments underscore the need for coordinated policy responses, international cooperation, and adaptive regulatory frameworks to ensure a sustainable ocean economy.
Increasing territorialisation of the ocean
One of the defining features of the contemporary ocean economy is the increasing territorialisation of marine spaces. Approximately 39% of the global ocean falls under national jurisdiction, encompassing areas such as territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Countries continue to expand their territorial claims, thanks to advances in ocean exploration and seabed mapping of continental shelves, asserting sovereign rights over vast ocean areas. This trend has led to more geopolitical disputes over maritime boundaries and resource rights, particularly in regions with overlapping claims (OECD, 2016[1]).
As mentioned earlier, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a legal framework defining maritime zones (Box 2.3). This regime outlines, in varying degrees of detail, the rights and obligations of different states in each zone, ensuring governance and jurisdiction over ocean activities.
Source: UNODC (2020[55])
The expansion of national jurisdiction over different ocean spaces can contribute to improved management, with the setting up of marine spatial planning and even sustainable ocean plans (Jay, 2017[56]; Lubchenco et al., 2016[57]; Ocean Panel Secretariat, 2021[11]). More monitoring and presence at sea, including an active military presence in ocean space and in waterways is becoming ever more important for a few countries to protect commerce and their strategic interests. This trend has as well significant implications for economic development, marine conservation, and global trade, underscoring the need for effective dispute resolution mechanisms and cooperative management frameworks (Blasiak and Claudet, 2024[13]). Some examples are provided below with the introduction of different types of zoning such as green corridors at sea and marine protected areas, ending with recent issues concerning maritime chokepoints.
Setting up green corridors at sea – Emission Control Areas (ECA) aim to mitigate pollution from maritime transport, with ships required to adopt cleaner fuels or install exhaust gas cleaning systems (scrubbers) to meet stringent emission standards (OECD, 2025[58]). Beyond generating carbon emissions, shipping contributes to about 30% of global nitrogen oxides emissions, which – along with sulphur oxide emissions – degrade air quality, especially in coastal areas, and are linked to respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, as well as premature deaths (OECD, 2022[59]). Recent developments in ECAs show an expansion of regulated zones, with the Mediterranean Sea set to become an ECA for sulfur oxides in May 2025. This addition follows the existing ECAs in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, North America, and parts of the Caribbeans. Discussions are ongoing about potential expansions in Asia and other high-traffic regions. The effectiveness of ECAs is evident in reduced sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions in regulated waters, leading to improved air quality and public health benefits (International Council on Clean Transportation, 2024[60]). However, challenges remain, including compliance costs, enforcement difficulties, and infrastructure limitations for alternative fuels. Despite these hurdles, ECAs continue to push the industry toward greener practices, with increasing investments in low-emission technologies and cleaner fuel alternatives.
Setting up marine protected areas - As of May 2024, there were around 18 200 marine protected areas and almost a hundred other area-based conservation measures covering over 29 million square kilometres or 8.3% of the ocean, according to the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) (UNEP IUCN, 2025[61]). This represents more than a tenfold increase in marine protected area coverage since 2000, largely due to the establishment of very large areas exceeding 100 000 square kilometres. Progress has stalled since 2020, however. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework commits to establishing protected areas to safeguard zones of particular importance for biodiversity, with the aim to cover up to 30% of the ocean by 2030. But reaching the target by 2030 would call for effectively managing important sites totalling on average an additional 1.13 million square kilometres of ocean each year. Additionally, the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) aims to protect marine biodiversity in international waters and the seabed.
MPAs aim to protect various ecosystems such as mangroves, salt marshes, and seagrass beds, which cover around 0.5% of the ocean and contribute to preserve biodiversity, enhance coastal protection, and support fisheries, while offering a level of carbon sequestration that may be important but which is still difficult to quantify (Macreadie et al., 2021[62]; Oschlies et al., 2025[63]). The level of actual protection of MPAs is however quite low due to lack of monitoring and enforcement, with estimates of 1,3% to 3% of effectively protected MPAs (Pike et al., 2024[64]). Setting up ocean observations systems to monitor biodiversity and ecosystem changes and enforcement mechanisms will be key (Miloslavich et al., 2018[65]). In addition, setting up more networks of connected marine protected areas in the future, equipped with protected corridors for ecological connectivity, would also make both scientific and economic sense, although they need to take into account coastal communities’ needs particularly in developing countries (Bohler-Muller, 2014[66]; Popova et al., 2019[67]).
Managing maritime chokepoints – Disruptions to shipping schedules, service reliability, security measures, freight costs and insurance premiums are increasingly affecting overall seaborne trade geography (UNCTAD, 2024[68]). Globally, an estimated 180 international maritime straits and passages are important for global trade. Historic routes such as the Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope, which played pivotal roles during early globalisation, are now of secondary importance, though they remain significant alternatives when other passages are blocked. The Strait of Malacca leads in total global maritime flows, handling 18.5% of traffic with approximately 80 000 vessels transiting annually, followed by the Taiwan Strait (18%), the Dover Strait (Pas de Calais) (15%), and the Strait of Gibraltar (12.3%). Recent crises in the Red Sea, Suez Canal and Panama Canal have hindered the free movement of goods, impacting industries like construction, automotive, chemicals, energy, food distribution, and machinery that depend on Asia-Pacific imports. Incidents on the Panama and Suez Canal due to climate-induced low water levels and regional conflicts led to a drop in traffic of over 50% by mid-2024 (UNCTAD, 2024[69]). The freedom of Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss further these implications.
Industrialisation and industry concentration
Parallel to the territorialisation of ocean spaces, the ocean economy is experiencing rapid industrialisation and industry concentration. Large-scale marine industries, including offshore oil and gas, commercial fishing, and maritime transport, are increasingly dominated by multinational corporations and vertically integrated business models. While this trend has driven efficiency gains and innovation, it has also raised concerns about market concentration, equity of resource access, and environmental sustainability. Ensuring fair competition and responsible business conduct in the ocean economy requires regulatory oversight, transparent governance mechanisms, and policies that support small-scale and community-based enterprises.
Some ocean industries are highly concentrated, dominated by a few large players, notably offshore oil and gas, shipping and increasingly ports. Others are concentrated at different segments of the value chain, such as in the case of fisheries and aquaculture. The top 10 companies in eight key ocean economy industries collectively generate an average of 45% of industry revenues, while the 100 largest firms account for 60% of total revenues (Virdin et al., 2021). This can lead to valid discussions around equity, like in other domains of the global economy, but also as an opportunity to boost more sustainable practices If leaders adhere to the same principles (UN Global Compact, 2019[48]).
Offshore Oil and Gas – The number of offshore oil and gas platforms in use around the world stands at around 7 500, the bulk of them in the Gulf of Mexico and Western Europe but with considerable numbers of them operating in Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region (OECD, 2019[9]). Many of these platforms are nearing the end of their service life. For example, in the Gulf of Mexico, the decommissioning of offshore structures has been a longstanding regulatory priority under the oversight of the United States Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). Since the 1980s, operators and contractors have undertaken the removal of approximately 150 to 250 offshore installations annually, ensuring compliance with environmental and safety regulations while managing the structural lifecycle of offshore energy infrastructure (Zeldovich, 2019[70]). In cases where rigs are partially left in place, marine species use the platforms’ structures on the seafloor as artificial reefs. These artificial habitats attract an array of species over a relatively small area of seafloor, rather like apartment buildings for small fish, clams and molluscs (OECD, 2019[9]). This industry is dominated by multinational corporations like ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and Chevron, with national oil companies (e.g., Saudi Aramco, Petrobras) playing a major role in regions with vast natural reserves. The increasing consolidation and growing number of partnerships in exploration and production, as well as a gradual shift toward offshore renewables, contribute to make the energy industry ever more concentrated.
Shipping – Maritime transport is the backbone of global trade in goods, accounting for more than 80% of the volume of global trade in goods and more than 70% of its total value (OECD, 2025[58]). In 2023, global maritime trade was transported on board around 105 500 vessels of 100 GT and above, with oil tankers, bulk carriers, and container ships accounting for 85% of total capacity (UNCTAD, 2023[52]). The value of world merchandise trade totalled some USD 24.1 trillion in 2023, and the volume of merchandise trade grew more than twice as fast as real world GDP in the 1990s, and 1.5 times as fast in the early 2000s (WTO, 2024[71]). The principal products transported by sea in terms of weight are bulk commodities, which tend to have relatively low weight unit values, such as iron ore, coal, crude oil, and grain. Higher value container freight accounts for about 15% of total tonnage but represents about 60% of the total value of seaborne trade (OECD/EUIPO, 2021[72]).
The top 10 companies control over 85% of container shipping capacity (Table 2.1). While mergers and acquisitions have reduced competition and increased economies of scale, the development of shipping alliances like 2M, Ocean Alliance and The Alliance are further increasing market concentration by pooling resources and sharing routes. This is not new, but the highly concentrated market is raising competition and level playing field concerns in most parts of the world (International Transport Forum, 2018[73]), providing considerable bargaining power to carriers with regard to acquiring ports and terminals, as shown in the next section. The cruise market is also dominated by a few major companies. Carnival Corporation, Royal Caribbean, and Norwegian Cruise Line control over 80% of the global cruise market. And the increasing focus on luxury and expedition cruises, which require significant investment, further benefits large players.
Source: Alphaliner (2024), Alphaliner Top 100, https://alphaliner.axsmarine.com/PublicTop100/ (accessed on 10 October 2024)
Note: The twenty-foot equivalent unit (abbreviated TEU) is a general unit of cargo capacity, often used for container ships and container ports.
Ports ownership - Shipping and ports connect global value chains and support global economic interconnectivity (OECD/EUIPO, 2021[72]). Port management is influenced by national priorities, economic strategies, and historical developments. Globally, most port authorities are publicly owned, with central governments and local municipalities serving as primary stakeholders. For instance, the Port of Rotterdam Authority in the Netherlands is an unlisted public limited company, with approximately 70% of its shares held by the Municipality of Rotterdam and around 30% by the Dutch government (Port of Rotterdam, 2024[74]). Private ownership of port authorities is not as common but is increasingly concentrated, with a few large conglomerates, often operating globally, leveraging economies of scale, expertise, and capital. The growth of private involvement is often driven by public-private partnerships (PPPs), privatisation of specific operations (e.g., terminals), or the outright sale or lease of port facilities. This trend is particularly notable in regions where governments seek to attract private investment to modernize infrastructure, increase efficiency, or reduce public expenditure.
The world's leading shipping companies have made significant investments in recent years in port logistics, including ownership and operation of ports and terminals, directly or via subsidiaries. Container carriers achieved unprecedented profits in 2022 estimated at almost USD 300 billion in earnings before interest and taxes (UNCTAD, 2023[52]). The operational profit margin of the ten largest container shipping companies reached an estimated USD 160 billion in 2021, a substantial part of which has been used to fund acquisitions in the freight forwarding and logistics business to achieve vertical integration (OECD ITF, 2022[75]). Maersk (Denmark) operates its terminal services through its subsidiary, APM Terminals, which manages a global network of 74 ports in 38 countries. MSC Group (Switzerland) bought in 2022 the Bolloré Group’s (France) shipping, logistics and terminals operations including 42 ports in Africa, 16 container terminal concessions, with three railway concessions.
Other private conglomerates include Hutchison Ports (China), a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings, which operates 52 ports across 27 countries, including major facilities in the United Kingdom, Germany, and until recently the Panama Canal (Tang, 2025[76]). PSA International (Singapore) which operates a global portfolio of 60 terminals in 26 countries, including in Singapore; Antwerp and Mumbai, and DP World (UAE) which operates 90 ports and terminals. This blend of ownership structures underscores the diverse approaches to port management worldwide, influenced by national priorities, economic strategies, and historical developments.
Industrial bottom fishing - trawling – Bottom fishing / trawling has been going on for centuries, but the industrial scale of these fisheries activities is threatening the sustainability of fish stocks (OECD, 2025[15]). Bottom fishing involves dragging nets across the seafloor (benthic trawling) or towing a net just above seafloor (demersal trawling) to catch marine species living at the bottom and semi-pelagic species (e.g. squid, cod, shrimp).
Bottom fishing occurs almost entirely in EEZs (99%, only 1% in high seas) and accounts for around one quarter of the global marine fisheries catch (Costello et al., 2020[77]). The annual total amount of seafood caught by bottom trawling in EEZs is roughly equivalent to all the seafood caught by the world’s artisanal fishers (Steadman et al., 2021[78]). It is almost entirely an industrial scale fishing activity, being more time- and cost-efficient than artisanal activity, but often also more destructive. The practices have negative effects on benthic communities and habitats that have been documented over years (ICES, 2021[79]; Long et al., 2021[80]), particularly as knowledge improves on the composition of deep-sea biodiversity (Good et al., 2022[81]). Although some mobile fauna may rapidly recolonise regions, where trawling has ceased, ecosystem recovery in soft sediments can remain limited even after 30 years, and for deep-sea organisms that are long lived and grow slowly, recolonisation and recovery could be on a timescale of centuries (Paradis et al., 2021[82]; de Juan, Demestre and Sánchez, 2011[83]).
Seabed mineral extraction – Much of current seabed extraction activity is conducted by the international dredging industry. Dredging is a routine requirement in waterways around the world because sedimentation—the natural process of sand and silt washing downstream—gradually fills channels and harbours (European Dredging Association, 2022[84]). It is also vital for civil engineering works (e.g. harbour construction, coastal protection infrastructures) and removal of hazardous waste and polluted sediment. The full cycle of dredging involves collecting, bringing up, and clearing away material and objects from the bed of a river or channel, and then transporting it to a relocation site and unloading it safely (NOAA, 2022[85]). Notwithstanding its essential role in keeping waterways and port access open and reducing the environmental risks of polluted water bodies, dredging in its various forms can have long-standing impacts on the environment.
Seabed mining is a long-established practice by several countries within their own national waters, usually involving the extraction of minerals from nearshore and shallow-water deposits (United Nations, 2021[86]). Among the oldest of such forms of extraction is dredge mining. This involves the retrieval of various aggregates such as sand, clay and gravel, i.e. for construction purposes, as well as mineral dredging involving the extraction of gold, diamonds, tin, so-called mineral sands (ilmenite, rutile, zircon) and phosphates (Schneider, 2020[87]). The technical feasibility, environmental impacts and economic models vary substantially depending on whether the extractive activities occur in shallow waters down to 200 metres (the case of most current seabed mining activities) or in the deep ocean (at depths greater than 200 metres). The impacts of mining practices have been documented in well-established shallow-water extractive activities (e.g. sand, diamonds, tin) (Kaikkonen and Virtanen, 2022[88]).
In recent years, more “placer deposits” (i.e., natural concentrations of often valuable minerals) have been identified by countries when surveying their national seabed, particularly in coastal, island and archipelagic States. There are no specific guidelines for countries engaging in seabed mining, but the OECD has developed “Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas”, which may provide advice as they apply to all mineral supply chains (OECD, 2016[89]).
Deep seabed mining would involve extracting polymetallic nodules and seafloor sulphide deposits at depths of below 200 metres, and much of the deep seabed is to be found in international waters. Few countries are known to be mining the deep seafloor in their territorial waters so far, since the technical difficulties (dark environment, high pressures) and risks of potentially major environmental impacts are important. Deep seabed mining seems to have been carried out for the first time in 2017 by Japan within its exclusive economic zone at a water depth of 1 600 metres (Washburn et al., 2023[90]). Prototype projects have already been tested at depths of 1 600m and 4 500m, and exploratory operations are underway to provide proof of concept for the technologies used to extract minerals (International Seabed Authority, 2022[91]). Technological developments in tools for mining cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, on the other hand, are lagging (UN, 2021[92]).
No deep seabed mining is taking place in international waters. However, exploration has been going on for many years under the aegis of the International Seabed Authority (ISA, which was established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to regulate activities in the deep seabed to prevent damage to ecosystems and biodiversity, and to level out across countries the potential economic advantages of eventual seabed exploitation. So far, ISA has permitted limited exploration of the seabed with 42 contracts of a 15-year duration, and the results of the research are starting to be shared internationally via different platforms (International Seabed Authority, 2022[91]). No permits for mineral exploitation have been issued so far by ISA, although a mining code is under negotiation, against a background of mounting calls for precautionary approach and an international moratorium on deep seabed mining.
The expansion of illegal activities at sea: the “dark ocean economy”
In addition to ocean economic activities that are often regulated under different frameworks, the growth of illegal activities at sea poses a growing challenge to ocean governance. Transnational organised crime groups have always exploited the ocean’s vast, less-patrolled waters and coastal areas, to traffic illicit drugs and other contraband. The economic fragility of many countries and high levels of corruption have also led to a steady rise of illegal activities in many parts of world, from piracy to illegal fishing (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024[93]). All these illegal activities at sea constitute what could be coined a “dark ocean economy” that threatens not only citizens and companies with violence, but often contributes to pollution and the destruction of the marine environment. Such high-profit activities are extremely hard to counter as national maritime surveillance, enforcement and criminal justice systems need to be in place and able to respond.
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains a pervasive issue, undermining marine conservation efforts and jeopardizing the livelihoods of communities dependent on fisheries (Hutniczak, Delpeuch and Leroy, 2019[94]). IUU fishing could account for up to 20% of the global fish catch, with some regions experiencing rates as high as 50%. IUU not only depletes fish stocks but also destabilizes marine ecosystems and economies reliant on sustainable fishing practices. The OECD highlights that IUU fishing is often facilitated by inadequate regulatory frameworks, insufficient enforcement, and, in some cases, government subsidies that inadvertently support illegal operations (Delpeuch, Migliaccio and Symes, 2022[95]). Addressing these issues requires comprehensive policy reforms and enhanced monitoring and surveillance capabilities. (Plan Bleu and UNEP/MAP, 2024[96]).
Illicit movement of drugs, arms, and humans - The maritime sphere has witnessed a concerning rise in trafficking activities, encompassing the illicit movement of drugs, arms, and humans. Criminal networks exploit vast and often poorly monitored oceanic expanses to conduct these operations, posing significant challenges to law enforcement agencies (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024[93]). For instance, fishing vessels are increasingly utilised as conduits for drug smuggling, with transshipment at sea enabling the transfer of narcotics between ships to evade detection. Additionally, there are documented cases where organised crime syndicates engage in human trafficking under the guise of legitimate fishing operations, subjecting individuals to forced labour and deplorable conditions. The OECD emphasizes the need for integrated maritime security strategies that address the multifaceted nature of these illicit activities (Yamaguchi, 2023[97]).
Recent data indicate a substantial rise in seizures and increasingly sophisticated smuggling methods. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), approximately 89% of global cocaine seizures between 2015 and 2021 were linked to maritime trafficking valued at some USD100 billion per year. Cocaine seizures surpassed 2,700 tons in 2024 (Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center, 2025[98]). Cocaine continues to be trafficked primarily from South America, as well as via Central America to Europe and North America. Other routes, such as that via the Indian Ocean, connect Afghanistan and East African nations, serving both as consumer markets and transit points for further distribution to Europe and other regions. The smuggling of “captagon”, an illicit drug containing amphetamine, also continues to increase notably across the Near and Middle East, and to some extent in North Africa. Smugglers continuously adapt their tactics, exemplified by the growing threat of narco-piracy along the shores of Ecuador and Colombia.
Marine pollution: Marine pollution includes the release of toxic material or dumping of illegal waste in coastal areas or the high seas, by all types of platforms and ships including cruise liners and ships transporting live animals (Boada-Saña, 2021[99]). Some of the major polluting accidents that have occurred at sea have triggered responses from policymakers to improve the regulation of commercial activities (e.g. polluter-pays principle used for the ocean). In the case of accidental oil spills, there have been huge reductions in spill volumes since the 1970s (Ritchie, Samborska and Roser, 2022[100]). Nonetheless the largest spills have released tens of millions of litres of oil and have resulted in fouled coastlines, polluted fisheries, dead and injured wildlife, and lost tourism revenues. In some cases, the review of the long-term impacts have gone on for years (e.g. BP’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010).
The overall context in which the ocean economy and the ocean itself have been evolving in recent decades has been greatly influenced by a whole range of powerful forces – economic, environmental, geopolitical and technological.
These in turn have in many cases elicited strong responses both from policymakers – in the form of rapidly evolving policy frameworks and ocean governance systems – and from other stakeholders such as decision makers in industry and the science and research communities. Hence, while progress has been made, many challenges remain. Further action is needed to improve policy coherence, foster greater cooperation among stakeholders, and strengthen governance mechanisms to achieve a healthier, more sustainable, secure and prosperous ocean.
Considering all the complex changes that have unfolded in and around the ocean economy in recent decades, how has its economic performance fared over time? This is the subject of the following chapter.
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