This chapter examines how global shaping forces may impact selected areas of the ocean economy over the coming decades. It then presents two possible scenarios for the future ocean economy based on different energy transition pathways – one rapid and one gradual – through to 2050. These scenarios highlight differences in trajectories and emphasise the crucial role of energy policies and technological advances in shaping the future ocean economy.
The Ocean Economy to 2050
Abstract
The foresight exercise in this report presents a set of possible future ocean economies. The aim is to inform policy decisions targeting the development of the ocean economy while conserving, sustainably using, and restoring marine ecosystems into the future.
The preceding chapters have examined the evolving governance of an ocean economy facing mounting challenges (Chapter 2), evolutions in ocean economic activity groups in the past (Chapter 3), and projections of their potential growth to 2050 under the assumption that historical trends persist (Chapter 4). However, the continuation of historical trends is improbable given the profound effects key global drivers – including demographic shifts, climate change, geopolitical uncertainties, and the energy transition to name a few – are likely to have on the broader economic landscape in the coming decades. These global forces are analysed individually in the previous chapter (Chapter 5).
This chapter builds on that foundation by first considering how global shaping forces could impact selected industries – offshore oil and gas and marine renewable energy, marine and coastal tourism, maritime transport and shipbuilding, marine fishing and aquaculture, and seabed mining. A second section presents two plausible scenarios for the ocean economy centred on different trajectories for the global energy transition. One scenario envisions a more rapid transition, while the other assumes a more gradual shift to 2050. The resulting scenarios illustrate substantial differences in both the overall trajectory of the ocean economy and the composition of its activities, highlighting the critical role of energy policies and technological developments in shaping its future evolution.
Drawing on scientific research and industry outlooks, the interplay of key global drivers—demographic trends, climate change, geopolitical tensions, and the energy transition will impact key ocean economic activities, amplifying both opportunities and challenges in the next decades. And given the interconnected nature of the ocean economy, developments in one area would be expected to have ripple effects across others. Potential future developments are explored for selected activities, including offshore oil and gas and renewable energy, marine and coastal tourism, maritime transport and maritime shipbuilding, marine fishing and marine aquaculture, as well as seabed mining. Some of these can be found in the ocean economic activity groups modelled in later sections.
Offshore oil and gas and renewable energy
The evolution of offshore oil and gas production will be shaped by multiple factors, including market dynamics, global energy policies, technological advancements, and the pace of the transition to low-carbon energy sources. The sector is expected to remain a key contributor to the ocean economy for the foreseeable future. However, its growth prospects are increasingly challenged by the expansion of renewable energy industries, driven by strategic energy autonomy objectives, climate policies, and rising demand for clean energy solutions.
Several governments in OECD and partner countries are implementing greenhouse gas emission limits, carbon pricing, and stricter environmental policies targeting offshore oil and gas operations (IEA, 2024[1]). While deepwater projects remain among the most cost-competitive sources of oil supply, they face mounting financial pressures due to supply chain disruptions and inflationary trends (Erlingsen and Busby, 2024[2]). Achieving a 50% reduction in emissions intensity across oil and gas operations by 2030 would require approximately USD 600 billion in upfront investment, equivalent to 15% of the sector’s windfall net income in 2022 (International Energy Agency, 2023[3]). However, many emissions-reducing measures could generate new revenue streams, allowing operators to recover their investments by minimizing gas flaring and optimizing resource utilization. Some large energy companies are reallocating some capital toward offshore wind, green hydrogen, and carbon capture projects while maintaining oil and gas exploration in profitable deepwater regions (IEA, 2024[1]). Meanwhile, aging infrastructure, particularly in shallow-water fields such as the North Sea, is facing early decommissioning due to rising maintenance costs and stricter environmental requirements (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2018[4]).
Major ocean economy actors, particularly in the Middle East, are already accelerating economic diversification plans, in an effort to balance their oil dependence. Initiatives such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Energy Strategy 2050 aim to expand investments in renewables, hydrogen, and tourism (Guillemette and Château, 2023[5]). While demand for oil could decline in key markets in the decades to come, natural gas production should continue to expand in the foreseeable future, reinforcing its role as a transitional energy source to meet global demand for lower-carbon fuels. Additionally, governments and companies are increasingly investing in emissions-reducing technologies such as carbon capture and storage, despite ongoing uncertainties regarding their long-term environmental implications (International Energy Agency, 2021[6]).
Among the various ocean-based industries, offshore wind energy stands to benefit most from the accelerated transition toward renewables. Even without factoring in geopolitical disruptions, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, projections indicate strong growth in offshore wind capacity over the next decade. For 2030, IEA (2019[7]) estimates total global installed capacity to reach between 165 GW (in its Stated Policies Scenario) and 225 GW (in its Sustainable Development Scenario); GWEC (2022[8]) expects total global offshore capacity to reach 370 GW by the end of 2031; and IRENA (2021[9]) foresees 380 GW installed by 2030 . The latter estimates would be equivalent to a more than ten-fold increase over 2020.
By 2040, advancements in energy storage technologies could further enhance grid reliability by mitigating the intermittent nature of renewables. As these storage solutions become more cost-effective and widely adopted, they will play a central role in accelerating the transition to a low-carbon energy system. Additionally, hybrid offshore energy platforms integrating offshore wind, green hydrogen production, and new carbon capture technologies could emerge, enabling oil and gas operators to decarbonize operations while maintaining a level of economic viability. Several offshore regions—including the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and offshore fields in Asia—could as well witness increased efforts to restore marine habitats to enhance blue carbon. Some decommissioned oil fields are being repurposed into marine protected areas, supporting ecosystem recovery after decades of resource extraction (IPCC, 2021[10]).
As climate change intensifies and energy systems increasingly incorporate emissions-reducing innovations, global demand for fossil fuels could decline, although not disappear over the period. Future offshore oil and gas platforms could become increasingly automated, managed remotely, and optimized through AI-driven efficiency systems.
Marine and coastal tourism
Marine and coastal tourism, particularly eco-tourism, could continue growing by 2030, driven by rising demand from the expanding middle class in emerging economies and aging populations in Europe and North America seeking eco-friendly travel options (OECD, 2021[11]; World Travel and Tourism Council, 2020[12]).
Shorter-haul and regional tourism are expected to increase due to higher air travel costs and environmental awareness. Domestic demand in many emerging economies, where demography continues to rise, would expand as well leading to increased environmental externalities in already heavily populated costal zones (Northrop and et al., 2022[13]). As an example, an estimated 6.1 million tonnes of plastic waste enter aquatic ecosystems annually, with 1.7 million tonnes ultimately reaching the ocean. Without the implementation of more ambitious policies, mismanaged plastic waste could rise by 47%, leading to a 50% increase in plastic leakage into the environment by 2040, compared to 2020 levels (OECD, 2024[14]).
Climate risks such as extreme weather, coral bleaching, and rising sea levels are expected to pose increasing vulnerabilities, especially in tropical and coastal regions reducing tourism appeal in some destinations (Scott, Hall and Gössling, 2019[15]; IPCC, 2023[16]). The Caribbean experienced already an 85% increase in extreme weather events from 2001 to 2020 compared to 1980-2000, and the trends are expected to accelerate. These events have caused significant socio-economic costs, averaging 2.13% of GDP annually between 1980 and 2020 and affecting 24 million people during that time (OECD/IDB, 2024[17]). In the state of Queensland, Australia, the bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef could cause the loss of 1 million visitors to the region each year, equivalent to at least 1 billion Australian Dollars in tourism spending and 10 000 jobs (Australian Climate Council, 2017[18]). An increasing number of touristic destinations would require to invest with development assistance funding and philanthropy support in adaptation measures like coastal defences, resilient infrastructure, and marine restoration, though efforts could be limited by funding, particularly in low-income regions (eco-union, 2019[19]). Sustainable tourism practices, including green certification programmes, gain traction in high-income and some emerging destinations. If plastic production and consumption were reduced, they would directly contribute to these more positive developments (OECD, 2024[14]).
Beyond climate risks, environmental stressors originating on land and in freshwater affect the ocean economy, calling for a whole-of-water approach that links freshwater and marine ecosystems with the surrounding human settlements and their accompanying activities and structures (OECD, 2024[20]). For instance, the socio-economic gains of reducing pollution in the Guanabara Bay in the state of Rio de Janeiro, through the universalisation of sanitation systems have been estimated at 25.4 billion Brazilian Reals between 2016 and 2046, by increasing tourism revenue and the value of real estate along the bay’s shores, reducing public health costs of waterborne diseases, and increasing income through improved health and productivity (OECD, 2024[21]).
By 2040, rising temperatures could expand the tourist season in temperate coastal regions, including parts of Northern Europe and Canada (IPCC, 2023[16]). Destinations traditionally considered summer-only start attracting visitors in spring and fall, shifting tourism flows northward and reducing demand for tropical destinations during hotter months (IPCC, 2021[10]). In fifteen years or so, continuing sea-level rise could however lead to significant coastal erosion, damaging beaches, resorts, and infrastructure in many low-lying areas. Some tourist areas in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean would require extensive coastal defences (elevated buildings, seawalls, and flood-resistant designs) or face abandonment (OECD, 2021[22]). To protect tourism-dependent ecosystems, several countries could designate new MPAs beyond their 30x30 objectives, and invest further in habitat restoration, such as rebuilding mangroves (OECD, 2021[11]).
Despite adaptation efforts, some islands and coastal areas could be no longer be viable tourism destinations by 2050 or earlier. These regions would face long-term economic challenges and need alternative income sources (IPCC, 2023[16]). Virtual tourism technologies could as well provide immersive experiences of marine life and coastal sites, offering limited revenue for climate-impacted regions, though they cannot fully replace physical tourism income (Northrop and et al., 2022[13]).
Trends in extreme weather and biodiversity loss – mangroves, corals reefs – are increasingly threatening coastal regions and cities in coastal countries in various parts of the world, especially those with long coastlines and dense coastal populations, facing significant threats from rising sea levels and coastal erosion (Armstrong McKay et al., 2022[23]; OECD, 2025[24]).
These challenges could render some areas uninhabitable, and many unsuitable for business activities, while also causing extensive damage to existing infrastructure. As an illustration, over 20% of Indonesia's coastline is at risk of being impacted by a 1-meter rise in sea level. And although projections for sea-level rise by 2100 vary (from 0.2 meters to as much as 2 meters), submersion occurs now regularly, and adaptive measures and sustainable coastal management are already underway with the move of the capital Jakarta to a new capital in a higher-elevation area (OECD, 2024[25]). The Mediterranean region as well is experiencing climate shifts at a pace exceeding global averages, with rapid warming of ocean temperatures observed across all seasons. These changes are having profound impacts on local populations, leading to more frequent and severe droughts, water shortages, reduced agricultural yields, natural disasters, and rising sea levels This combined with increased ocean economic activities imposes significant stress on ecosystems, leading to the depletion of natural resources and widespread environmental degradation (Plan Bleu, 2025[26]).
Coastal cities and regions play and important role in mitigating these trends due to their policy prerogatives and investment responsibilities. Subnational governments often have competencies for urban and regional planning, water and sanitation, waste management and climate resilience that affect freshwater and saltwater environments and ecosystems (OECD, 2024[20]). For example, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, the socio-economic gains of reducing pollution in the Guanabara Bay through the universalisation of sanitation systems have been estimated at BRL 25.4 billion between 2016 and 2046, by increasing tourism revenue and the value of real estate along the bay’s shores, reducing public health costs of waterborne diseases, and increasing income through improved health and productivity (OECD, 2024[20]). Local and regional governments also play a central role in enhancing resilience to extreme events exacerbated climate change, accounting for 63% of total climate-significant public expenditure and 69% of climate-significant public investment across 33 OECD and European Union countries in 2019. More regions are working with national governments in setting up marine protected areas along their coastlines (Maestro, Chica-Ruiz and Pérez-Cayeiro, 2020[27]). A large “Ocean Rise & Coastal Resilience Coalition” will meet for the first time at the next United Nations Ocean Conference, held in June 2025 in Nice, France.
Maritime transport and shipbuilding
Maritime transport driven by international trade is among the ocean economic activities directly impacted by key shaping forces, from demography, the geopolitical situation, and energy systems’ transformation to climate change, which are expected to drive significant changes in freight composition and potentially alter shipping routes.
Maritime trade could rise substantially through to 2050 (ITF, 2021[28]) (DNV, 2021[29]) (DNV, 2021[29]). Higher rates of growth in food consumption and in demand for infrastructure act as a lever on maritime trade in food products, livestock and cereals, iron and steel, etc. while the faster rate of urbanisation can lead to greater demand for trade in commodities. That in turn translates ultimately into increased business for maritime shipbuilding, where growth in newbuilding demand can be expected in bulkers, container ships and general cargo vessels (Daniel, Adachi and Lee, 2022[30]). However, significant declines in the share of trade carried by crude oil tankers and oil products tankers could occur, with a significant increase in the share of gas carriers (DNV, 2021[29]). At the same time, a combination of regulatory pressures on emission levels and possibly higher fossil fuel prices, as well as ports adaptations (see Box 6.2), could see carriers step up the search for alternative fuels and energy (i.e. biofuels, LNG, electricity and hybrid propulsion, ammonia, hydrogen, fuel cells, wind assistance) which could produce significant emissions reductions (Halim et al., 2018[31]).
Safe and cost-effective ship recycling would remain a pressing challenge in the decade to come for many coastal communities in the leading ship-breaking countries, primarily concentrated in South Asia. (e.g., Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan), as new generations of cleaner ships increasingly replace old fleets (Gourdon, 2019[32]). The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships will enter into force in June 2025, and should contribute to ensure that ships at the end of their operational lives are recycled safely, minimising risks to both human health and the environment (IMO, 2024[33]). However, with most large shipyards located in low lying areas, increased risks of extreme weather and sea-level rise will complicate the management of industrial pollutions (see Box 6.1).
Large companies could also adopt increasingly energy efficiency measures to meet IMO targets, employing speed reductions, optimized routing, and limited retrofitting (International Maritime Organization, 2023[34]). Although shipping companies will in the foreseeable future need to adapt constantly to new routes, as seen in Chapter 2, to avoid geopolitical flashpoints, such as parts of the Red Sea and the Black Sea, as well as managing climate-change related closures (e.g. droughts causing issues in the Panama and Suez canals).
Reverberations of these trends would inevitably be felt by maritime shipbuilding and the maritime equipment manufacturing. In the OECD’s latest projections, demand for new maritime ships is set to grow through to 2030 for all main categories– bulkers, tankers, container and general cargo vessels (Daniel, Adachi and Lee, 2022[30]). Thereafter, the impact of various factors (e.g. growing regionalisation of trade, global energy system change) could become more noticeable.
In its 2023 strategy on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) aims by 2030 for a 40% reduction in carbon intensity compared to 2008. The IMO also targets to reach net-zero GHG emissions “by or around, i.e. close to 2050” (International Maritime Organization, 2023[34]). In addition, national and regional policy measures could contribute to accelerate reductions, such as the recent inclusion of shipping in European Union Emissions Trading System since 2024 and the FuelEU Maritime Regulation since 2025 (OECD, 2025[35]).
These international, regional and national policy measures could push the commercial shipbuilding sector to adopt technologies like liquefied natural gas and biofuel propulsion, while R&D on hydrogen, methanol and ammonia systems accelerates, though these remain largely experimental (International Maritime Organization, 2023[34]). Shipyards in South Korea, Japan, and China could lead in integrating advanced technologies, including automation and AI-driven systems for enhanced efficiency and safety, while North American and European shipbuilders focus on modular designs for easier retrofitting with low-emission technologies (Daniel, Lee and Spieth, 2021[36]). Meanwhile, the current orderbook for alternative fuel–capable ships is predominantly held by Chinese and Korean yards, with European firms focusing on the development of low- and zero-emission propulsion engines (OECD, 2025[35]). Demand would grow in any case for lighter, durable materials like advanced composites to improve fuel efficiency.
Maritime ports could see significant changes in their functions in the decade to come as many become hubs for electricity generation and begin to produce hydrogen as energy for carriers (DNV, 2021[29]). They will need to adjust both to the changing composition of freight throughput and to the demand for new energy supplies and services that vessels will require in-port to support their transformation away from fossil fuel energy sources (International Maritime Organization, 2023[34]). They also need to adapt to more extreme weather. Ports in developed regions would have likely begun transitioning to renewable energy sources and electric infrastructure for loading and unloading vessels by 2030, this would include increased use of shore power systems to reduce emissions from docked ships (Daniel, Lee and Spieth, 2021[36]). Leading ports in Europe and Asia, such as Rotterdam and Singapore, are already starting to build bunkering infrastructure for LNG and biofuels, although adoption is likely to be limited by high costs and low demand to start with. Investments in ammonia and hydrogen infrastructure are still exploratory (International Chamber of Shipping, 2020[37]).
The digital transformation of many ports is also ongoing, with further uses of the Internet of Things (IoT), artificial intelligence and predictive logistics technologies to streamline cargo handling, reducing turnaround times and optimizing energy use (Hoffmann and Hoffmann, 2020[38]). Current and future investments will increasingly change ports operations with the uses of automated cranes and smart tracking systems to improve efficiency, reducing labour needs, and optimising multi-modal operations within across the wider port areas. As shown in chapter 2, maritime transport is linked to many types of illegal activities, so with the rise in global trade, ports will certainly be strengthening security protocols to safeguard against threats such as cyber-attacks and smuggling. The maritime port security market alone is projected to reach USD 33.3 billion by 2030 (Frost & Sullivan, 2024[39]).
Ports in vulnerable coastal regions and in low-lying areas, especially in Asia and the Caribbean, are likely to have begun by 2040 to invest further in climate-resilient infrastructure, including seawalls, raised terminals, and flood-resistant designs to counter rising sea levels and storm surges (IPCC, 2023[40]). Of the world’s 3 800 ports, approximately one-third are situated within a tropical zone highly exposed to the most severe impacts of climate change (Economist Impact, 2023[41]). Automated cargo handling, AI-powered logistics, and predictive maintenance could become more widespread, significantly reducing labour dependency and operational costs.
Port authorities often lead or take part as well in initiatives to restore ecosystems surrounding ports and enhance their resilience to climate change (OECD, 2024[20]). For example, the Port of Seattle is using nature-based solutions to restore coastal ecosystems and capture carbon emissions from its operations. As part of a consortium of four partners, the Port of Vigo in Spain is hosting the Living Ports project, which aims to shift away from grey infrastructure in ports, including through seawalls with innovative concrete that fosters the regeneration of local marine biodiversity. Through its 15-year environmental plan Cáyoli initiated in 2016, the French Port of Guadeloupe aims to protect and restore the mangroves, coral reefs and seagrass ecosystems present in the port, including through the development of mangrove and coral nurseries, the restoration of nesting areas for different species, and awareness-raising campaigns with local students.
Marine fishing and aquaculture
Marine fisheries and aquaculture will be increasingly affected by the combination of the different shaping forces. They stand to benefit from the population changes described in Chapter 4, as demand for their products increases over time. Also important is the projected acceleration of changes in population composition and structure. Marine fish and seafood consumption tends to be higher among the elderly, urban dwellers, and in the advanced economies, and likely to positively affect demand.
A warming ocean and increasing acidification will however impact increasingly species distribution, driving some species poleward or into deeper waters (IPCC, 2021[10]). Ocean conditions will need to be increasingly monitored with ocean observing systems, like the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System systems, which are already providing critical data to support US fisheries in particular (Rayner, Jolly and Gouldman, 2019[42]; Rayner, Gouldman and Willis, 2019[43]). The long-term decline in the productivity of global fisheries is likely to be most pronounced in tropical and sub-tropical regions while gains may be made elsewhere to the extent that species will drift towards the polar regions. The migration of commercially valuable fish species to colder waters would place pressure on high-latitude ecosystems and would increase fishing activities in the Arctic and Antarctic regions (FAO, 2022[44]). In the long run, Arctic and Antarctic fisheries will face rising pressure as high-latitude ecosystems become new centres for fishing activity, while the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and its provisions is not due for review until 2048 (50 years from its entry into force) (Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, 2024[45]). Finally, by 2030, 23% of transboundary stocks are expected to shift, impacting 75% of the world’s economic exclusive zones placing pressure on existing co-management arrangements and creating the need for new ones (Palacios‐Abrantes et al., 2022[46]).
Should the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies begin to take effect, some developed countries will be implementing initial reductions in subsidies, particularly those linked to Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated fishing and overfished stocks. Developing countries, especially those heavily reliant on artisanal fisheries in Southeast Asia and West Africa, would likely receive some flexibility in subsidy reduction to protect local economies (OECD, 2021[47]). Ongoing reforms to fisheries support may that presents a risk of overfishing and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated fishing in the absence of effective management will have implications for the activity and structure of the global fishing fleet (OECD, 2025[48]), which will be bolstered should the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies begin to take effect. The impacts could become more pronounced if the second round of negotiations, disciplining subsidies to overfished stocks, concludes successfully, but the extent to which this will impact fishing activity and production by 2050 is hard to predict.
More monitoring of industrial fishing fleets in the high seas could be on the horizon, thanks to technological advances. In higher-income regions, advances in digital monitoring, satellite tracking, and vessel tracking could improve further fisheries management and enforcement (Wright et al., 2018[49]). Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) used by regional fisheries management organisations would contribute as well better yields for some species, while increasing oversight at sea to counter IUU fishing. However, EBFM is complicated and resource intensive so many countries, especially those with limited financial resources, would still struggle to implement these practices effectively (Cohen et al., 2019[50]).
With respect to marine aquaculture, the potential for global expansion exists (Gentry et al., 2017[51]). Part of that future expansion could come from aquaculture intensification, but also partly from extensification including siting of operations offshore, with automation of operations (OECD, 2019[52]). Both strategies should increase the industry’s energy demand in the decade to come, and its necessity for addressing the emissions from support vessels through deployment of electric propulsion and use of hydrogen if possible (UN Global Compact and WWF, 2022[53]). Farming operations advances could include the shift to more electrification and application of hydrogen as well as other renewable energy sources. They will, for example, foster an expansion in suitable habitats for finfish aquaculture in some regions – at least for the next decade. However, as ocean warming and acidification increase, the resilience of marine species to be farmed are projected to vary (IPCC, 2023[16]). A decline in suitable habitats for the cultivation of crustaceans and seaweeds could occur in many parts of the world (IPCC, 2021[10]). Beyond this, and as the ocean continues warming overall, rates of growth in aquaculture output are unlikely to match those of previous periods.
Seabed mining
As both the digitalisation and energy transformation gather speed in the next decades, increases in demand are expected for rare earth elements (REEs) but also for minerals used in structural materials, because of continuing urbanisation, rising investment in infrastructure and housing around the world. In the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero Emissions Scenario, the total market value of critical energy transition minerals—copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements—is projected to more than double to USD 770 billion by 2040 (IEA, 2024[54]).
While there is significant potential in the reprocessing of some metals, the challenges are important, not least that of stepping up investment in research and recycling capacities, and efforts to find substitute materials (IEA, 2020[55]). However, recycling already contributes to develop second markets (i.e. the market value of recycled battery metals experienced nearly 11-fold growth between 2015 and 2023), and a successful scale-up of recycling could lower the need for new mining activity by 25‑40% by 2050 (IEA, 2024[56]). For offshore wind energy for example, recycling could possibly enhance global supplies of critical metals at a rate of around 12% by 2040 and supplies of REEs by as much 21% for the industry (Li et al., 2022[57]).
In terms of supply chain issues, China and Russia currently play dominant roles in the critical minerals sector. China controls a significant share of global mining, processing, and refining capacity, particularly for rare earth elements, lithium, and cobalt, while Russia is a major supplier of key minerals like nickel, palladium, and titanium (IEA, 2024[54]). Their influence raises concerns over export restrictions and geopolitical leverage for other countries reliant on these resources for technology, defence, and clean energy. A diversification could take shape in the next decade, as countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia as well as Australia, emerge as hubs for critical minerals (Brahab, 2022[58]; Purdy and Castillo, 2022[59]).
In this context, interest has been growing in the ocean as an additional potential source of metals and minerals, even if vast areas of the ocean are still unexplored and under-surveyed (Mayer et al., 2018[60]). Seabed mining operations refer to the extraction of minerals and resources from the ocean floor. It involves the recovery of valuable metals and minerals from three primary types of seabed deposits: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides, and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts. Although seabed mining operations have been underway for some years now in national (shallow) waters for sand and diamond notably. Mining at depths exceeding 200 meters has been conducted mainly for demonstration so far. Mining deep-sea minerals in the high seas is still on hold as exploration, research and negotiations on a mining code continue, as mentioned as well in Chapter 2 (International Seabed Authority, 2022[61]).
To date, a severe lack of information and data about the size of mineral deposits, their geographical distribution and composition has prevented a proper global assessment of deep-sea resources from being conducted (Hannington, Petersen and Krätschell, 2017[62]). There is need for improved, updated geological surveys, especially for developing economies. Open data sources are few and far between – the USGS is currently the only open data source for mineral resources with global coverage. The International Seabed Authority has a mandate over 54% of the world’s ocean seabed, and its current contractors are exploring regions corresponding to around 1% of the seabed, delineating mineral deposits and resources, through drilling core samples and multibeam echosounder. A few have published results of their research so far (Knobloch et al., 2017[63]; Kuhn and Rühlemann, 2021[64]) and some are sharing their bathymetric data to advance global seabed mapping efforts led by the International Hydrographic Organisation, but this is not a general practice yet. The true extent of land-based deposits of critical minerals is also unknown, and so it is unclear whether they would be sufficient to meet future demand or not.
While the pressure to open deep-sea deposits for exploitation is likely to mount, there remain many open issues and knowledge gaps relating as well to the magnitude of potential economic gains, technological feasibility and the serious impacts on the ocean’s ecosystems of mining operations. Despite high demand for minerals, the economic case for seabed mining, particularly deep seabed mining, is not evident in view of the strong volatility of prices. In recent years, the critical minerals market has experienced extreme volatility in with prices soaring in 2021-2022 before plunging sharply. Since 2023, lithium prices have dropped by over 80% after surging eightfold in the previous two years, while nickel, cobalt, and graphite have lost half their value over the same period (IEA, 2025[65]). This explains why the mining of rare minerals is already subsidised in most parts of the world.
Although strategic access to resources comes into play in a context of geopolitical tensions, the extra costs of mining and processing rare earth elements from the deep ocean may not be making economic sense in the foreseeable future, considering technological limitations, operational costs and high uncertainty on the impacts on the marine environment, with possible implications as well for other sectors (e.g. fisheries, aquaculture, defence) (Miller et al., 2018[66]; Leal Filho et al., 2021[67]). Some of the consequences of seafloor mining may also be unforeseeable since – despite considerable progress in acquiring knowledge of deep-sea ecosystems - there is still a significant lack of information and data on deep-sea biodiversity and ecological connectivity, functions and services (Levin, 2021[68]; Hauton et al., 2017[69]). In light of the knowledge gaps and given the risk of irreversible damage to deep-sea ecosystems,, it is considered by many experts still not possible to arrive at a conclusive risk assessment of the impact of large-scale seabed mining (Amon et al., 2022[70]; Niner et al., 2018[71]; Levin, Amon and Lily, 2020[72]). Precautionary approaches should be applied by all to avoid irreversible damage to the ocean environment, as discussions continue within the International Seabed Authority membership.
Over the next two decades, ocean science is poised to undergo significant transformations, driven by technological advancements that will support both improved ocean stewardship and ocean industries productivity. As seen in Chapter 2, the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030) is catalysing global efforts to enhance understanding of marine ecosystems and their role in climate regulation (IOC-UNESCO, 2024[73]). More integrated research should occur to build the scientific foundations to address complex challenges such as pollution, overfishing, and biodiversity loss, fostering a more holistic approach to ocean management. Technological innovation will be at the forefront of this evolution in the next decades:
The deployment of advanced ocean observation systems, including new drones and underwater vehicles, are expected to revolutionise data collection, enabling continuous and cheaper monitoring of oceanic processes with unprecedented precision (OECD, 2019[52]; European Marine Board, 2021[74]).
Advanced seabed mapping should also come to fruition, with ongoing efforts such as the General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans (GEBCO) - Seabed 2030 Project aiming to map the entire seafloor by 2030 (Mayer et al., 2018[60]; Nippon Foundation-GEBCO, 2022[75]). Based on key standards from the International Hydrographic Organization. Sophisticated seabed image processing techniques will as well enhance capacities to study previously inaccessible ocean depths. These advancements will facilitate detailed mapping of the seafloor and comprehensive assessments of marine biodiversity.
Genomic research is also anticipated to lead to breakthroughs in understanding marine biodiversity and its implications for human biology and planetary health. The Ocean Genome Atlas Project, for instance, focuses on sequencing the DNA of plankton and making data available (Vernette et al., 2022[76]). This endeavour aims to catalogue these microscopic organisms, which play pivotal roles in marine food webs and global biogeochemical cycles.
In the realm of ocean modelling, the emergence of AI-driven systems promises to transform predictive capabilities, such as the AI-Driven Global Ocean Modelling System (AI-GOMS) or the many ocean digital twins being constructed, such as the effort of Mercator Ocean (Mercator, 2025[77]; European Marine Board, 2021[74]).
More research on Carbon Dioxide Removal technologies (CDR), such as ocean alkalinity enhancement, electrochemical carbon capture, or artificial ocean fertilisation to increase carbon sequestration,will be crucial to assess their feasibility, scalability, and environmental impacts to effectively mitigate atmospheric CO₂ levels (Oschlies et al., 2025[78]).
Collaborative international research efforts will remain essential in addressing the multifaceted challenges facing the ocean and the ocean economy, with science data policies that promote common FAIR standards (Tanhua et al., 2019[79]; Pendleton et al., 2019[80]). These projects underscore the necessity of multidisciplinary collaboration and co-design, particularly in vulnerable coastal regions and some Small Island Developing States.
Possible alternative trajectories for the future of the ocean economy are too numerous to be addressed in this report. Hence, for the purposes of illustration, this final section offers two plausible scenarios exploring how some of the likely global changes identified in previous chapters might combine to impact the ocean economy of the future. Using combinations of global shaping forces as a backdrop, they are centred on the pace of the global energy transition, with one outlining a faster transition and the other a slower one, over three decades – 2030, 2040 and 2050.
Each scenario envisions, albeit following different pathways, a transformation that supports economic goals while addressing climate change and biodiversity loss. Each transition pathway presents both opportunities and challenges that will largely determine the ocean economy’s future growth and composition.
The scenarios presented here focus on the possible evolutions of the global ocean economy and shifts in its composition, with some examples of likely implications for specific ocean industries. The scenarios and modelling focus on global-level impacts. They do not get into detailed analysis of national and regional situations and provide only a few illustrations. However national and regional impacts can be a very important aspect. They could be explored in more granular detail as part of future foresight activities of the OECD Ocean Economy Monitor programme.
Scenario 1. Acceleration of the global energy shift
This is a scenario in which the global energy transition, despite a difficult initial period, succeeds in speeding up in the subsequent two decades. The acceleration is driven mainly by two major shaping factors: an improving global economic and political context favourable to the wider diffusion of renewable energy; and greatly increased efforts especially in many parts of the ocean economy to adopt and make use of digital technologies. Although ultimately failing to hit global emission-reduction targets by 2050, the gap is at least significantly narrowed by a big expansion of the share of renewables in world energy production and a corresponding decline in the share of fossil fuels, notably oil.
Describing the scenario
The short-term prospects for a faster transition to 2030 are not very promising. Geopolitical tensions around the globe coupled with mounting trade frictions between major trading countries as well as slowing world economic growth and concerns about public deficits and debt levels, create an overall context of uncertainty for economic actors, notably businesses and investors. As a result, there is a weakening of national and international resolve to accelerate the transition process, aggravated by narrowing margins of manoeuvre with respect to financial resources. Prospects pick up however as the world moves into the 2030s.
The internal political dynamics of nations evolves, geopolitical tensions and trade frictions ease, and debt/public sector deficits become more manageable. International co-operation on tackling emissions and climate change gathers momentum. Meanwhile, in many parts of the global economy, and not least in the ocean economy, national efforts have been underway to exploit the growing potential offered by digitalisation. Growing skill shortages in the first part of the 2020s have led countries to step up on a major scale education and training, especially in digital science and technology. This has helped create the basis for a more qualified workforce to support the anticipated wave of new technologies in the coming years.
Pressure for transparency is also rising over the period, as policy makers and regulatory bodies demand more comprehensive reporting and monitoring of commercial and institutional operations to ensure alignment with national and international goals. This is the case for many established and emerging industries, from emissions of shipping to fisheries and marine carbon dioxide removal projects, irrespective of their scale, requiring thorough monitoring, reporting, and independent verification.
As the uncertainties weighing on the prospects for the world economy recede, the investment climate has much improved. Spending particularly on innovative technologies has begun to expand rapidly both in the advanced and emerging market economies. More breathing space becomes available for investment in renewables, for technology transfers, and for financial transfers to developing economies to assist them with their transition efforts. The climate for technology transfers becomes more favourable, and the progress to faster transition is able to spread more widely to emerging economies and developing nations. As a result, productivity growth recovers strongly, especially in those sectors (including some ocean economy activities) that have previously lagged behind overall productivity trends.
The pace of global transition accelerates further during the 2040s. However, it proves hard to make up for the ground lost in the latter half of the 2020s and early 2030s. Consequently emission-reduction targets for 2050 are not fully met, but the gap narrows considerably.
Implications for the global ocean economy
The modelling of an accelerated transition scenario suggests that global ocean economy real-terms gross value added could grow at a lower rate through to 2050 than in the baseline projection, which assumes historical trends largely continue.
An illustration of the effects on the global ocean economy of a combination of shaping forces that are roughly consistent with an accelerated transition scenario is provided in (Figure 6.1). The following assumptions are relied upon to construct this projection and compare it to the baseline projection outlined in Chapter 4:
Contributions to GVA growth from labour composition and multifactor productivity converge towards labour efficiency trends from the OECD’s long-term baseline projections energy transition scenario (Guillemette and Château, 2023[81])
All other components of GVA growth in the offshore wind and marine renewables ocean economic activity group continue at the growth trajectory modelled based on historical trends in Chapter 4
Projected GVA growth in offshore oil and gas extraction is adjusted for the decline in the share of oil and gas in the energy mix according to the OECD’s long-term baseline projections energy transition scenario
Contributions to GVA growth from ICT and non-ICT capital services per hour converge towards growth in productive capital stock per hour worked in the OECD’s long-term baseline productive energy transition scenario
Income effects from climate change are expected to occur uniformly across ocean economic activity groups in each region at the lower bound of Kotz et al.’s (2024[82]) 10% confidence interval as described in Chapter 5
The accelerated transition scenario assumptions listed above result in a global ocean economy that is 40% higher in real-times GVA than it was in 2020 (Figure 6.1, Panel A). This indicates the likely growth slowdown that is likely to take place in the global ocean economy relative to the baseline projection which assumes historical trends continue.
The key driver of this reduction is a drop in offshore oil and gas extraction that broadly follows fossil fuels’ decline in projected energy-mixes aligned with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (IEA, 2024[1]). The offshore oil and gas and offshore industry activity group was the second largest globally in 2020 coming in just behind marine and coastal tourism (which has a history of slower productivity growth than other activity groups). The baseline projections outlined in Chapter 4 suggest that, should historical trends persist, offshore oil and gas and offshore industry is set to become the dominant ocean economic activity group during the projection period. Curtailing the growth in offshore oil and gas in a scenario where the energy transition is realised, removes much of the future value added generated by the otherwise largest ocean economic activity group. The assumption concerning raising capital services per hour worked – which has the effect of increasing GVA growth rates in all ocean economic activity groups – is not powerful enough to override the loss of economic activity in offshore oil and gas extraction. The benefits to preserve long term growth for the ocean economy and a healthy ocean remain though important economic and policy drivers for supporting the energy transition pathway.
This evolution is largely underscored by the results in (Figure 6.1, Panel B). All ocean economic activity groups finish the projection period with higher real-terms GVA than at the beginning of the period, but the composition of the ocean economy changes substantially according to differences in activity group growth rates. Global GVA in offshore oil and gas extraction and offshore industry, for example, drops as a share of GVA in the global ocean economy from 31% in 2020 to 20% in 2050. Marine and coastal tourism, which starts the period with 41%, increases its share to 46% by 2050. Most other ocean economic activity groups maintain their share throughout the projection period. The exception is offshore wind and marine renewables which ends the projection period with a share 21 times larger than it was at the beginning (0.2% in 2021 to 4.2% in 2050).
Global ocean economy real-terms gross value added index in an accelerated transition scenario relative to the baseline projection and consequent global ocean economic activity group shares of global ocean economy gross value added
Note: In panel A, a gross value added chained volume index for the global ocean economy is calculated under the assumptions outlined in the text. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity under each scenario. In panel B, the projected ocean economic activity group indexes under the same assumptions are used to estimate global gross value added in each ocean economic activity group in future current price US dollars and the shares calculated from this measure.
Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.
This is a scenario in which the economic and political context surrounding the transition process worsens in the second half of the 2020s, struggles to improve fundamentally in the 2030s, but gets back on track in the 2040s as the global climate deteriorates towards mid-century. This triggers a re-set of global emission-reduction targets, a flurry of international climate-related accords, and major efforts at national level to make up for lost time. This is however too late to make significant in-roads into global emission reductions by mid-century and 2050-targets are missed by a large margin. Over the 25-year span, progress towards expanding the share of renewables in the global energy mix slows, and the share of fossil fuels falls only gradually, as they are required to fill the energy demand gap left by the slower than anticipated roll-out of renewable energy. Over long periods, opportunities have been missed in many countries to harness the potential of advanced technologies to efforts aimed at accelerating the energy transition. Slow progress in adoption of renewable energy and in reducing the share of fossil fuels lead to only patchy energy-related technology advances in ocean economy activities.
Describing the scenario
The unfavourable global context of the second half of the 2020s and much of the 2030s is shaped largely by rising geopolitical tensions, the threat of trade wars, worsening conditions for international collaboration on climate change and energy transition issues, a darkening economic outlook for much of the world economy and shrinking fiscal headroom for government investment initiatives. Rather than bringing respite, much of the 2030s see prolongation of these unfavourable conditions, which tend to distract attention from critical long-term matters such as the energy transition in favour of resolving shorter-term issues. These latter issues include amongst others escalating trade disputes, and inadequate control over rising levels of public and private sector debt.
Consequently, in many countries insufficient attention and resources are devoted to preparing for the future. This concerns two important domains: gearing up education and training especially in science and technology to equip the workforce and society more generally with the skills necessary to navigate the digital era; and the necessary investment in advanced technologies and innovations to enable emerging opportunities to be fully exploited.
The ocean economy, with its rather poor record in productivity growth in several of its activities as well as neglect of investment in new technologies, is particularly disadvantaged in a race to respond to the challenges of a digital age. In a world of trade and investment barriers affecting large parts of the global trading system as well as limited room for financial and technology transfers, the geographic spread of the energy transition is considerably hampered. One important implication of this lack of dynamism is both to slow the growth in the share of renewable energy in world energy demand and production and to enable fossil fuels to maintain a key position in the global energy mix. By the early 2040s, geopolitical tensions begin to ease, trade barriers begin to weaken, and a broad improvement in international relations evolves not least in collaboration on climate change and the energy transition. But emission-reduction targets for 2050 have long since slipped out of reach, despite rapid progress in speeding up the energy transition during the 2040s, necessitating a huge global effort in the post-2050 period to restrain a further significant deterioration in the world’s climate and biodiversity loss.
Implications for the global ocean economy
The modelling of a stalled transition suggests that this scenario may lead to a larger negative deviation from the baseline projection than the reduction projected in an accelerated transition scenario. The reduction from the baseline is such that global ocean economy real-terms GVA would not continue to grow under a stalled energy transition scenario and would finish the projection period at a lower level than it begins it.
An illustration of the effects on the global ocean economy of a combination of shaping forces that are roughly consistent with a stalled transition scenario is provided in (Figure 6.1). The following assumptions are relied upon to construct this projection and compare it to the baseline projection outlined in Chapter 4:
Contributions to GVA growth from labour composition and multifactor productivity converge towards labour efficiency trends from the OECD’s long-term baseline projections baseline scenario (Guillemette and Château, 2023[81])
All other components of GVA growth in the offshore wind and marine renewables ocean economic activity group continue at 50% of the growth trajectory modelled based on historical trends in Chapter 4
All other components of GVA growth in the offshore oil and gas ocean economic activity continue at the growth trajectory modelled based on historical trends in Chapter 4
Trade disruption effects from bilateral tariffs are expected to occur uniformly across ocean economic activity groups in each region according to Góes and Bekkers’s (2022[83]) regional estimates as described in Chapter 5
Income effects from climate change are expected to occur uniformly across ocean economic activity groups in each region at the upper bound of Kotz et al.’s (2024[82]) regional 10% confidence intervals as described in Chapter 5
The stalled transition scenario assumptions listed above result in a reduction in global ocean economy real-terms GVA below 2020 levels of over 20% (Figure 6.2, Panel A). This suggests that a stalled transition would have far greater consequences for the global ocean economy than an accelerated transition and may lead to a period of contraction relative to the recent historical record.
The main difference between the scenarios that causes this result is a lack of catch-up growth in capital services per hour worked in the stalled transition scenario. The positive effect of the relevant assumption on all ocean economic activity groups in the accelerated transition scenario partially counterbalance the negative effect of the decline in offshore oil and gas extraction due to net-zero objectives. In the stalled transition scenario, there is no comparable positive force and the negative effects from climate change and trade disruptions push global ocean economy real-terms GVA far below the baseline projections premised on historical trends persisting.
As in the accelerated transition scenario, ocean economic activity groups grow at different rates. The resulting composition of the ocean economy in the stalled transition scenario is revealed in Figure 6.2, Panel B. Global GVA in offshore oil and gas extraction and offshore industry increases its share of GVA in the global ocean economy from 31% in 2020 to 63% in 2050. This is largely due to high projected growth rates in offshore oil and gas extraction in Western Asia. The share of the global ocean economy attributable to marine and coastal tourism is cut almost in half from 41% in 2020 to 22% by 2050 as climate change and trade disruptions take their affect. Most other ocean economic activity groups experience a roughly similar halving of their shares over the projection period. The exception, as in the accelerated transition scenario, is offshore wind and marine renewables which begins the projection period at 0.2% of the global ocean economy and ends it at 0.6%. In other words, as opposed to a 21-fold increase in the accelerated transition scenario, offshore wind and marine renewables only triples its share between 2020 and 2050 in a stalled transition scenario.
Global ocean economy real-terms gross value added index in a stalled transition scenario relative to the baseline projection and consequent global ocean economic activity group shares of global ocean economy gross value added
Note: In panel A, a gross value added chained volume index for the global ocean economy is calculated under the assumptions outlined in the text. The lines represent the mean projected gross value added chained volume indexes calculated from the sum of projected growth in hours worked and the components of labour productivity under each scenario. In panel B, the projected ocean economic activity group indexes under the same assumptions are used to estimate global gross value added in each ocean economic activity group in future current price US dollars and the shares calculated from this measure.
Source: OECD Ocean Economy Monitor, January 2025.
This Chapter 6 has examined how different global forces, notably demographic shifts, climate change, geopolitical dynamics, and the ongoing energy transition may shape key ocean economic activities —offshore oil and gas extraction and marine renewables, tourism, transport, shipbuilding, fishing, aquaculture, and seabed mining—over the next decades. All these activities would benefit from better use of ocean science and technology to improve management and sustainability.
It then presented two possible scenarios for the future ocean economy based on different global energy transition pathways: one accelerating rapidly, the other progressing more gradually to 2050. These scenarios highlight contrasting trajectories, emphasising the pivotal role of energy policies and technological advances in shaping future economic outcomes.
In both scenarios, global ocean economy real-terms GVA underperforms over the next decades relative to a baseline constructed using historical trends. This reduction from the baseline is more pronounced in the stalled energy transition scenario than in the accelerated transition scenario. The global ocean economy continues to grow in the accelerated transition scenario, albeit at a slower rate than in the baseline projection. However, the stalled transition scenario results in a period of economic decline relative to the global ocean economy’s historical record.
In the accelerated transition scenario, the ocean economy experiences continued growth but at slower pace. While innovation and efficiency improvements support some ocean economic activity groups, they are insufficient to fully compensate for the loss of economic activity in the fossil fuel sector. The ocean economy shifts away from offshore oil and gas extraction, reducing its share of total global ocean economy GVA from a third in 2020 to one-fifth in 2050. Offshore wind and marine renewables expand substantially, with a share 21 times larger than at the start of the period. Marine and coastal tourism remains the dominant ocean economic activity group, growing its share to just under 50% of the global ocean economy by 2050. Most other ocean economic activity groups maintain their share throughout the projection period.
In the stalled transition scenario, most areas of the ocean economy experience a substantial slowdown due to the economic effects of climate change and trade disruptions. Offshore oil and gas extraction retains its dominance. Largely driven by fossil fuel expansion in regions such as Western Asia, its share of the global ocean economy increases over the period, but not bringing enough global value added to compensate for losses. Marine and coastal tourism’s share declines substantially, while offshore wind and marine renewables grows only modestly as a share of the global ocean economy compared to the accelerated transition. A lack of technological innovation and investment in renewables prevents a meaningful diversification of the ocean economy.
The findings from this foresight exercise underscore how long-term pressures such as climate change, evolving trade patterns, and policy decisions, such as the transition towards low-carbon energy systems, are likely to drive significant changes in both the overall level of the future ocean economy and its composition.
Policymakers will need to make choices on how they wish to steer the ocean economy, working with different stakeholders in the private sector and the scientific community. A decision to steer the ocean economy towards more environmentally sustainable practices while reducing greenhouse gas emissions will require sustained public and private investments. that should bring important benefits in the long run to preserve long term growth for the ocean economy and a healthy ocean. Adequate policy frameworks (from marine spatial planning to tax mechanisms, and marine protected areas) and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will need to be put in place as well to encourage both continued ocean economic activity and the conservation and restoration of crucial marine ecosystems. Building on the analysis presented in this report, a summary of the major findings and recommendations for decision-makers are proposed in Chapter 1.
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