Reforming Government Communication for the Age of Algorithms

1. Digital disruption: How technology keeps reshaping how societies connect

Abstract

The information ecosystem in which governments operate has undergone profound disruption, entering a new and more complex phase of the digital age since the COVID-19 pandemic. The business model of traditional media has weakened, while content creators, personalised feeds and decentralised platforms now shape to a large extent how people encounter information. At the same time, demand has shifted, with declining interest in news, growing news avoidance and more divisive patterns of engagement that erode shared reference points across society.

Against this backdrop, this chapter examines how governments are adjusting their communication approaches to operate effectively in a new phase of the digital age. It also looks ahead to the newest inflection point: the mainstreaming of artificial intelligence. Together, these developments underscore the need for communication that is more agile, evidence informed, and centred on people.

Key takeaways

• A more fragmented digital environment and the ongoing adoption of generative AI are changing how governments reach, listen to and engage with citizens. In the 2025 OECD Survey of Government Communicators, 60% of senior communicators report significant changes to the nature of the function over the past five years, and more than one-third say their institutions have updated their communication policies in the past two years.

• Traditional media is no longer the main gateway to public attention. Algorithms, content creators and online communities increasingly shape the visibility and perceived trustworthiness of information. While 28% of communicators report that news media is no longer their primary channel, 49% say it remains important because political leaders continue to prioritise it.

• Citizens are changing how they access information and whether they seek it out. Rising news avoidance, driven by news fatigue and low trust in media, is leading more people to rely on creators and content they perceive as more relevant to their identities and everyday experiences.

• As shared information sources decline and online platform dynamics amplify divisive content, institutional messages are more easily crowded out or misinterpreted. In the OECD Survey, 77% of communicators say polarising discourse undermines clear communication, and 65% say increasing politicisation is affecting effort to build public trust.

• Public communication can play a stronger role in supporting informed public debate and policy delivery. Realising this potential will require more agile, evidence-informed and adaptive communication approaches that respond to evolving technologies, platforms and audience behaviours.

For the best part of the last two decades, communication has been upended by digital transformation. Prior to the digital age, the information ecosystem was dominated by a finite number of media actors who served as the main intermediaries of information for large audiences. These outlets were among the means for holding governments accountable and shaping public understanding of policy.

The COVID‑19 pandemic coincided with and contributed to a clear inflection point in the long‑term transformation towards a vaster, more dynamic, and more complex information ecosystem, largely due to continuous digital disruption. Trends that had been building for years, such as the decline of traditional media, challenges to information integrity, and the erosion of trust in conventional news sources, intensified rapidly in a context where timely access to reliable information was essential (OECD, 2024[1]).

At the same time, new dynamics emerged that permanently altered the supply and demand for information. Information channels and pathways grew more fragmented while social media feeds became more personalised and algorithm‑driven. Meanwhile, content creators have grown to dominate online channels, just as online discussions became more divisive.

In this post-pandemic digital environment, algorithms increasingly shape individual information diets, and personalities or content creators command as much attention as established news organisations (OECD, 2024[2]; Newman et al., 2023[3]). The result is a more complex, decentralised and less predictable environment for governments seeking to reach the public and inform public debate on reforms.

Today, the mainstreaming of generative AI signals the next major inflection point. Generative AI tools have the potential to diminish the importance of both social and traditional media as sources of information in the future (Bogost, 2022[4]). Their application to the communication and media sector stands to transform the fields, as discussed later in the report.

This new age of algorithms is the backdrop to government efforts to connect with citizens, build their trust, navigate and explain decisions on complex policy challenges. This context and these priorities are reflected in the view of 60% of the 57 senior government communicators surveyed by the OECD in 2025 (see Reader’s guide) who claim that the nature of the public communication function, and expectations for it, have changed significantly compared to only five years prior (Figure 1.1, Panel A).

The above trends have been exacerbated by global crises such as COVID-19, international conflicts, high inflation, and climate-related disasters. These developments have increased the need for focused crisis communication and were compounded by faster, more fragmented news cycles. These changes have far-reaching implications for how governments communicate and the key role that communication plays across the policy cycle (Box 1.1).

The context has required considerable efforts from governments to modernise and adapt communication functions. Over the last two years more than a third of institutions in the OECD Survey reported updating the policy, law, standard, or directive regulating the purpose and scope of communication (Figure 1.1, Panel B). Another 16% have updated these documents since the COVID-19 pandemic, the last time the OECD surveyed its Members on their communication practices.

Navigating the age of algorithms means not only seizing new technologies and the opportunities they offer. It also means adapting to a markedly different information landscape than that which existed even five years ago.

Figure 1.1. Most government communicators surveyed feel the nature of communication has changed significantly, over a third have updated their communication policies in the last two years

 

Note: Data shown above refers to 57 responses to the relevant question in the OECD Survey of Government.

Source: OECD 2025 Survey of Government Communicators.

On one level, adapting to the new landscape means accelerating and elevating the digital communication efforts that institutions have already been pursuing, and becoming more agile in keeping pace with the rapid shifts in platforms, formats, and user behaviours. OECD Member countries have invested significantly in integrating digital channels into their communication infrastructure, enabling faster and more direct outreach to citizens (Alfonsi et al., 2022[5]; OECD, 2021[6]). This is the approach taken by Korea, detailed in the Annex A. Still, many governments have yet to master social media, even as the digital environment evolves faster than institutional practices can follow.

On another level, adaptation also means rethinking the core approaches public institutions use to connect meaningfully with citizens, respond to their expectations, and build or maintain trust, including through communication. The fragmented and divisive information environment described in this chapter leaves a growing gap for citizens seeking clear and trustworthy information about policies and services that affect their lives. In 2023, only 40% of citizens surveyed across 30 OECD Member countries felt that their national government clearly communicated how reforms would affect them (OECD, 2024[2]).

The introduction of new technologies, including the large-scale adoption of AI, provides governments with a historic opportunity to modernise both their operations and their communication practices. At the same time, it introduces new challenges and risks – particularly for trust, transparency and accountability in the production and dissemination of information, which require clear governance, safeguards and institutional capacity (OECD, forthcoming[7]).

Building on the OECD’s first Report on Public Communication (2021[6]) 1 as the baseline, this chapter takes stock of how the supply and demand for information has evolved over the last five years. This serves as the backdrop to the analysis of how government communication is adapting to a new phase in the digital age, while gearing up for upcoming transformations brought about by AI.

Box 1.1. How public communication adds value across the policy cycle

Public communication contributes to policymaking at every stage, supporting governments in designing, delivering, and explaining policies in ways that strengthen trust and public understanding. It does so in the following ways:

1. Informing the public and enabling democratic debate

A foundational responsibility of the function is to explain government actions, policies, and priorities, provide timely information, and enable open public debate. This includes responding to media enquiries, engaging stakeholders, and increasingly, using digital channels to reach diverse audiences. By ensuring transparency and clarity, communicators help citizens understand what government is doing and why.

2. Bringing insights into agenda‑setting and policy design

Communication teams contribute upstream by grounding policy discussions in evidence about citizens’ perceptions, needs, and concerns. Through organisational listening, attitudes research, engagement with stakeholders, and horizon scanning, they identify risks, misunderstandings, behavioural barriers, and opportunities for clearer policy framing. These insights help decision makers anticipate how proposals will be perceived and strengthen the design of policies before they are finalised.

3. Supporting implementation and service delivery

During rollout, communication ensures that policies are understood and accessible. Strategic campaigns, based on insights and drawing on marketing and behavioural methods, help inform target groups, promote compliance or service uptake, and demonstrate progress on cross‑cutting goals. Communicators also play a co-ordinating role across ministries and delivery partners, ensuring coherence and clarity in how policies are presented to the public.

4. Enabling real‑time adaptation and continuous learning

Monitoring public reactions across channels allows teams to detect gaps in information, confusion, misleading information, or unintended consequences early. This creates a feedback loop between citizens, communicators, and policymakers, supporting course correction during implementation or crises. Evaluation frameworks focused on outcomes (such as changes in understanding, attitudes, trust, or behaviour) also provide evidence on what worked, for whom, and why, strengthening accountability and supporting future policy development.

Across all stages, communication’s value stems from its ability to improve the responsiveness and legitimacy of policy. When communicators are engaged early and consistently, policy becomes more citizen centred, implementation more coherent, and outcomes more measurable. This is the foundation for better integration across the two functions (see Chapter 4).

Figure 1.2. Communication’s contribution to policy impact

Source: Adapted from OECD (2023[8]), Public Communication Scan of the United Kingdom: Using Public Communication to Strengthen Democracy and Public Trust, https://doi.org/10.1787/bc4a57b3-en.

1.1. The rise of algorithms and new information intermediaries: How a decentralised news ecosystem is redefining how people receive information

The shift of news and information sources from traditional outlets to digital and social media has been a defining feature of the digital age. That shift, once characterised by a few platforms and follower-based feeds, has recently given way to an increasingly decentralised, creator‑to‑audience ecosystem shaped by algorithmic distribution and a proliferation of platforms, each governed by specific and distinct policies (discussed further in the next chapter).

Social media is growing as a primary source of news for people across the OECD, playing an increasingly significant role in people’s information diets. According to the latest OECD Trust Survey (OECD, 2026[9]), 47% of individuals of all age groups report using social media to stay informed about politics current affairs (Figure 1.3). Social media has now overtaken legacy channels as the main news source for young people aged 18–29, with 68.3% turning to it regularly in 2025 (Figure 1.3) (vs. 54% TV/radio and 42% print/online news), though only 14% say social media accounts for 80% or more of their news.

Figure 1.3. Younger people rely more on social than traditional media

Share of population who indicate that they get information about politics and current affairs from respective source, unweighted OECD average, 2025

Note: The percentages show the unweighted OECD average. The shares are derived from the response to the question “On a typical day, from which of the following sources, if any, do you get information about politics and current affairs?”. Respondents were able to select all responses that applied.

Source: OECD (2024[2]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

In parallel, the online news landscape has become increasingly fragmented. Whereas ten years ago two social media platforms were dominant, as of 2025 at least six different ones command a large share of users (Newman et al., 2025[10]). Among the platforms, Facebook remains the largest weekly news source at 36% of global respondents, followed closely by YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, WhatsApp and X, with the gap between longer‑established platforms and newer entrants continuing to narrow.

The fragmentation and multiplication of platforms have been matched by a diversification of content formats that better match specific audiences’ interests and preferences, including popular formats such as podcasts, short‑ and long‑form videos, and newsletters, often created and shared by individuals rather than organisations, or by prominent figures within organisations. Video‑based content has come to dominate feeds also when it comes to news. A global survey found two‑thirds of respondents watch short news clips and half engage with longer formats each week. Most of this happens on third‑party platforms rather than publishers’ own websites (Newman et al., 2024, p. 10[11]).

Moreover, overall the proliferation of digital channels has coincided with the decline of traditional media that is continuing to lose share, an outcome driven by digital disruption itself. OECD figures show that as of 2025, 68% of people still receive their news from TV or radio on a typical day, while 45% use newspapers, magazines or online news websites (OECD, 2026[9]). However, these sources have long been losing their share of audiences’ attention (OECD, 2024[2]; Newman et al., 2023[3]). The OECD Trust Survey reveals that this can have profound implications for trust in institutions (Box 1.2).

The next wave of disruption is being driven by rapid advances in AI that weaken the pathways that once reliably brought audiences to news. As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, the growing use of generative AI chatbots and tools is replacing search engines, especially for the young (61% of Gen Z and 53% of millennials) (Wong and Melnizek, 2025[12]; Ofcom, 2024[13]). This shift in search behaviours presents major challenges for publishers: studies anticipate losses of up to 40% in search driven traffic as AI‑powered answer tools reduce click‑throughs, while automated content makes standard news updates easier to replicate and less distinctive (Newman, 2026[14]).

In response, many news organisations are already rethinking their strategies, doubling down on formats that are harder to automate and more likely to build durable audience relationships. Many plan to invest more in original investigative reporting and deeper explanatory journalism, and to prioritise richer storytelling through video and audio, areas seen as offering greater resilience in an AI‑saturated information environment (Newman et al., 2025[10]; Newman, 2026[14]).

The decline of traditional mass media coupled with the extent of online fragmentation have great consequences for public engagement in democratic life. Previously, large audiences shared exposure to the same news sources, supporting a common understanding of public interest issues. In the current environment, algorithmic distribution and self‑selection funnel people into narrower information pathways aligned with their existing interests and networks, increasing the risk that there is little overlap in what different groups see.

This fragmentation reduces exposure to a broader range of perspectives and can channel communication into smaller silos and communities. The result is pressure on the social fabric, as fewer citizens encounter a shared baseline of facts or framing (Rabb, Cowen and de Ruiter, 2023[15]; Di Martino et al., 2025[16]). For governments, this makes broad, one‑size‑fits‑all messaging more ineffective and increases the need for novel strategies to meet people where they are, on the platforms and in the formats they actually use, while maintaining clarity and consistency on the core facts.

The 57 senior government communicators surveyed by the OECD are largely aware of this shift and its implications. For 28% of them, news media is no longer the primary means for achieving communication goals. Another 49% agree that a focus on news media is less effective but maintain it because political leadership tend to be more attentive to it (Figure 1.4). This finding likewise emerged in OECD country studies (OECD, 2023[8]; OECD, 2025[17]) and echoes a common bias of the political circles to pay greater attention to where their peers get their news rather than the broader public they serve.

Box 1.2. Information, communication, and trust: Evidence from the 2023 and 2025 OECD Trust Surveys

The OECD Trust Survey has analysed people’s relationships with news, information, and public communication across 33 OECD Member and 5 accession candidate countries. It shows that concerns about information reliability are widespread and that patterns of media consumption are associated with varying levels of trust in public institutions:

• Trust in news media is mixed across OECD countries, 40% report high or moderately high trust in news media compared to 39% in 2023, while 44% report low to no trust in 2023. This mirrors similarly modest trust in national government in many contexts and highlights fragility in the institutions that mediate public understanding.

• Trust in media and trust in government are linked at the individual level: people who trust the media are more than twice as likely to trust the government as those who do not (the 2023 Survey highlights a gap of 22% high/moderately high trust in government among people who prefer not to follow political news versus 40% among those who follow news in some way). Persistent distrust in the media ecosystem can therefore push people toward an unhealthy choice between blind trust in government and cynical distrust of both media and government.

• News consumption patterns correlate with trust in government. 2023 results show that people who disengage from political news report markedly lower trust in government. Consumption via traditional media (TV, radio and the press) is associated with higher trust. By contrast, trust levels among those who get news on social media are similar, on average, to who do not, possibly because news consumption on social media is not consistently conducive to better political knowledge.

The Trust Survey additionally highlights three main leverage points for public communication to serve as a driver of trust:

• Clarity and accessibility of routine service information: Across countries, many people expect clear information about administrative services (e.g. registrations, benefits) to be easily available; 68% on average believe it to be so as of 2025. This routine information functions as a public service in its own right and has a small positive association with trust in the national civil service.

• Communication about reforms and their effects: Perceptions are more divided about whether governments clearly explain how reforms will affect people. Importantly, confidence that government communicates well about reforms is strongly associated with trust in national government, making reform communication a high-impact area for strengthening trust.

• Credibility of decision making: Perceptions of evidence-informed decision making are closely linked with trust: where people believe decisions are evidence-based, trust tends to be higher. Only about four in ten people, on average, think governments draw on the best available evidence when making decisions. This points to the importance of transparency about how decisions are made what evidence was used, what trade-offs were considered, and what uncertainties remain.

Source: Author’s work based on OECD (2024[2]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en; and OECD (2026[9]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2026 Results: Navigating Rising Expectations and New Horizons, https://doi.org/10.1787/9eb63fec-en.

Figure 1.4. Half of communicators say news media has lost efficacy for achieving communication goals

Has the role of news media changed in your overall approach to communication compared to 5 years ago?

Note: Data shown above refers to 57 responses to the relevant question in the OECD Survey of Government Communicators.

Source: OECD 2025 Survey of Government Communicators.

1.1.1. Creators and issue‑based communities are supplanting traditional news sources as intermediaries

In the early days of the digital age, over a decade ago, social networks were expected to foster more direct connections between citizens and public institutions, bypassing the filter of news media. This expectation only materialised to a limited extent (see Chapter 2), as today the centre of gravity is moving from person‑to‑person sharing toward new classes of intermediaries whose voices carry outsized influence, in a context of increasingly commercialised social media platforms.

Algorithm-based feeds increasingly elevate individual personalities and content creators to a new leading class of news, opinion, and entertainment sources. What builds trust in this new digital age is increasingly the perceived authenticity, relatability, or lived experience of a person, not the editorial authority or institutional status of a traditional outlet. As of 2024, one in five Americans (and more than one third of those under 30) report regularly receiving news from influencers, and in the United Kingdom nearly 55% of 16–34‑year‑olds say they get news from influencers every day (Pew Research Centre, 2024[18]; Ipsos, 2025[19]).

The traditional information system built around largely self-regulated journalism has given way to an environment where virtually anyone can build an audience and shape public understanding of current affairs (Jensen and Helles, 2017[20]). This transformation has been accelerated by the proliferation of creator‑friendly publishing tools and the rapid rise of formats centred on individuals, such as vlogs, podcasts, newsletters, livestreams, and short‑form videos.

Within the realm of the content creator industry, “news influencers” have emerged as their own category of online personalities primarily focused on current affairs (Newman et al., 2025[10]). News influencers are described as “individuals who regularly post about current events or civic issues on social media and have at least 100 000 followers” on any social media platform (Pew Research Centre, 2024[18]).

This group of creators primarily share commentary, opinions and analysis rather than producing original reporting, and some also blur the lines between news and entertainment (Nelson, 2025[21]). The most followed voices include the likes of American podcaster Joe Rogan and individuals with established profiles or political backgrounds, such as the former British Director of Communications turned podcaster, Alastair Campbell. A subset of news influencers is also gaining prominence for producing original reporting or creating content that seeks to package news reporting in a way that audiences find more relatable (Nelson, 2025[21]). These include for example Hugo Decrypte in France, Lisa Remillard in the United States, and more.

Content creators operate largely outside conventional media structures, but increasingly are establishing their own news-like organisations and reshaping the media industry. In many cases traditional media outlets are investing in building the profiles of their own top commentators to keep up with the trend (Newman et al., 2025[10]; Jazwinska, 2025[22]).

In tandem with the rising prominence of creators, social media is also aiding the formation of niche online communities organised around identities, narrow interests and single issues (Generate Team, 2024[23]). These include wellness, parenting, gaming, as well as political and social communities such as the “manosphere”. Many of these communities, especially popular among younger digital natives, now serve as primary gateways to information and connection with peers.

With more non-journalist voices becoming commentators and sources on current affairs, there will be a natural dilution of journalistic norms and editorial standards in the information ecosystem. This risks increasing sensationalist framings and spreading of erroneous information (Lyubareva and Rochelandet, 2021[24]; Zhou, 2025[25]).

For public institutions, this shift toward personality‑ and community‑driven information flows presents a structural challenge. As explored further in Chapter 2, communication strategies must adapt to an environment in which trust is increasingly vested in individuals rather than institutions, and where authenticity, relatability, and messenger credibility are critical determinants of reach and impact.

Meeting citizens where they are increasingly means learning from how these new intermediaries connect, communicate, and build trust in ways that conventional government communication has not always been able to match.

1.2. New patterns of engagement with news and information are complicating the task of connecting with citizens

The profound shifts in how news and information are supplied are mirrored by equally significant changes in how people seek out, engage with, and interpret information. These new patterns of information demand create a series of obstacles for public communication. Trust in established media sources remains weak, while many people increasingly avoid news altogether or gravitate toward content that feels more emotionally resonant, identity‑affirming, or aligned with existing views. At the same time, unrelatable stories and messages, divisive discourse, and the blurring of boundaries between fact, opinion, and commentary further undermine the visibility and resonance of institutional communication. The following sections explore how these dynamics shape people’s engagement with news today and the implications they hold for governments seeking to reach and connect with diverse audiences.

1.2.1. When news feels overwhelming or unrelatable: The growing trend for news avoidance among citizens

As the supply of news and information has expanded, interest in consuming it has moved in the opposite direction. Across many countries, citizens report a declining interest in news, a trend documented consistently in recent years. In the United Kingdom, for example, interest in news2 has fallen from 70% in 2015 to 38% in 2024, with similar declines observed across most countries surveyed (Newman et al., 2024[11]). Reductions of 33 percentage points in Spain, 19 in Germany, and 15 in Korea illustrate the international incidence of this shift. Low interest and engagement with news are especially pronounced among women, and those without a university degree (Altay, Fletcher and Nielsen, 2024[26]; Gorski and Thomas, 2022[27]).

This decreasing interest is closely tied to the growing phenomenon of intentional news avoidance, defined as deliberately turning away from news either selectively or altogether (Schäfer, Aaldering and Lecheler, 2022[28]; Palmer, Toff and Nielsen, 2023[29]). Avoidance is often driven by the perception that news is too negative, repetitive, or emotionally draining, particularly on topics such as politics and war.

Levels of avoidance vary widely across countries. The Reuters Institute’s DNR (2025[10]) finds over 60% of respondents in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Croatia avoid the news, while just 11% do so in Japan. However, the trend has grown stronger in the digital age. Historically low before the 2000s, avoidance has risen sharply over recent years (Gorski and Thomas, 2022[27]; Newman et al., 2025[10]). In the United States for instance, the percentage of adults reporting to follow news all or most of the time fell from 51% in 2016 to 36% in 2025 (Forman-Katz, 2025[30]). Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that according to the OECD Trust Survey, only 4% of people on average don’t get any information on politics and current affairs on a typical day (OECD, 2026[9]).

Relatability and perceived relevance of news stories and information is likewise a significant cause for disengagement. Many people increasingly find news are distant from their realities or difficult to understand. Around 30% say they struggle to make sense of financial or economic reporting, challenges felt most acutely among those with lower income or lower levels of education (Newman et al., 2023[3]). Studies in several countries further show that news coverage often fails to reflect people’s lived realities, reinforcing a sense of disconnect (Arguedas et al., 2023[31]; Blastland and Dilnot, 2022[32]).

These developments carry significant consequences. Individuals who avoid the news tend to be exposed primarily to stories lacking context and nuance, which can distort understanding of public issues and getting the right messages to the right people harder. People rely more heavily on second-hand information from friends, family, or social media, channels where false information circulates more easily, increasing vulnerability to false or misleading content (Palmer and Toff, 2022[33]). At a societal level, declining news consumption undermines civic and democratic engagement, which research shows is positively linked to media use (Livingstone and Markham, 2008[34]; Barthel et al., 2016[35]; Norris, 2000[36]).

1.2.2. Government communication needs new strategies to navigate an increasingly divisive landscape

Another consequence of the shifting supply and demand for information is the deterioration of the tone and cohesion of public discourse around many policy and social issues. The so-called “culture wars” that are increasingly playing out in online spaces are enabled and amplified by an information environment that is more fragmented, personality‑ and algorithm-driven (Milli et al., 2025[37]; Shteynberg et al., 2023[38]). As a result, citizens increasingly encounter information through divisive and adversarial frames that can make societies feel more split than they truly are and make policy debates more divisive.

A major feature of this shift is the growing tendency for people to sort into opposing camps, with divisions fuelled as much by perception as by genuine disagreement. Cross-country surveys find similar patterns in suspicion or dislike of people on the opposite side of the political spectrum, with between two-thirds and three-quarters of respondents reporting such sentiment across 10 countries (Henley, 2021[39]).

Divisive narratives distort people’s ability to form an accurate view of institutions and of one another (Yudkin, Hawkins and Dixon, 2019[40]). People also tend to seek information that aligns with their existing beliefs, making those beliefs more resistant to change even when new evidence emerges, and narrowing more largely their exposure to differing viewpoints (Garimella et al., 2021[41]; Fletcher and Jenkins, 2019[42]; Bakker and Lelkes, 2024[43]).

The current information ecosystem amplifies these dynamics. Traditional media, grappling with shrinking revenues and intense competition, have grown more sensationalist and opinion-driven, while online platforms reward content that provokes stronger emotional reactions (Milli et al., 2025[37]; Newman et al., 2025[10]). Negative or conflict-framed material attracts significantly more engagement online, a dynamic exploited by individuals and news organisations seeking visibility (Kim, Villanueva and Chen, 2023[44]; Radsch, 2023[45]).

This information context is distorting public perceptions of the extent of true differences. People widely report feeling their societies are divided: 84% of people in the United Kingdom claim this according to a survey (Duffy and Skinner, 2025[46]), with high perceptions of division felt by those surveyed in France (75%), Poland (85%) and Spain (68%) (More in Common, 2024[47]). Yet research shows that such divisions are routinely overestimated: many citizens assume their political “opponents” hold more extreme positions than they actually do (Yudkin, Hawkins and Dixon, 2019[40]). Likewise, “echo chambers” involve only a small minority of users who are most active and louder (Budak et al., 2024[48]; Fletcher and Jenkins, 2019[42]).

A large “silent middle” exists: many people hold moderate or mixed views, dislike toxic debate, and are open to persuasion, but they are less visible in online or media debates (Small, Yudkin and Wylie, 2025[49]). This finding suggests that identity‑based cues drive much of the perceived conflict, with the implication that fixing the narratives that reinforce divisions can be a lever to build common ground.

The blending of fact, opinion, and commentary, lower trust in institutions and media, and the prevalence of emotionally charged narratives all contribute to significant challenges for public communication. Fragmented and adversarial discourse narrows the space for compromise, amplifies misunderstandings, and heightens the risk that institutional messages will be drowned out or misinterpreted.

The divisiveness of media and online discourse creates a more challenging environment for communication, especially on sensitive or value‑laden policy issues that have the potential to become increasingly divisive in the current global context. Seventy-seven percent of respondents in the 2025 OECD Survey of Government Communicators agree or strongly agree that polarising discourse in the media and online is compromising institutions' ability to communicate policies clearly (Figure 1.5).

Similarly, partisanship is affecting citizens’ perceptions on whether government communication of reforms is clear. On average across 30 OECD countries in the 2023 Trust Survey, there is an 18 percentage-point gap in perception that government clearly communicates the effects of reforms between those who voted for the incumbent political party and those who did not (OECD, 2024[2]).

Overcoming these barriers requires approaches that recognise the dynamics of divisiveness, broaden shared reference points, and help rebuild the conditions for constructive public debate to move forward on policy challenges. In this regard, the OECD has developed dedicated guidance for communicators and policymakers on leveraging a range of methods and tactics to favour a more constructive debate on divisive and contested policy topics (Box 1.3).

Figure 1.5. Respondents see polarising discourse as an obstacle to clear communication

To what extent do you agree with the statement: Discourse in the media and across communication channels has become more polarising and it is compromising institutions’ ability to communicate clearly on policies?

Note: Data shown above refers to 57 responses to the relevant question in the OECD Survey of Government Communicators.

Source: OECD 2025 Survey of Government Communicators.

Box 1.3. OECD’s guidance to Bridge Divides and Shape Better Policy: a multi-disciplinary approach for communicating on divisive and contested policy problems

The OECD’s Public Communication Handbook to Bridge Divides and Shape Better Policy (forthcoming) draws on the insights from years of analysis and the advice of leading practitioners in the field, with the goal of helping governments connect constructively with citizens on societies’ most complex challenges.

It is based on the premise that public discourse is strongly shaped by narratives, not just facts. Narratives determine how people interpret new information, judge actions, or whose experiences they see represented. Yet narratives in the wider information ecosystem can also be polarising, emotionally charged, or disconnected from people’s realities. They can distort understanding of policy problems and reduce openness to dialogue and compromise.

A key task for public communication is therefore to understand the values, concerns, and lived experiences that underpin how different groups make sense of an issue, and to support shared frames of reference for debate that can speak across those divides.

To support this, the OECD proposes an approach centred on three interconnected components (Figure 1.6). First, joining up communication and policy requires that communication is actively considered at each step of policymaking, and that insights between teams are shared and inform decisions. The role of communication is to support the conditions for constructive debate to happen and translate such debate into insights for decision-making. When policies are adopted, communicators help explain complex reforms and how they take into account different perspectives and concerns.

Learning what people think beneath the surface of public opinion is the foundation of both responsive policy and communication. It goes beyond traditional opinion polling by combining qualitative research, segmentation, social listening, and even participation methods to uncover how different groups make sense of an issue, what they worry about, and what narratives shape their views. This step elucidates the assumptions, emotions, and lived experiences that determine why certain narratives resonate, and provides the basis for adjusting policy as much as communication.

Figure 1.6. The approach for communicating across divides

Source: OECD (forthcoming[50]), Voices that Resonate: A Public Communication Handbook to Bridge Divides and Shape Better Policy.

Finally, broadening the frames of reference translates those insights into messages and entry-points for debate that bring different groups around to a shared way of discussing a problem, as an alternative to irreconcilable, antagonising framings. Shared frames of reference are ones that feel relevant, fair, and recognisable to people with different worldviews. They broaden the aperture of debate and help shift attention from frames that divide toward more constructive ones. Crucially, these shared frames are to be supported collaboratively by broad ranges of independent voices, rather than be owned or controlled by governments.

This approach aims to help governments move beyond reactive, top-down style of policy communication based on one-way announcements towards an evidence‑informed communication that leverages the decentralised information ecosystem to support constructive public debate. Each element of this approach is accompanied by detailed technical guidance and examples for implementation.

Source: OECD (forthcoming[50]), Voices that Resonate: A Public Communication Handbook to Bridge Divides and Shape Better Policy.

Another key consideration for managing the current information landscape involves maximising the trustworthiness of government communication and ensuring that it is responsive, reliable, and impartial (OECD, 2023[8]; Smillie and Scharfbillig, 2024[51]). In this climate, the temptation can be high for political actors to adopt tactics and narratives that perform well on algorithm‑driven platforms by leaning into conflict or division. While such approaches may deliver short‑term visibility, they are damaging for public institutions whose legitimacy depends on being able to speak to all parts of society, especially those who already feel left out or unheard.

Similarly, 65% of communicators in the OECD Survey agree or strongly agree that the politicisation of public communication is compromising their institutions’ work to build trust with citizens (Figure 1.7, Panel B). In all OECD countries covered by the 2025 Survey (Figure 1.7, Panel A) institutional communication is formally distinct from political communication, meaning it is expected to be non-partisan, evidence-based, and focused on public service (OECD, 2023[8]). Almost half of respondents, however, claim that this distinction is not fully observed in practice. This finding confirms similar reports that the blurred lines between political and institutional communication is a primary challenge for building trust (WPP/Kantar Public, 2023[52]).

Additionally, as audiences become harder to reach through traditional news channels, public communicators need approaches that build trust and cut through a crowded and increasingly selective information environment. This means designing content that is easy to grasp, grounded in people’s daily realities, and clearly separate from political messaging, so it feels trustworthy and relevant rather than overwhelming or meant to persuade.

Moreover, politicisation presents a risk to the neutrality and integrity of government information, key to trustworthiness (OECD, 2023[8]). When official communication is perceived as serving partisan interests rather than the public good, citizens may question its credibility and discount even factual messages (Baugh, 2026[53]). This dynamic weakens the capacity of public institutions to convey policy objectives, support informed public debate, and maintain transparency. It can also exacerbate existing divides and threats to information integrity, as audiences selectively interpret messages through political lenses, further reducing the effectiveness of communication in times of reform or crisis.

Despite generally low levels of public trust in politicians as messengers, it remains common for them to appear in official communications to signal their leadership role. Communicators increasingly need to advise against this instinct when it undermines credibility and reduces the effectiveness of neutral, service‑focused information (Baugh, 2026[53]).

In this context, one effective way for public communication to clearly separate from political messaging is to focus on showing concrete effects of policies on daily life through credible, relatable messengers rather than relying on high‑level political voices that many audiences tune out. This is the foundation of the approach developed by the United Kingdom’s Government Communications, which has established a New Media Unit as an experimental team to deploy novel approaches to reach citizens and build their trust (Box 1.4).

Finally, investing in the trustworthiness of public communication is essential in an environment where risks to information integrity continue to evolve, both from the unintended effects of the changing information landscape discussed and by premeditated efforts by malign actors to exploit these vulnerabilities to further their goals (OECD, 2024[1]).

Figure 1.7. A majority of communicators worry about politicisation of government communication

Note: Data shown above refers to 57 responses to the relevant question in the OECD Survey of Government Communicators. Full labels of Panel A figure read "Yes (the two are formally designated as distinct and this is observed in practice)”, "Mostly (the two are distinct but there are some grey areas in practice)”, “No (the two are not formally or practically distinct)”.

Source: OECD 2025 Survey of Government Communicators.

Box 1.4. The United Kingdom’s New Media Unit: An approach to connect with audiences’ everyday realities

The United Kingdom’s Government Communications established a New Media Unit (NMU) to address a central challenge they recognised in today’s information environment: many people do not trust, engage with, or feel represented by government communication delivered through traditional channels or political voices.

The NMU was designed to counter this by developing communication that reaches audiences directly via paid media, is explicitly apolitical, highly relatable, and rooted in real government delivery.

Its new approach to content is grounded in three principles. First, messages are audience-first not ‘grid-led’ (a traditional media management planning tool notably introduced in the United Kingdom), prioritising issues that citizens are most concerned about rather than mirroring the daily news cycle.

Second, communication should demonstrate delivery, showing improvements in specific services, places and positive impacts on people's lives. Content should be created and targeted locally, showing that improvements are being made across the country rather than relying on national framing and dissemination (an approach echoed by practices discussed further in Chapter 2).

Third, messages are carried by people who reflect the public's lived experience and are perceived as credible. First-hand accounts of people who have used a service or benefit, frontline figures such as nurses, teachers and community leaders resonate most strongly with citizen audiences. The NMU also works closely with content creators as trusted voices and native content experts to engage audiences and build trust in government information.

By combining depoliticised messengers with practical, place‑based storytelling, the NMU has been able to reach audiences that typically disengage from government communication, including those who feel underserved or sceptical of institutions. Evaluation of year one activity shows that the NMU approach performed markedly better than typical institutional messages, generating stronger engagement, clearer understanding and more positive perception of government delivery.

With the model proven, the UK Government is scaling up the NMU's capability to deliver ongoing direct-to-citizen targeted digital communications to meet the ongoing challenge of cutting through in a fragmented and often distrustful information environment.

Source: Written input provided by the New Media Unit to the OECD Secretariat (2026).

As this chapter has shown, the accelerating transformation of the information ecosystem presents governments with a communication environment that is more complex, faster moving and harder to navigate than ever before. Against this backdrop, there is substantial potential to strengthen the role and impact of communication in government.

Recent surveys echo responses to the OECD’s 2025 Survey that find that most government communicators believe their organisation’s communication has improved in recent years, but it is not yet being used to its full potential (WPP/Kantar Public, 2023[52]). This gap reflects the broader challenge highlighted throughout the chapter: communication systems and practices have not kept pace with the scale and speed of change.

Looking ahead, public communication will need to become more agile, more evidence‑informed and more capable of adapting to rapidly shifting technologies, formats and audience behaviours. Ensuring communication remains trustworthy, relatable and responsive will be essential to support governments in addressing increasingly complex policy challenges.

References

[5] Alfonsi, C. et al. (2022), “Public communication trends after COVID-19: Innovative practices across the OECD and in four Southeast Asian countries”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 55, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/cb4de393-en.

[26] Altay, S., R. Fletcher and R. Nielsen (2024), “News participation is declining: Evidence from 46 countries between 2015 and 2022”, New Media & Society, Vol. 27/9, pp. 5110-5131, https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448241247822.

[31] Arguedas, A. et al. (2023), News for the powerful and privileged: how misrepresentation and underrepresentation of disadvantaged communities undermine their trust in news, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, https://doi.org/10.60625/risj-jqny-t942.

[43] Bakker, B. and Y. Lelkes (2024), “Putting the affect into affective polarisation”, Cognition and Emotion, Vol. 38/4, pp. 418-436, https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2024.2362366.

[35] Barthel, M. et al. (2016), “Civic Engagement Strongly Tied to Local News Habits”, Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2016/11/03/civic-engagement-strongly-tied-to-local-news-habits/.

[53] Baugh, S. (2026), Winning Strategies, Pt 4: Borrow Trust, https://simonbaugh.substack.com/p/winning-strategies-pt-4-demonstrate.

[32] Blastland, M. and A. Dilnot (2022), Review of the impartiality of BBC coverage of taxation, public spending, government borrowing and debt, https://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/documents/thematic-review-taxation-public-spending-govt-borrowing-debt.pdf (accessed on 27 March 2023).

[4] Bogost, I. (2022), “The Age of Social Media Is Ending”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/11/twitter-facebook-social-media-decline/672074/.

[48] Budak, C. et al. (2024), “Misunderstanding the harms of online misinformation”, Nature, Vol. 630/8015, pp. 45-53, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07417-w.

[16] Di Martino, E. et al. (2025), “Ideological fragmentation of the social media ecosystem: From echo chambers to echo platforms”, PNAS Nexus, Vol. 4/9, https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf262.

[46] Duffy, B. and G. Skinner (2025), The UK’s changing ‘culture wars’: Division, tension and common ground, Ipsos/King’s College London/The Policy Institute, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/uks-changing-culture-wars-division-tension-and-common-ground.pdf.

[42] Fletcher, R. and J. Jenkins (2019), Polarisation and the news media in Europe, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-03/Polarisation_and_the_news_media_in_Europe.pdf.

[30] Forman-Katz, N. (2025), “Americans are following the news less closely than they used to”, Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/12/03/americans-are-following-the-news-less-closely-than-they-used-to/.

[41] Garimella, K. et al. (2021), “Political Polarization in Online News Consumption”, Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, Vol. 15, pp. 152-162, https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v15i1.18049.

[23] Generate Team (2024), The Rise of Niche Online Communities, https://generate.nextatlas.com/feed/online-communities/the-rise-of-niche-online-communities.

[27] Gorski, L. and F. Thomas (2022), “Staying Tuned or Tuning Out? A Longitudinal Analysis of News-Avoiders on the Micro and Macro-Level”, Communication Research, Vol. 49/7, pp. 942-965.

[39] Henley, J. (2021), “Voters in west divided more by identity than issues, survey finds”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/nov/17/voters-in-west-divided-more-by-identity-than-issues-survey-finds.

[19] Ipsos (2025), “Half of 16–34-year-olds trust news from online influencers, even with concerns about ‘widespread fake news’”, https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/half-16-34-year-olds-trust-news-online-influencers-even-concerns-about-widespread-fake-news.

[22] Jazwinska, K. (2025), “News Organizations Are Starting to Embrace Creator‑Model Journalists”, Columbia Journalism Review, https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/news-organizations-embrace-creator-model-journalists-collaborate-compete-tiktok-instagram-youtube.php.

[20] Jensen, K. and R. Helles (2017), “Speaking into the system: Social media and many-toone communication”, European Journal of Communication, Vol. 32/1, https://doi.org/10.1177/026732311668280.

[44] Kim, S., I. Villanueva and K. Chen (2023), “Going Beyond Affective Polarization: How Emotions and Identities are Used in Anti-Vaccination TikTok Videos”, Political Communication, Vol. 41/4, pp. 588–607, https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2023.2243852.

[34] Livingstone, S. and T. Markham (2008), “The contribution of media consumption to civic participation”, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 59/2, pp. 351-371, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00197.x.

[24] Lyubareva, I. and F. Rochelandet (2021), “From News Diversity to News Quality: New Media Regulation Theoretical Issues”, in Digital and Social Media Regulation, Springer International Publishing, Cham, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66759-7_6.

[47] More in Common (2024), Europe Votes: The Road to the European Elections, https://www.moreincommon.com/europevotes/.

[21] Nelson (2025), The Project C Newsletter, https://projectc.beehiiv.com/.

[14] Newman, N. (2026), Journalism, Media, and Technology Trends and Predictions 2026, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2026-01/Trends_and_Predictions_2026.pdf.

[10] Newman, N. et al. (2025), Digital News Report 2025, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, https://doi.org/10.60625/risj-8qqf-jt36.

[11] Newman, N. et al. (2024), Digital News Report 2024, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2024-06/RISJ_DNR_2024_Digital_v10%20lr.pdf.

[3] Newman, N. et al. (2023), Digital News Report 2023, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023.

[36] Norris, P. (2000), A Virtuous Circle, Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609343.

[9] OECD (2026), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2026 Results: Navigating Rising Expectations and New Horizons, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9eb63fec-en.

[17] OECD (2025), Public Communication Scan of France: Evaluating public communication performance to strengthen public trust, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7450361a-en.

[1] OECD (2024), Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d909ff7a-en.

[2] OECD (2024), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.

[8] OECD (2023), Public Communication Scan of the United Kingdom: Using Public Communication to Strengthen Democracy and Public Trust, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bc4a57b3-en.

[6] OECD (2021), OECD Report on Public Communication: The Global Context and the Way Forward, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/22f8031c-en.

[50] OECD (forthcoming), Building Common Ground with Communication, OECD Publishing, Paris.

[7] OECD (forthcoming), Government Unstuck: Unleashing governments’ capacity to deliver, OECD Publishing, Paris.

[13] Ofcom (2024), Online Nation, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/research-and-data/online-research/online-nation/2024/online-nation-2024-report.pdf?v=386238.

[33] Palmer, R. and B. Toff (2022), “Neither Absent nor Ambient: Incidental News Exposure From the Perspective of News Avoiders in the UK, United States, and Spain”, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 29/3.

[29] Palmer, R., B. Toff and R. Nielsen (2023), “Examining Assumptions Around How News Avoidance Gets Defined: The Importance of Overall News Consumption, Intention, and Structural Inequalities”, Journalism Studies, Vol. 24/6, pp. 697-714, https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670x.2023.2183058.

[18] Pew Research Centre (2024), America’s News Influencers, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/11/18/americas-news-influencers/.

[15] Rabb, N., L. Cowen and J. de Ruiter (2023), “Investigating the effect of selective exposure, audience fragmentation, and echo-chambers on polarization in dynamic media ecosystems”, Applied Network Science, Vol. 8/1, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41109-023-00601-3.

[45] Radsch, C. (2023), “Platformization and Media Capture: A Framework for Regulatory Analysis of Media-Related Platform Regulations”, UCLA Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 28/2, pp. 175-223, https://uclajolt.com/platformization-and-media-capture/.

[28] Schäfer, S., L. Aaldering and S. Lecheler (2022), ““Give Me a Break!” Prevalence and Predictors of Intentional News Avoidance During the COVID-19 Pandemic”, Mass Communication and Society, Vol. 26/4, pp. 671-694, https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2022.2125406.

[38] Shteynberg, G. et al. (2023), “Theory of collective mind”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 27/11, pp. 1019-1031, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2023.06.009.

[49] Small, C., D. Yudkin and J. Wylie (2025), The Connection Opportunity Insights for Bringing Americans Together Across Difference, More in Common, https://moreincommonus.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/The-Connection-Opportunity_More-in-Common_2025.pdf.

[51] Smillie, L. and M. Scharfbillig (2024), Trustworthy Public Communications: How Public Communicators can Strengthen our Democracies, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, https://doi.org/10.2760/695605.

[37] Van Bavel, J. (ed.) (2025), “Engagement, user satisfaction, and the amplification of divisive content on social media”, PNAS Nexus, Vol. 4/3, https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf062.

[12] Wong, E. and A. Melnizek (2025), “The future of the internet is likely smaller communities, with a focus on curated experiences”, The Verge, https://www.theverge.com/press-room/617654/internet-community-future-research (accessed on 14 April 2025).

[52] WPP/Kantar Public (2023), The Leaders’ Report: The Evolving Future of Government Communication, WPP Government Practice, https://govtpracticewpp.com/report/the-leaders-report-the-evolving-future-of-government-communication/.

[40] Yudkin, D., S. Hawkins and T. Dixon (2019), The Perception Gap: How False Impressions are Pulling Americans Apart, Center for Open Science, https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/r3h5q.

[25] Zhou, S. (2025), “Effectiveness of citizen journalism: evaluating the credibility, bias, and impact of user-generated news content in the digital age”, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-06216-6.

Notes

← 1.  The flagship OECD Report on Public Communication: The Global Context and the Way Forward provides a baseline assessment and an evidence-based examination of relevant policies and practices of public communication across 46 countries and 63 institutions. It builds on the data collected through the first OECD survey on public communication and makes the case for a more strategic use of communication as an instrument of government; an enabler of the open government principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation; and as a tool for reinforcing democracy. (OECD, 2021[6])

← 2.  Defined as the share of respondents that express being very interested or interested in news in the Reuters Institute’s DNR survey.