This chapter examines labour market dualism and work – life balance as key factors shaping the context for fertility decisions in Korea. Labour market dualism delays labour market entry and creates economic and financial insecurity, which can contribute to reduced fertility. Rigid gender norms and stereotypes around unpaid care responsibilities, long working hours and a demanding workplace culture in Korea combine to create intense work-life balance challenges. Layered on top of high opportunity costs of career breaks in terms of future employment and earnings potential, women face a difficult decision between work and family, with many choosing to delay or forgo childbearing.
Exploring Korea’s Fertility, Work, and Family Policy Trends
Abstract
Economic opportunities play a key role in fertility decisions. A richness of labour market opportunities that generate financial stability and confidence in the future is favourable to fertility decisions. On the other hand, if there is uncertainty about the future, if quality labour market opportunities are scant, if work and family commitments are hard to combine, then having (more) children becomes more difficult and fertility trends downwards.
Across the OECD, men and women are postponing parenthood until they have established themselves in labour- and housing markets. In Korea, the ages at marriage and first childbirth have gone up, which is related to young people finding it increasingly difficult to embed themselves in a quality career pathway. Furthermore, even if young men and women manage to obtain a quality job, then work-life conflict issues come to the fore, as various aspects of workplace culture are not family-friendly. Many prospective parents – women rather than men – feel that they have to withdraw (temporarily) from the labour market, in order to be a parent. For many women, the opportunity costs of having children in terms of lost earnings and career opportunities are so high that they have to choose between “Babies and Bosses” (OECD, 2007[1]), with many Korean women choosing not to have children.
This chapter examines labour market factors related to fertility in Korea. It begins with setting the scene, briefly describing the dual labour market in Korea and its effect on delayed labour market entry, and the associated economic and financial insecurity. It then considers patterns in women’s employment, the work/life balance challenges and the high opportunity costs associated with childbearing. Afterwards different aspects of the workplace culture in Korea are considered, and the chapter ends with a discussion of compliance with labour standards.
5.1.1. Main Findings
The main findings of this chapter include:
Korea’s labour market is characterised by a profound dichotomy between employment in large companies and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) with large differences in labour productivity and earnings, and employment as a “regular” or “non-regular” worker, with sharp differences in job security, earnings and their progression, access to social benefits and training opportunities.
Only 12% of employees in Korea are high-wage regular workers in large companies (300 or more employees). Most workers are employed in SMEs (85% of all employees). Around one‑third of all employees are non-regular workers in SMEs, who earn only about 40% of the earnings of high-wage regular workers.
Women are disproportionately likely to work in non-regular jobs – 47% of female employees compared to 31% of male employees. Gender pay gaps are small for younger workers, but they increase rapidly for women in their 30s. This contributes to Korea having the widest gender pay gap across the OECD.
Korea’s dual labour market affects fertility trends through different interacting channels:
Labour market dualism translates into intense competition among young people for a limited number of high-quality jobs. This encourages greater investments of time and effort in preparation for employment, which can delay entry into the labour market and lead to postponement or abandonment of marriage and/or childbearing.
Long working hours, a lack of flexible working arrangements options and long commuting times contribute to intense work-life balance conflicts. Entrenched gender norms and stereotypes (Chapter 3) reduce the time fathers can spend with their families, while women – who bear the brunt of unpaid work responsibilities (Chapter 2) – often have to take a career break if they choose to have children.
In Korea’s dual labour market, career breaks come at a high cost as Korean women find it nigh impossible to regain regular employment after exiting the labour force for childbirth. Faced with such high opportunity costs of motherhood, many women choose to remain in employment, while delaying and/or opting out of marriage and motherhood.
Compared to regular workers, non-regular workers experience limited economic and financial security, which reduces marriage and/or childbirth intentions. There is ample evidence to suggest that economic and financial insecurity is a key driver of low fertility rates in Korea.
Policy should address the structural divide between regular and non-regular employment through several policy actions, including extending social insurance coverage to more non-regular workers, easing employment protection for regular workers, and shifting from seniority-based wage systems to performance‑based pay, also to facilitate mobility from non-regular to regular employment.
Systemic changes to maternity and parental leave could include:
Reduce the financial burden on employers for child-related leave by sharing the costs among all companies through social insurance or financing such leave out of general taxation to reduce incentives towards discrimination of women at work.
Expand the coverage of earnings-related maternity and parental leave benefits to more non-regular workers (Chapter 4).
Strengthen incentives for both parents to take leave: for example, by further widening the gap in benefit levels between cases where both parents take parental leave and in which only one parent takes leave (excluding single‑parent families).
A more supportive workplace culture – as facilitated by policy through for example, stronger support for SMEs to cover the cost of replacement workers and increasing transparency of take‑up in large companies – is also essential.
Recent policy debates in Korea have considered ways and means of strengthening the cultural shift away from very long office hours. Recent initiatives to reduce actual working hours, e.g. the support for the introduction of 4.5‑day workweeks, should be monitored. The government should also make further efforts to advance reforms to working-time regulation through social dialogue.
Employers in Korea are not required to offer flexible work arrangements, such as flexible working hours or remote work, but these could be made statutory entitlements especially after child-related leave to help alleviate work-family conflict. Financial support for the adoption of remote work equipment, particularly among SMEs, could help increase take‑up.
Korea’s gender wage gap remains the largest among OECD countries. Expanding the coverage of pay transparency requirements and introducing a pay audit system could further strengthen efforts to promote gender equality at work.
Ensuring that employees are not penalised in terms of pay or career opportunities when they take parental leave or use flexible working arrangements is crucial for encouraging the widespread use and acceptance of these practices. To enhance the effectiveness of the labour inspectorate in this area, the number of labour inspectors could be extended, while reallocating administrative responsibilities.
It is important that workplaces keep pace with changing times and facilitate the productive integration for both men and women in the workforce. Young Korean women have obtained higher educational attainment than their male peers, and the Korean economy needs to make much better use of their contribution to keep its economic engine going in the face of rapid population ageing. To this end, policy action needs to be multifaceted, reducing disparities between men and women in both paid and unpaid work patterns and enabling young people to pursue both their career and family aspirations.
In the past two decades, Korea’s labour market has demonstrated strength and resilience. Key labour market indicators such as the unemployment rate and the employment rate have, on average, shown better results in Korea than in the OECD. Unemployment rates, for example, have been more stable in Korea than in OECD countries, even during the global financial crisis and the COVID‑19 shock. Employment rates for both men and women have also been higher than the OECD average, with women’s employment recently on an upward trend (Figure 5.1).
Unemployment rate (%), population aged 15 years and over, Korea and OECD, 2005-2025 (Panel A) and employment rate (%), population aged 15 years and over, Korea and OECD, men and women, 2005-2025 (Panel B)
Note: The unemployment rate is the ratio of number of persons unemployed and the number of persons in the labour force. The employment rate is measured as the number of employed people as a ratio of the working age population.
Source: OECD Data Explorer, “Infra-annual labour statistics” (https://data-explorer.oecd.org/).
Strong performance against these indicators, however, masks significant disparities in the Korean labour market between companies and groups of workers. Labour market duality in Korea is characterised by profound duality between workers in large companies and those in SMEs as well as “regular” and “non-regular” workers, with sharp differences in employment conditions.
5.2.1. The dichotomy between regular and non-regular employees
A widely used definition of “regular” and “non-regular” workers in Korea is based on an agreement reached in 2002 by the Tripartite Commission. According to this definition, workers in temporary, part-time, or atypical forms of employment are classified as “non-regular” workers (for more detail, see the note to Figure 5.3). Other workers such as permanent full-time workers are generally classified as “regular” workers.
While regular workers tend to have relatively favourable employment conditions, only a small share of workers hold regular jobs in large firms. Indeed, only 12% of employees in Korea are high-wage regular workers in large companies – 300 or more employees (Figure 5.3). About half of all employees are regular workers in SMEs, where wages, on average, amount to about 60% of those earned by their counterparts in large companies. These pay differentials among regular employees are related to the productivity gaps between large firms and SMEs (Figure 5.2).
Large differences in working conditions among Korean workers also stem from wide productivity gaps across industries and firm sizes. In 2023, labour productivity per employee in manufacturing was 134% of the OECD average, while productivity in services stood at only 69% (Korea Productivity Center, 2025[2]). Even within the manufacturing sector, SMEs’ labour productivity amounts to only 33% of that of large firms with 300 or more employees (Korea Productivity Center, 2025[2]). In the Korean labour market, high-productivity large firms are more likely to hire regular workers, whereas lower-productivity SMEs rely more on non-regular workers to contain labour costs and maintain flexibility.
These productivity gaps are closely related to the structure of product markets in Korea. Korea’s export-led growth model has centred on large, manufacturing-intensive business groups (chaebols), which benefited from past export-promotion policies, strengthening their global competitiveness and contributing to their dominance in the domestic market. At the same time, the government has provided extensive support schemes and regulatory protection to the SME sector, where competition has often been limited (OECD, 2024[3]; OECD, 2022[4]). This combination of large‑firm dominance and extensive SME protection has contributed to persistent productivity gaps across industries and firm sizes.
Due to limited competition in segmented markets, low-productivity SMEs continue to account for a large share of the Korean economy. In the service sector, firms with fewer than 250 employees account for 87% of employment, the highest among OECD countries, with the majority of these firms being micro‑enterprises with 1‑9 employees (Figure 5.2). Potentially, increased use of AI could raise productivity (Chang et al., 2025[5]), but its adoption among SMEs in Korea remains limited (31%), largely due to skill shortages (OECD/Korea Labor Institute, 2025[6]). Stronger support for the digitalisation of SMEs is needed (Bianchini and Kwon, 2021[7]), for example, through tailoring publicly funded training programmes to the needs of SMEs (OECD/Korea Labor Institute, 2025[6]).
Distribution of employment in the service sector by firm-size group, 2024
Note: Data for services for Slovenia refer to 2023; for Costa Rica, Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic to 2022; for Israel to 2021; for Korea to 2020; and, for the United Kingdom to 2018. Services refer to services of the business economy excluding financial and insurance activities.
Source: OECD Database on Structural and Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS).
Strengthening product market competition and enhancing productivity in SMEs are also key to ensuring stable and secure employment. Korea could consolidate its extensive SME support schemes to reduce resource misallocation and limit subsidies to clearly identified market failures. This also calls for deregulation including a shift to a negative‑list regulatory approach, and stronger competition in sectors with significant state involvement (for more recommendations, see (OECD, 2024[3]; 2026[8])).
Share (%) of employees, 2025 (Panel A) and hourly wages, 2025 (Panel B) by firm size and contract status
Note: “Large” refers to establishments with 300 or more employees, while SMEs refer to those with fewer than 300 employees in Korean statistics. “Non-regular” includes temporary, part-time, and atypical workers, but these are not mutually exclusive. Temporary workers: workers with fixed-term employment contracts (fixed-term workers), workers without fixed-term employment contracts but who can continue to work through repeated contract renewals, and workers who cannot be expected to continue working due to involuntary reasons (non-fixed-term workers). Part-time workers: prescribed working hours at the workplace (work) are at least one hour shorter than the prescribed working hours of workers performing the same type of work at the same workplace, and who are normally scheduled to work less than 36 hours per week. Atypical workers: dispatched workers, contract workers, special workers, home‑based (telecommuting, home‑based) workers, and daily (short-term) workers. Other workers are classified as “regular.”
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, “Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type” and Statistics Korea “Supplementary Results of the Economically Active Population Survey by Employment Type in August 2025”.
Regular workers, unlike non-regular workers, typically see their wages rise with age and tenure (Figure 5.4 Panel A). In Korea, these seniority-based wage systems remain in place in 53% of establishments with 100 or more employees (MOEL, 2024[9]). As a result, wages rise comparatively steeply with tenure. Between 10 and 20 years with the same employer, wages increase by 15% – the largest tenure‑related wage increase in the OECD – even after controlling for skills and job complexity (OECD, 2025[10]; OECD, 2018[11]).
By contrast, non-regular workers face disadvantages in terms of earnings, job security and access to employment-related benefits. Indeed, non-regular workers in SMEs earn, on average, around 40% of the earnings of high-wage regular workers (Figure 5.3). Overall, the wage gap between regular and non-regular workers has grown from 56% in 2008 to 66% in 2024 (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2025[12]). Many non-regular workers are also employed on temporary contracts, contributing to Korea having the highest share of temporary employment in the OECD (Annex Figure 5.A.1). Furthermore, they are less likely to be covered by employment-based social insurance and retirement benefits, have more limited access to training opportunities, and are less likely to be unionised (Figure 5.4 Panel B).
Non-regular employment in Korea is disproportionately concentrated among women, youth and older workers, less-educated workers and employees in small firms, and this concentration has become even more pronounced over the past decade (Figure 5.5): 38% of all wage earners were non-regular workers in 2025, up from 32% in 2015. The increase was driven largely by young workers, among whom the non-regular employment rate rose from 32% to 44%, while rates among older workers remained broadly stable. In 2025, almost half of female employees were in non-regular employment, compared with about one‑third of male employees. Non-regular employment is especially common among middle and high school graduates, although it also affects more than one‑quarter (26%) of tertiary-educated workers.
Total hourly wage by age (Panel A), 2025, and Coverage rate (Panel B) by contract status, 2025, Korea
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, “Survey Report on Labor Conditions by Employment Type” and Statistics Korea “Supplementary Results of the Economically Active Population Survey by Employment Type in August 2025”.
Furthermore, non-regular workers face limited opportunities to transition into regular employment, and these opportunities have declined over time (Yoo and Kwon, 2023[13]). Hwang et al. (2023[14]) suggest that the transition rate (the possibility of changing job status from the previous year) from non-regular to regular employment was only 4% in 2021 compared to 12% in 2006. Firm-level surveys likewise point to difficulties in conversion. According to an official survey on employers’ measures when fixed-term contracts expire, 72% of contracts were simply terminated in 2024, while only 10% of workers were converted to regular employment (MOEL, 2024[15]). Since 2007, the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts has been limited to two years, after which workers are deemed to hold an open-ended contract (OECD, 2022[4]). Nevertheless, around 62% of contracts reaching the two‑year limit are terminated rather than converted.
Share of non-regular workers among wage earners, by gender, age group, education and firm size, 2025 and 2015
Note: For definitions on non-regular workers, see the notes to Figure 5.3.
Source: Statistics Korea, “Economically Active Population Survey Supplementary Survey on Employment Type”.
Addressing labour market duality and promoting transitions from non-regular to regular employment remain important policy priorities in Korea. The OECD Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index shows that protection for regular contracts in Korea exceeds the OECD average (OECD, 2026[16]), and easing excessive protection for regular contracts while expanding social insurance coverage for non-regular workers could help reduce labour market segmentation (OECD, 2025[10]). Furthermore, policies should ensure that non-regular workers have access to training opportunities and encourage a shift from seniority-based wage systems to performance‑based pay, which could facilitate transitions from non-regular to regular employment (Ko and Weaver, 2023[17]).
Labour market dualism intensifies competition among young people for the declining number of reputable stable jobs (see above and Chapter 4). This is especially true when there is limited upward mobility, where the first job plays a crucial role in securing a strong foothold in the labour market. In Korea, young adults show a clear preference for employment in large corporations over SMEs. A 2023 Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) survey highlighted this tendency: only 16% of college students aspire to work for SMEs, while other respondents favoured large corporations and/or the public sector (Koh, 2024[18]).
Young jobseekers invest more time and effort in preparing for employment. This sometimes involves recruitment examinations, which are used by many large and public employers in Korea (OECD, 2019[19]; 2026[8]). Among women, for instance, 27% of university graduates aged 15‑29 years reported taking a leave of absence from university – either temporarily interrupting their studies or delaying official graduation upon completion of all coursework – with an average duration of 14 months, mainly to “prepare for employment and qualification exams” (57%) or to “gain field experience such as language training and internships” (21%). Among men, who must also complete mandatory military service, 74% reported a leave of absence, with an average duration of 27 months. In 2025, of young people not in employment, 36% were preparing for job-related examinations (Statistics Korea, 2025[20]).
Changing hiring practices further complicate efforts by young adults to secure stable employment. Large companies in Korea traditionally relied on “open, mass recruitment” of new graduates, hiring large cohorts who are then trained and later assigned to roles according to company needs. In recent years, however, surveys targeting large firms suggest that the share of planned recruitment conducted through open, mass recruitment fell from 83% in 2009 to 62% in 2021, with a gradual shift towards “need-based” recruitment of experienced hires for task-specific positions (Chae and Chang, 2025[21]). While this shift may improve job matching in Korea, where the field-of-study mismatch rate is the highest in the OECD (OECD, 2022[4]; 2024[3]; 2025[10]), it may also make the transition from education to work more challenging for young people, as employers increasingly seek candidates with relevant experience. This hiring trend, together with weak economic growth in recent years and the potential displacement effects of AI, may make the employment prospects of young adults more uncertain (OECD, 2026[8]).
Labour market conditions have become particularly challenging for young men. Yun, Oh and Oh (2026[22]) find that the labour force participation rate of men aged 25‑34 declined from 90% in 2000 to 82% in 2025. They suggest that one factor is increasing competition for high-skilled jobs due to the rising labour force participation of highly educated women in recent cohorts (see Section 5.5.1). In addition, industrial transformation, including the decline of middle‑ and low-skilled jobs in sectors such as manufacturing and construction, has reduced employment opportunities for men with lower educational attainment.
As a result of intense labour market competition, it takes an average of 11 months to find a first job after graduation or withdrawal from university. For about 10% of graduates, it takes over three years (Statistics Korea, 2025[20]). Among those with experience of regular employment, about half of the women obtained their first regular job by age 24; for men this was close to 27 years of age. Roughly a quarter of men and women only did so after turning 30 years of age (Annex Figure 5.A.2).
Long job-search periods early in a career can have lasting negative effects on employment stability and income later in life, a phenomenon often referred to as the “scarring effect”. Lee (2026[23]) estimates that if the non-employment period is one year, the probability of being a regular worker five years later is 66%, but this falls to 56% if the period lasts three years, and each additional year of past non-employment reduces current real wages by about 7%. Even among those who do secure a first job after a long job search, average tenure in 2025 was only 18 months, with many resigning due to dissatisfaction with working conditions. For some graduates, labour market conditions are so discouraging that they give up their job search altogether. In 2025, 25% of young people not in employment reported that they were “just passing time” (Statistics Korea, 2025[20]).
Given that stable and secure employment is a critical factor in fertility, policy should work to smooth school-to-work transitions. Enhanced career guidance and labour market information around different employment opportunities could, for instance, help diversify young people’s aspirations. Stronger linkages between the education system and employers – through internships, work placements, and partnerships with industry – could ensure that skills development aligns more closely with labour market needs. This may be particularly important in higher education, as studies suggest that vocational high school graduates have better employment outcomes in large firms than university graduates in Korea (Choi, Ogawa and Yugami, 2025[24]). Moreover, the OECD Survey of Adult Skills shows that the earnings premium for tertiary education in Korea has declined, particularly among older adults. This underscores the need to strengthen investment in skills development, including through lifelong learning (see OECD (2026[8]) for the detailed discussion).
Delays in labour market entry are a symptom of Korea’s dual labour market and contribute to the postponement of family formation in a relatively mechanical sense: people typically want to establish themselves in the labour market prior to starting families (Chapters 2 and 3, and OECD (2024[25])). At the individual level, precarious first jobs are associated with delayed childbearing and higher lifetime childlessness (Ramos, 2024[26]; Guetto, Tocchioni and Vignoli, 2023[27]). At the macroeconomic level, entering the labour market during recessions can also reduce fertility (Yin and Jiang, 2023[28]; Von Wachter, 2020[29]). For example, Korean men who graduated during the 1997‑1998 Asian financial crisis were significantly less likely to marry and have children (Choi, Choi and Son, 2020[30]).
In Korea, the highly competitive labour market has delayed young people’s entry into stable employment. While comparable statistics are not available for other OECD countries, except Japan, regular employment rates, which peak at ages 35‑39 for men and 30‑34 for women in Korea, also point to delays in securing stable employment. Compared to Japan, regular employment rates peak substantially later – by around 10 years for men and 5 years for women (Figure 5.6). Differences in the timing of entry into stable employment may therefore partly explain why ages at first marriage and first childbirth are higher in Korea than in Japan.
Furthermore, Figure 5.6 also shows that, while patterns of regular employment over the life course are broadly similar for women in Japan and Korea, regular employment among Korean men declines steadily after their late 30s, whereas rates among Japanese men remain relatively stable until their late 50s. These differences may partly reflect the practice of “honorary retirement” in Korea, under which employers encourage older employees to voluntarily leave their jobs before reaching the mandatory retirement age (typically around age 50) through financial incentives (OECD, 2018[11]). Such practices are not common in Japan. In addition, the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s had a more pronounced impact in Korea, with lasting adverse effects on entry into regular employment for the cohort aged in their late 40s in 2024 (Choi, Choi and Son, 2020[30]).
Regular employment-to-population ratio (%), men and women, Japan and Korea, 2025
Note: Data refer to the proportion of the population in regular employment. Data for Korea refer to August 2025.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using Statistics Korea’s Economically Active Population Survey and Supplementary Results of the Economically Active Population Survey by Employment Type; the Korea Labor Institute’s 2024 KLI Non-Regular Labor Statistics; and the Statistics Bureau of Japan’s Labour Force Survey.
Korea’s labour market conditions are also reflected in people’s perceptions. In many OECD countries, concerns among young people about having the right skills for work diminish with age. However, this is not the case in Korea, where in 2024 two‑thirds of middle‑aged workers worried that they did not have the right skills and knowledge to work in a secure and well-paid job beyond the next ten years (Annex Figure 5.A.3).
In addition to perceived skill shortages, many (young) Koreans feel a greater sense of job insecurity than their peers in other OECD countries. The OECD Risks that Matter Survey found that 45% of young people and 36% of those aged 30‑64 in Korea think it is likely or very likely that they will lose their job or self-employment income in the next 12 months (Figure 5.7).1 This is much higher than the OECD averages – 31% for the young and 26% for middle‑aged and older workers.
Economic and financial insecurity is another symptom of Korea’s dual labour market that further discourages fertility. A large body of empirical research from OECD countries (and beyond) confirms a negative relationship between job insecurity – both objective and perceived – and fertility (intentions) (Alderotti et al., 2025[31]; Martínez-Jiménez and Vall Castelló, 2023[32]; Vignoli, Tocchioni and Mattei, 2020[33]; Alderotti et al., 2021[34]; D’Ambrosio, Lepinteur and Clark, 2023[35]; Scherer and Brini, 2023[36]; van Wijk, de Valk and Liefbroer, 2022[37]; Bono, Weber and Winter-Ebmer, 2014[38]; Lopes, 2020[39]). Simple correlations using OECD data reinforce these results, finding that intended fertility is lower in those OECD countries with higher NEET rates and in those countries with higher temporary employment rates among youth (Chapter 2).
Research specific to Korea confirms these findings, linking marriage intentions, childbirth intentions and economic and financial security (Jung, 2021[40]; Nam and Hwang, 2023[41]; Lim, 2021[42]; Yi and Lee, 2011[43]; Fleckenstein, Lee and Mohun Himmelweit, 2023[44]; Yoon, Lim and Kim, 2022[45]; Kim, 2017[46]; Matsuda et al., 2024[47]). Yoon, Lim and Kim (2022[45]), for example, find that securing a regular job significantly increases the likelihood of marriage, especially among men, and marriage is strongly correlated with fertility in Korea (Chapters 2 and 3). Hwang et al. (2023[14]) undertook panel data analyses regarding 16 cities and provinces between 2005 and 2021 and found that employment insecurity is a main cause of low fertility, alongside competitive pressures and housing (Chapters 2 and 4).
Share of respondents who think it is likely or very likely that they will lose their job or self-employment income in the next 12 months, 2022
Note: Respondents were asked, “How likely do you think it is that you might lose your job or self-employment income in the next 12 months?” The answer options were very unlikely, unlikely, likely, very likely, and can’t choose. Shares refers to respondents who chose likely or very likely.
Source: OECD (2024[48]), OECD Risks that matter for young people: Concerns, perceived vulnerabilities and policy preferences, https://doi.org/10.1787/62b44423-en.
Whether or not men and women can continue their labour force attachment around new parenthood depends on a range of factors, including availability of child-related leave and childcare options, workplace cultures and working hours, and prevailing societal gender norms and practices around parental care and participation in unpaid family work.
The combination of paid and unpaid work demands creates significant work-life conflicts, especially for married women, as Korean men’s contribution to unpaid housework is among the lowest in the OECD (Chapter 2). In addition, prevailing social norms among both older and younger Koreans hold that pre‑school aged children suffer when mothers are in paid work (Chapter 3). Faced with these pressures, many women may feel that the only viable option when starting a family is to temporarily exit the labour market. An official 2025 Korean survey illustrated that such exits are quite common, with 30% of married Korean women aged 25‑54 having experienced a career break due to family reasons such as marriage, childbirth, or childcare. On average, such career breaks begin at age 29.8 and last for 7.5 years (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2026[49]).
Women’s employment rates by age group in Korea have a more significant “M-shape” than women’s employment rates in OECD countries, on average, suggesting that career breaks may be more common (Figure 5.8). Indeed, women’s employment rates in Korea fall from a high of 75% for those aged 25‑29 years to a low of 65% for those aged 40‑44 years. This compares to a slight increase for women in OECD countries. While some women resign before taking maternity leave in Korea, women on leave would be counted as “in employment”, whereas those who resign and take a career break are not. Maternal employment rates further confirm the prevalence of career breaks: Korea has one of the lowest maternal employment rates in the OECD, at 64% (Figure 5.9), compared with an OECD average of 71%.
Employment rate (%) by age group, Korea and OECD average, 2025
Source: OECD Data Explorer, “Employment and unemployment by five-year age group and sex - indicators” (https://data-explorer.oecd.org/).
Employment rates for women aged 15‑64 years with at least one child aged 0‑14 years, 2021 or latest available year
Note: Data refer to 2025 for Korea, 2020 for Sweden and New Zealand, 2019 for the United Kingdom, 2017 for Chile, and 2013 for Türkiye. Data cover all women aged 15 years and over in Australia and Japan, married women aged 15‑54 years in Korea, and women with children aged 0‑17 years in Canada, Korea and the United States. See OECD Family Database LMF1.2 for more details.
Source: For Korea, Local Area Labour Force Survey; for all other countries, OECD Family Database “LMF1.2 Maternal employment” (https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-family-database.html).
5.5.1. Opportunity costs to career breaks are high for women in Korea
Across all OECD countries, career breaks for family reasons create opportunity costs for women in terms of labour market outcomes (e.g. future employment opportunities, earnings, promotability) (OECD, 2025[50]). Korea is no exception. Earnings for Korean women, for instance, suffer after the birth of a first child (Dynan, Kirkegaard and Stans, 2022[51]), and many Korean women find it difficult to secure stable regular employment after a career break (Fauser and Kim, 2023[52]). Research also suggests that the share of Korean women working part-time increased from 7% at the time of their career break to 27% in their first job following the career break, an increase of 20 percentage points (p.p.) (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2026[49]). This finding partly reflects Korea’s highly competitive and dual labour market with pronounced seniority-based wage systems but may also reflect the need for working arrangements that are more easily adjusted to personal and family needs after childbirth.
One of Korea’s major success stories is that the share of women with tertiary education has surged over the past 30 years: only 20% of women aged 55‑64 years in Korea have a tertiary education, compared to 77% of those aged 25‑34, a difference of 57 p.p. (Figure 5.10). In the OECD, on average, changes between these cohorts have also been significant, but more modest, sitting at only 23 p.p. Growth for men in Korea was also smaller, at only 29 p.p. Labour force participation rates have also increased rapidly among Korean women, rising from 48% in 1980 to 72% in 2024, a difference of 24 p.p. This is slightly larger than the increase observed for women across the OECD on average, which amounted to 20 p.p. over the same period.
Share of population with tertiary education among 25‑34‑ and 55‑to‑64‑year‑old women, 2024
Note: Data for Iceland, Japan, the United States refer to 2023. Population with tertiary education is defined as those having completed the highest level of education, by age group.
Source: OECD Data “Population with tertiary education” (https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/population-with-tertiary-education.html).
While these are welcome developments, the rapid expansion in women’s educational and economic opportunities means that the opportunity cost of having children has increased significantly (OECD, 2025[10]), especially as gender norms and stereotypes have been remarkably slow to evolve and have had little time to adjust (Myong, Park and Yi, 2020[53]; Goldin, 2025[54]). In the specific context of Korea, slow-moving gender norms and stereotypes around the division of labour may interact with social and economic norms, structural barriers, bias and discrimination to create remarkably high opportunity costs for mothers (Chapter 3 and (Myong, Park and Yi, 2020[53]; Goldin, 2025[54]; OECD, 2025[55]; OECD, 2025[56]; Choi et al., 2024[57]; OECD, 2025[50])).
In particular, the difficulty for mothers to find stable regular employment on return to the labour market illustrates the mounting opportunity costs after a career break. In recent years, Korea has expanded efforts to assist women experiencing career breaks, including through Women’s Re‑employment Centres. These centres provide career counselling, job matching, and vocational training (OECD, 2025[50]). Participants in publicly subsidised internship programmes had a high employment rate of 97% in 2024 – compared to 29% overall, including non-participants (MOEL, 2025[58]), but only about half remained employed one year later in 2019 (Kim et al., 2021[59]). Governments should continue to strengthen such initiatives to further support both re‑entry and retention.
As women in paid employment are over-represented among non-regular employees, they have limited access to bonus payments or seniority-based earnings progression. Young women’s educational attainment is higher than that of young men and gender wage gaps are small among workers in their 20s. However, these gaps rapidly increase for workers in their mid‑30s and older age groups (Figure 5.11). The prevailing wage system in regular employment and women’s under-representation among regular workers contribute to Korea having the largest gender wage gap in the OECD (Chapter 1). Faced with such high opportunity costs, many women choose to prioritise work, postponing or altogether forgoing marriage and motherhood.
Average monthly wages in establishments with more than 5 employees, by age group and gender, Korea, 2025
Note: Data refer to employees in establishments with five or more employees. Monthly wages include the fixed salary, overtime pay, and one‑twelfth of the previous year’s annual special allowance.
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, “Survey on Labor Conditions by Employment Type”.
To address the gender pay gap, Korea plans to strengthen its pay‑transparency reporting systems. Large private companies (those with 500 or more employees, or corporate groups with 300 or more employees), as well as all public‑sector employers, will be required to report the aggregated gender gap in yearly mean pay within their organisations (OECD, 2026[60]; 2023[61]). However, there remains room for improvement, including expanding coverage and introducing a more comprehensive equal‑pay auditing process.2
5.5.2. Work-life balance challenges and high opportunity costs to career breaks reduce fertility
Across OECD countries, higher opportunity costs of motherhood and work-life balance challenges are strongly associated with lower fertility intentions (Kim, 2023[62]; Park, Cho and Kim, 2023[63]; OECD, 2024[3]; Raybould and Sear, 2020[64]; Choi et al., 2024[57]; Kim, 2017[65]; Bratsberg and Walther, 2025[66]; Lee and Liu, 2024[67]; OECD, 2025[10]; Ahn et al., 2021[68]). This is particularly true when there is a lack of affordable, accessible and high-quality childcare, limited flexibility at work, poorly paid child-related leave and little sharing of unpaid work between partners. Given that opportunity costs of career breaks and motherhood are particularly high in Korea, its low fertility is perhaps not as surprising. Korean women are aware of opportunity costs and are adjusting their fertility (intentions) accordingly. Indeed, in a recent Korean survey, 93% of unmarried women with no intention of getting married reported that it is because of the burden of the roles that marriage entails (e.g. housework, childbirth, childrearing and supporting the family) (Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 2024[69]). As another example, Cho and Han (2024[70]) estimated that the increase in opportunity costs to motherhood – the “child penalty”, could explain as much as 40% of the decline in the fertility rates between 2013 and 2019.
Simple correlations further suggest that this trade‑off between work and life is an important consideration in shaping fertility intentions (Figure 5.12, Panel A). Countries where child penalties are higher – i.e. larger declines in women’s employment relative to men’s employment after the birth of a first child – have lower reported fertility intentions, on average. Countries where men undertake a lower share of unpaid work per day also have lower fertility intentions (Figure 5.12, Panel B).
Correlation between child penalties and intended fertility (Panel A) and share (%) of unpaid work minutes per day undertaken by men and intended fertility (Panel B)
Note: In Panel A and B, intended fertility is the average of the number of children respondents indicate they intend to have. Intentions are based on responses to the question “How many children do you intend to have?” (for respondents who do not have any children) and “Including the children you already have, how many total children do you intend to have?” (for respondents who already have at least one child). Respondents could enter integer values up to 15 or select “I prefer not to answer.” In Panel A, child penalties – i.e. the negative impact of parenthood on earnings for women – are calculated using pseudo‑event studies of first birth, which aim to control for some of the (observable and unobservable) differences between people with and without kids to better estimate the impact of first births on employment. In Panel B, the share of unpaid work undertaken by men is estimated by dividing men’s number of unpaid work minutes per day by the sum of unpaid work minutes per day for men and women. Chapter 2 holds further detail.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using the OECD Risks that Matter Survey 2024, (OECD, 2025[71]) for intended fertility, Kleven, Landais and Leite‑Mariante (2023[72]) for child penalties and the OECD Time Use Database (https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/time‑use‑database.html) for the distribution of unpaid work hours.
5.6.1. A long working hours culture
The Korean labour market is also characterised by a long working hours culture. Although the prevalence of very long working hours has declined over time, 16% of employed Koreans aged 15‑64 still worked 50 hours or more per week in 2024, one of the highest shares in the OECD (Figure 5.13). In addition, many workers face long daily commutes (Box 5.2), further reducing the time available for family life and leisure. As emphasised in the OECD Jobs Strategy, working such long hours can impair the quality of the work environment, with potentially adverse consequences for health, productivity and well-being (OECD, 2018[73]).
Share (%) of all employed aged 15‑64 working 50 hours or more per week, 2015 and 2025
Note: Data refer to usual weekly hours worked in the main job. Data for Japan and Korea refer to actual hours of work.
Source: OECD Data Explorer, “Incidence of employment by long usual weekly hours worked” (https://data-explorer.oecd.org/).
Recent evidence from Korea indicates that long working hours not only constrain work-life balance but are directly associated with elevated infertility risks for health-related reasons and reduced fertility intentions through higher opportunity costs (Kim, 2023[62]; Ahn et al., 2021[68]). Cross-national evidence also suggests that longer total working hours are associated with lower fertility, while fertility is higher when most – both women and men – work moderate hours (20‑40 hours per week) rather than in polarised patterns of long and very short hours (Nahm, 2025[74]). This implies that shorter working hours, especially for men, may facilitate a more equal sharing of childcare responsibilities, making childbearing more feasible.
To reduce excessive working hours, the Korean Government lowered the statutory weekly limit from 68 to 52 hours, with the reform phased in from 2018 onwards. It was fully implemented by the end of 2024, when a temporary provision allowing an additional eight hours of overtime in firms with fewer than 30 employees expired. However, even after full implementation, many workers remain exempt from the limit, including those in establishments with fewer than five employees and those in certain industries (e.g. healthcare services and transportation), where long working hours are common.
Reducing long working hours remains an important policy challenge in Korea. Research suggests that the reform reduced the incidence of employees working more than 52 hours per week but shifted more workers into the overtime range within the new limit (41‑52 hours), as firms adjusted to compensate for the reduction in total allowable overtime hours (Carcillo, Hijzen and Thewissen, 2024[75]).
There are different initiatives to reduce actual working hours in Korea and increase productivity. At the end of 2025, labour, business, and government representatives jointly declared a landmark plan to reduce annual working hours to around the OECD average (1 700 hours) by 2030 (MOEL, 2025[76]). These measures include preventing the misuse of the inclusive wage system (under which a fixed wage is paid regardless of actual hours worked) by institutionalising transparent recording and management of working hours; enabling workers to use annual leave in half-day units; and providing subsidies and consulting support to help SMEs reduce working hours. In addition, Gyeonggi-do (province) is piloting a voluntary programme (2025‑2027) that supports firms in adopting shorter working-time arrangements, including a 4.5‑day workweek, without wage cuts, through subsidies and organisational support (Gyeonggi-do, 2025[77]). Early results as of December 2025 indicate that 107 organisations have participated, with reductions in working hours, modest productivity gains, and improvements in recruitment, retention, worker satisfaction, and business performance (Woo, 2026[78]).
Box 5.2. Long commutes in Korea
Long working hours are compounded by extensive commuting times in Korea. Koreans spend an average of 52 minutes per day travelling to and from work or study (Figure 5.14). This is 12 minutes longer than the next highest country and almost twice as long as across the OECD on average. By alleviating time constraints, shorter commutes may contribute to higher fertility, but in Seoul this effect is counterbalanced by significantly higher housing costs that negatively affect marriage and fertility rates (Kim, 2024[79]).
Average time spent travelling to and from work or study, in minutes per day, 2024 or latest year
Note: Data refer to 2024 for Korea and the United States, to 2023 for Poland, to 2022 for Canada, Germany and Norway, to 2021‑2022 for Austria, to 2021 for Japan, to 2020‑2021 for Finland, to 2019‑2021 for Estonia. For information, see the methodology guidelines for the OECD Time Use Database (https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/time‑use‑database.html).
Source: OECD Time Use Database (https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/time-use-database.html) and Statistics Korea ‘’Time Use Survey” (https://kostat.go.kr/menu.es?mid=a20205040000).
5.6.2. Workplaces and child-related leave
Chapter 4 showed that Korea provides the longest paid parental leave period for both parents as an individual entitlement for those who are eligible, but that some non-regular workers are not. This eligibility gap deserves policy development, but there are a few other workplace‑related aspects of child-related leave policy that require further attention.
Employer-paid maternity leave
First off, employers are required to bear a large part of the cost of maternity leave benefits. Large firms pay the first 60 days without reimbursement, while employers in SMEs receive reimbursements from social insurance only up to a ceiling. By contrast, in most OECD countries maternity leave benefits are financed entirely through social insurance. As of April 2025, only six OECD countries rely on employer-paid maternity leave schemes, and in most of these countries, employers can reclaim (almost) the full payment (e.g. Colombia, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom); Costa Rica and Korea are the exceptions (Dobrotić et al., 2025[80]; OECD, 2026[81]).
Employer-financed maternity leave schemes create disincentives to hiring and investing in women (OECD, 2025[50]). Firm-level evidence from 111 countries shows that while paid maternity leave is generally associated with higher female employment, this effect is substantially weaker when benefits are financed by employers rather than by the governments (Amin and Islam, 2022[82]), while Bapna and Funk (2024[83]) found that employer-financing of maternity leave had a negative effect on female employment. Shifting the financing of maternity leave from employers to social insurance could therefore help improve female labour supply and promote gender equality.
To reduce costs of maternity leave to SMEs, the government provides them with subsidies towards the cost of replacement workers. However, these do not fully cover the wages of minimum-wage workers, and employers must also bear recruitment and training costs (OECD, 2025[10]). Moreover, unlike other social security contributions, employers must continue to pay health insurance contributions for the worker on maternity and parental leave.
If replacement workers are not hired, colleagues face additional workloads. The strong collectivist workplace culture in Korea, which generally prioritises the team or organisation over individual needs, may create a social environment in which women are hesitant to take leave (Kim, Hwang and Kim, 2021[84]), and if they do, the associated stigma makes it less likely that they return to the workplace after leave (Yang et al., 2021[85]). Indeed, qualitative evidence suggests that women may be expected to demonstrate greater commitment to their jobs in order to take leave (Oh and Mun, 2022[86]). According to administrative data, the employment rate of women one year before they had a child was 62% in 2022; but this declined to 54% at childbirth, and 56% at 2 years after childbirth (Statistics Korea, 2025[87]). The 2025 survey also found that, among female wage workers aged 19‑54 who experienced a career break due to marriage, childbirth or childcare, only 47% returned to work after taking parental leave. The main reasons for not returning to work were the absence of a trusted caregiver (34%) and difficulties in balancing work and childcare responsibilities (28%) (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2026[49]).
Father’s use of leave
Evidence suggests that while mothers may be less likely than fathers to be eligible for parental leave (Chapter 4), they are more likely to use it. Among parents of children born in 2024, 72% of eligible mothers and 10% of eligible fathers took paid parental leave in the same year (Statistics Korea, 2025[87]). However, these figures include only parents who took parental leave in the same year as the child’s birth. In Korea, paid parental leave can be taken until the child turns eight years old. Most mothers take parental leave immediately after maternity leave, whereas most fathers take it when the child is older than one year. Accounting for this timing issue, the OECD Family Database reports the number of recipients of parental leave benefits per 100 births (OECD, 2026[88]), which for Korea in 2024 amounted to 61 mothers and 25 fathers.
Take‑up among fathers may be low in Korea, but the duration of leave taken by fathers is relatively long. Across OECD countries, Luxembourg has the highest male share of all users at over 50%, but around half of fathers take partial leave (e.g. one day per week) (Berger, Salagean and Valentova, 2025[89]). Portugal and the Nordic countries follow, with male shares just under 50% (Figure 5.15). However, in these countries, the duration of leave differs markedly by gender: the male share of total leave days reaches at most around 30% (OECD, 2026[88]). By contrast, in Korea, the male share of all users was 37% in 2025 (29% in 2024) – up from 5% in 2014. While Korea does not have comparable data on total leave days, the gender difference in average duration of paid parental leave among private‑sector workers is relatively and remarkably small, at 9.4 months for mothers and 7.6 months for fathers (MOEL, 2025[90]).
Gender distribution of recipients/users of publicly-administered paid parental leave/benefits, 2024 and 2014
Note: Data refer to recipients/users of publicly administered parental leave benefits or publicly administered paid parental leave, and do not generally include users of maternity or paternity leave unless the country in question does not make a distinction between the different leaves. Data labelled “2024” for Belgium, Canada and New Zealand refer to 2023, and for Denmark to 2022. Data labelled “2014” for Denmark and Poland refer to 2015. For further assumptions, see source.
Source: OECD Family Database, Indicator PF2.2 “Use of childbirth-related leave benefits“ (https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-family-database.html).
Fathers’ long durations of parental leave in Korea reflect both the incentive structure of the scheme and user characteristics. Longer leave is encouraged by rising payment ceilings, which peak in the sixth month when both parents take leave. Fathers who take leave tend to be more involved in unpaid work before taking leave (Lee, 2023[91]), and are more likely to work in large firms; 68% of fathers taking parental leave in 2024 were employed in firms with 300 employees or more (Statistics Korea, 2025[87]), which are generally more family-friendly workplaces.
Constraints on take-up of parental leave by fathers are closely related to workplace culture. MOEL (2025[92]) found that 15% of firms with five or more employees consider it challenging for eligible workers to take parental leave, with this share being significantly higher among smaller firms. The main reasons cited by firms were: “increased workload for colleagues and managers” (36%), “workplace culture” (31%), and “difficulty in finding replacement workers” (27%). The Democratic Labor Institute (2024[93]) found that the main barriers for fathers to taking leave were “concerns about potential career disadvantages” (27%) and “negative perceptions of parental leave” (23%).
To foster workplace cultures that facilitate fathers taking parental leave, some countries require larger companies to report not only on employees’ gender pay gaps but also on the use of parental leave once or twice a year (e.g. Australia, Italy, Japan, Norway and Spain) (OECD, 2025[94]). Korea also introduced a mandatory disclosure system requiring eligible organisations to report their use of work-life balance measures, including parental leave, for public sector organisations in 2023 and expanded it to listed companies in 2024. Greater transparency can create pressure for change and foster accountability. For SMEs, Korea could strengthen the existing subsidies to support the cost of replacement workers and additional allowances for existing co-workers who cover the duties of employees on parental leave or working reduced hours (MOEL, 2025[95]).
Given firms’ operational constraints, part-time parental leave may be a viable alternative, especially when children are older. In Korea, parents of children under the age of 12 may reduce their working hours with income loss partially compensated through employment insurance. Part-time leave can reduce employers’ need for replacement workers while limiting income loss for employees. Higher benefit levels contributed to a tenfold increase in the number of part-time parental leave users between 2018 and 2025. However, uptake remains far below that of full-time parental leave. In part this may reflect limited awareness of the scheme (MOEL, 2025[92]). In addition, men account for only around 20% of users (Jo and Park, 2023[96]), suggesting scope to further expand and promote the use of part-time parental leave. For example, 2015 reform in Germany introduced financial incentives for both parents to take part-time leave, and between 2016 and 2024 the number of men receiving benefits for part-time leave increased by around fourfold.3
5.6.3. Limited use of flexible work arrangements
Flexible working arrangements can also help improve employees’ work-life balance by allowing them to adjust their working hours or work location to better suit their needs. They may also have positive effects on women’s employment and wages. Jeong et al. (2025[97]) found that, compared with women who take parental leave alone, those who subsequently use flexible working arrangements face lower long‑term risks of job separation and experience smaller wage penalties.
However, many companies lack the infrastructure needed to support flexible working arrangements. In Korea, aside from reduced working hours available to parents with young children, employers are not required to offer other forms of flexibility, such as flexible schedules, adjustable working hours, or remote work options. Consequently, 67% of establishments do not provide any of these optional arrangements (MOEL, 2025[92]).
Employees are also often reluctant to take advantage of existing options due to concerns about potential penalties in terms of earnings, performance evaluations or employment prospects (OECD, 2025[10]). Indeed, flexible working arrangements remain less widespread in Korea than in European countries and the incidence of working from home in Korea seems particularly low (Figure 5.16). Official statistics show that only 16% of wage workers used flexible working arrangements in 2025, although this represents an increase from 5% in 2015 (Statistics Korea, 2025[98]). Even among employees with children under six, take-up remains low – 22% for women and 18% for men – well below the EU averages of 62% and 58%, respectively (Seong, Kim and Jeong, 2024[99]).
Workplace flexibility plays an important role in shaping fertility outcomes. Recent evidence from Korea suggests that female workers whose immediate supervisors exhibit authoritarian management styles – captured by attitudes towards inflexible working hours and mandatory after-work social gatherings – have significantly lower desired fertility (Lee and Myong, 2026[100]). Other studies similarly find that inflexible working hours are associated with lower fertility (Kim and Parish, 2022[101]; Yi et al., 2020[102]). In contrast, greater access to working from home – which remains the lowest in Korea among OECD countries (Figure 5.16) – may have a positive effect on fertility (Aksoy et al., 2026[103]).
A demanding workplace culture also makes it difficult to take short-term leave. Employees undergoing assisted reproductive treatment (ART) are entitled to infertility treatment leave of up to six days per year, with the first two days paid, but its use remains limited: only one in five employees report being able to take time off for treatment. Some employees refrain from using the leave because they do not want their infertility to be disclosed to colleagues or supervisors, and some even leave their jobs as a result (Kim et al., 2021[104]).
Share (%) of “flexible working time arrangement” and “working from home” used by employees aged 25‑54, 2024
Note: Data on working from home refer to the share of employees aged 25‑54 who reported working from their own home “always”, “often”, “sometimes”, or “rarely”, excluding those who reported “never”. Data on flexible working time arrangements refer to the share of employees aged 25‑54 who reported that they can “choose between several fixed working schedules determined by the company or organisation”, “adapt their working hours within certain limits (e.g. flexitime)”, or “determine their working hours entirely by themselves”, excluding those who reported that “their working hours are set by the company or organisation with no possibility for changes”. Data for Korea refer to 2023.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using the European Working Conditions Survey 2024 and the Korean Working Conditions Survey 2023.
5.6.4. Strengthening compliance with labour standards
Addressing the structural divide between regular and non-regular employment and otherwise improving employment conditions would amount to an important step towards reducing economic and financial insecurity. Korean labour market policy has moved forward in many areas, but compliance with labour regulations is not a given. For example, expanding social benefit coverage for non-regular workers can help close protection gaps and improve access to pensions, health insurance, unemployment benefits and child-related paid leave (Yang, Hwang and Pareliussen, 2024[105]; OECD, 2025[10]). However, current coverage gaps are not just related to eligibility requirements of social insurance schemes but also to weak compliance among SMEs (OECD, 2023[106]).
Another measure to reduce the dichotomy between regular and non-regular workers was the 2007 reform which prohibits discrimination against non-regular workers performing tasks similar to those of regular workers within the same establishment. It has narrowed gaps for some workers (Choi, 2016[107]), but many non-regular workers remain outside its scope because they often lack comparable colleagues, especially in SMEs (OECD, 2013[108]). The scope of anti-discrimination protections for non-regular workers could be broadened.
Furthermore, working-time regulations are important for work-life balance, but exemptions based on firm size or sector remain. In particular, the exemption for firms with fewer than five employees stands in sharp contrast to the dominant practice across OECD countries (Hijzen and Thewissen, 2020[109]). The government should make further efforts to advance reforms to working-time regulation through social dialogue.
Regulations to address gender discrimination and harassment are also essential for promoting a family-friendly workplace. In Korea, 2.5% of pregnant respondents reported being encouraged to leave their jobs in 2022 (KWDI, 2022[110]), and 6.1% of female workers said they experienced sexual harassment at work or during work-related gatherings in 2024 (KWDI, 2025[111]). The Equal Employment Opportunity and Work-Family Balance Assistance Act protects women against such practices. However, three out of four victims did not report incidents, citing perceptions that the behaviour was not serious (53%), concerns about future interactions with the offender (33%), and a lack of confidence in organisational responses (27%) (KWDI, 2025[111]).
The effectiveness of these measures ultimately depends on compliance and, where necessary, enforcement. Over the past decade, the government has increased the number of labour inspectors, reaching 0.75 inspectors per 10 000 workers in 2023 (Figure 5.17). This is slightly below the OECD average and the ILO benchmark of one inspector per 10 000 workers (ILO, 2006[112]). However, labour inspectors in Korea conducted an average of only 14 inspection visits per year in 2023, well below the OECD average of 83. This is partly because Korea’s labour inspectors devote much of their time to handling complaints reactively rather than conducting proactive inspection visits (Kim, 2024[113]). To strengthen the effectiveness of labour inspection, efforts should focus not only on increasing the number of inspectors but also on improving operational efficiency and their skills, using AI support, and reallocating responsibilities.
The number of labour inspectors per 10 000 employed persons and labour inspection visits per inspector, 2024
Note: Data refer to 2023 for Australia, Colombia, Czechia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Korea and New Zealand; 2022 for Malaysia and Portugal; 2021 for Spain; 2020 for Costa Rica; 2019 for Finland; 2018 for Mexico; and 2015 for the United States. For labour inspectors per 10 000 employed persons only, data for Estonia refer to 2022. For labour inspection visits per inspector only, data refer to 2023 for Japan, Singapore and Estonia; 2022 for Finland; 2021 for the United Kingdom; and 2019 for France. Data for the OECD average refer to the unweighted average of 34 countries.
Source: ILOSTAT (https://ilostat.ilo.org/).
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Temporary employment rate (%), dependent employment, 2025
Note: Temporary employment rates are calculated by dividing the number of temporary employees by the total number of employees. Definitions of temporary employment can vary considerably across countries. For more details, see OECD (2023[114]).
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Age at first regular employment for regular workers by gender and education level, 2023
Note: All percentile estimates in the figure are weighted.
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Share (%) of respondents who are concerned about not having the right skills and knowledge to work in a secure and well-paid job beyond the next ten years, 2024
Note: Respondents were asked, “Looking beyond the next ten years, how concerned are you about the following? Not having the right skills and knowledge to work in a secure and well-paid job.” The answer options were “Not at all concerned,” “Not so concerned,” “Somewhat concerned,” “Very concerned,” and “Can’t choose.” Shares refer to the sum of “Somewhat concerned” and “Very concerned.”
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (OECD, 2025[71]).
← 1. Employment insecurity is also associated with depression among young people. Recent studies using data from the Korean Welfare Panel Study suggest that unstable employment among Koreans in their twenties is linked to depressive symptoms, with the effects being particularly pronounced among those with lower educational attainment (Park, Ardelt and Koropeckyj-Cox, 2025[115]) – see Chapter 2 for information on young adults experiencing extreme social withdrawal.
← 2. An equal pay audit is a process conducted by an employer or external auditor that should include an analysis of the proportion of women and men in different positions, an analysis of the job evaluation and classification system used, and detailed information on pay and pay differentials on the basis of gender. An equal pay audit is more intensive than simple pay reporting. A pay audit should make an effort to analyse any gender pay gaps found, should attempt to identify the reasons behind these gaps, and could be used to help develop targeted actions on equal pay. An equal pay audit is comparable to a joint pay assessment, as proposed in recent EU pay transparency legislation (OECD, 2023[61]).
← 3. In 2015, Germany introduced financial incentives for part-time parental leave (ElterngeldPlus) by allowing the benefit duration to be doubled for those working part-time. In addition, when both partners in a couple work 25 to 30 hours per week for at least four months during or after the period of receipt of paid full-time or part-time parental leave, they are eligible for the partnership bonus (Partnerschaftsbonus), which is equivalent to four additional months of benefits for part-time parental leave (OECD, 2017[116]). Between 2016 and 2024, the number of male recipients of both benefits for part-time leave increased by around fourfold (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2026[117]).