(Changes in) attitudes and norms across genders, generations and over time can help to explain (changes in) fertility rates. Declining fertility rates reflect both a decline in marital fertility and a decline in marriages. Several factors may be causing divergence in perceptions of gender equality among young Koreans, including imbalanced sex ratios and pervasive economic and financial insecurity in a labour market with intense competition for stable employment. Negative perceptions of working mothers contribute to an intense work-family conflict that exerts downward pressure on fertility rates. Changing perceptions of the personal and social value of children contribute to declining fertility. Improved work-life balance and economic and financial security could improve fertility. Government action to increase gender equality and improve work-life balance could boost fertility.
Exploring Korea’s Fertility, Work, and Family Policy Trends
Abstract
Reflecting that attitudes and norms toward work, marriage, family, and gender equality significantly influence fertility patterns, this chapter explores (changes in) norms and attitudes in Korea and in OECD countries – both across genders and over time – to better understand changes in family formation.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next two sections explore (changes in) attitudes toward marriage, the link between children and marriage, and declining marriage rates as well as the reasons for the decline in (interest in) marriage, the associated changing perceptions of economic and financial security, (perceptions of) gender roles after marriage, and imbalanced sex ratios in the marriage market. Section 3.4 discusses gender issues regarding dating and partnering, whereas the subsequent sections look at the conflict between work, family and leisure in the context of fertility, especially for women. Section 3.7 investigates (changes in) perceptions of the personal and social value of children. The final section offers some policy suggestions.
3.1.1. Main findings
The main findings of this chapter include:
In Korea, reflecting Confucian culture, marriage is central to social stability and seen as the foundation for raising children. Declining fertility in Korea thus reflects both a decline in marital fertility and a decline in marriages. Indeed, marriage continues to be viewed as a prerequisite for having children, but having children is no longer a necessary outcome of marriage. This combines with an ever-growing share of single, never married people in Korea.
Several interrelated factors can explain declining marriage rates.
People are increasingly indifferent towards the idea of marrying.
Economic and financial insecurity, including around employment and housing, are acting as barriers to marriage.
(Anticipation of) unequally shared unpaid work is a barrier to marriage. Many unmarried women – whether they intend to marry or not – mention gender roles after marriage and their impacts on other aspects of life as a primary factor behind their decision to delay marriage or not marry. This reflects that rapid educational and economic growth has outpaced shifts in gender norms (and workplace cultures, Chapter 5), creating friction around the division of unpaid household and care work.
Young men currently outnumber young women, creating a marriage market squeeze that contributes to many marriageable‑age men being unsuccessful in finding wives.
Several factors may be causing divergence in perceptions of gender equality among young Koreans, including imbalanced sex ratios and pervasive economic and financial insecurity in a labour market with intense competition for stable employment. To address the “gender perception gap”, the Korean Government has recently launched initiatives to promote dialogue and mutual understanding.
Conflict between parenthood and personal goals (e.g. career, leisure, hobbies) may be particularly salient in Korea, where high standards for parenting and care demand greater investments of time, particularly of mothers. This is reflected in negative perceptions of working mothers with children of pre‑school age.
Changing perceptions of the personal and social value of children may also be contributing to declining fertility.
Given the complex web of social and economic factors that help explain Korea’s low fertility rates, including changes in attitudes toward work, marriage, family and gender equality, government will need to pursue co‑ordinated action across several policy areas – e.g. labour market, housing, education – and move beyond isolated and siloed measures to ensure that different policies are horizontally and vertically co‑ordinated across ministries, agencies and levels of government.
Declining fertility in Korea reflects declining marriage rates in a culture and context where there are strong perceptions that marriage is a precondition to having children and where marriage without children is increasingly normal and accepted.
3.2.1. Marriage is considered a necessary condition for children in Korea…
In Korea, marriage is viewed as a precondition for having children (Box 3.1). Recent statistics from the Korean Social Survey, for example, show that in 2024, well over half of Koreans believed it is unacceptable to have a child without being married (63%) (KOSIS, 2024[1]). Only 29% of respondents in OECD countries agreed with the similar statement – “people who want children ought to get married” – in the 2022 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).1 Other data present a similar picture. Only 4% of children born in Korea are born to a couple that is not married, compared to 43% for OECD countries, on average (Figure 3.1). Only Japan and Türkiye have similarly low shares.
Confucianism – which views families as the fundamental unit of society – has deeply shaped Korean culture and continues to exert an influence on values and attitudes to this day (Kim, Shim and Kim, 2022[2]; Choi and Qian, 2023[3]). By framing individuals as temporary stewards of their patrilineage and by deifying ancestors, Confucian values centralise parenthood as the purpose of marriage and reinforce patriarchal hierarchies within the family unit, setting up the male‑breadwinner-female‑homemaker model as the most efficient means to achieve the production of high-quality heirs (Choi and Qian, 2023[3]). Against a backdrop of rapid economic development and changing educational and economic opportunities for women, there is a tension between Confucian traditional (family-based) values and modern (individualistic) aspirations. This tension has contributed to rapid changes in family formation patterns and fertility preferences (Raymo and Park, 2020[4]; Choi and Qian, 2023[3]). For example, although marriage is no longer seen as essential by many (Figure 3.4), marriage is still seen as necessary for children (Figure 3.1). In a similar way, although more and more women and couples are choosing to remain childless (Chapter 2) or do not see children as essential after marriage (Figure 3.2), many Koreans continue to adhere to the belief that women should remain at home with young children, as in a male‑breadwinner-female‑homemaker model (Figure 3.15).
This strong link between marriage and fertility further means that delayed marriage can lead to delayed or reduced fertility. Recent research using Korean data, for instance, found that “an increase of one year in age at first marriage reduces the likelihood of any childbirth by about 8 percentage points (10%) and total childbirths by 0.1 children (6%)” (Kwon and Sohn, 2023[5]). This is noteworthy given the steady upward climb in the average age of marriage in Korea from 25 years in 1990 to 31 years in 2020 (Chapter 2).
Share (%) of births where the mother’s marital status at the time of birth is other than married, 2023 or latest
Note: Data refer to 2018 for Belgium, to 2019 for Iceland and Ireland, to 2020 for Switzerland, to 2021 for Denmark and to 2022 for Chile. For more details on definitions of “outside marriage,” see source.
Source: (OECD, 2026[6]), OECD Family Database Indicator SF2.4 “Share of births outside marriage”.
3.2.2. …but having children is less and less an outcome of marriage
Koreans are less and less inclined to see children as necessary (Figure 3.2). In 1994, only 8% of married women in Korea said that it was no problem if they did not have their own children, and 78% said they must have their own children. By 2021, these shares had changed dramatically: 27% say they are not bothered if they do not have their own children, and only 31% say they must have their own children. Similar results are found in other research based on East Asian Social Surveys (e.g. Lai and Song (2022[7])).
Share (%) of married women by preferences for children, Korea, 1994-2021
Note: Distribution of responses to the question “Do you think you have to have your own child(ren)?” Sample includes married women only. Data for 1991, 2015 and 2018 cover married women aged 15‑49 years. Data for 1994 through to 2019 cover married women aged 15‑44 years. Data for 2021 cover married women aged 19‑49 years.
Source: OECD (2025[8]), Korea's Unborn Future: Understanding Low-Fertility Trends, https://doi.org/10.1787/005ce8f7-en.
3.2.3. …and marriage rates have declined
In the past, in Korea, marriage was viewed as a natural stage of development that could be achieved in the life cycle through individual efforts (Kim, 2014[9]). But marriage has been on the decline in Korea for decades. Crude marriage rates have fallen from around 8 per 1 000 people in the 1970s to less than 4 per 1 000 people in 2022 (Figure 3.3, Panel A). This decline is mirrored by a rise in the share of people aged 30‑39 years who are single and have never been married (Figure 3.3, Panel B).
Recent work by Tan, Cui and Uchikoshi (2025[10]) confirmed that, in Korea, declines in marriage have become an increasingly important component of declining total fertility rates. Over the 1970-1990 period, the decline in fertility was driven largely by married women having fewer children. After 1990, changes in marriage dynamics contributed more to reductions in total fertility rates than changes in marital fertility. And since 2000, “the decline in nuptiality has had approximately twice as much of an effect as marital fertility” (Tan, Cui and Uchikoshi, 2025[10]).
Crude marriage rate, marriages per 1 000 people, Korea, 1970-2022 (Panel A) and share (%) of population aged 30‑39 years who are single and never married, by gender, Korea, 1950s to 2010s (Panel B)
Note: In Panel A, marriage rates are unweighted averages over each 10‑year period of available annual marriage rates. In Panel B, shares are unweighted averages over each 10‑year period of available annual shares. Annual shares are calculated as “single (never married)” over “Total.” More calculation details available upon request.
Source: (OECD, 2026[6]), OECD Family Database “SF3.1 Marriage and divorce rate”. and OECD Secretariat calculations using United Nations Statistics Division, Demographic Statistics Database, “Population by marital status, age, sex and urban/rural residence” (https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3A23).
Several interrelated factors can explain declining marriage rates, including declining interest in marriage, perceptions of economic and financial security, unequal sharing of unpaid care and housework responsibilities after marriage, and imbalanced sex ratios.
3.3.1. Changing interest in marriage
In just over a quarter of a century, perceptions of marriage have changed dramatically in Korea (Hwang et al., 2023[11]; Lee, Brzozowska and Sobotka, 2024[12]; An, Lee and Woo, 2022[13]; Lim and Seo, 2021[14]), with the share of respondents aged 13 and over indicating that they are “indifferent” towards marriage rising by 18 percentage points (p.p.), from 24% in 1998 to 42% in 2024 (Figure 3.4). Although more than half still believe that it is better to marry or that they have to marry, this share has fallen from 74% to 53% over the same time span – a 21 p.p. decline. However, recent official survey data point to a more positive attitude towards marriage and childbearing among men and women aged 25 to 49: between March 2024 and March 2026: the share of respondents reporting a positive view of marriage increased from 70.9% to 76.4%, while the share of respondents who regarded children as necessary rose by 10.5 percentage points to 71.6% (PCPP, 2026[15]).
When zeroing in on unmarried women aged 19‑29 years in Korea, the share indicating indifference toward marriage increased by 36 p.p. increase between 2012 and 2020 (OECD, 2025[8]). Over this same time period, there was also a rapid increase in the share of young women with no intent to marry, almost doubling from 11% in 2012 to 21% in 2020 (OECD, 2025[8]). Looking back further, changes are even more dramatic: in 1979, only 2% of unmarried women aged 15‑29 years in Korea indicated that it is better not to marry (Park and Park, 1979[16]).2
Distribution (%) of population according to attitudes toward marriage, Korea, 1998 to 2024
Note: Distribution of responses to the question “What do you think about marriage?” Sample refers to total population aged over 15 years prior to 2008 and aged 13 years and over from 2008 onwards.
Source: OECD (2025[8]), Korea's Unborn Future: Understanding Low-Fertility Trends and KOSIS (2024[17]), Opinions on Marriage (13 years old and over).
The perceived necessity to marry (and the need to have children) started to decline around 2014 until 2022 when it increased a little (Kim, 2025[18]; Kim, 2026[19]). During the mid‑2010s, there were a series of events that reflected social distrust (the Sewol Disaster), socio-economic insecurity (the Hell Joseon discourse) and gender conflict (the Gangnam restroom murder, the MeToo movement), which are likely to have a had a negative impact on perceptions or marriage and childbirth (Cho et al., 2025[20]). Among those who unmarried but are willing to marry “not having found the right partner” (43%) is the main reason followed by job-insecurity (20%) and housing costs (20%). Half of those who are unmarried and are unwilling to marry do not feel the need to marry while about one‑third cite high wedding costs and one‑sixth refer to concerns about expected gender roles in marriage (Kim, 2026[19]).
3.3.2. Negative perceptions of personal economic and financial security
(Perceived) economic and financial security can affect attitudes to marriage. In a recent survey in Korea, for instance, 36% of unmarried respondents stated that they wish to marry but that their situation (e.g. employment, housing, etc.) doesn’t allow it (Hwang et al., 2023[11]).
In another survey, among unmarried respondents with no intention of getting married, 89% of men and 76% of women stated the reason as the financial burden of wedding expenses, housing, and furnishings for marriage (Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 2024[21]). In this same survey, among those who are unmarried, but who intend to get married, 83% of men and 63% of women report saving up more money for the wedding as their reason for delay. Other studies and surveys come to similar conclusions around employment, job security and housing (or a lack thereof) as key enablers (or barriers) to marriage (Jeong and Shim, 2021[22]; Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 2024[21]; KOSIS, 2024[23]; Zhao, Chen and Li, 2023[24]; González-Val, 2022[25]; Assaad, Krafft and Rolando, 2021[26]). Indeed, although changes in attitudes play a role, “external economic and societal factors” (Box 3.2), e.g. “the exorbitant costs needed for marriage and childbirth, and the lack of family support” are also affecting decisions relating to marriage and fertility in Korea (Jo, 2021[27]).
Korea’s competitive labour market makes it difficult to find well-paid stable employment (Chapter 5) and costs of living are rapidly rising and significantly above the OECD average (Choi, 2025[28]). Combined, these factors may create a sense of economic and financial insecurity that acts as a barrier to dating and mating, creating a “romance recession.” This is confirmed by a recent survey that found that the most cited reason for choosing not to date was financial reasons (Lee, 2024[29]).
Beyond purely financial barriers to dating and mating, difficulties finding well-paid stable employment and rising costs of living may also lead young people to withdraw socially, which may impact dating, marriage and mating. Indeed, a recent study identifies intense competitive pressures related to education and career – themselves related to Confucian culture’s excessive expectations on the social roles and responsibilities of individuals – as one of the main causes of extreme social withdrawal in Korea (Shin, Pyo and Kim, 2024[30]) (Chapter 2).
Concerns about the affordability of increasingly lavish weddings are not unwarranted. According to the Korea Consumer Agency, which surveyed wedding halls and wedding package stores across the country, the average total cost of wedding services by engaged couples nationwide in April 2025 was KRW 21.0 million (around USD 15 000) (Korea Consumer Agency, 2025[31]). This is nearly half of average annual wages in 2024 – KRW 47.5 million (about USD 34 000) (OECD, 2025[32]). Given that youth in Korea can struggle to find secure well-paid employment (Chapter 5) and earn about 40% less than prime‑age employees, on average (OECD, 2025[33]), such costs may feel (and are perceived as) prohibitive. Indeed, according to the 2024 Social Survey in Korea, 77% of respondents perceive wedding culture as somewhat or very excessive (KOSIS, 2024[34]).
Cash gifts from weddings guests may offset wedding costs to a great extent. In 2024, for example, a survey revealed that the average cash gift at a wedding was KRW 90 000 (around 60 USD) (Ahn, 2024[35]), but this means that breaking even on average wedding costs would require attendance from 250 guests. Payments for wedding services may also require deposits or payments prior to the wedding (and thereby the receipt of gifts), which may force couples to incur debt. Indeed, in 2022, almost nine out of ten newlyweds in Korea were in debt, with a record high level of KRW 164 million (around 115 000 USD) (Park, 2023[36]). This reflects not only direct wedding expenses, but indirect expenses, such as housing and household furnishings. Parents do assist with wedding expenses, but this can eat into retirement savings (Choi, 2016[37]; Shin, 2015[38]). Aware of the issue, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has introduced a public wedding support programme (“Seoul Wedding”), which as of April 2025 provided choice of 25 wedding venues (most of them free of charge), providing wedding planning services and additional support of up to KRW 1 million – about USD 675 (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2025[39]).
Perceptions of the economic and financial security provided by marriage have also changed, which may further contribute to changes in marital intentions or timing. Kim (2020[40]) shows that many young women in Korea disagree with the idea of marriage as a solid institution for life‑long survival, diverging from perceptions of previous generations. Instead, many young women adhere to a “labour-centred life” that focusses on “individual survival”.
3.3.3. Concern about gender roles after marriage
(Anticipation of) heavy and unequal sharing of unpaid work demands after marriage – and its impact on work and leisure – are a barrier to relationship formation, especially for women (for a discussion see (Goldin, 2026[41])). In a recent survey, 60% of unmarried women who intend to get married reported anxiety about changes in daily life or roles after marriage as the reason for delay, while 93% of unmarried women with no intention of getting married reported that it is because of the burden of the roles that marriage entails (e.g. housework, childbirth, childrearing and supporting the family). Nearly three‑quarters also report that it is because they are afraid that marriage will burden their career and other aspects of self-fulfillment (Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 2024[21]).
Such perceptions are not unfounded. In the 2024 Time Use Survey in Korea, 20% of young Korean men aged 20‑29 years agreed that men should work and women should stay home (KOSIS, 2025[42]). But even when people believe in fair sharing of household burdens, there is a gap between perception and reality, reflecting that gender roles are sticky over time. In Korea, for instance, 64% of men and 74% of women believe that housework should be shared. In reality however, only 24% of men (husbands) and 23% of women (wives) report that housework is shared equally (Figure 3.5. ).
Distribution (%) of men and women in Korea according to opinions on (Panel A) and actual (Panel B) division of housework between husband and wife, 2024
Note: Results are from the Social Survey in Korea. Panel A refers to a sample of respondents aged 13 years and over. Panel B refers to a sample of husbands and wives aged 19 years and over.
Source: KOSIS (2024[43]; 2024[44]; 2024[45]; 2024[46]).
Similar results emerge in other OECD countries. In the 2022 ISSP, for example, 80% of partnered men and 84% of partnered women report that women and men should take equal responsibility for the home and the family.3 But the actual division of unpaid labour among partnered people is gendered, with about 63% of weekly hours of unpaid caregiving and household tasks carried out by women.4 Italy and Japan post the highest rates among available OECD countries, at 70% and 79%, respectively.
This unequal division of labour also shows up in time use data. Factoring in both paid and unpaid work, married or cohabiting Korean women work 655 minutes on weekdays (or 10 hours and 55 minutes), of which 53% is traditional paid work, 27% is housekeeping, and 19% is caring for family and household members (Figure 3.6. ). This compares to 9 hours and 28 minutes for married or cohabiting men, of which 75% is traditional paid work, 13% is housekeeping and 13% is caregiving. Single people, by comparison, have only small gender gaps in total hours worked and very little difference in the distribution of those hours across paid work, housekeeping and caregiving.
But women shoulder more unpaid work across OECD countries, so why are concerns about balancing work, life and leisure such a prominent barrier to relationship formation in Korea? One explanation may be the rapid rise in educational attainment and labour market participation among women in Korea relative to OECD countries, on average (Chapter 5). Such rapid growth has left little time for norms around gender roles within and outside the household to update and adjust to a model with more equal sharing between men and women, potentially creating more (anticipated) friction around the division of unpaid family and housework responsibilities (Moon, 2025[47]; Goldin, 2024[48]; Raymo et al., 2015[49]).
Number of minutes of traditional paid work, housekeeping and caregiving per day, women and men, Korea, 2024
Note: Estimates refer to the population aged 19 years and over on weekdays.
Source: KOSIS (2025[50]).
3.3.4. Imbalanced sex ratios create a “marriage market squeeze”
Declining marriage rates may reflect Korea’s “marriage market squeeze,” with young men currently outnumbering young women (Figure 3.7). This marriage market squeeze was predicted in the early 2000s following high sex ratios at birth in the early 1990s due to female‑specific induced abortion, even though in recent years Korea appears to have shifted from strong son preferences to preferring daughters (Chun and Das Gupta, 2022[51]). For example, among the age group 30‑34, there are 115 men relative to 100 women. These high sex ratios were estimated to lead to approximately 10‑13% of young men in 2015 being “unsuccessful in their courtship pursuits,” or about 400 000 Korean men being unable to find wives (Wu, Kim and Poston, 2003[52]). To some degree the marriage squeeze is mitigated by international marriages (Box 3.3), while it is exacerbated by women choosing to opt out of the marriage market (Box 3.4).
Sex ratio (number of men per 100 women) by age group, Korea and OECD, 2024
Note: The data refer to mid-year estimates of the population. The line at 100 indicates perfect balance between the number of men and women.
Source: OECD Data Explorer, “Historical Population Data.”
Imbalanced sex ratios may create a more pronounced “marriage market squeeze” in Korea for lower educated men and higher educated women due to “entrenched norms of status homogamy and female status hypergamy” combined with rapid increases in women’s educational attainment (Raymo and Park, 2020[4]). In this context, research shows that the growth in international marriages has played an important role in preventing marriage rates among low-educated men from “falling even further” (Raymo and Park, 2020[4]).
Statistically, the growth in international marriages occurred primarily in the early 2000s, with the share of marriages between a Korean groom and a foreign bride in all marriages peaking at nearly 10% in 2005 and staying above 8% until 2010 (Figure 3.8, Panel A). Since then, the share has fallen slightly to hover between 5‑8%. Chinese brides were common in international marriages in the 1990s and early‑2000s (Lee, Govindasamy and Tan, 2025[53]; Lu and Yeung, 2024[54]). Starting in the late‑2000s and early‑2010s, an increasingly important share of brides came from Southeast Asia (Figure 3.8, Panel B).
International marriages are also characterised by distinct age patterns. A substantial share of Korea-born husbands in these couples is aged 45 or older (38.4%), while foreign spouses are mostly in their late 20s (23.2%) and early 30s (20.6%). The average age at first marriage was 37.1 years for husbands and 29.7 years for wives, indicating an age gap of 7.4. This contrasts sharply with marriages between Korean-born couples, where the average age gap is 1.9 (33.6 for men and 31.7 for women) (Statistics Korea, 2025[55])
Share (%) of marriages between a Korean husband and a foreign bride (Panel A) and distribution of Korean-husband-foreign-wife marriages according to foreign bride’s nationality (Panel B), Korea,1994-2024
Note: In Panel B, “East Asian countries” include Chinese Taipei, Japan and Mongolia, while “Southeast Asian countries” include Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
Source: KOSIS (2025[56]; 2025[57]).
Short for biyeonae, bihon, bichulsan, bisekseu (no dating, no marriage, no childbirth, no sex), the 4B movement is a women’s movement that rejects marriage, children, romantic relationships and sex. It emerged largely as a form of resistance against deeply entrenched social and economic norms and clearly signals women’s disillusionment with widespread gender inequality in a deeply rooted patriarchal culture (Mo and You, 2025[58]; Lee and Jeong, 2021[59]). Indeed, considering the inequalities tied to being a wife and a mother, choosing to postpone or forgo marriage and children altogether may seem like a viable option for young women in Korea.
Because the movement exists primarily online, its actual scale and impact remain difficult to measure (Rashid, 2024[60]). Although some have sought to connect the 4B movement to Korea’s low fertility rate, this connection is a distraction from the myriad interrelated factors – including personal, social and economic – that have contributed to Korea’s low fertility rate for decades (Chapter 2).
In Japan, there does not appear to be movement similar to the 4B movement. However, an increasing proportion of young adults report a loss of interest in romantic relationships, a phenomenon often referred to as “herbivorisation” (Ghaznavi et al., 2020[61]). Around one in three never-married individuals aged 18‑34, from both sexes, report not being particularly interested in a relationship with the opposite sex (IPSS, 2023[62]). The estimated prevalence of sexual inexperience was just over one in three among Japanese adults aged 20‑24 for both sexes in 2002, but by 2021 this had risen to 60% among men and 51% among women in the same age group. Reduced interest in romantic relationships and sexual inactivity may be associated with socio-economic and cultural factors, but the underlying causes have not been clearly identified (Ueda et al., 2025[63]).
3.4.1. Perceptions on gender issues among youth are different
Gender equality and feminism are key points of contention among youth in Korea (Lee, 2024[64]; Park, 2025[65]). Despite clear gender inequalities in Korea (Box 3.5), many young men do not perceive gender inequality to be a problem. According to the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey, for example, only 35% of men in Korea agree that gender inequality is a problem in their country, compared to 60% of women, a statistically significant gap of 24 p.p. (Figure 3.9). Only five other OECD countries with available data – Estonia, Finland, Chile, Switzerland and Greece – have a larger gender gap.
Across numerous indicators relating to labour markets and leadership, gender equality in Korea is less advanced than in many OECD peers (OECD, 2025[66]).
Korea has some of the lowest labour force participation rates among women aged 15‑64 years in the OECD, sitting at 63%. This compares to the OECD average of 71%.
Respondents in Korea are among the most likely to believe that men are more entitled to a job during periods of job scarcity (53% in Korea compared to 17% in the OECD, on average).
Relatively high shares of women in Korea are earning low pay (25%) compared to the OECD average (18%). Shares for women in Korea are also notably higher than for men (11%). Indeed, Korea’s gender gap of 14 p.p. is the second largest in the OECD.
Korean women have some of the highest rates of old age poverty (45%), almost three times higher than the OECD average among women (17%) and 11 p.p. higher than men in Korea. This compares to an average difference of 5 p.p. between men and women in the OECD.
Korea has one of the lowest shares of board members who are women in the OECD, at 13%. Only two countries – Mexico and Hungary – have lower shares. In the OECD, on average, 31% of board members are women.
Korean women are some of the least likely to be in national politics, with some of the lowest shares of politicians who are women, at 20%. This is 14 p.p. below the OECD average, and only three countries post lower shares: Türkiye, Japan and Hungary.
Respondents in Korea are some of the most likely to agree that men make better business executives than women and that men make better political leaders than women.
Results from other surveys in Korea support this finding, showing that perceptions among younger men and younger women are at odds. In one survey, only 15% of men in their 20s or younger in Korea agree that “women are disadvantaged,” while 42% agree that “men are disadvantaged” (Figure 3.10). This compares to 71% of women of the same age group who believe women are disadvantaged, and 6% who believe men are disadvantaged. Such divergences by gender are only observed among younger generations: older men and women are both more likely to agree that “women are disadvantaged.”
The 2024 Carnegie California Gallup Korea Survey and the 2024 Carnegie California Embrain Korea Survey confirm these gender and generational divides (Mo and You, 2025[58]), but go further, noting that attempting to correct beliefs may only worsen divisions. Young men’s support for gender equality policies, for example, remains largely unaffected by information on gender disparities in economic, political and social spheres, while young women’s support for change grows (Mo and You, 2025[58]).
Share (%) of respondents who agree gender inequality is a problem in their country, 2024
Note: OECD reflects an unweighted average of the 27 countries with available data. Respondents were asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree that gender inequality is a problem in [country]?” Response options were “Strongly disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree,” and “Can’t choose.” The numerator includes those who selected “Agree” and “Strongly agree.”
Source: 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey, (OECD, 2025[67]).
Share (%) who believe men are disadvantaged (Panel A) and women are disadvantaged (Panel B), by gender, Korea, 2024
Note: Results are drawn from a study conducted using an online survey of 3 000 men and women voters (1 474 women and 1 526 men) aged 19‑68 years across 17 metropolitan cities and provinces.
Source: Korea Women’s Development Institute (2024[68]).
Another example of differing views among young Korean men and women lies in their voting behaviour. Combining data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the OECD Risks that Matter (RtM) Survey, there is evidence of increased division between younger Korean men and women. Of the 10 OECD countries with available data for both 2005 and 2024, no other country has seen a larger change in the gender gap of voting behaviour, and only one other country – Finland – had a larger gender gap in 2024 (Figure 3.11). This can act as a barrier to relationship formation and contributing to reduced marriage rates. Indeed, according to a recent survey in Korea, over half of all respondents (58%) were unwilling to date or marry someone of different political leanings (Kwak, 2023[69]) (Box 3.6).
Gender difference (%) in share of respondents voting for different political parties, Korea and OECD average, 2005 and 2024
Note: Estimates for 2005 are from the WVS. Estimates for 2024 are from the OECD RtM Survey. The OECD average is an unweighted average of weighted estimates from Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Spain, Türkiye and the United States. Data refer to the gender difference in the respective shares voting for right- and left-leaning political parties among respondents who would vote for either. Those who would vote for a centre party, an unidentifiable party, an independent candidate or another option not elsewhere classified (e.g. “Don’t know,” “I would not vote”) are not included. The World Values Survey covers the population aged 18‑85 years. OECD RtM Surveys cover the population aged 18‑64 years. The “older generation” is defined as those born before 1981 – the “younger generation” is defined as those born in 1981 or later.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using Inglehart et al. (2022[70]).and the 2024 OECD Risk that Matter survey (2025[67]).
Apart from the fact that people are naturally drawn to those perceived to be similar to themselves, including politically (Byrne, 1971[71]; Peacock and Pederson, 2022[72]; Alford et al., 2011[73]; Huber and Malhotra, 2017[74]), people may not date or marry across political lines for a variety of reasons.
Division means smaller networks
Existing networks – friendships, acquaintances, civic and social circles – are important sources for romantic relationships. Unwillingness to socialise across political ideologies could thus act as a barrier to relationship formation, particularly when such attitudes diverge strongly by gender. Data from the 2023 Social Integration Survey show a tendency toward homogenous socialisation by political orientation in Korea, with 33% of respondents indicating unwillingness to drink with friends and acquaintances of different political leanings and 71% indicating unwillingness to participate in civic and social group activities with someone of different political leanings (Kwak, 2023[69]).
(Anticipation of) disagreements may undermine relationships
Disagreements over core beliefs, including those relating to gender equality and gender roles, can intensify conflicts and undermine relationship satisfaction, potentially leading to higher breakup rates and marital instability (Peacock and Pederson, 2022[72]; Thielemans, Fallesen and Mortelmans, 2020[75]; Grunow and Lietzmann, 2021[76]; Nitsche, Grunow and Hudde, 2025[77]; Gordon, Luciani and From, 2024[78]).
(Anticipation of) disagreements could act as a barrier to childbearing
Even when relationships do form across ideological lines, (anticipation of) disagreements could impact fertility by reducing willingness to raise children among partners holding opposing views. Research from several OECD countries, for example, shows that “inconsistency between ideals and reality…significantly delays continued childbearing” (Goldscheider, Bernhardt and Brandén, 2013[79]) and that “couples who are gender-equal in attitudes and who have a higher level of sharing [of] household chores” post a greater likelihood of having a second child (Aassve et al., 2015[80]). Research from Korea points to similar conclusions. Nam (2022[81]), for example, finds that marital satisfaction is positively correlated with childbirth plans. Lee, Song and Park (2025[82]) find that, among younger Koreans, negative attitudes toward marriage and childbearing are higher for those who perceive higher levels of gender conflict, with the association particularly strong among women. Yoon (2016[83]) finds that men’s participation in unpaid work is an important factor in the realisation of second birth intentions. Extending the definition of unpaid work to include educational responsibility reinforces the findings. Women who hold primary responsibility for decision making around their firstborn’s education and who have heavy burdens of other types of unpaid care (e.g. childcare, housework) are the least likely to realise an intended second birth (Yoon, 2016[83]).
3.4.2. What causes the gender perception gap?
Several factors may contribute to the gender perception gap, including pervasive economic insecurity in a labour market with intense competition for stable employment (Chapter 5). In Korea, competition for good employment is so intense that job search is sometimes referred to as “war” (chwi‑eob-jeon-jaeng) (Lee, 2024[84]). The intensity is related to Korea’s dual labour market between regular and non-regular work, and large firms and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with considerable differences in pay, benefits and job security between regular employment in large firms and non-regular employment in SMEs (Chapter 5). Non-regular jobs are also not seen as providing pathways into regular jobs (e.g. through experience or skills development) and are, instead, viewed negatively and can act as critical barriers or “scars” (Park, 2024[85]). Rates of non-employment and non-study among youth – among some of the highest in the OECD – capture this dual labour market, with many young people choosing to defer entry into the labour market instead of choosing to accept a bad job (Lee, 2024[84]).
Rapidly increasing levels of educational attainment among women have increased competition for “insider” jobs and may contribute to young men feeling threatened by young women, in terms of both educational and labour market opportunities. This may be especially true when combined with military service, which delays labour market entry, and is required of men but not of women (Lee, 2024[84]).
Layering on growing costs of living and a relatively strong adherence to patriarchal norms, young men may increasingly perceive that they are unable to fulfil societal expectations of the male‑breadwinner-female‑homemaker model. This could further drive young men to feel that they are disadvantaged (or that there is reverse discrimination against men) and foster a sense of disagreement with or distaste for gender equality policies (Lee, 2024[84]; Mo and You, 2025[58]). This is despite the fact that such perceptions are at odds with evidence that women continue to face tremendous inequalities in the labour market in Korea (and beyond), including gender wage gaps, gendered labour market allocations, discrimination and gender-based violence (OECD, 2025[66]) (Box 3.5).
This relationship between (decreasing) economic security and (declining) support for gender equality is confirmed by recent research on perceptions of gender equality during job scarcity. Using microdata from the WVS for a panel of 103 countries over the 1995‑2021 period, Berniell et al. (2024[86]) found that “an increase in unemployment is associated with more conservative views about gender roles” in the labour market, and that the link is stronger in countries with “higher gender inequality” and lower labour force participation among women.
In Korea, perceptions of gender equality during job scarcity have worsened over time. In 1996, 43% of Korean respondents to the WVS believed that when jobs are scarce, men should have more a right to a job than women (Figure 3.12. ). In 2018, 53% agreed with this statement. In OECD countries with available data over both periods, the share fell from 29% to 24%. Gender differences among younger respondents are also much more divided in Korea than in peer countries. In Korea, younger women are 17 p.p. less likely than younger men to agree that men have more right to a job during job scarcity (34% versus 51%). This gap is about half the size in the OECD, on average, at only 8 p.p., and shares are much smaller, at 18% for younger women and 26% for younger men.
Share (%) of respondents who agree that men have more of a right to a job when jobs are scarce, Korea and OECD average, 1996 and 2018 (Panel A) and Korea and OECD average, by gender and generation, 2018 (Panel B)
Note: In Panel A, OECD average is an unweighted average of weighted estimates from Australia, Chile, Colombia, Czechia, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. Each country ran one survey between 1995 and 1998 (mode is 1996) and another between 2016 and 2023 (mode is 2018). In Panel B, OECD average is an unweighted average of weighted estimates from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. Australia and the Netherlands were not included due to small cell sizes (i.e. fewer than ten observations in the numerator or residual, i.e. denominator less numerator). Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” Response options included “Agree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Disagree,” “No answer,” and “Don’t know.” The numerator includes “Agree strongly” and “Agree.” WVS covers the population aged 18‑85 years. A five‑category version of this same question was used in the 2017-2022 wave of the WVS.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using WVS, see Inglehart et al. (2022[70]).
Concerns about the gender perception gap among young people, the Korean Government has recently launched initiatives to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. One such initiative was “Soda Pop”, a five‑session discussion series held in late 2025 in which young women and men shared their experiences and perspectives on issues such as employment, military service, family roles, workplace culture and safety (MOGEF, 2025[87]). Building on these discussions, the government initiated the Youth-Led Gender Equality Dialogue by means of establishing a Youth Coexistence and Empathy Committee, in March 2026. Thise 150‑member committee, composed of men and women in equal measure is to develops policy recommendations through three working groups: recruitment and workplaces, society and culture, and safety and health (MOGEF, 2026[88]). Following its interim report, the committee published its proposals on the Youth Coexistence and Empathy Network website in July 2026 (Youth Coexistence and Empathy Committee, 2026[89]). The proposals cover measures to improve the gender equality in recruitment, reduce gender-based hate speech, and the introduction of safety policies that both men and women can empathise with. To broaden the discussion, public feedback will be collected through online comments and reactions, and an open public forum will in the second half of 2026 involving young people from outside the committee to broaden the discussion (MOGEF, 2026[88]).
Strong and persistent negative perceptions of working mothers could affect women’s interest in family formation and motherhood by creating a conflict between family and career-related personal goals. According to the theory of the Second Demographic Transition, after a certain level of economic development, non-materialist values (e.g. self-fulfilment) become more important (Sobotka, 2008[90]), placing a greater emphasis on individual autonomy, choice, and self-actualisation. Since children require time and resources this can impact fertility as parenthood is seen as competing with alternative life goals (e.g. career, travel, leisure). This conflict between parenthood and personal goals may be particularly salient in cultures and contexts that have standards for parenting and care that demand greater investments of time, particularly of mothers, such as attached, intensive and/or helicopter parenting (Schettini Kearney and Levine, 2025[91]).
Although no precise prevalence figures exist for such parenting styles, they are considered common in Korean families (Lee, 2025[92]; Mesmer, 2025[93]), likely reflecting a combination of traditional Confucian values (Box 3.1) and fierce competition in educational opportunities and labour markets (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2021[94]; Mahler, Tertilt and Yum, 2025[95]) (Chapters 4 and 5). This fierce competitiveness in Korea has led to the coining of the terms “education fever” (kyoyuk yŏlgi) (Dittrich and Neuhaus, 2023[96]; Shin, Jahng and Kim, 2019[97]) and “educational manager mother” (maenijeo eomma) (So Jin Park, 2007[98]; Shin, Jahng and Kim, 2019[97]); the rise of “entrance exams” for English kindergartens, dubbed the 4‑ and 7‑year‑old exams (Kim, 2025[99]); the development of intensive early English education for toddlers (Choi, 2025[100]), a burgeoning hagwon culture (Lee, 2023[101]; Lim, 2025[102]); “goose fathers”, a term used to refer to men who work in Korea while their children and their wives live in another (often English-speaking) country (Kim, 2024[103]); “spec” (seupek, from “specifications”) building from an early age (Hae-joang, 2015[104]), and “status externalities” from receiving “the right” education (e.g. at elite schools, at higher levels, Chapter 4). Modelling the link between fertility and this preoccupation with education, Kim, Tertilt and Yum (2024[105]) found that eliminating “status externalities” would increase fertility by 28%. Another paper comes to a similar conclusion, finding that high-stakes testing may fuel comparisons, which may contribute to declining fertility (Mahler, Tertilt and Yum, 2025[95]).
But are there negative perceptions of working mothers in Korea? Survey evidence suggests this is the case, with 65% of Korean respondents to the WVS agreeing that “when a mother works for pay, the children suffer” – 25 p.p. higher than across OECD countries, on average (Figure 3.13). In Korea, this share has also remained strikingly stable over time – dropping a mere 7 p.p. since 1990. This compares to a drop of 39 p.p. for Japan, 19 p.p. for India, and 33 p.p., on average, for OECD countries. Only one peer country – China – shows no statistically significant decline.
Share (%) who when asked, agree with “when a mother works for pay, the children suffer", Korea, selected peer countries and OECD average, 1990 and 2018
Note: OECD average is an unweighted average of weighted estimates from Chile, Czechia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and the Slovak Republic. Each country ran one survey between 1989 and 1994 (mode is 1990) and another between 2016 and 2023 (mode is 2018). Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.” Response options included “Agree strongly,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” “Strongly disagree,” “Don’t know,” and “No answer.” The numerator includes “Agree strongly” and “Agree.” WVS covers the population aged 18‑85 years. As this question is in an attitudinal survey, “suffer” is not defined, and it is up to the interpretation of the respondents.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using WVS, see Inglehart et al. (2022[70]).
Combining data from similar questions in the 2017-2022 wave of the WVS and the 2022 ISSP to widen the sample, Korea continues to have one of the highest shares of respondents who believe children of pre‑school age suffer with a working mother (Figure 3.14). There is also little difference between genders and generations in negative perceptions of working mothers (Figure 3.15).
Share (%) of respondents who believe a child suffers with a working mother, 2022 or latest
Note: See Figure 3.13 for details on the WVS. For the 2022 ISSP, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.” Response options included “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Disagree,” “Strongly disagree,” and “Can’t choose.” The numerator includes “Strongly agree” and “Agree.” Slight differences between the survey questions in the WVS and the 2022 ISSP (e.g. including of a neutral option in the 2022 ISSP but not in the WVS) may explain some of the variation between the two estimates. Some of the variation may also be explained by changes in beliefs over time.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using WVS, see Inglehart et al. (2022[70]) and 2022 ISSP, see (ISSP, 2025[106]).
Share (%) who when asked, agree with “when a mother works for pay, the children suffer", by gender and generation, Korea and peers, 2018
Note: OECD average is an unweighted average of weighted estimates from Chile, Czechia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and the Slovak Republic. See Figure 3.13 for more survey details. Older generation is defined as those born before 1981. Younger generation is defined as those born in 1981 or later.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using WVS, see Inglehart et al. (2022[70]).
Given that there are such strong pressures for mothers to remain at home when children are young, it is perhaps not surprising that Korean women who have children face significant career penalties. Pseudo-event studies of first births, for example, show that the effects of parenthood on women relative to men (often labelled “child penalties” or “motherhood penalties”) in Korea are significantly higher than the OECD average (Kleven, Landais and Leite-Mariante, 2023[107]) with women’s employment falling 49% behind that of men’s employment after having a first child (Figure 3.16). Other research confirms that the “sizable child earnings penalty for South Korean [sic] women is fully explained by women dropping out of the labor [sic] force after the birth of their first child” (Dynan, Kirkegaard and Stans, 2022[108]), and further research confirms a strong negative correlation between fertility and child penalties: larger child penalties are associated with lower fertility rates (Cho and Han, 2024[109]).
Estimated average per cent impact of parenthood on the employment rate of women relative to men
Note: OECD‑37 averages are unweighted. Estimates are calculated using pseudo‑event studies of first birth, which aim to control for some of the (observable and unobservable) differences between people with and without kids to better estimate the impact of first births on employment. Kleven, Landais and Leite‑Mariante (2023[107]) estimate child penalties for employment in 134 countries around the world.
Source: Kleven, Landais and Leite‑Mariante (2023[107]).
Although values and attitudes, especially around gender roles, contribute to the child penalty, formal childcare constraints, relatively limited use of parental leave by fathers , labour market structures (e.g. seniority-based wage systems, workplace culture) and gender discrimination can contribute to and enhance negative employment effects for women and mothers (Chapter 5).
Most fertility research and current family policy focusses on the conflict between paid and unpaid work as a primary factor influencing people’s choices to have a (or another) child. Although this is certainly a central factor for many individuals and couples, reducing life to only two facets – work and family – ignores the many other social, emotional or personal needs essential to a sense of self, including leisure time and time for hobbies (Raz-Yurovich, 2021[110]). People – especially parents – who feel that they already “have too little free time” may be reluctant to commit to having another child, especially if that would mean (further) trading off against leisure (Jarosz, Matysiak and Osiewalska, 2023[111]). Perceptions of parents’ freedom in Korea provides some supportive evidence that the conflict between work, family and other social, emotional or personal needs may be influencing fertility.
In the Youth Life Outlook Perception Survey, for example, women identified the following negative impacts of children on their lives: their economic situation (50%), maintaining the job they want (46%), their desired hobbies (46%) and their health (40%) (Kim, 2020[40]). The alignment between the shares citing employment and leisure in this survey is notable, highlighting that young women in Korea are not only concerned about balancing work and family, but also hobbies and leisure time.
(Anticipation of) concern about finding time for hobbies and leisure amongst work and family is not particularly surprising, since women in Korea spend less time on hobbies than men, particularly when married. On an average day of the week, for instance, married women spend about an hour less per day than married men on socialising and participation activities and cultural and leisure activities (KOSIS, 2025[50]).
Historically, larger families were necessary for economic survival, especially in agrarian societies or in times of high infant mortality. Religious institutions and patriarchal structures further reinforced norms around reproduction, with children often framed as a moral or religious duty. Over the past century, the calculus around family formation and family size has changed dramatically for several (interrelated) reasons, including economic development, urbanisation, declining religiosity, increased educational attainment, and improved access to contraception. And as material and social conditions have evolved, so too have the reasons people choose to have children. Rather than having children to secure economic survival, many now do so primarily for emotional reasons, such as the desire for personal fulfilment or a sense of meaning and purpose.
Declining fertility in Korea could then be linked not only to practical constraints (e.g. housing, childcare, education costs, finding a suitable partner, work-life balance, etc.), but also to changes in perceptions of children as conferring personal or social benefits (Andersson, 2026[112]; Fernandez, Berniell and Onofri, 2026[113]; OECD, 2023[114]).
Koreans are less likely than people in other advanced economies to view family and children as a source of meaning in life: In a recent survey by the Pew Research Centre, only 16% of respondents in Korea mentioned “family and children” when describing what gives them meaning in life (Figure 3.17). This compares to 40%, on average, among the 17 advanced economies included in the survey. Notable differences also emerge across generations. Only 3% of those aged 18‑29 years in Korea mention “family and children” as the source of meaning in their life, compared to 25% of those aged 30‑49 years (Pew Research Centre, 2021[115]). This likely reflects that those aged 30‑49 years are more likely to have children at home. However, even when compared to a similar age group in other advanced economies, Koreans are less likely to report “family and children.” In Canada, for example 53% of those aged 30‑49 years report “family and children,” as do 48% in Belgium, 64% in Greece and 70% in Australia.
Koreans are open to being childfree for life: In a recent survey, organised by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), 53% of reproductive‑age men and women agreed that they did not need children in their lives (Lee, 2024[116]; Kim, 2025[18]). Preferences for a childfree life were most prevalent among women in their 20s and non-regular workers with unstable employment. Indeed, over half of 19‑ to 29‑year‑olds said that they were not missing out by not having children (Lee, 2024[116]; Kim, 2025[18]).
Family remains important to Koreans: According to the WVS, 89% of Koreans viewed family as “very important” in life in 2018, 4 p.p. less than in 1990, when 93% of Koreans shared this view. Of the other 11 countries with data for both the 1990-1994 wave and the 2017-2022 wave of the WVS, only two – Czechia and Brazil – also posted a decline in this share. Other countries with data available for both waves, including Argentina, Chile, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Slovak Republic and Türkiye, posted increases in the share who view family as “very important” in life, with the average among these 9 countries increasing from 83% to 92% (Inglehart et al., 2022[70]).5
Share (%) who mention “family and children” when describing what gives them meaning in life, by age, 2021
Note: Open-ended questions were coded by analysts at the Pew Research Centre.
Source: Pew Research Centre (2021[115]).
Media can play a powerful role in shaping public perceptions, including those related to ideal family size and fertility norms. (Social) media exposure, for instance, can present individuals with lifestyles norms that diverge from traditional models of marriage and parenthood (Hartmann, 2024[117]; Ferrara, Chong and Duryea, 2012[118]). Time spent consuming media may also displace activities that foster relationship satisfaction and fertility (Lucas and Wilson, 2019[119]).
Media, too, can normalise child-free or small-family lifestyles, sometimes framing parenthood as incompatible with modern, aspirational living (Savelieva, Jokela and Rotkirch, 2022[120]). Regarding Korea, Kim (2026[19]) suggests that the 1990 cohort which has grown up in a digital environment tends to prefer loose connections based on practical values, rather than strong social ties, and in that vein may view marriage and children as optional rather than necessary.
Sensationalised or emotionally charged media coverage may additionally play a role, amplifying anxieties and concerns that can thereby influence personal and collective decisions around fertility (Guetto et al., 2023[121]). Media about parenting, fertility treatments or demographic trends may further shape public attitudes, especially when presented negatively (Yao et al., 2025[122]).
Media can thus shape fertility decisions through multiple channels (Savelieva, Jokela and Rotkirch, 2022[120]) and studies have documented links between media and fertility in the context of radio and television (Hartmann, 2024[117]; Ferrara, Chong and Duryea, 2012[118]; Lucas and Wilson, 2019[119]; Guetto et al., 2023[121]; Yao et al., 2025[122]; Caria, 2024[123]). Myers and Hooper (2026[124]) estimate that the roll out of the iPhone over the 2007-2011 period (around the Great Financial Recession) helps to explain 33 to 52% of the decline in the fertility rate in the US among women aged 15‑44 as the iPhone reducing in-person interactions, increasing pornography use and reducing sexual activity. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo (2026[125]) postulate that the roll-out of digital technologies and smartphones is related to the decline in socialising among young people, which has accelerated the decline in teenage births in the United Kingdom and the United States. In both studies, a large share of the fertility declines concerns a decline in unintended pregnancies, especially among younger women. Buckles, Guldi and Schmidt (2025[126]) found that between 2007 and 2019 intended births fell by 8.5%, while unintended births fell by 22%, with the drop more severe among young women and unmarried women. However, fertility rates among these groups in Korea have long been low (Chapter 2).
The decline in the incidence of in-person socialising associated with the increased use of digital technologies may affect finding “the right partner”, but important gaps remain in our understanding of how media influences family formation and fertility in ultra-low fertility settings with a limited share of unintended births, such as Korea, in a rapidly changing landscape of online and social media.
Given that many women are concerned about gender roles after marriage and motherhood, policies that support women’s return to work after childbirth are critical for fertility (OECD, 2019[127]; OECD, 2025[8]; OECD, 2024[128]). Korea has developed a comprehensive formal childcare system in just 20 years or so (Chapter 4) but enhancing the quality of early learning and childcare – through clear standards, monitoring, and staff training, for example – can build trust in these services and encourage greater take‑up of formal services (OECD, 2025[129]; Park et al., 2020[130]). Given the (negative) attitudes in Korea toward working mothers with very young children, ensuring quality childcare services may be particularly important to build trust. Communications counteracting negative societal views that children suffer with working mothers could also be helpful, focussing on the link between quality early learning and childcare and child development.
Increasing the family-friendly nature of workplaces – through reducing working hours and increasing flexible work options and extending access to parental leave to all workers is critical (Chapter 5). In terms of gender equality, it is particularly important to increase fathers’ take‑up of parental leave as it is an important step towards normalising shared caregiving and reducing the career costs borne by women (Chapter 5).
The importance of childcare and family-friendly workplaces for fertility to Koreans is made evident by a recent survey in Korea in 2024, which found that 53% of respondents think childcare support is the appropriate response to low fertility and 48% think that cultivating a work culture that respects a balance between work and family is needed (KOSIS, 2025[131]). Other surveys find similar results, with the most support (82%) for the use of a flexible parental leave system to help address the low birth rate. The next most popular measures are fostering a culture of equal participation by men and women in childcare (78%) and fostering a culture that supports childcare (76%) (Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 2024[21]).
Many of these government actions either directly or indirectly relate to improving gender equality in the labour market (OECD, 2025[66]), but government efforts to promote gender equality can trigger pushback (e.g. Mo and You (2025[58])). Close monitoring of implementation and government communications is therefore essential.
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← 1. The estimate for the OECD based on the 2022 International Social Survey Programme is an unweighted average of Australia, Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “People who want children ought to get married.” Response options included “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Disagree,” “Strongly disagree,” “Can’t choose” and “No answer.” The numerator includes “Strongly agree” and “Agree.”
← 2. Due to differences in survey design and question structure between surveys held in 1979 (Park and Park, 1979[16]) and in the 2020s (OECD (2025[8]) and KOSIS (2024[17])), the estimates for 1979 and 2024 are not directly comparable, but are indicative of notable and significant change in attitudes toward marriage over the last half century.
← 3. The 2022 International Social Survey programme asked respondents: “People have different opinions about how much responsibility women and men should have for the home and family. Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?” Response options included: Women should take much more responsibility,” “Women should take somewhat more responsibility,” “Women and men should take equal responsibility,” “Men should take somewhat more responsibility,” “Men should take much more responsibility” and “Can’t choose.” The share refers to the share of married respondents who selected “Women and men should take equal responsibility.” “Can’t choose” and other non-answers are excluded from the denominator. Estimates are weighted at the country level using post-stratification weights. The following countries are included in the unweighted OECD average: Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland.
← 4. The 2022 International Social Survey programme asked respondents: “On average, how many hours a week do you personally spend on household work, not including childcare and leisure time activities?” and “On average, how many hours a week do you spend looking after family members (e.g. children, elderly, ill or disabled family members)?” Respondents entered an integer number of hours, top coded at 95 hours. Restricting the sample to those aged 15‑64 years, weighted averages for both married men and married women for each of these questions are calculated at the country level using post-stratification weights. Only valid responses are included in the averages. Country-level averages for each question are summed to calculate an estimate of total hours on housework and caregiving. The share of hours of housework and caregiving done by women is calculated by dividing the average number of hours undertaken by women by the sum of the number of hours undertaken by both men and women. The following countries are included in the unweighted OECD average: Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland.
← 5. The World Values Survey – covering the population aged 18‑85 years – ran one set of surveys between 1989 and 1994 (mode is 1990) and another between 2016 and 2023 (mode is 2018). Only countries with data available in each of these two waves were considered. Respondents were asked to indicate how important family is in their life. Response options included “Very important,” “Rather important,” “Not very important,” “Not at all important,” “Don’t know,” and “No answer.”