Exploring Korea’s Fertility, Work, and Family Policy Trends

1. Overview: Korea’s unique fertility, work, and family policy trends

Abstract

Korea’s fertility rate has fallen to 0.8 children per woman in 2025, the lowest at the country-level worldwide. Why has this happened, what are the consequences, and what can be done about it?

Based on the detailed analysis in the four other chapters of this review, this overview chapter looks at a range of drivers such as changes in attitudes to marriage and having children, family policy, high private tuition and housing costs, and the intricacies of labour market institutions and workplace cultures. The last section looks ahead at some of the implications for population ageing.

1.1. Introduction

Fertility rates are declining globally but the fall has been dramatic in Korea (Figure 1.1): from a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 6 children per woman in 1960 to a TFR of 0.8 in 2025 – the lowest at the country-level worldwide. Fewer people are marrying and marriages happening later: since 1990 the average age at first marriage for women increased from 25 to over 31.5 years. The average age at first childbirth for women in Korea has increased to 33.5 years, and mothers in Korea often have only one child: in 2022, 57% of births in Korea were firstborns – the highest rate among OECD countries (OECD, 2024[1]).

Mirroring the declining marriage trend, the share of single and never-married persons aged 30‑39 years was negligible in the 1950s but had increased to 41% for men and 24% for women by the 2010s (Chapter 2). According to the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey, nearly half of the Koreans under age 50 intend to have no children (OECD, 2025[2]).

Figure 1.1. Total Fertility Rates have fallen almost everywhere, but nowhere as much as in Korea

Total Fertility Rates, 1960, 1990 and 2024

Note: The total fertility rate in a specific year is defined as the total number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and give birth to children in alignment with the prevailing age specific fertility rates. It is calculated by totalling the age specific fertility rates as defined over five‑year intervals. OECD averages are unweighted averages.

Source: OECD (2026[3]), OECD Family Database Indicator SF2.1, Fertility rates.

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There are many different and interacting factors that, taken together, create barriers to parenthood or having more children. In Korea, as in other OECD countries, these factors include job security, earnings levels, housing affordability, the costs of education, access to affordable quality childcare and issues around the reconciliation of work and family commitments (OECD, 2007[4]), as well as more difficult-to-quantify cultural factors, such as shifting norms, priorities and expectations about work, parenting, lifestyles and gender roles (e.g. OECD (2024[1])). Also, over the past 15 to 20 years the number of young people who perceive children as conferring personal or social benefits appears to have diminished (Andersson, 2026[5]; Fernandez, Berniell and Onofri, 2026[6]; OECD, 2023[7]). Nevertheless, the 2026 Demographic Futures Survey of 73 countries found that partnerships and having children remain important aspirations to young people, but economic insecurity, housing constraints and difficulties finding a suitable partner are the most frequently cited barriers (UNFPA, 2026[8]). In addition, the recent rapid succession of global crises such as COVID‑19 and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as questions around the impact of AI, have helped to spread a feeling of uncertainty and unpredictability. Furthermore, important gaps remain in our understanding of how media influences family formation and fertility in the rapidly changing landscape of online and social media. All these factors may lead some potential parents to delay having children, or even to decide against parenthood. For a concise discussion of trends, drivers and issues, see Sobotka (2026[9]).

Box 1.1. An economic approach towards fertility

In his seminal work, Becker (1960[10]) outlines how households decide on the number of children given budget and time constraints. The costs and benefits of children affect fertility choices. The benefits of children include the joy, love and satisfaction they bring to parents as well as a source of support in older age. The costs of children include direct costs such as childcare, education and housing costs while the indirect costs of children include the labour market opportunities – earnings – that parents relinquish when having children. These direct and indirect costs reduce the “demand for children”.

Becker’s economic approach also suggests that income increases can have opposing effects on fertility. As earnings rise, households may choose to have more children because they can better afford them (income effect). However, higher earnings can also increase the opportunity cost of childrearing (substitution effect) and lead parents to invest more in each child but have fewer children. As economies develop, these effects often outweigh the positive effect of higher income on fertility.

This review addresses the many issues that play a role in fertility decisions in Korea (Chapter 2) and pays particular attention to gender attitudes and norms (Chapter 3), family policy and the role of private education (Chapter 4) and the intricacies of the labour market that make work and family reconciliation and finding economic security so difficult to achieve (Chapter 5). It builds on past OECD work on the issue (OECD, 2019[11]; 2024[1]; 2025[12]), and further develops past policy recommendations.

Throughout, it is important to realise that there is only so much that policy can and, indeed, should want to do about low fertility rates. One of the many different objectives of modern family policy is to create an environment in which people can choose to have the number of children they want at the time of their choosing (Adema, 2012[13]). Family policy can support people in making these choices in line with their preferences, but the direct link between family policy interventions and the number of births should not be overestimated (Gauthier and Gietel-Basten, 2025[14]).

1.2. Marriage, fertility intentions, and gender gaps in attitudes

In Korea, having children is strongly associated with being married. Declining fertility reflects both a decline in the number of marriages and in marital fertility, while at the same time the incidence of singlehood is increasing (Chapter 2). In part declining marriage rates reflect Korea’s “marriage market squeeze”. Given “son preferences” for births in the 1990s, the number of young men of marriageable age outnumbers young women, making it harder for young men to find spouses. To a limited extent this “marriage market squeeze” is eased by cross-national marriages with women often from Southeast Asian countries (Chapter 3).

Changes in attitudes and norms over time can help explain changes in marriage and fertility rates. There is a marked change in many – but not all – attitudes playing out in Korean society. For example, there is a growing indifference towards marriage, with just over half of respondents age 13 and over stating that “it is best to marry” in 2024 down from three‑quarters of respondents in 1998 (KOSIS (2024[15]), and Chapter 3). Also, just over half of Korean men and women of reproductive age agreed that they did not need children in their lives (Chapter 3). Among young women, in particular, a culture of remaining unmarried or childless has become increasingly prevalent, alongside more negative attitudes toward traditional expectations and concerns over motherhood penalties or career interruptions (Shin and Lee, 2024[16]). As women’s participation in higher education and the labour force has steadily risen, both marriage and fertility rates have continued to decline. Women also bear the brunt of unpaid housework in Korea, much more so than in most other OECD countries, which is cited as a reason for not achieving desired fertility by 19% of survey respondents – twice the OECD average (UNFPA, 2025[17]). Overall, Koreans younger than 50 years of age intend to have about 1.2 children while this is 1.8 across the OECD on average (Figure 1.2), and around 2.1 among married women in Korea (Chapter 2).

However, attitudes towards marriage and childbearing among men and women aged 25 to 49 appear to have become more positive recently, as between March 2024 and March 2026: the share of survey respondents reporting a positive view of marriage increased from 70.9% to 76.4%, while the share of respondents who regarded children as necessary rose by 10.5 percentage points to 71.6% (PCPP, 2026[18]).

These developments have coincided with a recovery in the TFR from 0.72 children per woman in 2023, 0.75 in 2024 and a preliminary estimate of 0.80 for 2025. The recent increase should, however, be interpreted with caution as it at least in part reflects a cohort effect (Chapter 2) and does not in itself establish a sustained reversal of the longer-term fertility decline.

Figure 1.2. Koreans intend to have fewer children than elsewhere in the OECD

Intended number of children, 2024

Note: Fertility intentions reflect the average of the number of children respondents indicate they intend to have. Intentions are based on responses to the question “How many children do you intend to have?” – for respondents who do not have any children, and “Including the children you already have, how many total children do you intend to have?” – for respondents who already have at least one child. Respondents could enter integer values up to 15 or select “I prefer not to answer.” Shares are calculated as the share who indicated they intend to have no children over all respondents who provided an answer other than “I prefer not to answer.”

Source: OECD 2024 Risks that Matter Survey (OECD, 2025[2]), for public use microdata, see https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/oecd-risks-that-matter-rtm-survey.html.

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Differences in perceptions of gender issues exist among young men and women in Korea. According to the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey, for example, only 35% of men in Korea agree that gender inequality is a problem in their country, compared to 60% of women. Only five other OECD countries with available data – Estonia, Finland, Chile, Switzerland and Greece – have a larger gender gap (OECD, 2025[2]). Results from other surveys in Korea also show that perceptions on gender issues among young men and young women are different (Korean Women's Development Institute, 2024[19]). These differences on gender issues can act as a barrier to relationship formation as Korean survey data suggest that just over half (51.8%) of young men and women were unwilling to date or marry someone with different political leanings (Kwak, 2023[20]).

Concerns about the “gender perception gap” among young people inspired recent Korean Government initiatives to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. For example, the “Soda Pop” discussion series held in late 2025 involved young men and women sharing perspectives on issues such as employment, military service, and family roles (MOGEF, 2025[21]). Building on these discussions, in March 2026 the government established a 150‑member Youth Coexistence and Empathy Committee which developed policy recommendations in three broad areas: recruitment and workplaces, society and culture, and safety and health (Youth Coexistence and Empathy Committee, 2026[22]). These proposals will be further developed through on-line feedback and an open forum to be held in the second half of 2026 (MOGEF, 2026[23]).

As fertility remains strongly linked to marriage in Korea, difficulties with finding a suitable partner have an impact. The decline in the incidence of in-person socialising, with social withdrawal and social isolation as extreme forms that concerns about 5% of young adults aged 19‑39 (Shin, Pyo and Kim, 2024[24]; Son, 2023[25]), can lead to a decline of meaningful social networks and opportunities, which may contribute to declines in fertility via an inability or unwillingness to meet potential partners.

The change in attitudes towards marriage and the associated decline in the marriage rate are mirrored in the dramatic increase in singlehood in Korea: by the 2010s, a quarter of Korean women in their thirties were single and never married and this concerned 40% of their male peers. France, the Netherlands and Nordic countries report similar numbers, but in contrast to Korea, in these countries at least 40% of births are outside of marriage (OECD, 2025[26]).

1.3. “Education fever”

One of Korea’s major success stories is the increase in the share of women with tertiary education over the past 30 years: while only 20% of women aged 55‑64 years in Korea have completed tertiary education, 78% of those aged 25‑34 years have done so (Chapter 5). By comparison, 64% of young men aged 25‑34 held a tertiary degree. However, the share of women among all tertiary graduates in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) was only 28%, below the OECD average (34%).

Clearly, educational attainment is valued in Korea, and parents invest in the education of their children regardless of gender. Indeed, one of the particularly high-cost challenges that Korean parents and their children face is a competitive educational environment which frequently starts during the pre‑school years. From an early age, children spend long hours after their normal school day in a range of private institutes, called “hagwon”, with schooling by private tutors, parents and online learning at home, to prepare for tests and exams to enter prestigious schools which after high school culminate in the tough College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) or “Suneung”. This exam is no longer the only criterion for university entry, but remains the most important sorting mechanism, particularly for the most prestigious universities. Preparing for CSAT has always been competitive, but over the past decades, competition has intensified while the number of quality regular job opportunities has declined (see below).

Parents across the world want what is best for their children, and during the school years they provide support with homework and if needed organise and finance private tuition. However, Korean practice is at a different level. In 2024, household spending on private tuition amounted to around 1.1% of GDP compared to about 0.4% of GDP in 2023 in Singapore – another country where private tuition plays an important role. Spending on education as a share of final household consumption amounted to over 5% in Korea, more than three times as high as in Japan and across the OECD on average (Chapter 4).

The systemic focus on gaining a place at a renowned university results in less attention to pursuing studies that fit individual interests and skills. This contributes to Korea having the highest degree of labour market skills mismatch among OECD countries (OECD, 2022[27]; 2024[28]; 2025[12]). In addition, the “intense testocracy” has negative repercussions for child well-being, and with increasing monetary costs, raises issues around equity in education and social mobility as the wealthiest parents can afford to spend the largest sums. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the associated costs to parents have had a downward effect on fertility trends, as in this environment, many parents cannot afford a second child (Chapter 4).

It is illusory to think that Korean society will abandon its use of private tuition. For many years, policy has tried to curb Korean private tuition, but spending on private education remains substantial (Chapter 4). By now, however, it must be abundantly clear to everyone that current practice charges too high a price to Korean society in terms of child well-being, household budgets, and children foregone. Policymakers, parents, would-be parents, and society more generally can see the negative effects of education fever in Korea, including on the fertility rate (see below), but thus far this has not generated widespread change.

A multi-faceted policy package is needed to take the sharp edges off education fever:

• It is important to reduce the unnecessarily competitive nature of the exam processes. For example, the Suneung exam process involves relative grading (except for English and Korean History), so individual scores are determined in direct comparison with fellow students. Schools generally engage in criterion-referenced absolute grading, particularly in elementary, middle school and non-core high school subjects such as arts, but relative grading remains dominant in key academic subjects linked to Suneung. To reduce the competitive nature of the overall exam processes, it would be better to extend absolute grading across Suneung and core subjects in school-exams.

• There is a need to involve all stakeholders in the establishment of a “societal covenant” (or social contract) that, while not wholesale in nature, takes the sharp edges off the system, making it more child- and student-friendly and more sustainable. The “societal covenant” could involve the Ministry of Education, the National Education Commission, teachers’ unions, parent associations, student bodies, and the Korea Association of Private Institutes. In fact, the National Education Commission has a “Special Committee on Private Education” and by ensuring broad inclusion of stakeholders, such a body could be tasked to develop the content of the societal covenant and help introduce reform more effectively.

• Policy can help by considering a broad package of measures including continuing to improve the public education system, vocational training and the extension of capacity of out-of-school hours services. Policy could also consider taxation of private education to curb its excessive use. It may initially well be most effective to focus this measure on families with students who are not yet in high school (Chapter 4), but the design of any potential tax measure should be carefully considered among experts and policymakers in view of prevailing policy objectives, equity concerns, the age of students as well as existing and planned education and tax policies and potential administrative costs.

Combined with effective monitoring and a continuous awareness campaign on the negative aspects of current practice, while illustrating the benefits of play, social interaction, and respect for children. Policy should consider all measures and use a mix of them to take off the extreme edges of the competitive system, and slowly but surely reduce the intensity of education fever that exerts downward pressure on fertility trends.

1.4. The dual labour market

Korea’s labour market is characterised by a profound dichotomy between large companies and Small Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) with large differences in labour productivity and earnings, and between “regular” and “non-regular” workers with sharp differences in working conditions. Regular workers, unlike non-regular workers, typically see their wages rise with age and tenure while non-regular workers, often on temporary contracts, face disadvantages in terms of earnings, job security and access to training and employment-related benefits. Only 12% of employees in Korea are high-wage regular workers in large companies (300 or more employees), but most workers are employed in SMEs (85% of all employees), and around one‑third of all employees are non-regular workers in SMEs, who earn only about 40% of the earnings of high-wage regular workers. Furthermore, non-regular employment in Korea has expanded and covered 38% of all wage earners in Korea in 2025, up from 32% in 2015, and it is disproportionately concentrated among women, youth, and less-educated workers.

Considering these labour market features, it is no surprise that many workers in Korea are worried about losing their jobs: almost half of young people and over one‑third of prime‑age workers, well above the OECD average (Figure 1.3). The perceived concerns about economic and financial security are a key barrier to having (more) children and have been identified in a range of studies as an important driver of the persistently low fertility in Korea (Chapter 5).

Figure 1.3. Many Koreans of working age worry about losing their job

Share of respondents who think it is likely or very likely that they will lose their job or self-employment income in the next 12 months, 2022

Note: Respondents were asked, “How likely do you think it is that you might lose your job or self-employment income in the next 12 months?” The answer options were very unlikely, unlikely, likely, very likely, and can’t choose. Shares refers to respondents who chose likely or very likely.

Source: (OECD, 2024[29]), “OECD Risks that matter for young people: Concerns, perceived vulnerabilities and policy preferences”, https://doi.org/10.1787/62b44423-en.

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1.4.1. Improving financial independence of young people

The Korean labour market holds particular challenges for young people. Given the limited opportunities to transition from non-regular to regular employment (Chapter 5), securing a stable job at labour market entry has become increasingly important, contributing to intense competition among young people. Furthermore, there has been a gradual shift towards “need-based” recruitment of experienced hires for task-specific positions among large companies in Korea that traditionally relied on “open, mass recruitment” of new graduates, hiring large cohorts who were then trained and later assigned to roles. This trend is likely to improve job matching, but it has reduced employment opportunities for young people with limited work experience. Consequently, many young people face a lengthy transition from school to work. On average, it takes 11 months to find a first job after graduation, while for about 10% of graduates it takes over three years (Chapter 5).

These difficulties in securing stable employment also complicate young people’s entry into the housing market. Seoul remains a magnet for many (young) people in Korea where unlike in non-metropolitan areas, house prices and rents keep rising (Chapter 4 and OECD (2026[30])). Four out of five Koreans in their 20s live in the parental home (Figure 1.4), which is one way of dealing with high rental prices and job insecurity. This is also a factor for less and later partnership and family formation.

Housing costs negatively affect fertility trends, as suitable housing is crucial for family formation (Chapter 4). A mix of supply-side measures (e.g. investment to expand the supply of public housing) and demand-side support (e.g. support with housing loans for young families) are both elements of any successful affordable housing strategy (OECD, 2026[31]). However, house price trends are different between metropolitan and rural areas in Korea, with price increases most pronounced in Seoul. There is a need for more geographically targeted policies with policy for metropolitan areas prioritising promoting affordable housing, while policy for regional areas could focus on expanding job opportunities (OECD, 2026[30]).

Figure 1.4. The vast majority of young Korean adults live in the parental home

Share of young people (20‑29) living with their parents

Note: Data for Hungary, Korea, Switzerland and the United States refer to 2023; data for Canada, Chile, Mexico and the United Kingdom refer to 2022; data Australia refer to 2021; data for Iceland and Türkiye refer to 2020.

Source: (OECD, 2026[32]), OECD Affordable Housing Database, Indicator “HM1.4 Living arrangements by age groups”.

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1.4.2. Too often women have to choose between work and family life

Having established themselves in the labour market, young men and women have to consider how they can find work/life balance outcomes that fit their labour market and private life aspirations. Balancing work and care commitments for children is a challenge across the OECD (2007[4]), but in Korea, it seems particularly difficult.

To some extent this is related to workplace cultures. Although the prevalence of very long working hours has declined over time, 16% of employed Koreans aged 15‑64 still worked 50 hours or more per week in 2024, one of the highest shares in the OECD (Chapter 5). Many workers face long daily commutes (Chapter 5), further reducing the time available for family life and leisure. Workplace flexibility is also limited, as in addition to reduced working hours for parents with young children, employers are not required to offer other forms of flexibility, such as flexible schedules, adjustable working hours, or remote work options. Moreover, employees are often reluctant to take advantage of existing options due to concerns about potential penalties in terms of earnings, performance evaluations or career prospects (Chapter 5).

Entrenched gender norms and stereotypes imply that women should bear the brunt of unpaid housework and care work. Indeed, while young women would like to share unpaid work on an equal basis, they often also feel that children suffer when mothers are in paid work. This is one of the social norms that have not changed much across generations (Chapter 3), and its persistence further complicates work-life conflict issues when children are very young.

All these factors help explain why many women withdraw from the labour force upon motherhood, and maternal employment in Korea sits at only 64%, substantially lower than the OECD average of 71%. However, for regular workers in particular, these career breaks can come at a huge cost in terms of future earnings and employment opportunities, as once the link with seniority-based wage progression is broken, many of the earnings gains associated with tenure are lost, unless previous experience is recognised by a (new) employer. Moreover, “mother returners” generally struggle to find well-paid regular employment, which contributes to women being disproportionately likely to work in non-regular jobs – 47% of female employees compared to 31% of male employees (Statistics Korea, 2025[33]).

Career breaks in Korea also contribute to the widest gender pay gap in the OECD (Figure 1.5). On average, young women have higher levels of educational attainment than young men, and gender pay gaps are small among younger workers but widen rapidly+ among workers in their 30s following career breaks (Chapter 5). This gender wage gap reinforces traditional roles during childrearing as reducing women’s paid work minimises household income loss. Employers’ expectations that women will work less after childbirth thereby become a self-fulfilling prophecy, reinforcing a vicious cycle of statistical discrimination (OECD, 2025[12]).

Faced with such high opportunity costs, many young women delay marriage and childbirth, but all too often, Korean women still have to choose between work and family life. Some choose to have (more) children and limit their labour force participation, while others prioritise paid work and have fewer children than they would have liked or none at all. In the absence of quality work-life balance options, past gains in female labour participation have contributed to declining fertility rates in Korea. Cho and Han (2024[34]) estimated that the increase in opportunity cost to motherhood could explain as much as 40% of the decline in the fertility rates between 2013 and 2019 (Chapter 5).

Figure 1.5. Gender pay gaps are wider in Korea than elsewhere in the OECD

Gender pay gap, full-time workers, median earnings, 2024

Note: The gender pay gap is defined here as the difference between the median wages of men and women relative to the median wages of men. Estimates are unadjusted and based on gross earnings of full-time employees by earnings deciles (upper limits) as reported in the OECD Distribution of Earnings Database. Data refer to 2022 for Belgium, Iceland and Luxembourg. Data refer to 2023 for Chile, Hungary, Portugal and Türkiye. Data for all other countries refer to 2024. The negative gender pay gap in Luxembourg is a feature of a unique labour market with many cross-border workers form Belgium, France and Germany and where men are more likely than women to be in lower-paying industries and occupations than women – who are well-represented in the financial services sector (STATEC, 2024[35]).

Source: OECD Data Explorer, “Gender wage gap” (https://data-explorer.oecd.org/) as per 15 March 2026.

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1.5. Policies to support the reconciliation of work and family life

1.5.1. Public family benefits

Over the past few decades, Korea has been developing a comprehensive family policy with public spending on family benefits increasing from 0.1% of GDP in 1998 to 1.8% of GDP in 2023. This is slightly below the OECD average (2.3%) as a share of GDP, but Korea ranks 10th in the OECD when public spending on family benefits is measured on a per-child basis.

The bulk of Korean public family spending is towards formal childcare or Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) supports; about two‑thirds of Korean children aged 0‑2 participate in formal childcare. Quality concerns have come to the fore, and the policy response could include further standardisation of facilities and ensuring good employment conditions of staff (Chapter 4).

Korea has also developed a system of financial transfers towards families that currently includes a child allowance paid to all children under the age of 9, which will be gradually extended to cover all children under 13 years of age by 2030. Korea also has a child tax credit (CTC) system, and while payment rates have increased, questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the system in terms of supporting low-income households. It is important to monitor the evolution of the income position of families and, if necessary, strengthen income‑support for lower-income families.

Growing public spending on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) has contributed to its increased use, and by 2024, 15.1% of all newborns were born with the use of ART. Supporting ART is not a panacea for addressing low fertility, but at least it helps some parents to have children at the time when they would like to.

At first glance, the Korean leave system, including maternity, paternity and parental leave, appears generous, providing about 91 weeks of leave for mothers and about 82 weeks earmarked for fathers. However, the system has a few key weaknesses in terms of coverage and use of child-related leave:

• Coverage among self-employed and non-regular workers is low – among parents of children born in 2024, 46% of mothers and 71% of fathers were eligible for parental leave (Statistics Korea, 2025[36]). The coverage of earnings-related maternity and parental leave benefits should be expanded to more non-regular and self-employed workers.

• Large companies bear the costs of maternity leave benefit, which can create disincentives to hiring and investing in women. It would be advisable to reduce the financial burden on employers by sharing the costs through social insurance or finance such paid leave through general taxation.

• Financial support for SMEs towards the costs of replacement workers is available but it is low and would need to be enhanced to make it more effective.

• While the male share of all parental leave users increased from 5% in 2014 to 37% in 2025, many fathers do not take leave as they fear the earnings and career implications of doing so. Further progress should be monitored, and if necessary, incentives for both parents to take leave could be strengthened. Increasing transparency of take‑up in large companies can also help.

1.5.2. Labour market and workplace measures

Workplace cultures need to move with the times and facilitate the productive integration of both men and women, fathers and mothers in the workforce. It is important that policy action facilitates reducing the dichotomy between regular and non-regular workers, and that social partners in large companies, and colleagues in SMEs work together towards workplace practices that facilitate workers to pursue both their career and family aspirations:

• Labour market policy needs to further address the structural divide between regular and non-regular employment through several policy actions, including extending social insurance coverage to more non-regular workers, easing employment protection for regular workers, and enhancing change from seniority-based wage systems to performance‑based pay, also to facilitate mobility from non-regular to regular employment.

• Recent policy debates in Korea have considered ways and means of strengthening the cultural shift away from very long office hours. Recent initiatives to reduce actual working hours, e.g. the support for the introduction of 4.5‑day workweeks, should be monitored. Efforts to reduce actual working hours and otherwise promoting flexible workplace practices should be advanced through social dialogue.

• Employers in Korea are not required to offer flexible work arrangements, such as flexible working hours or remote work, but these could be made statutory entitlements especially after child-related leave to help alleviate work-family conflict. Financial support for the adoption of remote work equipment, particularly among SMEs, could help increase take‑up.

• Korea’s gender wage gap remains the largest among OECD countries. Expanding the coverage of pay transparency requirements and introducing a pay audit system could further strengthen efforts to promote gender equality at work.

• Ensuring that employees are not penalised in terms of pay or career opportunities when they take parental leave or use flexible working arrangements is crucial for encouraging the widespread use and acceptance of these practices. To enhance the effectiveness of the labour inspectorate in this area, the number of labour inspectors could be increased, while reallocating administrative responsibilities to allow more labour inspection visits.

1.6. Getting ready for the future

1.6.1. Ageing at an unprecedented pace

Koreans have made important gains in life expectancy. Since the turn of the millennium, life expectancy at birth for men increased from 72.3 to 80.8 years in 2024, and from 79.7 to 86.6 years for women, while accounting for a slight fall during the COVID‑19 years (OECD, 2026[37]). Over the same period, healthy life expectancy increased by 5 years for women and 7 years for men and on both measures of life expectancy Korea now ranks above the OECD average (OECD, 2026[38]). This reflects major societal progress but taken together with the persistently low fertility rates it means that Korea’s population is ageing more rapidly than in any other OECD country.

In 1980, Korea had the youngest population among OECD countries with 8 people aged 65 and over for every 100 persons of working age (here defined as age‑grouping 20‑64). By 2060, Korea is projected to have the oldest population among OECD countries with almost as many Koreans over 65 as Koreans of working age (Figure 1.6, Panel A). By comparison, the pace of population ageing across the OECD is much slower, but large enough to pose significant challenges across a range of social policy issues, including aged care, institutional long-term care and pension policy (e.g. OECD (2017[39]; 2022[40]; 2025[41])).

As population ageing is expected to continue at pace in Korea, there will be a growing demand for long-term care services, and thereby, long-term care workers. Projections suggest that the share of long-term care workers in total employment will need to increase by 66% in Korea to meet demand – one of the highest rates in the OECD and much higher than the OECD average of 32% (OECD, 2023[42]). If such increased demand for long-term care workers cannot be met, long-term care systems will not be able to meet increased demand for services. This could place a growing care burden on family members, who are both complements to and substitutes for formal care services, and this care burden could translate into reduced fertility desires or intentions (Box 1.2). In terms of long-term care policy, the 2024 reform has led to further progress in the provision of integrated community care in Korea, with further challenges ahead in terms of coverage and quality improvement (e.g. Jang (2025[43]) and OECD (2025[44])).

By the end of 2025, 55.5% of people over 65 years of age receive a national pension payment, but recipiency will continue to grow as the national pension scheme was introduced less than 40 years ago and the impending retirement of the baby boom generation. Still, at present, many senior citizens have limited access to adequacy-guaranteed national pension income. With increasing pension coverage old-age poverty is expected to decline further in Korea: the relative poverty rate among those aged 65 and over in Korea was 47.9% in 2011 and declined to 39.8% in 2023, the highest level in the OECD (OECD, 2025[45]). The current senior citizens grew up when Korea was relatively poor and subsequent generations are likely to be healthier and have better access to old-age pension income. Nevertheless, the population ageing challenge will be huge as by 2060 the cohorts of men and women over 70 years of age will be much larger than in 2020 (Figure 1.6, Panel B).

Box 1.2. Growing and evolving long-term care needs may complicate fertility decisions

As populations age, long-term care needs of elderly family members may complicate fertility choices, particularly when formal long-term care is unaffordable or unavailable. When faced with the financial demands of long-term care, for example, couples may delay or forgo having (more) children due to affordability concerns. In a similar manner, when long-term care is unavailable, couples providing care for (elderly) relatives may feel they do not have the time or energy to raise a (or another) child, which could influence their fertility choices. Indeed, in a recent analysis of Australia, a generalised difference‑in-differences model shows decreases in fertility expectations after becoming a parental caregiver, with stronger effects over time (Lazzari and Zurla, 2024[46]). Evidence from Japan presents a similar story, with “an increase in the probability of having to look after a parent” related to an increase in the probability of childlessness among the post-war cohort (Sakata and McKenzie, 2021[47]).

Although Confucian norms place children under pressure to provide care for ageing parents, with expectations particularly intense for women (American University, 2019[48]; Xu, 2019[49]), evidence suggests that such pressures have waned in Korea. For example, the share of people in Korea believing family members should “financially support their ageing parents” fell from 36% to 18% between 2010 and 2024 (KOSIS, 2024[50]). Other surveys show similar patterns of shifting expectations around family caregiving roles (Jeong, 2025[51]; American University, 2019[48]; Jones, 2023[52]).

Despite waning perceptions of obligations around parental care, children continue to play a role in long-term care in Korea, potentially reflecting accessibility and affordability challenges (Jones, 2023[52]). For example, the 2023 National Survey of Older Koreans found that 46% of people aged 75 and over received care from co-residing family members (MOHW & KIHASA, 2024[53]). Other survey results present a similar story, with many adult children providing support and care to their ageing parents (Kim, 2024[54]; KOSTAT, 2019[55]).

Figure 1.6. Korea is projected to age much more rapidly than any other OECD country

Source: For both panels are based on United Nations (UN, 2025[56]), World Populations Prospects – 2024 Revisions.

Statlink

1.6.2. Looming labour shortages

Rapidly unfolding demographic changes will have serious consequences for the labour market. Korea’s working-age population (15‑64) declined from 36.6 million in 2020 to 35.6 million in 2024, and Korea’s employment-to-population ratio is projected to decrease by 8.1% between 2023 and 2060; this corresponds to four times the projected decrease across the OECD (Figure 1.7). This raises the issue of how to deal with the consequences of population ageing and the level of political support for such measures (Box 1.3).

Increases in fertility rates today do not lead to a larger working-age population for several decades, so general policy needs to be adjusted to a “low-fertility future” (OECD, 2024[1]; OECD, 2025[57]). To some the issue could be addressed through productivity gains as technology endogenously responds to declines in the younger population, but to what extend that holds in a rapidly changing demographic structure such as Korea’s is unclear (Acemoglu et al., 2026[58]). An important issue is how to mobilise labour market resources using different channels in the more immediate future. For example, across the OECD there is plenty of scope to increase employment rates among older workers. However, in Korea the employment rates for older workers are already relatively high among men and women, so potential further gains in this area are very limited compared to other OECD countries (Figure 1.7).

Another option would be to harness labour migration. Addressing population decline and workforce contraction, especially in science and technology, manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, and regional economies, are objectives of Korea’s 4th Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (2023‑2027). The Basic Plan does not set numerical targets, leaving flexibility to adjust to changing economic circumstances (OECD, 2019[59]). Migration scenarios in forecasts produced by official sources have been conservative or based on lower historical trends. While most migration to Korea has been for employment, and participation rates of migrants in Korea (71.8%) are very close to those of native‑born Koreans (72.3%) (OECD, 2025[60]), the labour migration necessary to compensate for the contracting labour force would be much higher than in any recent year: more than a 10‑fold increase in net migration.

The migration scenario depicted in Figure 1.7 gives a sense of the potential impact of migration (Bassanini, 2026[61]), even though it is unlikely to materialise. Most migrants remain only temporarily in the host country and policy would have to compete effectively in attracting talent. Also, host countries’ populations are often not ready to accept large increases in foreign-born inflows, even when these could bring clear economic gains (OECD, 2025[57]). The Korean Government has been developing more detailed scenarios to guide labour migration quota setting; directing labour migration towards shortage sectors through quotas, rather than increasing overall numbers, is one way to increase the impact of inflows (OECD, 2026[62]), even if these cannot compensate for overall labour force decline.

Figure 1.7. Women and migrants can help mitigate looming labour shortages

Potential gains in employment rates from combining various scenarios, 2024‑2060, percentage points (p.p.)

Note: Adjusted from OECD Employment Outlook 2025, Figure 2.13. The figure compares the projected p.p. loss in the share of employment to total population in the baseline scenario with gains from alternative scenarios: higher-employment of older-workers (55‑64), gender equality (working age population), and high migration. The higher-employment-of-older-workers scenario is constructed by assuming that, by 2060, each country would reach in each age category above that of the 50‑54 years old (for the gender with the highest employment rate) at least the employment rate which would make the rate of decline in employment rates above 55 years of age as small as the 10th percentile of the cross-country distribution, as projected in the baseline scenario. For the other gender in each country and age category, projected employment rates are assumed to be such that they maintain the same gender employment gap as in the baseline scenario. The gender equality scenarios assume that by 2060, for both genders, employment rates in each age category are as high as that of the gender with the highest rate in the baseline scenario. The high migration scenario sets future net migration rates equal to the 75th percentile of the cross-country distribution in 2021‑2024 and further assumes the inflow is concentrated among working age migrants (Bassanini, 2026[61]). Projected employment-to-population loss: p.p. loss in employment-to-population ratios as projected in the baseline scenario. OECD: Weighted average of OECD countries. p.p.: percentage points. See source for more information.

Source: OECD (2025[57]), OECD Employment Outlook 2025, https://doi.org/10.1787/194a947b-en.

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Box 1.3. Opinions on dealing with the consequences of labour shortages

The 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (OECD, 2025[2]) found that Koreans report a much stronger support for fertility measures as a response to labour shortages than elsewhere: 61% of Koreans support such measures compared to 43% of respondents across the OECD on average (Figure 1.8). Looking beyond fertility, 70% of Korean respondents support increased use of technology to improve efficiencies in the workplace, 65% support measures to increase the participation of women and other underrepresented groups in the labour market, and 64% support actions to encourage part-time workers to transition to full-time hours. Compared to the OECD average, Koreans are much more supportive of encouraging people to work longer (63% versus 34%), but as in other OECD countries support for more immigration is relatively limited.

Figure 1.8. Koreans are supportive of encouraging people to have more children

Share (%) of respondents who support responses to labour shortages, Korea and OECD average, 2024

Note: What degree do you oppose or support the following measures to address worker shortages in your country? a) Encouraging longer working lives, b) Encouraging people to have more children, c) Increasing migration to bring more workers into the country, d) Supporting the greater participation of women and other underrepresented groups in the labour market, e) Increasing the use of technology to improve efficiencies in the workplace, and f) Encouraging part-time workers to transition to full-time hours.” Response items a) through f) were randomly rotated. Response options were: “Strongly oppose,” “Oppose,” “Neither support nor oppose,” “Support,” “Strongly support,” and “Can’t choose.” Estimates refers to the combined share of “Support” and “Strongly support.”

Source: OECD Secretariat calculations using the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey, (OECD, 2025[2]).

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1.6.3. Closing the gender gap in employment

Closing the gender gap in employment appears to be another potentially impactful avenue for addressing labour shortages (Figure 1.7), and it is estimated that simultaneously closing gender gaps in labour force participation and working hours could boost annual growth by 0.23 p.p., boosting GDP per capita by 8.9% by 2060 (Fluchtmann, Keese and Adema, 2024[63]).

If women in Korea were able to combine work and family life, this could contribute to both better economic outcomes and higher fertility rates. More options to combine work and family commitments, along with greater societal emphasis on gender equality, help explain why women’s employment rates that were negatively linked to fertility in the past, are now positively associated across the OECD on average (Fluchtmann, van Veen and Adema, 2023[64]). This shift reflects that supportive family environments (e.g. parental leave, childcare, flexible working arrangements, sharing of caregiving) reduced work – life conflicts, and promoting women’s employment can be consistent with both economic goals and increased fertility rates with the right institutional context (e.g. (Goldin, 2026[65])).

This is not yet the case in Korea. Family policy has shifted towards the reconciliation of work and family life, through important progress in parental leave, ECEC and OSH-service provision. However, labour market institutions and workplace cultures have not changed at the same pace as public family policy. Workplace cultures should change so that all new mothers can take leave to remain in employment, mothers with older children can find quality regular employment after a career break, and all fathers can use their leave entitlements. Reducing the long working hours that still prevail in Korea is also important. Flexible working hours and teleworking need to be made more widely available in Korean workplaces to help reconcile work and care commitments.

Greater gender equality is needed in society. Clearly, at present the Korean economy does not make efficient use of investment in human capital of either men or women. Moreover, the dynamics of population ageing are such that increased female labour force participation, longer working lives and increased productivity are needed to keep Korea’s economic engine going.

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