Exploring Korea’s Fertility, Work, and Family Policy Trends

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4 November 2026

2. Unpacking declining fertility in Korea

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Abstract

At less than one child per woman, Korea has the lowest total fertility rate of all OECD countries. This chapter compares fertility trends in Korea with other OECD countries and highlights (potential) drivers of observed trends, including economic and financial insecurity, housing affordability and accessibility, challenges balancing work and life, changing attitudes and norms toward family, and more.

2.1. Introduction and main findings

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Fertility rates are declining worldwide, but the fall has been especially dramatic in Korea. These declines in fertility have contributed to population ageing (OECD, 2024[1]; OECD, 2024[2]; OECD, 2023[3]), which has negative implications for economic growth (André, Gal and Schief, 2024[4]; OECD, 2025[5]) and the sustainability of social protection systems (OECD, 2024[1]).

Governments are concerned about these outcomes, but so are people, especially people in Korea. In the 2024 Risks that Matter (RtM) Survey, Koreans, for instance, are 20 percentage points (p.p.) more likely than those in OECD countries, on average, to report that they are concerned about population ageing (85% versus 65%) (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Concerns about population ageing are highest in Korea
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Share (%) of respondents who are somewhat or very concerned about population ageing beyond the next ten years, by country, 2024

The declining fertility rate is a pressing policy concern in Korea. But what types of measures can encourage people to have more children? To answer this question, this chapter looks at what factors might be leading people to choose to have no children or fewer children than desired. This chapter begins with an analysis of fertility trends in Korea, related shifts in marriage and family formation patterns, and trends in expected and ideal number of children. It then explores (potential) drivers of observed declines in fertility such as economic and financial insecurity, the costs of raising children, challenges balancing work and life, the marriage market squeeze and changing attitudes towards marriage and family.

2.1.1. Main findings

Korea’s total fertility rate has dropped sharply from about six children per woman in 1960 to under one in 2023 – the lowest among all OECD countries.
Declines in fertility in Korea can be traced to two interrelated shifts: first, marriage is strongly linked to fertility, and fewer people are marrying, and second, people who marry are marrying later and having fewer or no children. Intentions to remain childless are also high in Korea, with 52% of women (the highest among OECD countries with available data) and 45% of men aged 50 or younger intending to have no children, according to the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey.
A complex mix of interrelated factors contributes to Korea’s ultra-low fertility, including social, institutional and economic conditions (e.g. job security and housing affordability) as well as cultural shifts in values, priorities, and gender roles.
Economic and financial insecurity is on the rise among young people in Korea, playing a key role in their decisions about having children.
Rising and high costs of raising children can reduce fertility. In the Korean context, private education costs are a major component of the costs of raising children, reflecting a highly competitive education and labour market.
Suitable housing is crucial for family formation. In Korea, housing challenges (e.g. high costs, low availability, unstable tenure, price volatility) are associated with reduced or delayed marriage and childbirth.
Traditional gender norms around paid and unpaid work are common across OECD countries and create a work – life conflict that can impact women’s fertility (intentions). This tension may be especially strong in Korea due to the combination of long working hours, intensive parenting norms, persistent gender ideologies, and rapid expansions in women’s educational and economic opportunities.
Imbalances in Korean dating and marriage markets – i.e. more men than women of marriageable age – make it harder for young men to find spouses.
Social isolation is high in Korea, with as many as 5% of young adults aged 19‑39 years experiencing extreme social withdrawal. By limiting the development of meaningful social networks, this social isolation could contribute to declines in fertility through a lowered probability of finding a suitable partner.
Infertility and access to affordable infertility treatments can influence whether (and when) people are able to have children. In Korea, about 17% of women in legal and common-law marriages report experiences with infertility.
Although economic, social, and cultural factors dominate explanations for declining fertility, physical and mental health and global uncertainty – including around climate change and rising tensions – may also play a role in shaping fertility and reproductive intentions.

2.2. Fertility rates in Korea are the lowest among OECD countries

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Total fertility rates (TFRs) have declined rapidly in Korea since 1960, falling from six children per woman in 1960 to less than one in 2023 (Figure 2.2.). Declines were extremely rapid between 1960 and 1988, with fertility rates falling by 4.5 births per woman over this period, or about 0.2 births per woman per year. Since 1988, declines have continued until 2024, but at a reduced rate.

Looking across countries in 2023, no other OECD country had a fertility rate below 1 birth per woman. In addition, in the OECD, on average, fertility rates sat at about 1.4 births per woman, almost double that of Korea.

Recent quarterly estimates from Statistics Korea show that the birthrate in Korea has been increasing on a year-on-year basis since the second quarter of 2024 (Figure 2.3, Panel A), while annual estimates of the TFR increased from 0.72 children per woman in 2023, to 0.8 in 2025. Such developments should be viewed with caution. On the one hand, the increase may reflect changes to social, economic and policy environments that support family formation and childbirth. On the other hand, it may also reflect the relatively large size of the “echo boom” generation (i.e. children born to Baby Boomers from the late‑1980s to the mid‑1990s), who are now of prime marriageable and childbearing ages (i.e. 30‑35 years) (Figure 2.3., Panel B).

Figure 2.2. Below-replacement fertility in Korea for decades and lowest of OECD countries
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Total fertility rates (TFRs), number of children per woman aged 15‑49 years, Korea and OECD average, 1960-2024 (Panel A) and Korea and selected OECD countries, 2024 (Panel B)

Figure 2.3. Recent spikes in births in Korea may “echo” spikes in births in previous cohorts
Copy link to Figure 2.3. Recent spikes in births in Korea may “echo” spikes in births in previous cohorts

Year-over-year change in number of live births, quarterly, Korea, 1981-2026 (Panel A) and number of live births, Korea, 1950-2024 (Panel B)

Generally speaking, declines in fertility in Korea can be traced to two interrelated shifts. First, fewer people are marrying, and there is a strong link between marriage and children in Korea. Second, people who marry are marrying later and having fewer or no children (Hwang, 2023[10]). Each is examined below.

2.2.1. Fewer people are marrying, and marriage is strongly linked to children in Korea

In the last half century, crude marriage rates in Korea have fallen dramatically, from 9 marriages per 1 000 people to 4 marriages per 1 000 people (Figure 2.4). This decline in crude marriage rates is matched by an increase in singleness. Among men aged 30‑39 years in Korea, the share of single and never married men increased by 38 p.p. between the 1950s and the 2010s, from about 3% to about 41% (Figure 2.5). This is some of the largest growth of all OECD countries with available data. Women in Korea saw this share increase by 24 p.p., from less than 1% to 24%, also some of the largest growth among OECD countries. Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and France post larger growth.

Figure 2.4. Marriage rates in Korea have fallen rapidly
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Crude marriage rate, marriages per 1 000 people, 1970 and 2022 or latest available year

Compared to Korea, however, these countries combine their high rates of singleness with high shares of births outside of marriage – surpassing 40% in all five cases (Chapter 3). By comparison, in Korea, less than 5% of children are born to unmarried parents. This suggests that strong declines in marriage rates and increased singleness are important factors explaining declines in fertility rates in Korea, reflecting that many Koreans believe that marriage is necessary for children (Tan, Cui and Uchikoshi, 2025[11]; Myong, Park and Yi, 2020[12]).

Figure 2.5. Dramatic increases in singleness in Korea
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Change in share (%) of population aged 30‑39 years who are single and never married, men and women, p.p., 1950s to 2010s

2.2.2. People who marry are doing so later and having fewer children

Korean men and women are marrying later and having fewer children at later ages. The mean age at first marriage in Korea for women was 31 in 2021 (Figure 2.6). This is notably higher than in the 1990s, when women first married at age 25 years. Compared to OECD countries, on average, the age at first marriage for Korean women has grown faster – rising by 6 years between the 1990s and 2021 versus only 4 years for the OECD.

Figure 2.6. The average age at first marriage has risen in Korea
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Average age at first marriage, women, Korea and selected OECD countries, 1990s and 2021 (Panel A) and average age at first marriage, men and women, Korea, 1990-2021 (Panel B)

This rise has been matched by a rise in the average age at first childbirth (Box 2.1). On average, in 2000, Korean women gave birth around 28 years of age (Figure 2.7), which by 2024 had increased to 33 years of age. The highest age at first childbirth of all OECD countries with available data (OECD, 2026[7]).

Box 2.1. Later marriages: Does educational expansion play a role in childlessness?

Copy link to Box 2.1. Later marriages: Does educational expansion play a role in childlessness?

Educational attainment is often cited as a key factor behind later marriages and delayed childbearing: as women pursue longer and higher levels of education, they tend to marry and have children later, if at all (Tan, 2022[13]; Lee and Zeman, 2024[14]). But recent work by Lee and Zeman (2024[14]) and Hwang (2023[10]) challenges this view, showing that expansions in women’s educational attainment are not a primary cause of increased childlessness in Korea. Indeed, Korean women across all levels of educational attainment are increasingly postponing and forgoing marriage and childbirth, and although lower-educated women marry earlier, they are more likely to remain childless.

Broader socio‑economic changes are more likely to have played a role in reshaping marriage and fertility behaviours (Chapter 3), but educational expansion may still have played an indirect role through changes in values and attitudes relating to family and children (Chapter 3) and through increased competition in the labour market (Chapter 5).

Figure 2.7. Korean women give birth to their first child later than women in other OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.7. Korean women give birth to their first child later than women in other OECD countries

Average age at first birth, 2000 and 2024

Women in Korea are also having fewer children relative to peers. In 2022, 57% of births in Korea were first-borns – the highest rate of all OECD countries (Figure 2.8).

In addition, there is a growing number of (married) men and women in Korea (and in the world at large) who are choosing to have no children, with new research on advanced economies suggesting that childlessness explains 38% of the decline in cohort fertility (Geruso and Spears, 2025[15]).

In the Korean context specifically, in recent years, there has been a rapid rise in childlessness. Among those born in 1935, only 4% were childless (OECD, 2024[16]). For those born in 1965, this rose slightly to 7%. For those born five years later, in 1970, the share was 13% (OECD, 2024[16]), and for those born ten years after that, in 1980, the share jumped even further to 27% (Lee and Zeman, 2024[14]). Other research suggests that rates of childlessness are poised to continue to rise (Sobotka, 2021[17]).

Figure 2.8. Korea has the highest share of first-borns and the lowest share of higher order children
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Share (%) of births by birth order, 2022

Intentions to remain childless are also high in Korea. According to the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter (RTM) Survey, in Korea, 52% of women aged 50 years or less without children indicated that they intend to have no children. This is the highest of all OECD countries with available data and compares to an OECD average of 37%. Among similarly aged men without children in Korea, this share is 45% (Figure 2.9). This may partly reflect the growing social acceptance of childlessness (Box 2.2).

Figure 2.9. Nearly half of all Koreans aged 50 or younger intend to remain childless
Copy link to Figure 2.9. Nearly half of all Koreans aged 50 or younger intend to remain childless

Share (%) of respondents aged 50 years or less and without children who indicate that they intend to have no children by gender 2024

Box 2.2. Choosing to be childless

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A growing number of people are choosing to remain childless, and childlessness is increasingly accepted. At the same time that general acceptance is growing, individuals without children – especially women – may face backlash or discrimination, both at work and in society (Verniers, 2020[18]; Ashburn-Nardo, 2016[19]; Koropeckyj-Cox et al., 2015[20]; Vinson, Mollen and Smith, 2010[21]; McCutcheon, 2018[22]; UNFPA, 2025[23]; de La Rochebrochard and Rozée, 2022[24]; Savage, 2023[25]). Such negativity may impact women’s labour market, health and social outcomes. Across five survey experiments in the United States, Szekeres, Halperin and Saguy (2023[26]) found that “voluntarily childless women elicit more negative reactions than mothers, and importantly, also more than women violating other gender norms in the realm of occupation, power or sexual orientation.” Szekeres, Halperin and Saguy (2023[26]) also found that women who are childless involuntarily do not face the same negativity.

As women increasingly choose not to have children, it will be important to understand the experiences of both women with and women without children (whether by choice or not) in the labour market and beyond (U.S. Census Bureau, 2022[27]; Sobotka, 2021[17]; Provencher and Galbraith, 2024[28]; OECD, 2024[2]).

Government policies must also be careful not to coerce or shame women and men into having children, which risks producing more harm than good (Gietel-Basten, Rotkirch and Sobotka, 2022[29]; UNFPA, 2025[23]). Instead, governments should focus on creating the economic, social and environmental conditions in which individuals want to have children. Since decisions about parenthood are shaped by a web of complex and interrelated considerations – including financial security, access to affordable housing, work – life balance, gender equality, healthcare, childcare availability, and broader cultural norms – governments must take a concerted, co‑ordinated and sustained approach to removing potential barriers to fertility.

Box 2.3. What about childless men?

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Official statistics on childlessness typically focus on women, but many men also remain childless, and in many cultures and contexts, it is more common for men to remain childless than women (Liu et al., 2023[30]; Schubert and Dudel, 2025[31]; Schubert, 2025[32]). In Finland, for example, 29% of men and 21% of women are childless. Given the strong relationship between education and income, childlessness is also found to be more prevalent among less education men. In Norway, for example, 72% of men in the lowest 5% of earners are childless, compared to only 11% among the highest earners (Hegarty, 2024[33]). Understanding who remains childless and why – and recognising that those reasons may differ between men and women across social and economic characteristics – is important for better designing and targeting interventions, especially since evidence suggests that the reasons people remain childless and the conditions they state they require in order to have children often differ by gender. For example, if men’s childlessness is more often linked to economic insecurity (Section 2.4.1), while women’s childlessness is more often connected to work – life balance concerns (Section 2.4.4), designing fertility policies only around helping couples manage work and children (e.g. childcare subsidies, parental leave) may miss the men who are not forming couples at all.

2.3. Koreans appear to be having fewer children than desired

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Massive declines in fertility in Korea have occurred despite small(er) declines in reported ideal and expected number of children. Indeed, if respondents to recent surveys were to have their expected number of children, Koreans would have more than one additional baby per woman and not be too far off the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman (Figure 2.10).

Figure 2.10. Actual fertility rates are far below expected and ideal fertility
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Ideal and expected number of children among married women and total fertility rates, Korea, 1976-2023

Other surveys also found results that point to a potential gap between ideals, expectations, intentions and reality (Box 2.4). OECD (2025[6]) showed that Korean respondents under the age of 50 years intended to have 1.2 children (Figure 2.11, Panel A), while this is 1.8 across the OECD on average. It is also less than in other Korean surveys that focus on married women (Figure 2.10), but still about 0.4 more than current fertility rates (Figure 2.11, Panel B).

Box 2.4. Fertility intentions, ideals and expectations

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Each of these three fertility concepts – intentions, ideals and expectations – offers a distinct perspective on reproductive decision making. Ideal fertility reflects values, norms, and cultural beliefs, not concrete plans or expectations. Intended fertility is more volitional than expected fertility – it captures what people aim to achieve, not necessarily what they predict will happen. Expected fertility reflects people’s anticipations or forecasts based on real-life circumstances.

Given the availability of modern contraception, which enables reproductive choice, individuals can more precisely control if and when to have children. This control can help people align intentions with outcomes, but it also allows people to choose to postpone or forgo children due to competing priorities or constraints. This can also explain why intended and expected fertility are, on average, lower than ideal fertility. According to a survey from 2021, 68% of women aged 19‑49 years in Korea were using a modern method of contraception, including female or male sterilisation, intrauterine device (IUD), implant, injectable, pill, female or male condom, vaginal barrier methods, lactational amenorrhea method (LAM), emergency contraception or another modern method (United Nations Population Division, 2024[36]).

Figure 2.11. Koreans intend to have fewer children than respondents in other OECD countries
Copy link to Figure 2.11. Koreans intend to have fewer children than respondents in other OECD countries

Intended number of children (Panel A) and gap between intended number of children and fertility rates (Panel B)

2.4. Many interrelated social and economic factors contribute to declining fertility in Korea

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Low fertility rates cannot be explained by a single cause. Rather, a web of interrelated factors has reshaped individual choices, leading to delayed or no childbearing (Yoo, Sung and Chung, 2024[37]; Oh and Seo, 2025[38]; Jones, 2019[39]; OECD, 2024[40]). These can include social, institutional and economic factors, such as job security, housing affordability and childcare availability, but also more difficult-to-quantify cultural factors, such as shifting norms, priorities and expectations about work, parenting, lifestyles and gender roles (Goldin, 2026[41]; Schettini-Kearney and Levine, 2025[42]).

A recent survey, for example, found that among respondents in Korea who wish to have at least one child, the most commonly cited reason for not achieving intended fertility was financial limitations (58%) followed by housing limitations (31%). These are substantially higher than OECD averages (Figure 2.12). Lack of sufficient or quality childcare (28%), unemployment or job insecurity (26%) and insufficient involvement of partner in housework or childcare (19%) were also highly cited reasons, and higher than the OECD average.

Another survey in Korea presents similar reasons among people who indicate that they do not wish to have any children but also shows that factors can and do differ by gender (OECD, 2025[34]). Among Koreans aged 20‑44 years, for example, 28% of men indicated they do not want to have children because it is difficult to make children happy and 26% indicated that it is because they will be better off financially without children (Figure 2.13). For women, the top reported response was because children would take away their freedom (32%).

Figure 2.12. Financial limitations and housing conditions are key factors limiting fertility in Korea
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Share (%) of respondents indicating selected reasons for not achieving desired fertility, 2024

Figure 2.13. Men and women report different reasons for childlessness
Copy link to Figure 2.13. Men and women report different reasons for childlessness

Share (%) of respondents selecting specified reasons as reasons for not wanting children, Korea, 2018

This is mirrored by results from the 20s‑30s Youth Life Outlook Perception Survey, which found that the top 3 prerequisites for men to have children differ dramatically from the top 3 prerequisites for women (Kim, 2020[43]). For men, conditions are principally economic (e.g. pass on a better life to my child, financial preparedness, stable job), while for women, conditions are principally related to sharing of caregiving (e.g. partner actively participates in parenting, partner fairly divides housework, partner’s company has paternity and childcare leave). The next sections explore these various factors, using a broad thematic approach.

2.4.1. Economic and financial insecurity may drive down fertility rates

Economic and financial insecurity is considerable and rising in Korea for young people. Between 2014 and 2024, temporary employment rates in Korea for youth aged 15‑24 years increased by about 10 p.p., from 26% to 36%. This compares to a lower share and almost no change in OECD countries, on average.

Given such levels and trends, it is perhaps not surprising that, according to a recent survey of 46 countries, perceptions of economic and financial insecurity are higher among younger generations in Korea than elsewhere. In 2022, 43% of Gen Z Koreans and 49% of Millennial Koreans reported being concerned about the cost of living, including housing, transportation and other bills. This compares to 29% of Gen Z and 36% of Millennials in other countries. Younger Koreans also appear to be more pessimistic about the economy: 43% of Korean members of Gen Z think the country’s economic situation will worsen in the next 12 months, compared to 37% of non-Korean members of Gen Z (Park, 2022[44]).

Perceived and actual economic and financial insecurity play a central role in shaping fertility. Recent results from the 2024 Risks that Matter Survey, for example, show that intended fertility is lower in those countries with higher temporary employment rates among youth (Figure 2.15).

Figure 2.14. In Korea, temporary employment among youth has increased over the past 10 years
Copy link to Figure 2.14. In Korea, temporary employment among youth has increased over the past 10 years

Share (%) employees aged 15‑24 years old in temporary employment, Korea and OECD average, 2014 and 2025

Figure 2.15. Temporary employment among youth and intended fertility
Copy link to Figure 2.15. Temporary employment among youth and intended fertility

Share (%) of those aged 15‑24 years in temporary employment and intended fertility among those aged 18‑29 years

This link between economic and financial (in)security and fertility is confirmed by many other surveys and studies (Lopes, 2020[45]; Fleckenstein, Lee and Mohun Himmelweit, 2023[46]; Bono, Weber and Winter-Ebmer, 2014[47]; Alderotti et al., 2021[48]; van Wijk, de Valk and Liefbroer, 2022[49]; Scherer and Brini, 2023[50]). Research using a French labour market reform, for example, has found that younger workers feeling insecure about their jobs reduced their fertility (D’Ambrosio, Lepinteur and Clark, 2023[51]). Using a quasi‑experimental design, Alderotti et al. (2024[52]) found that, in Italy, people with irregular or unstable employment histories are less likely to become parents at all, and when they do, they tend to have fewer children than those who experience steady, uninterrupted careers. In the context of Korea, specifically, marriage intentions have been found to be higher among employed individuals than unemployed individuals (Hwang et al., 2023[53]), and marriage is intimately linked to fertility in Korea. Panel data analyses of 16 cities and provinces between 2005 and 2021 further show that employment insecurity is a main cause of low fertility, alongside competitive pressure (see below) and housing (Hwang et al., 2023[53]). Other studies zeroing in on Korea found similar results, with job security linked to marriage intentions and/or childbirth intentions (Jung, 2021[54]; Nam and Hwang, 2023[55]; Lim, 2021[56]; Yi and Lee, 2011[57]).

Box 2.5. Growing concerns that children will miss out on progress

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Perceptions of the state and direction of the world can play a significant role in shaping fertility choices (Section 2.4.8). Increasingly, potential parents express doubt about whether future generations will enjoy the same opportunities, stability or quality of life as previous ones. Such pessimism – about social, economic and environmental prospects – has been linked to reduced intentions to have children. Recent research, for instance, finds that individuals who hold negative views about the future are significantly less likely to plan or desire parenthood, suggesting that declining confidence in intergenerational progress may itself be a factor in fertility decline (Ivanova and Balbo, 2024[58]).

In Korea, specifically, the share of people who believe that today’s children will grow up to be worse off than their parents reached 60% in 2022. Although not the highest of all available OECD countries, Korea posted the highest growth rate – a 23‑p.p. increase – between 2013 and 2022 (Figure 2.16).

Figure 2.16. Rapid growth in concerns over children’s futures in Korea
Copy link to Figure 2.16. Rapid growth in concerns over children’s futures in Korea

Change (p.p.) in share (%) of respondents who report thinking that when children today grow up, they will be worse off financially than their parents, 2013 and 2022 or latest

2.4.2. Cost of raising children: substantial private education costs reduce fertility

Economic and financial insecurity can interact with the rising and high costs of raising children to reduce fertility, including higher birth orders (see Chapter 4). Hwang et al. (2023[53]), for example, found that 44% of respondents select the high cost of raising and educating children as the reason for delaying or opting out of childbearing.

In the Korean context, private education costs are a major component of the costs of raising children, reflecting the determination of parents to raise children who will be successful in a highly competitive society (Box 2.6). Koreans’ preoccupation with providing their children with a good quality education is evident in the World Values Survey (WVS), where 64% of Koreans reported being concerned about not being able to give their children a good education. This compares to an OECD average of 42%.1

Box 2.6. Competitive pressure in Korean society

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Cross-regional and cross-country panel analyses show that young people facing intense competitive pressure expressed a markedly lower desire to have children (Hwang et al., 2023[53]). This is an important finding given the extreme competitive pressure that exists in education and employment in Korea (Chapters 4 and 5 for more detail).

In Korea, competition is driven by both cultural and institutional factors. A deeply rooted hierarchical culture shaped by Confucian traditions, honorific language systems, and strong norms of social comparison normalises ranking and status differentiation from an early age (Kim, 2021[59]). As a result, education functions as a key mechanism of social stratification, where university prestige strongly determines life outcomes. This cultural foundation sustains intense academic competition, widespread private tutoring, and high pressure on families to secure educational advantages.

The competitive pressure is also a feature of Korea’s dual labour market, where at one end of the scale there are a limited number of high-quality jobs (e.g. large companies, permanent contracts) while employment conditions are poor in low-paid and/or unstable employment (e.g. SMEs, temporary contracts). Mobility between these sectors is limited and with the continuous rise in temporary and contractual work, wage disparity is increasing. According to the Ministry of Employment and Labour’s Survey on Working Conditions by Employment Type, the wage gap between regular and non-regular workers has grown from 56% in 2008 to 66% in 2024 (Korean Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2025[60]).

Since 2020, private education expenditure grew to KRW 29 192 billion in 2024 to decline to KRW 27 535 billion (just over 1% of GDP) in 2025 (KOSIS, 2026[61]). On a per student basis, average monthly private education expenditures were KRW 474 000 (USD 347) in 2024 but declined to KRW 458 000, or about 10.8% of average wages. With participation rates in private education among elementary, middle and high school students standing at about 80%, these costs are borne by most families (KOSIS, 2026[62]). Participation rates in private education are also expanding among preschool-aged children. According to the Korea Institute of Childcare and Education, the private education participation rate has also increased for two‑year-olds, from 41% to 51% between 2016 and 2024 (KICCE, 2025[63]).

Figure 2.17. Private education expenditures in Korea are much higher in 2025 than in 2020
Copy link to Figure 2.17. Private education expenditures in Korea are much higher in 2025 than in 2020

Average monthly private education expenditures per student, 10 000 won (left axis) and education expenditures as a share of average wages (%, right axis)

Education expenditures in Korea are much higher than in other OECD countries: with over 5% of final household consumption expenditure going toward education, this is more than three times the average across the OECD (Chapter 4).

Much research shows that these substantial financial resources devoted toward private education – with the goal of helping children gain admission to elite universities and secure high-status careers – are an important factor shaping fertility decisions and contributing to ultra-low fertility rates in Korea (Anderson and Kohler, 2013[64]; Ho and Wang, 2024[65]; Choi, Park and Lee, 2024[66]; Tan, Morgan and Zagheni, 2016[67]; Park and Park, 2023[68]; Park, 2025[69]; Kim, 2017[70]; Kim, Tertilt and Yum, 2024[71]; Park, Cho and Kim, 2023[72]; Mahler, Tertilt and Yum, 2025[73]) (Chapter 4). Sung (2023[74]) quantified the contribution of education costs to fertility declines in recent years and found that approximately 26% of the decrease in the fertility rate from 2015 to 2022 is due to the increase in private education costs.

The burden of private education in Korea extends beyond finances, with parents devoting substantial time resources to educating children. This type of unpaid work – a form of “helicopter, intensive or tiger” parenting – is considered common in Korea (Lee, 2025[75]; Mesmer, 2025[76]; OECD, 2019[77]). Research also suggests that this education-related unpaid work – often carried out by mothers – may represent a significant factor influencing fertility, especially regarding the fulfilment of second-birth intentions (Yoon, 2016[78]). This underscores the need to consider the full scope of “unpaid work” when examining how the division of labour shapes fertility choices within households.

2.4.3. Housing availability and costs play an important role in family planning

Access to affordable housing can play a key role in enabling family formation (Chapter 4). When the costs of securing a stable home are higher, young people do not feel that they can afford to start a family. As a result, they may live at home longer to save and delay starting a family until they feel more stable (Hwang, 2023[10]; Lim, 2021[56]; Schettini-Kearney and Levine, 2025[42]). In a survey experiment in Korea, for example, the desired number of children was lower among respondents in the treatment group who were provided with information about housing costs than among respondents in the control group who did not receive such information (Hwang et al., 2023[53]).

Cross-region and cross-country panel research also shows that rising home prices can lead to a decline in fertility (Fluchtmann, van Veen and Adema, 2023[79]; Hwang et al., 2023[53]). Several additional empirical studies in Korea further demonstrate that housing challenges (e.g. high costs, limited availability, price volatility, population concentration) are associated with later marriage and/or fewer births (Chapter 4). Research from other countries and contexts confirms this important relationship between housing and fertility is not unique to Korea (Atalay, Li and Whelan, 2021[80]; Bai et al., 2025[81]; Brauner-Otto, 2021[82]; Clark, Yi and Zhang, 2020[83]; Cumming and Dettling, 2020[84]; Dettling and Kearney, 2025[85]; van Doornik et al., 2024[86]; OECD, 2025[87]; Saguin, 2021[88]; Weiwei and Pu, 2026[89]).

These findings are further supported by results combining data from the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey with data from the OECD Affordable Housing Database, which show that actual and perceived housing conditions are correlated with intended fertility (Figure 2.18). A 10‑p.p. increase in the share living with parents or other adults, for example, is associated with a reduction of 0.035 in intended fertility. This coefficient is 0.026 for concern about finding adequate housing. Taken together, these results suggest that stabilising housing prices and implementing targeted housing support policies may be crucial for increasing first births (Park, 2025[69]).

Figure 2.18. Housing is a major factor in determining intended fertility
Copy link to Figure 2.18. Housing is a major factor in determining intended fertility

Correlation between share (%) of people aged 20‑29 years living with parents, other youth or adults and intended fertility among those aged 18‑29 years (Panel A) and share (%) of respondents aged 18‑29 years concerned about not being able to find and/or maintain adequate housing beyond the next ten years and intended fertility among those aged 18‑29 years (Panel B)

2.4.4. Challenges balancing work and family can impact fertility intentions

In OECD countries and around the world, gender norms encouraging a traditional division of labour between men and women persist, with men believed to have the primary responsibility for earning money and women believed to have the primary responsibility for caring for children (OECD, 2025[91]). Such gendered perceptions of “responsibility” for unpaid work are apparent across OECD countries, but Korea posts one of the largest gender gaps, with women doing 122 minutes more unpaid work per day than men – or about 2 hours more (Figure 2.19). Other surveys focussing on Korea show similar gaps in time use (Kim, 2024[92]).

Figure 2.19. Large gender gaps in hours of unpaid work in Korea
Copy link to Figure 2.19. Large gender gaps in hours of unpaid work in Korea

Gender gap in unpaid work, number of minutes per day, women less men, 2025 or latest (2021 or after)

This traditional division of labour can lead both parents to face intense work/family balance conflict, with men often spending less time with their loved ones, while women are often forced to (feel they need to) choose between their careers and their family. The conflict between work and life may be particularly intense in cultures and contexts with long working hours (Chapter 5), intensive parenting norms, and persistent gender ideologies (Chapter 3), like Korea. Rapid expansions in women’s educational and economic opportunities – another distinct feature of Korea relative to other OECD countries – has also been found to further intensify this conflict between work and family (Myong, Park and Yi, 2020[12]; Goldin, 2025[100]). This reflects that as women’s opportunities expand, internalised gender norms and stereotypes combine with social and policy environments, structural barriers, bias and discrimination to create a high labour market opportunity cost for women, especially mothers (Chapter 5, (OECD, 2025[91]; OECD, 2025[101]; OECD, 2025[102]; Choi et al., 2024[103]). It further reflects that as women’s opportunities expand, preferences may change, and women may place (greater) value on different life choices, such as personal fulfilment and career (Schettini-Kearney and Levine, 2025[42]; Choi et al., 2024[103]).

Such conflicts between work and family (and leisure) have important implications for fertility (Box 2.7), with much research confirming that work-life balance challenges can reduce birth intentions, especially when there is a lack of affordable, accessible and high-quality childcare, limited flexibility at work, poorly paid family leave and little sharing of unpaid work between partners (Kim, 2023[104]; Ahn et al., 2021[105]; Park, Cho and Kim, 2023[72]; OECD, 2024[40]; Raybould and Sear, 2020[106]; Choi et al., 2024[103]; Kim, 2017[70]; Bratsberg and Walther, 2025[107]; Lee and Liu, 2024[108]; OECD, 2025[34]). This is true of OECD contexts more generally, including Korea, where difficulties in combining employment and family formation have increasingly contributed to women delaying or forgoing marriage and childbearing. Choi et al. (2024[103]), for example, show that, up until around 2010, women negotiated this conflict by delaying marriage and childbirth and reducing lifetime fertility, but “almost all women eventually got married and had at least one child.” By comparison, in more recent years, women are increasingly choosing to remain unmarried or to remain childless upon marriage.

Box 2.7. If social and cultural conditions are similar, why are fertility rates higher in Japan?

Copy link to Box 2.7. If social and cultural conditions are similar, why are fertility rates higher in Japan?

As in Korea, in Japan, marriage is seen as a prerequisite for children, and few children are born to unmarried mothers (Figure 3.1). Japanese women also face a highly unequal division of unpaid work by gender (Figure 2.19), contributing to large child or motherhood penalties to employment (Figure 3.16). Despite these similarities, fertility rates are 0.5 children per woman higher in Japan than in Korea. Why?

One important distinction is the age at marriage and at first childbirth. Although Japanese women are less likely to marry than Korean women, when they do marry, they marry earlier (29 years versus 31 years). Delayed marriage means delayed childbirth, especially in countries where marriage is seen as a precondition for children. Indeed, in Japan, first childbirth occurs at around age 31, while in Korea, it occurs at around age 33. These differences in timing are partly explained by the delayed entry into stable employment in the Korean labour market. Regular employment rates in Korea peak at ages 35‑39 for men and 30‑34 for women – around 10 years later for men and 5 years later for women than in Japan (Chapter 5).

Another difference concerns birth order, which is itself related to delayed childbirth. Japanese women who have children are more likely to have more than one child than their Korean counterparts (Figure 2.8). Differences in birth order may partly reflect higher costs of raising children in Korea, including private education costs. For example, among OECD countries, Korea has the largest share of education expenditure in final household consumption (5.5%), which is more than three times as high as in Japan (1.8%) (Chapter 4).

Several government policies can help to overcome these conflicts, including affordable, accessible and high-quality childcare (Chapter 4) and well-paid parental leave (Chapters 4 and 5). Policies that help to increase partner involvement in housework or childcare can further reduce work-life balance challenges and support fertility intentions (Chapter 5). Indeed, a recent survey in Korea found that childcare support (53%) and a work culture that respects a balance between work and family (48%) are seen as an important response to low fertility (KOSIS, 2024[109]). Another survey in Korea finds similar results, with well-paid childcare leave and reduced work hours as key conditions around intentions to have children (Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, 2024[110]). Chung and Lee (2022[111]) found that access to maternity leave is positively associated with the likelihood of childbirth in Korea for high income earners, underscoring the importance of improving women’s eligibility for child-related leave.

Data from the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey confirm the importance of social protection – like childcare and parental leave – for fertility intentions. Simple linear regressions show that intended fertility increases by 0.14 children when respondents agree that they have access to adequate income support upon having a child or having more children (labelled “pregnancy and childbirth” in Figure 2.20, Panel A). This coefficient is statistically significant and larger than the coefficients for all other income loss events. Only one other coefficient – illness and disability – is also significant, but the coefficient is half the size. The other coefficients – retirement, leaving work to provide care, etc. – are even smaller and statistically insignificant (i.e. error bars representing 95% confidence intervals cross zero).

Similar results emerge when relating perceptions of access to good quality affordable public services to intended fertility. Here, family supports are the most strongly related policy area to intended number of children, with a coefficient of 0.17 (Figure 2.20, Panel B). Only one other public service – long-term care for older people – is also significant, with a coefficient of 0.09. The presence of a relationship between long-term care and fertility is not surprising, since care burdens for family members, who are both complements to and substitutes for formal care services, can translate into reduced fertility desires or intentions (Chapter 3).

Figure 2.20. Perceptions of income support during pregnancy and childbirth are strongly related to intended fertility
Copy link to Figure 2.20. Perceptions of income support during pregnancy and childbirth are strongly related to intended fertility

Simple linear regression of perceptions of adequate income support by income loss event on intended fertility (Panel A) and perceptions of access to good quality affordable public services on intended fertility (Panel B).

Availability of social protection policies supporting families is, however, only one part of the problem. Take‑up is another. Despite the availability of parental leave in Korea, an intense work culture may reduce take‑up due to a fear of discrimination in the workplace and/or overburdening colleagues (Hwang et al., 2023[53]) (Chapter 5). This means that policy change also needs to be accompanied by efforts to change attitudes and norms, including around the sharing of family responsibilities. Changing such attitudes and norms will require a comprehensive approach, since there are many feedback loops that can create, reinforce or uphold gender gaps in paid and unpaid work (OECD, 2025[91]). Gender pay gaps, for example, can perpetuate gender norms around unpaid work, since rational couples who choose to have one parent stay at home will choose the parent who earns less (Stansbury, Kirkegaard and Dynan, 2023[112]).

2.4.5. Difficulties in dating and mating markets may contribute to low fertility

In most cultures and contexts, childbearing is tied to partnership or marriage, and this is especially true in Korea. This means that an inability to find a (suitable) partner may limit fertility. According to recent survey results, about 10% of Korean respondents identify the lack of a (suitable) partner as a factor contributing to lower-than-expected fertility (Figure 2.12. ). This inability to find a (suitable) partner may be linked to several factors, including the marriage market squeeze, dating issues (Box 2.8), and social withdrawal.

Box 2.8. Gender-based (dating) violence persists in Korea

Copy link to Box 2.8. Gender-based (dating) violence persists in Korea

Evidence points to persistent and pervasive intimate partner violence in Korea. In 2024, an in-person survey among 7 027 women indicated that 36.1% of women had experienced violence at least once in their lifetime (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2025[113]). Between 2016 and 2018, the number of dating violence reports rose from 9 364 to 15 150 (Police Science Institute, 2019[114]) (Jeong, 2019[115]). In 2025, 105 344 cases of dating violence‑related 112 reports were recorded by the National Police Agency, up from 57 305 in 2021 (National Policy Agency, 2026[116]). The number of people arrested for dating violence also rose from 8 367 in 2016 to 14 900 in 2024 (National Police Agency, 2025[117]). Reported cases of stalking – often a forewarning of more severe violence – have risen as well, from 5 468 in 2019 to 31 824 in 2023 (Ma, 2025[118]). The share of women reporting image‑based sexual abuse by former partners increased from 13.8% in 2022 to 42.5% in 2025, while sexual assault by former partners increased from 5.6% to 14.6% (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2026[119]).

Some of these increases may stem from changes over time in norms and stigma around reporting and perceptions of violence, some may reflect raised public awareness, and some may derive from strengthened government intervention and reporting mechanisms (OECD, 2019[77]; OECD, 2025[91]; OECD, 2026[120]).

Marriage market squeeze

Difficulties in dating and marriage markets may partly reflect Korea’s “marriage market squeeze,” with young men currently outnumbering young women in the marriageable age range. In 2022, for every 100 women aged 25‑29 years, there were 114 men of the same age. Among those aged 30‑34 years, the sex ratio was 113. This compares to ratios of around 100 in OECD countries, on average (Chapter 3).

Social withdrawal and social isolation

Social withdrawal and social isolation can lead to a decline of meaningful social networks and opportunities, which may contribute to declines in fertility via an inability or unwillingness to meet potential partners. In the Korean context, research suggests that about 5% of young adults aged 19‑39 years may be experiencing extreme social withdrawal (Shin, Pyo and Kim, 2024[121]; Son, 2023[122]). Although definitions differ, making direct comparisons difficult, in Japan, Cabinet Office estimates from 2022 suggests that 2% of those aged 15‑39 years are in a state of social withdrawal (Kato, Sartorius and Shinfuku, 2024[123]).

Results from the 2024 Time Use Survey also show that social isolation may be increasing, with 42% of respondents eating breakfast alone, up 3 p.p. from 2019 (Kim and Park, 2025[124]). Over one in four are also eating lunch (27%) and dinner (26%) alone. In addition to eating alone, over half of all leisure time (53% of 5 hours and 8 minutes) was dedicated to media consumption, including watching YouTube (Kim and Park, 2025[124]).

In addition, Koreans are significantly less likely than respondents in other countries to mention “friends, community and other relationships” as giving them meaning in life (Pew Research Centre, 2021[125]). Looking at younger generations, “friends, community and other relationships” are mentioned by only 3% of those aged 18‑29 years in Korea (Figure 2.21). This compares to 18% in Singapore, 28% in Italy, 34% in New Zealand and 44% in the Netherlands. Indeed, in almost all countries with age decompositions, youth aged 18‑29 years rate friends as the source of meaning in life much more frequently than other age groups. Korea is the exception.

Figure 2.21. Young Koreans rarely see friends, community and other relationships as a source of meaning in life
Copy link to Figure 2.21. Young Koreans rarely see friends, community and other relationships as a source of meaning in life

Share (%) who mention “friends, community and other relationships” when describing what gives them meaning in life, by age, 2021

OECD research on social isolation in Japan – called hikikomori – emphasises that to address the issue requires a community-based, integrated approach (OECD, 2025[126]). Local governments, civil society groups, health and welfare agencies can collaboratively provide outreach, support and opportunities for (gradual) reintegration.

2.4.6. Both male and female factors contribute to infertility

Infertility and access to affordable infertility treatments can influence whether (and when) people are able to have children. WHO research suggests that about 1 in 6 people will experience infertility at some stage in their lives (WHO, 2023[127]; Bögl et al., 2024[128]). Estimates specific to Korea are similar, with 17% of women in legal and common-law marriages reporting experiences with infertility (Park, 2021[129]).

To overcome infertility, many people turn to assisted reproductive therapies (ART), and specifically in vitro fertilisation (IVF) (Schettini-Kearney and Levine, 2025[42]). This is especially true as women age, with older women often having a more difficult time conceiving (McClelland, 2020[130]; Geruso, LoPalo and Spears, 2023[131]). In the above‑mentioned Korean survey, for instance, 33% of married women aged over 35 years reported experiences with infertility (Park, 2021[129]). Indeed, “between 2018 and 2022, the number of fertility treatments carried out in the country rose nearly 50% to 200 000 (Chapter 4), and in 2024, one in six babies in Seoul were born with the help of fertility treatment” (Ewe and Lee, 2025[132]).

But what about men? Difficulty conceiving can be caused by male or female infertility, or both. Unlike female infertility, male infertility receives substantially less attention (Huang et al., 2023[133]). This is despite the fact that a male factor alone accounts for about 20% of infertility cases, and when including co‑existing male and female factors, male factors count in about 50% of all cases of infertility (Leslie, Soon-Sutton and Khan, 2024[134]).

According to the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) Global Burden of Disease (GBD) database, the prevalence of female infertility among OECD countries, on average, is estimated at 1 333 per 100 000 population, while male infertility is estimated at 995 per 100 000 population (Figure 2.22). In some countries – including in Korea – male infertility is estimated to be higher than female infertility (731 versus 437). IHME GBD estimates of the prevalence of infertility are based on a wide variety of data sources and a range of modelling assumptions, meaning that there is a margin of error behind these results. Nevertheless, these estimates highlight that when discussing infertility, both male and female infertility should be considered and assessed. Yet, male infertility continues to be underdiagnosed and undertreated. This is not only an issue for men’s health, but also for women’s health, since, historically, women have traditionally been blamed when a couple has been unable to conceive (Turner et al., 2020[135]). The advent of ART has not entirely shifted this perception, as women remain the primary subjects of intervention, even if infertility may stem from male factors or remain unexplained (Pandruvada et al., 2021[136]; Turner et al., 2020[135]).

Figure 2.22. Female and male infertility
Copy link to Figure 2.22. Female and male infertility

Prevalence of male and female infertility, rate per 100 000 population, 2021

At a very high level, estimates of infertility prevalence differ across countries due to a range of factors, including differences in demographics, lifestyles, dietary patterns, environmental exposures and access to healthcare. Discrepancies may also arise from differences in testing, diagnostic procedures, the use of ART and unequal access to medical resources (Liu et al., 2025[137]).

Regardless of the source of cross-country differences, increasing public investment in research around infertility, including both male and female infertility, could help couples experiencing fertility challenges by yielding better diagnostic and preventive tools. Maintaining or introducing public support for infertility treatments is another clear government action with potential dividends (Chapter 4) since recent research reveals a low private willingness to pay and a strong responsiveness to insurance coverage (Bögl et al., 2024[128]).

2.4.7. Physical and mental health as determinants of fertility (intentions)

Physical and mental health have received less attention than economic, social and cultural factors in explanations for recent declines in fertility, but a small (and growing) body of research suggests that physical and mental health may be essential determinants of fertility and fertility intentions.

In Australia, for example, poor self-rated health is associated with lower fertility expectations, and reductions (or improvements) in self-rated health correspond to a decrease (or increase) in fertility expectations (Lazzari and Beaujouan, 2025[138]). Other studies have also linked mental and physical health to fertility (Syse, Dommermuth and Hart, 2020[139]; Zhao et al., 2024[140]; Kailaheimo-Lönnqvist et al., 2025[141]; Mondal, 2024[142]; Kang, Kim and Koh, 2025[143]). Kang, Kim and Koh (2025[143]), for example, find that, in Korea, poor mental health after childbirth is negatively associated with the likelihood of having another child. Analysis of potential mechanisms suggests that this may be driven by time reallocation after the first birth, with mothers’ overall well-being worsening due to a substitution of time for self-care, leisure and paid work toward family care. Childcare expenses are identified as another potential channel, as they impose a significant liquidity constraint and financial burden on families that can contribute to declining mental health (Kang, Kim and Koh, 2025[143]).

Simple comparisons using self-perceived health suggest that self-perceived health is much lower in Korea than in the OECD, on average. Only 50% of women aged 15 years and over in Korea rate their health as good or very good, compared to 64% of women of the same age in the OECD, a gap of 14 p.p., on average (Figure 2.23). Gaps are similarly larger for Korean men. Such gaps may reflect genuine differences in underlying health, differences in perceptions despite similar actual health, or differences arising from measurement issues. Survey methodology, for example, has been shown to bias self-rated health downward in Korea compared with other countries (OECD, 2023[144]). But regardless of whether these differences are real, perceived or statistical, health appears to be closely linked to (intended) fertility and thus warrants careful monitoring, especially since improving access to healthcare represents a relatively straightforward policy lever that could help support higher fertility (intentions).

Figure 2.23. Koreans have low positive self-reported health relative to the OECD
Copy link to Figure 2.23. Koreans have low positive self-reported health relative to the OECD

Share (%) of population aged 15 years and over who perceive their health as good or very good, 2024

(Intended) fertility and self-perceived health may be linked for several reasons. Drawing on Lazzari and Beaujouan (2025[138]), these can be summarised as follows.

Direct effect: Health problems – whether physical or mental – can directly reduce the likelihood of becoming pregnant or carrying a pregnancy to term through several channels. For instance, certain physical health conditions – e.g. obesity, cancer, severe endometriosis, infection, sexually transmitted diseases – can lead to infertility. Mental illnesses, whether diagnosed or not, may create psychological distress and reduced motivation or energy, which may lead people to want fewer or no children. Indeed, for both men and women, psychotic disorders are most strongly associated with lifetime childlessness and with fewer children.
Indirect effect: Health problems may indirectly reduce fertility for a number of reasons. Many health problems (and associated treatments or medications) can, for example, lead to a reduced desire to have sex. Some medical treatments and medications are also incompatible with pregnancy, with significant or severe risks for foetal development. On top of this, poor mental and physical health are associated with lower labour force participation and lower earnings, which may contribute to greater feelings of economic and financial insecurity, which can discourage childbearing.

Going forward, governments may therefore wish to consider health and access to healthcare as potentially important axes for understanding (and responding to) declining fertility rates. But even beyond fertility, better understanding women’s health and women’s (unmet) healthcare needs through gender mainstreaming in healthcare is essential, since much evidence points to significant gender differences in diagnosis and treatment within the healthcare system and to a lack of health research on women and women’s health issues, including pre‑ and post-partum women (OECD, 2025[91]).

2.4.8. Climate change and beyond: Concern about climate change and geopolitical instability may (increasingly) influence fertility choices

A range of external pressures may shape fertility decisions which are not easily captured within more conventional categories. Climate change, for example, represents a powerful (albeit difficult to quantify) force that can affect how individuals and couples imagine their futures. Uncertainty around that future may (increasingly) feature as a factor in family formation decisions, discouraging people from having children (Dillarstone, Brown and Flores, 2023[145]). According to the OECD Risks that Matter Survey, 64% of respondents see concern about the environment and climate change as an important factor for young people considering having a (or another) child (Figure 2.24). In Korea, this share is 67%. Another survey among Korean respondents who want to have children finds similar results, with 8% citing concerns about climate change or environmental degradation as a reason for not achieving their intended fertility (Figure 2.12).

Figure 2.24. Two-thirds of respondents in Korea cite concern about climate change and environment as a factor affecting young people’s fertility decisions
Copy link to Figure 2.24. Two-thirds of respondents in Korea cite concern about climate change and environment as a factor affecting young people’s fertility decisions

Share (%) of respondents who believe concern about climate change and environment is a factor contributing to lower fertility, by country, 2024

Although not (yet) a large literature, similar results emerge in other research. In the United Kingdom, concerns about environment and climate change are associated with intentions to remain childless among older millennials aged 36‑41 years (Berrington, Kuang and Perelli-Harris, 2024[146]). In Thailand, Chaijaroen and Panda (2025[147]) showed that increased air pollution exposure leads to a statistically significant increase in information gathering (measured through Google search results), which is associated with a statistically significant 10% decline in births. Keivabu, Cozzani and Wilde (2023[148]) show that, in Spain, warm(er) temperatures are linked to a decrease in the total fertility rate, with each additional day above 30°C associated with a 1% decrease in the total fertility rate. In Korea, specifically, each additional hot day reduces the birth rate by about 92 children per month (Cho, 2019[149]). Other similar findings come out of Italy (Puglisi, Muttarak and Vignoli, 2025[150]), the United States (Barreca, Deschenes and Guldi, 2018[151]), Hungary (Hajdu and Hajdu, 2019[152]), Finland, Estonia and Sweden (Bastianelli, 2024[153]) and sub-Saharan Africa (Thiede et al., 2022[154]).

Collectively, this research suggests that rising temperatures and (concern about) climate change are (emerging) factors shaping fertility. Although perhaps less notable than housing, economic and financial security and work-life balance, environment and climate change concerns may become a more significant consideration as environmental degradation and climate change intensify. Other global issues increasing uncertainty, such as rising global tensions and conflict, could additionally increasingly influence fertility choices going forward (UNFPA, 2025[23]; OECD, 2024[2]). Indeed, in a recent survey, 13% of respondents in OECD countries cited concerns about the political or social situation (e.g. war, pandemic) as a reason for not achieving their desired fertility (Figure 2.12).

At a time when population ageing is already expected to strain labour markets, social protection systems, and long-term growth, such global uncertainties could reinforce or exacerbate these challenges. By better understanding fertility responses to such global uncertainties, governments could design more responsive policies that bolster resilience and safeguard social stability.

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← 1. Respondents were asked “To what degree are you worried about not being able to give one's children a good education.” Response options were “Very much,” “A great deal,” “Not much,” “Not at all,” and “Don’t know.” Estimates refer to the aggregate of “Very much” and “A great deal.” OECD average is an unweighted average of Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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