Fertility rates are declining globally but the fall has been dramatic in Korea: from a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 6 children per woman in 1960 to 0.72 in 2023. Since then, the TFR has increased to 0.8 children per woman in 2025, but this change does not imply a sustained reversal of the longer-term decline of the fertility rate.
Parenthood remains strongly associated with marriage in Korea, and not only are fewer people marrying but marriages are also happening later. The average age at first childbirth for women in Korea was 33.7 years in 2024 – compared to an OECD average of 31.1, and mothers often have only one child: in 2022, 57% of births in Korea were firstborns – the highest rate among OECD countries.
Many different and interacting factors, taken together, create barriers to parenthood or to having more children. In Korea, as in other OECD countries, concerns about job security, housing affordability, work-life balance issues, and the scope of public family supports play a role. More difficult-to-quantify cultural factors include shifting norms, different perceptions on gender issues among young people, priorities and expectations about work, parenting and lifestyles, and the perceived personal happiness derived from parenthood. These can also affect partnering and/or fertility trends.
The most commonly cited reason for not achieving intended fertility in Korea lies in “financial limitations”. In part these are related to the structure of the Korean labour market with its profound differences in pay and employment conditions among groups of workers. Only 12% of employees in Korea are high-wage regular workers (with open-ended contracts) in large companies while around one‑third of all employees are non-regular workers (often with fixed-term contracts) in SMEs, who earn around 40% of the high-wage regular workers’ earnings. The incidence of non-regular employment has increased over the past decade, and it is disproportionately concentrated among women and youth. Young people’s difficulties with establishing themselves in the labour market also complicate their entry into Seoul metropolitan’s housing market: four out of five Koreans in their 20s live in the parental home, which further contributes to later family formation.
Korean workers face considerable difficulties in balancing work and care commitments. The prevalence of very long working hours may have declined, but the use of flexible working-hour arrangements and/or teleworking is not widespread. In addition, many workers face long daily commutes. Entrenched gender norms and stereotypes imply that women should bear the brunt of unpaid housework and care work. This contributes to a maternal employment rate of 64% in Korea, well below the OECD average of 71%. Furthermore, as children grow up, “mother returners” generally struggle to find well-paid regular employment. Faced with such high opportunity costs, many young women delay marriage and childbirth, as many Korean women still have to choose between work and family life.
The diminishing share of quality regular jobs and the difficulties with transitioning from non-regular to regular employment mean that securing a stable job at labour market entry has become increasingly important. This contributes to intense educational competition among children and young people. From an early age, children spend long hours after their normal school day in a range of private institutes, called “hagwon”, with schooling by private tutors, parents and online learning at home, to prepare for tests and exams. Students prepare for the demanding College Scholastic Ability Test or “Suneung” which determines at which level and at what university candidates can pursue their studies.
In 2024 spending on education as a share of final household consumption amounted to over 5% in Korea, more than three times as high as the OECD average. These high outlays have had a downward effect on fertility trends, as many parents feel they cannot afford a second child.
There is a need for a “societal covenant” involving a multi-faceted approach with all stakeholders, e.g. policymakers, industry representatives, parents and students to make the system more child- and student-friendly and more sustainable. It should include widely accepted guidelines on teaching hours and fees and be supported by a broad package of policy measures including continued improvement of the public education system and vocational training and the expansion of out-of-school-hours services.
Addressing demographic change is a key family policy priority in Korea. Public spending on family benefits has increased from 0.1% of GDP in 1998 to 1.8% in 2023. This is slightly below the OECD average (2.3% of GDP), but Korea ranks 10th in the OECD when public spending on family benefits is measured on a per-child basis. Family policy supports include:
Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) supports ensure that about two‑thirds of children aged 0‑2 participate in ECEC, and policy aims to further improve its quality.
Financial supports for families continue to expand, as coverage of child allowances paid to all children under the age of 9 will be gradually extended to cover all children under 13 years of age by 2030.
Growing public spending on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) has contributed to its increased use, and by 2024, 15.1% of all newborns were born through ART.
In itself, the system of paid maternity, paternity and parental leave is generous and provides about 91 weeks of leave for mothers and about 82 weeks earmarked for fathers. However, coverage of earnings-related maternity and parental leave benefits should be expanded to more non-regular and self-employed workers.
The dynamics of population ageing are such that increased female labour force participation, longer working lives and increased productivity are needed to keep Korea’s economic engine going. Policy has become more family-friendly, but labour market institutions and workplace cultures have not changed at the same pace. Fathers should be encouraged to use their leave entitlements to care for children and policies should make it easier for “mother returners” to access quality regular employment opportunities. Greater gender equality is needed. If both men and women were able to improve their work-life balance, this would contribute to better economic outcomes and higher fertility rates.